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To Our Readers

The Neal A. Maxwell Institute for Religious Scholarship encourages and supports research on the Book of Mormon, the Book of
Abraham, the Bible, other ancient scripture, and related subjects. The
Maxwell Institute publishes and distributes titles in these areas for
the benefit of scholars and interested Latter-day Saint readers.
Primary research interests at the Maxwell Institute include the
history, language, literature, culture, geography, politics, and law rele
vant to ancient scripture. Although such subjects are of secondary importance when compared with the spiritual and eternal messages of
scripture, solid research and academic perspectives can supply certain
kinds of useful information, even if only tentatively, concerning many
significant and interesting questions about scripture.
The Maxwell Institute makes reports about this research available widely, promptly, and economically. These publications are peerreviewed to ensure that scholarly standards are met. The proceeds from
the sale of these materials are used to support further research and
publications.
The purpose of the FARMS Review is to help serious readers make
informed choices and judgments about books published on the Book
of Mormon and associated topics, as well as to publish substantial
freestanding essays on related matters. We hope, thereby, to encourage reliable scholarship with regard to such subjects.
Most reviews and articles are solicited or assigned. Any person interested in writing a specific article or review should send a proposal
to the editor. If the proposal is accepted, the Review style guidelines
will be sent with the acceptance.
The opinions expressed in these reviews and articles are those
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the opinions of the
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Maxwell Institute, its editors, Brigham Young University, the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, or the authors’ employers. No por
tion of the reviews or articles may be used in advertising or for any
other commercial purpose without the express written permission of
the Maxwell Institute.
The FARMS Review is published semiannually. See the Web site
at maxwellinstitute.byu.edu for reviews and articles appearing in the
FARMS Review.
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Editor’s Introduction

Concern for the Things of Eternity
George L. Mitton, associate editor

The Angel with the everlasting Gospel hath already flown
through the middle of the Earth; Happy be they who shall
receive it, nor despise this great treasure, by trampling it
under their feet. The Sun of Righteousness shall shine upon
them in his full light, and dispel these horrible Clouds without any prejudice unto them.
Christopher Kotter, 1 June 1621,
vision and prophecy of the end time1

O

f much concern to the Latter-day Saints is the attitude and reaction of people when presented with the Book of Mormon and
other revelations that God has called them to proclaim. Together with
the Holy Bible, these scriptures provide the written word of God in
these troubled times.
Recently I took the opportunity to read and ponder some claimed
revelations from Europe in the early 1600s. The passage quoted above
caught my attention since it alludes to the prophecy in Revelation 14:6
about an angel bringing the everlasting gospel to the earth in the last
1. Prophecies of Christopher Kotterus, Christiana Poniatovia, Nicholas Drabicius:
Three Famous German Prophets, trans. R. C. Gent, comp. Robert Codrington, 2nd ed.
(London: Printed for Robert Pawlet at the Sign of the Bible in Chancery-lane, near the
Inner-Temple Gate, 1664), 47, emphasis added. Hereafter cited as Prophecies. All quotations in the present essay preserve the original spelling, punctuation, capitalization, and
other stylings.
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days. It was given the visionary as he was shown scenes of the latter-day
judgments. Latter-day Saints have always considered that the Book of
Mormon helped fulfill that biblical vision in a marvelous way. Did the
vision and prophecy of 1621 foresee the Book of Mormon coming as a
warning before the destructions? At the least, it described in a terse and
striking way the circumstance we find regarding the Book of Mormon
today—received with great joy by some but strongly resisted or rejected
by others.
My reading of these seventeenth-century prophecies and the conditions in which they were given was very instructive as to how the
world reacts to prophecy. I found the revelations informative and very
moving at times, although sometimes obscure, extravagant, or disappointing when compared with the plain and lucid revelations received
through the Prophet Joseph Smith. I did feel great respect for those
who claimed to receive them, for their purposes and their efforts to
express the things their messages entailed. I also felt a keen appreciation for the persecution they suffered and the sacrifices they made in
trying to convey these messages during the very difficult times of the
Thirty Years’ War in Europe (1618–1648). The visions are very apocalyptic, a form often found during times of great persecution, stress, and
hardship. They assure the righteous that God has not forgotten them
and that in his time and way he will provide a judgment by which the
oppressors and evil powers will be overthrown and righteousness and
peace will prevail. These prophecies would have provided comfort to
those who embraced them. A short summary of the circumstances in
which they were put forth will set the stage for brief comments on the
attitude toward revelation today.
Comenius and the Desire for Immediate Revelation
Jan Amos Komenský (1592–1670) was a Bohemian Christian
leader of great significance and accomplishment.2 Better known as
2. See Daniel Murphy, Comenius: A Critical Reassessment of His Life and Work
(Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1995); and Matthew Spinka, John Amos Comenius: That
Incomparable Moravian (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967). A helpful commentary
is found in Frances A. Yates, The Rosicrucian Enlightenment (London: Routledge and
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Comenius, the latinized form of his name, he is a person of heroic
stature. Comenius believed in and published the revelations I discuss
here. Before the Thirty Years’ War, he was the last bishop of the Bohemian Brethren, a Protestant denomination known as the Unitas Fratrum (United Brethren). That church derived from the devoted followers of John Hus (1369–1415), a very important Christian martyr at
the beginning of the Reformation who was burned at the stake. Later,
Comenius and his people suffered great violence and were scattered
during the war. After a period of hiding when his life was in constant
danger, he was driven from his Czech homeland and suffered the death
of his wife and daughter and the loss of all his possessions, including
his remarkable library and manuscripts. Although he was forced to
remain in exile the rest of his life, he became famous, especially for his
work and influence in Poland, the Netherlands, and England.
Comenius was greatly influenced by his friend and mentor Johann Valentin Andreae (1586–1654), a German Lutheran pastor and
probably the prime leader in the early Rosicrucian movement. This
society taught through symbolism and allegory that “an illumination
of a religious . . . nature” was “about to be revealed to the world” and
would “bring about a general reformation.” There would be not only
religious reform, which was paramount, but a reform “both of divine
and human things.”3 The Rosicrucians anticipated a great advancement in all aspects of life. Indeed, the title of their primary publication
in 1614 began, “Universal and General Reformation of the whole wide
world.”4 Historian Frances Yates summarizes that “whilst involving
Kegan Paul, 1972), 156–70. I first encountered the revelatory complex being considered while reading this noted work of the late Dame Yates. Later informative discussions are Clare Goodrick-Clarke, “The Rosicrucian Afterglow: The Life and Influence of
Comenius,” in The Rosicrucian Enlightenment Revisited, ed. Ralph White (Hudson, NY:
Lindisfarne Books, 1999), 193–218; Craig D. Atwood, “Comenius as a Public Theologian,”
which includes a useful bibliography on Comenius and is available at http://divinity.wfu
.edu/pdf/comenius.pdf (accessed 9 September 2008).
3. Yates, Rosicrucian Enlightenment, 42–45, quotations on pp. 44, 45. For a summary of recent research on Rosicrucian origins, see Tobias Churton, The Golden Builders:
Alchemists, Rosicrucians and the First Freemasons (Boston: Weiser, 2005); and Donald
R. Dickson, The Tessera of Antilia: Utopian Brotherhoods & Secret Societies in the Early
Seventeenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 62–88.
4. Yates, Rosicrucian Enlightenment, 42.
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definite reforms in education, church, and law, this general reformation has millenarian overtones; it will bring the world back to the state
in which Adam found it . . . [and will] presage ‘a great influx of truth
and light’ such as surrounded Adam in Paradise, and which God will
allow before the end of the world.”5 The Rosicrucian movement was an
aspect of the late Renaissance, that marvelous and mysterious period
that did so much to help prepare the world for what the Latter-day
Saints see as the last days—for conditions that would allow the restoration and teaching of the everlasting gospel. It may be that we should
consider the possibility that the Renaissance period was not only a
preparation for but also a prefiguration and witness of what was to
come, perhaps even a kind of grand allegory not told as a story or parable but actually acted out in history.
Comenius was a devout and admirable Christian. He did much
to foster interest in Christianity and to help and comfort his scattered
flock. Deeply concerned about the development of Christian unity,
he traveled widely in Europe and became justly famous for his work
and publications. His numerous books had religious overtones when
treating many topics and frequently employed scriptural references
and allusions. His interest in a general reformation motivated him to
recommend improvements in many subject areas.6 He was not only a
theologian and bishop but also a cartographer, hymn writer, novelist,
lexicographer, politician, and social reformer.7 He became known as
“Teacher of Nations” and is best known for his extensive writings and
work on educational reform, generally being considered the father of
modern educational methods and of the concept of free and universal
education looking toward universal literacy.8 When he visited England in 1641–1642, he was influential in assisting in the development
of the Encyclopedia and of the Royal Society, so important in the pro5. Yates, Rosicrucian Enlightenment, 57.
6. John Amos Comenius, Panorthosia or Universal Reform: Chapters 1–18 and 27,
trans. A. M. O. Dobbie (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995).
7. Atwood, “Comenius,” 1.
8. Will S. Monroe, Comenius and the Beginnings of Educational Reform (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1900); John Edward Sadler, J. A. Comenius and the Concept of
Universal Education (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966).
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gression of modern science.9 John Winthrop apparently offered him
the presidency of Harvard College, but Comenius declined.10 It has
even been claimed that his writings were used in the determination
of some of the philosophy and symbolism in Freemasonry,11 a movement so influential in the establishment of free government.
Clearly, it was his Christian convictions and anticipations that
motivated and colored all that Comenius did. Soon after being forced
from his homeland, he wrote a marvelous book, The Labyrinth of the
World and the Paradise of the Heart,12 which expressed his outlook,
desires, and expectations. While not as well known in the West as it
should be, it is his most popular work and is considered by many to be
one of the world’s great books. Latter-day Saints should find it stimulating, amusing at times, insightful, and inspiring in many passages.
In his dedication of the book, Comenius explained:
The first part depicts the ludicrous and senseless scenes of the
world: how despite the exertions of all its powers the world
accomplishes nothing; and how everything finally ends miserably either in laughter or in sorrow. The second part describes in a measure, either allegorically or objectively, the
true and assured happiness of the sons of God: how truly they
are blessed who, leaving behind the world and all mundane
things, adhere and firmly cleave to God alone.13
In “using the traditional theme of a pilgrimage through the WorldCity, Labyrinth distinguishes itself from numerous similar allegories
9. Robert Fitzgibbon Young, Comenius in England (London: Oxford University
Press, 1932); G. H. Turnbull, Hartlib, Dury and Comenius (London: Hodder & Stoughton,
1947). The encyclopedia referred to was later named the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
10. Cotton Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana (New Haven: S. Andrus, 1820), II,
iv, 10, as cited by Spinka, Comenius, 85.
11. For example, Josef S. Roucek, “Jan Amos Komenský: The Spiritual Founder of
[the] Modern Masonic Mouvement,” Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 15/4
(1963): 371–76.
12. John Amos Comenius, The Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the Heart,
trans. Matthew Spinka (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1972). First published in
1623.
13. Comenius, Labyrinth, xi.
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in world . . . and Czech literature by its artistic qualities and its elaborate style . . . [and it] has outlived many now forgotten compositions of
similar theme and genre.”14 It is important to observe that this was a
time when many thinkers and writers tried to envision an ideal, or utopian, community, and Labyrinth was influenced by that genre. Comenius was affected by utopian writings such as Thomas More’s Utopia,
Francis Bacon’s The New Atlantis, and Thomas Camponella’s The City
of the Sun. He was particularly stimulated by a utopian writing of his
friend Andreae entitled Christianopolis.15 A significant aspect often
found in these utopian writings is the concept that the ideal Christian community will have intense angelic guidance. This is notable in
Christianopolis, but even more so in the Labyrinth of Comenius.
For my present purpose, it is important to note that Andreae’s
Christianopolis clearly states that the underlying principle in envisioning the ideal Christian city-state is that everything is treated “as
a prelude which imitates eternal life” and that “the best arrangement
for a community is this, that it approximate as closely as possible to
heaven.”16 Accordingly, Christianopolis is governed under the leadership of three men “modelled on the Trinity.”17 A temple is at the very
center of the city, and it is a place where sacred plays are performed.18
Religious music is of great importance, for the choir sings “in imitation
of the angelic choir, to whose songs of joy God Himself bears witness.
And since they place the greatest emphasis on the service, protection,
warnings and teachings of the angels and take steps to have the angels
as near them as possible, it is their hope . . . that the choir of angels will
join in with their singing.”19
14. Lubomír Doležel, Narrative Modes in Czech Literature (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1972), 57.
15. J. V. Andreae, Christianopolis, intro. and trans. Edward H. Thompson (Dordrecht,
The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, 1999). This work was first published in 1619. On its
influence on Labyrinth, see Murphy, Comenius, 13, 76. For other influences, see Dickson,
Utopian Brotherhoods, 160–61.
16. Andreae, Christianopolis, 196.
17. Andreae, Christianopolis, 96.
18. Andreae, Christianopolis, 61, 65, 257–58.
19. Andreae, Christianopolis, 235.
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Comenius followed the same principle in describing the utopian
aspects of Labyrinth. From his comments, I infer that the underlying
concept was based on a wonderfully expansive interpretation of part
of the Lord’s Prayer: “Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done in earth, as
it is in heaven” (Matthew 6:10).20 A responsible Christian community
will strive to follow the order of heaven so far as it has been revealed
and in anticipation of the kingdom. It was this anticipation that motivated Comenius to seek to do many things that he felt would bring
about improvement in the world, and he was remarkably successful
in his contribution. In Labyrinth he discusses perceptively many aspects of Christian life and how improvement can be made. He depicts
a Christian life and community where prayer is fundamental and the
gifts of the Spirit are richly enjoyed. God is a constant source of comfort. The angels surround and protect, guide and instruct:
I have likewise observed . . . another benefit derived from this
invisible holy company: namely; that they not only have angels as guardians, but also as teachers of the elect, to whom
they often transmit secret hints and whom they teach the
deep hidden mysteries of God. For since they ever look upon
the face of the omniscient God, none of those things which a
pious man desires to know can remain hidden from them. . . .
From this source come the increase of the gifts of God within
us. . . . Oh, the blessed school of the sons of God!21
Comenius held that not only do the angels protect the faithful, but
they are also blessed with miracles and “God’s own august presence.”22
He even describes a visit of the Savior in such a striking, vivid, and
moving way as to make one wonder whether the account reflects his
own actual experience—or that of a friend.23 It reminded me of Joseph
Smith’s vision and description of the Lord of Glory and illustrates
the intense faith of Comenius in the reality of divine revelation. His
20. Spinka, Comenius, 84.
21. Comenius, Labyrinth, 123.
22. Comenius, Labyrinth, 124.
23. Comenius, Labyrinth, 104–5. That the passage has an affinity to one from Andreae
is noted at 145.
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expectations were great. Since the Protestant Reformation had already
occurred, what more was he seeking? He yet anticipates a time of great
illumination and fulfillment when the “result of that light which is
promised is the conversion of all peoples to the Church, so that Jehovah shall be King over all the earth” and, as promised, “the Gospel of
the kingdom shall be preached in the whole circle of the world, for a
witness to all the peoples, before the end shall come.”24
The Revelations of Lux in Tenebris
In his travels, Comenius met many visionary persons, apparently
showing that revelatory experiences were significant in that day.25
Clearly he took an interest in such claims that purported to give guidance on the future. Some of his friends persuaded him to compile a
book on the subject. This he did, and he published it in 1657 under
the title Lux in Tenebris (“Light in Darkness”).26 It was a title bearing rich allusions, such as to God’s separation of light and darkness
in the creation or to a New Testament theme: “the dayspring from
on high hath visited us, to give light to them that sit in darkness and
in the shadow of death, to guide our feet into the way of peace (Luke
1:78–79). The title derives from the Latin Vulgate version of John 1:5,
which in our more familiar English version reads, speaking of Christ:
“And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended
it not.” The book contained some commentary by Comenius and his
Latin translation of revelations claimed by three persons he knew. For
this preliminary review, I have relied on the selections and English
translation of the Latin published in 1664 by Puritan writer and translator Robert Codrington (d. 1665), hereafter cited as Prophecies.27
The three prophetic figures quoted by Comenius are Christopher
Kotter, a Lutheran; Christina Poniatowska; and Nicholas Drabík—
24. Comenius, The Way of Light, 198, as cited by Spinka, Comenius, 83.
25. Murphy, Comenius, 14.
26. Comenius, Lux in Tenebris (Amsterdam, 1657). An enlarged edition entitled Lux e
Tenebris was published in 1663 and 1665. I am citing these rare books from Spinka,
Comenius, 139, 161. Most copies were destroyed, having been consigned to the flames.
27. See n. 1 above.
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scattered members of the United Brethren church. All of them experienced great hardship as a result of the Thirty Years’ War between Catholic and Protestant factions. Kotter, a tanner from Silesia who proclaimed
his prophecies unto many, was thrown into prison and later exiled to
Saxony. Poniatowska was a young refugee orphan from Bohemia whom
Comenius cared for in his own family. She married a priest and tutor
of royalty and died at age 34. Drabík, a Moravian who was appointed to
the ministry in 1616 at the same time and place as Comenius, was exiled
and became a cloth merchant. He claimed many revelations and was
a martyr and witness of great cruelty when religious freedom did not
exist. He was beheaded in 1671 for his effrontery.28 Comenius had great
respect for these people.
Approached from the viewpoint of Latter-day Saints today, these
revelations appear to be of mixed quality. I find some rewarding aspects both moving and faith promoting, while other things are problematic, even raising the question of failed prophecy. These interesting writings need to be approached with caution like all noncanonical
writings that claim inspiration. What the Lord said in relation to the
Apocrypha is instructive here: “There are many things contained
therein that are true, . . . [and] there are many things . . . that are not
true. . . . Therefore, whoso readeth it, let him understand, for the Spirit
manifesteth truth” (Doctrine and Covenants 91:1–4). Even the Book of
Mormon allows the possibility of human error within inspired scripture: “Whoso receiveth this record, and shall not condemn it because
of the imperfections which are in it, the same shall know of greater
things than these” (Mormon 8:12). This is a most remarkable comment and promise. These revelations collected by Comenius afford an
instructive opportunity to gain experience in confronting this problem. I will first outline what I see as the more positive aspects of them,
and then I will comment on some rather difficult passages.
28. On the lives of these people, see Prophecies, 20–27, 56–61, 91–95; Wilhelmus Rood,
Comenius and the Low Countries (Amsterdam: Van Gendt, 1970), 30, 35, 44, 52, 100–101,
108, 169–74, 177–79, 237–38; Murphy, Comenius, 14, 41–42; and Sadler, Comenius and
Universal Education, 16–17, 306–7, 309.
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A Witness of Eternal Things
Today our view of what is most important in these writings likely
differs from that of people in Comenius’s day, preoccupied as they
were with wartime trauma and a great concern for what was to come.
The most striking and important thing we may see in these writings
is their witness of the ministry of angels, the nature of Deity, and the
reality of the heavenly realm. Since that time, in addition to biblical accounts, a remarkable number of sacred writings from the past
have been recovered, offering useful comparisons with the prophecies
collected by Comenius. The discovery of an ancient Book of Enoch
a century after Comenius was an important milestone in understanding Enoch’s heavenly vision, or “ascent,” and that of other visionaries. That book begins with this summary passage: “Enoch a righteous
man, whose eyes were opened by God, saw the vision of the Holy One
in the heavens, which the angels showed me, and from them I heard
everything, and from them I understood as I saw.”29 The strong involvement of the angels as instructors or heavenly guides is a conspicuous motif among ancient visionary accounts.30
Angelic guidance is also prominent in the visions preserved by
Comenius. Frances Yates thought it extraordinary that “Kotter’s visions were brought to him by angels, so he believed, who would suddenly become visible to him, show him a vision, and return to invisibility. In the illustrations, the angels are shown as young men,
without wings, in long robes.”31 Latter-day Saints will appreciate that
detail, as they will Kotter’s report that an angel appeared again and
“repeated the same words” along with additional instruction.32 The
angel would allay his fears: “giving his right hand to [Kotter], he admonished him to put off all Fear, for no evill should come unto him.”33
When Kotter was introduced to another angel in the vision, the angel
29. 1 Enoch 1:2, in R. H. Charles, The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old
Testament (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 2:188.
30. Christopher Rowland, The Open Heaven: A Study of Apocalyptic in Judaism and
Early Christianity (London: SPCK, 1982), 200.
31. Yates, Rosicrucian Enlightenment, 159. Compare Prophecies, 59.
32. Prophecies, 28, 41.
33. Prophecies, 29.
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said: “Give me the fellowship of thy Right Hand.”34 The same motif appears in Poniatowska’s visions where the heavenly figure “came
unto me in a long white rayment, and giving me his right hand, said
unto me, My strength and my victory be to thy eternal comfort, and
to the eternal ruin and destruction of those who vainly trust in their
own greatness.”35 The judgment motif is often present, but the revelations give a warm feeling of close association offered from the heavenly world to mankind. This brought to mind the Lord’s direction and
promise through Joseph Smith: “Be thou humble; and the Lord thy
God shall lead thee by the hand, and give thee answer to thy prayers”
(D&C 112:10).
The concept of God in these visions is strongly anthropomorphic.
Poniatowska refers to the heavenly figure teaching and assisting her as
“the Antient of dayes” or “Ancient of Times” and as an elderly looking
man.36 This may be a restrained allusion to Deity or to one very near
to God who is personally serving as guide.37 This guide introduces
Poniatowska to the vision of God on his throne, surrounded by the
angels, so characteristic of other apocalyptic accounts. It is not unlike
the prophet Lehi’s vision in the opening chapter of the Book of Mormon. The description reads:
Lifting up my eyes I beheld the Heaven to open, and the old
man looking down upon me, and saying to me, Come up to
me: but I answering, Lord, I cannot, He replied, Give me your
hands. I therefore held out both of my hands unto him, and
he drew me up from the hill into Heaven, and said unto me,
Pray thus, O Lord prepare my heart, and all my senses to understand thy wonderful works.
This prayer being ended I beheld a great company, and
a large plain in which they stood, so full of light that I could
hardly behold it for the glory of it. I demanded therefore of
34. Prophecies, 39.
35. Prophecies, 73.
36. Prophecies, esp. 59, 77. See also 62–64, 67–78, 82, 86–87.
37. Compare usage in the book of Daniel and the concept of “the angel of his presence” in Abraham 1:15.
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the old man, what spacious and shining place it was: He answered, It is the throne and the Majesty of the living God,
attend diligently and behold.38
The “opening of the heavens” is an important biblical concept, and
such visions are found in Isaiah, Ezekiel, and the Apocalypse. A key
New Testament passage appears where the Lord promises Nathaniel
that “hereafter ye shall see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man” (John 1:51). Joseph Smith
referred to such revelations as “the visions of eternity” or “the visions
of heaven” as they were experienced in the church.39
In Poniatowska’s account, the visionary was given to understand
many things about the divine order: how the angels praise the Lord for
his goodness, mercy, and cosmic power over both heaven and earth;
and how angels go between heaven and earth with swiftness (as on
wings or flying), reporting to God and pleading before him for the
benefit of those oppressed who thus are not being forgotten. The coming judgments of God are represented in several circumstances, often
with quite some complexity and in symbolic ways. Assurances are
given that God’s judgment will certainly provide rewards and punishments and will put all things in order. In a striking resurrectional figure, the “Church of Christ” is likened to one “alone in a corner like a
dead Body,” but the Lord will yet come in mercy and bring the church
“forth into the light, and my countenance shall shine upon [it] bright
as the Sun,” while the church will be known as “the City of Righteousness, and my faithful Sion.”40
Apocalyptic Visions and the Question of Failed Prophecy
These visions invite brief consideration of the question of failed
prophecy. They give promise of divine intervention and judgment in
cases of hardship and claim that certain kings or powers will be deposed or others will be instated. Some of these prophecies seem to
38. Prophecies, 62–63.
39. History of the Church, 1:83.
40. Prophecies, 79, 80, 81.
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have created false hopes since it does not appear that the events they
foresaw came to pass at the time. I do not doubt the possibility of
false prophecy, human error, or even the deceptions of the evil power.
However, the question should be considered whether true prophecies
may not always be intended as literal, but perhaps may be given as
examples of contingent actions, or the type of things that will result
if repentance does not follow stern warning. From God’s eternal perspective, and when there may be many aspects of a thing that we don’t
even know about, does it really matter when a correction or judgment
is carried out, as long as “all’s well that ends well”? Could stark things
be shown in vision to emphasize the gravity of a thing and the type
of result that will eventually follow if wrong choices are made? Kotter quoted an angel as saying that “God pronounceth his judgement
against a Nation or Kingdom which he intends to destroy and break in
pieces: but if that Nation or Kingdom shall truly repent them of their
evil ways, God will repent himself of the evil which he intended to
bring upon them.”41 God is merciful, patient, and desirous of repentance wherever possible and allows mankind agency in all things.
In one of the revelations, the visionary is told that “this day the
judgements of the Lord shall be shown unto you, and his power by
which he will cast down the proud from their thrones, and exalt the
humble in their places.”42 Can and will God carry out this great reversal? It is the power that is being made evident here, as in the grand scene
of the heavenly court, providing the assurance that it can and will be
done in the Lord’s due time. To make evident that power and establish
confidence in it is an important purpose of the revelation. Thus, at the
end of the marvelous throne vision one of the angels exclaims:
Rejoyce you righteous in the strength of this mighty King, for
now in a short time he will arise to help you; he will multiply
the gladness of your hearts with the greatness of his power, he
will comfort you, and fill your hearts with abundant joy. Use
41. Prophecies, 53.
42. Prophecies, 82.
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but a little patience, and be assured that Iehovah the God of
Hosts will perform it.43
From the life of Comenius comes a helpful example. In 1619 he was
present at the Prague cathedral for the coronation of Frederick V as king
of Bohemia. That ceremony “was the last official act of the church to
which he belonged before its suppression.”44 Comenius and the church
anticipated great things from the reign of Frederick and even “expected
a world reformation from his rule . . . [and] were attempting reforms in
society and in education under his auspices.”45 Their disappointment
was great when he was soon overthrown in the war and forced to flee to
The Hague in the Netherlands. He lived there in exile the rest of his life.
In the prophecies of Kotter, it appeared that Frederick would be restored
to his kingship, although that did not come about. Yates has translated
a passage from Kotter to illustrate this:
Frederick, . . . King of Bohemia, crowned by God, the supreme
King of all Kings, who in the year 1620 fell into danger, but . . .
will again recover all and far greater riches and glory.46
Placing great confidence in this prophecy, Comenius took an illustrated manuscript of Kotter’s revelations to show the exiled king at
the Hague:
He presented him with a precious copy of the prophecies, in
which was given the prospect of a return to Prague. When
Frederick V saw the volume in folio size, he was amazed that
there were so many of such predictions. He opened the beautifully written work and saw that it was illustrated with appropriate pictures. In one of these pictures he saw a man who
stood out clearly in the midst of an army, whilst being presented with a golden book.47
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Prophecies, 66–67.
Yates, Rosicrucian Enlightenment, 158.
Yates, Rosicrucian Enlightenment, 160.
Yates, Rosicrucian Enlightenment, 159; from Lux in Tenebris, 42–43.
Rood, Comenius and the Low Countries, 29.
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The king wondered what it all meant. Comenius then explained that
there would come to pass the preaching of the gospel to the unbelieving nations and the liberation of the church from its persecutors.48
What should we think of this prophecy? Could it not be viewed from
an eternal perspective to see Frederick receive a glorious crown as
promised the faithful in the resurrection, one of eternal duration,
power, and influence and far more important and glorious than any
earthly diadem? As for preaching the gospel to all nations, four centuries have gone by, but we still have reason to believe it will come
about with the assistance of a “golden book.” We need to enlarge our
view and to strive to see prophecy and all things from God’s eternal
perspective.
Apparently Comenius had such a perspective. He published these
prophecies some years after the premature death of Frederick, when it
was known he would not recover his kingship. He felt the revelations
still had great value. When he visited England in 1641–1642 at the invitation of members of Parliament,49 he tried to create interest in Lux
in Tenebris and provided prominent persons with copies, despite the
opposition of some.50 Yates has noted how that visit demonstrated “the
great importance which Comenius attached” to the book.51 After the
deaths of Kotter and Poniatowska, he placed reliance on the prophecies still being given by Drabík, but these caused him much disappointment and criticism when it became evident the throne would not
be restored at Prague. Drabík’s revelations were problematic, and his
life became unstable. He was subjected to great stress and hardship,
culminating in his execution. Nevertheless, Comenius appears to
have kept his confidence in the revelations of Lux in Tenebris. Where
they lacked fulfillment,
he regarded prophecy as being dependent upon man’s response to God’s will and therefore believed that particular
events must be interpreted in the light of the ultimate purpose
48.
49.
50.
51.

Rood, Comenius and the Low Countries, 29–30.
Young, Comenius in England, 11, 52.
Turnbull, Hartlib, Dury and Comenius, 377–81.
Yates, Rosicrucian Enlightenment, 158 n. 3.
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of God to establish his rule on earth. It was necessary to distinguish between things fundamental, instrumental and
accidental.52
What appears most significant is that since Comenius was working earnestly with others to plan for an ideal kingdom upon the return
of Frederick, when that hope was thwarted it caused him to turn his
energies to seek reform and improvement on a worldwide basis. This
resulted in a greater, lasting influence and a contribution that helped
prepare the world for the glory of the latter days. One of his biographers has concluded:
In his literary work he left to his nation and to the whole world
a great legacy; whilst preserving his national individuality, he
kept in mind mankind as a whole; through the ennobling and
improvement of his own nation he endeavoured to further the
interests of the whole world. Under the most unfavourable
conditions he always thought of the good of others. Christian humanity spoke from every one of his actions. A true
patriot and son of his Church, he was free from all national
or religious prejudice. Owing to the loftiness of his aims and
the greatness of his personality he held the attention of the
eminent men of all nations.53
On the Reaction to Revelation or Prophecy
I have dwelt upon the experience of some Christians of the seventeenth century because I feel they should be better known and their
struggles and contributions appreciated. Living as I do now in a day of
fulfillment, their revelations have stimulated my faith but also made
me grateful for the plainness of the scriptures received for our dispensation through the Prophet Joseph Smith. They also help me to
consider that God has provided a witness in many times and places
or, as the title page of the Book of Mormon says of Christ, that he is
52. Sadler, Comenius and Universal Education, 310.
53. Jan Jakubec, Johannes Amos Comenius (New York: Arno Press, 1971), 59.
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“manifesting himself unto all nations.”54 Christ is the all-important
message, not only of the Bible, but of the more immediate revelations
espoused by Comenius. Kotter reported that the angel impressively
said to him:
Do thou adhere to this thy Lord and Saviour: first, as thy
Advocate, Intercessour, and Patron to his Father; who best
knoweth thy own necessities, and can send thee a deliverance
from them. Secondly, Adhere unto him as thy Saviour and
Redeemer, unto whom all the Prophets, and the Scriptures
lead thee, and to no other. Trust thou in God, and rejoyce, in
his goodness, so shalt thou overcome all temptations, especially, if thou wilt apply thy selfe unto prayer, and the hearing
of the Word of God.55
Comenius and the visionaries found there was much opposition
to their testimony. He often tried to share the revelations, but many
found a reason to reject them. They thought he was foolish or for other
reasons would turn them aside, even when they greatly respected him
in other matters. They failed to see that the heavenly things from the
Bible and the further revelations provided his zeal and enthusiasm
and gave him his expansive, reforming view. The visionary persons
found much opposition and persecution. Kotter related that the angel
directed him to witness to public officials, but when he did they feared
he was mad or dishonest, warned him against his efforts, and refused
to give him credence.
Latter-day Saints have also found that many do not want to hear
of revelation or consider it in any way. Others like to find fault and
sometimes go to extravagant lengths to find what they think is a basis
to reject it. They trample it under their feet. Orson Pratt, who directed
much of the church’s early missionary work, held that
the conduct of millions in relation to the Book of Mormon
goes to show that they would reject all true revelation as well
54. See the discussion of revelation in the medieval period in Carol Zaleski, Other
world Journeys (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 45–60, 206–9.
55. Prophecies, 44.
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as false ones: they are determined to reject, at all hazards,
without the least inquiry, every thing under the name of new
revelation. They seem to be absolutely certain, as their conduct
abundantly indicates, that God will never favor man with another communication of his will concerning them.56
In rejecting revelation, people are denying themselves much joy.
We can only hope and pray that more people will begin to lift their
eyes to heaven for inspiration and guidance. Kotter quoted the angel as saying “it hath been alwayes the custom of the wicked world
to despise heavenly things and to esteem things that are earthy to be
heavenly.”57 It is the “light in darkness” theme again. The Lord said to
Joseph Smith: “A light shall break forth among them that sit in darkness, and it shall be the fulness of my gospel; but they receive it not, for
they perceive not the light, and they turn their hearts from me because
of the precepts of men” (D&C 45:28–29).
In closing this discussion of these portentous eternal things, I am
reminded of an apt comment of the late Hugh Nibley. While considering Egyptian texts and their deep concern with preparation for the
afterlife, he was moved to say: “Granted its mind-expanding scope,
is the Egyptian experience at all relevant to the modern world? The
answer is no; and neither is Mormonism relevant to the distracted
modern world, which has no concern with the things of the eternities
and will soon be forgotten.”58
In This Number of the FARMS Review
We have an interesting variety of articles in this number of the
Review, many of which will help keep our minds focused on eternal
things. We particularly commend the thoughtful essay by Richard
Williams on the glories of the gospel restoration and its correction of
errors together with its great enhancement of faith and understanding.
56. Orson Pratt, “Divine Authenticity of the Book of Mormon,” no. 1, p. 2, in A Series
of Pamphlets, by Orson Pratt (Liverpool: R. James, 1851).
57. Prophecies, 51.
58. Hugh Nibley, The Message of the Joseph Smith Papyri: An Egyptian Endowment,
2nd ed. (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book and FARMS, 2005), 31.
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Those who enjoy a philosophical discussion will appreciate James
Faulconer’s essay on modernism and postmodernism, viewed from a
gospel perspective.
On matters of doctrine, we note with great interest the growing
number of studies among students of the Bible and Christian history
that are concerned with the doctrine of deification, or the concept that
mankind has the possibility to attain to godhood. Recent numbers of
the Review have carried discussions of new studies on this subject or
noted their publication. This development is of special interest to Latter-day Saints, who have been ridiculed as attempting to be “Godmakers” and whose sacred doctrines have been treated with disdain. Tom
Rosson reviews a new book by Daniel Keating, written from a Catholic
viewpoint, that again reflects the position that the idea of deification
was an important aspect of the Christian faith. James Farmer provides
a review of a helpful new book by Frank Salisbury on the concept of
divine design, a topic of current interest regarding the creation. Sandra Thorne reviews a book by Kim Clark on divine protection.
Several essays touch on important concerns about the scriptures.
Terryl Givens offers a meaningful essay on the origin of the Book of
Mormon and the manner of its origin as witnessing profound doctrinal and ecclesiastical truths. The Book of Abraham continues to
demand attention, and Egyptologist John Gee discusses the status of
research with the Joseph Smith Papyri and addresses questions of interest pertaining to these remarkable documents that are somehow
related to Joseph Smith’s production of the Book of Abraham. Brant
Gardner considers Diane Wirth’s new book on Book of Mormon geography, and Don Brugger samples a new “timechart” of Mormonism
and the scriptures.
Mormon culture and history meet us in Larry Morris’s review of
Frederick Babbel’s inspiring account of his mission with Elder Ezra
Taft Benson to bring assistance to the Saints in Europe at the end of
World War II. Long out of print, this book is now available as a reprint. Oxford University Press has recently published an insightful
history of Mormon culture by Terryl Givens that is reviewed here by
Cherry Silver.
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Our detractors are still at work. We offer two responses. One concerns a recent book by the atheist writer Sam Harris that has attracted
much attention. It is reviewed by Gregory Smith. Hank Hanegraaff, a perennial source of disparagement, has produced a book in the tradition of
Walter Martin. Ara Norwood has written an “open letter” in response.
In addition to the above, we present a number of brief Book Notes,
calling attention to other works that may be of interest to Latter-day
Saints.
Editor’s Picks
As customary, we offer our selection of books of particular interest, according to the following ratings:
****	Outstanding, a seminal work of the kind that appears
only rarely
***
Enthusiastically recommended
**
Warmly recommended
*
Recommended
The recommendations:
***	Terryl L. Givens, People of Paradox: A History of Mormon
Culture
***	Frederick Babbel, On Wings of Faith: My Daily Walk with
a Prophet
**
Daniel A. Keating, Deification and Grace
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Toward the Ultimate
Book of Mormon Time Line
Don L. Brugger

Review of Christopher Kimball Bigelow. The Timechart History of Mormonism: From
Premortality to the Present, ed. Jana Riess. Herfordshire, UK: Worth Press, 2006. $17.99.
31 pp. (timechart), 31 pp. (booklet).

M

ore than a mere time line, this eye-catching digest of scriptural
history and Mormon cultural trivia features a large-format,
concertina-style “timechart” supplemented with an attached booklet,
both richly illustrated with superior artwork and historical photographs. Unfolding to an impressive eleven feet, the timechart traces
events in the Bible, the Book of Mormon, and Latter-day Saint church
history alongside an external chronology in one grand panoramic
sweep from 4000 bc to ad 2005.1 The reverse side is packed with maps
and other visual aids, a glossary, and substantive sidebars on beliefs,
ordinances, temples, prophets, historical sites, and notable theo
logians, writers, and historians. A near-perfect counterweight to the
timechart is the booklet Highlights of Mormon History and Culture,
offering a potpourri of historical and scriptural overviews, time lines,
1. The book’s subtitle extends that range back into premortality since the timechart
notes the grand council in heaven, but the chronology itself begins at 4000 bc, which
seems to follow the calculations of the Irish Protestant bishop James Ussher (1581–1656),
who believed that the creation of the earth took place on October 23, 4004 bc. This has
been the accepted date of creation partly because it appeared in annotated editions of the
King James translation of the Bible. The Church of Jesus Christ does not, of course, take
a position on chronological issues such as the date of creation.
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who’s who listings, membership data, distinctive Mormon beliefs, offshoot groups, Mormon Web sites, and books for further reading.2
As a whole, the book reflects the marvel of modern document
design and printing technology—so much data tidily compressed and
arranged and illustrated. The pictorial approach is striking and effective,
making for delightful browsing while not crowding or overpowering
the text. Worth Press, a British publisher specializing in timecharts, is
to be commended for a tasteful job of making the factoids and raw data
visually appealing. The use of color and ghosted images is restrained
enough so that the text can be read without difficulty.3 And Timechart’s
overall attractiveness makes it something of an objet d’art itself.
Author Christopher Bigelow and editor Jana Riess have teamed up
before. Their coauthored Mormonism for Dummies4 has garnered high
marks for coverage, accuracy, and readability despite the challenges of
satisfying curious outsiders and knowledgeable insiders alike and capturing the attention of serious-minded reviewers when the frivolous
title and popular appeal of this flourishing cult-genre do not exactly
inspire confidence in quality. One simply cannot judge this surprisingly informative book by its cover; nothing else is quite like this
one-stop primer on all things Mormon for casual readers. Fastidious
insiders may squirm or bristle at the occasional patches of irreverent humor and dalliance with controversial and delicate subjects, yet
they too would likely admit that, for the most part, Mormonism for
Dummies is well informed and even engaging.
As a quick-reference tool designed for “teachers, students, history
buffs, and readers of all ages and faiths,”5 Timechart likewise assem2. It is puzzling that the suggested reading list includes a few books by prominent
detractors of Mormonism when Timechart otherwise presents an altogether positive
image of the faith. Because the FARMS Review often includes scholarly essays that refute
the work of such critics, it is unfortunate that the sidebar “Mormon Periodicals” (p. 31
of the booklet) omits the Review from the list while including two periodicals of mixed
reputation.
3. One exception is the map “Modern-Day Membership and Temples” (pp. 26–27 of
the booklet), which employs hard-to-see black type on a dark blue background.
4. Jana Riess and Christopher Kimball Bigelow, Mormonism for Dummies (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2005).
5. http://www.worthpress.co.uk (accessed April 2008).
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bles a variety of information calculated to appeal to motivated readers. As one would expect, its approach is factual and concise, with
nothing of the humor, whimsy, and informal character of its cousin,
Mormonism for Dummies. Overall, Timechart does a respectable job
of distilling fundamentals of Latter-day Saint history, scripture, belief,
and culture in a fair-minded and accurate manner.
This is not to say that Timechart does not have its flaws, most of
them quite minor—virtually any publication of length has its share,
especially design-intensive projects like this one where text is manipulated for fit in the design shop. Because Timechart presents aspects of
their faith, beliefs, and culture to the wider community, Latter-day
Saints may feel something of a proprietary interest in expecting any
oversights to be rectified in a future printing or edition. In that spirit
I exercise a reviewer’s prerogative to point out a few lapses, trusting
that the publisher will make good on its commitment to consider all
comments and corrections for future editions (p. i).
Catching the eye on page viii is the orphaned a at the end of the
caption for the painting of Christ among the Nephites. This and the
nearby typo murdvernment under the time point “ca. ad 32” admit
the likelihood of other design slips. Looking further we find a whopper: a duplicated contents page for the attached booklet. A surprising
lapse, given the Timechart series’ emphasis on history, is the “year” 0
in place of 1 bc in the time line and corresponding text, ignoring a
firm convention among historians. A rather significant error occurs
on page ix, where the Book of Mormon time line abruptly ends at
ad 363, when the Nephites initiated war with the Lamanites—as if
the Nephite record ends at the start of Mormon 4. Some sixty years
and fifteen chapters (excluding the book of Ether, which figures at the
beginning of this time line) are unaccounted for. What of Mormon’s
return as military commander? The penultimate time point marks
his refusal to lead the armies, yet his resumption of leadership goes
unmarked. What of hiding the plates? If we search beyond the main
time line and then squint, we discover a separate, miniature time line
running along the bottom of the page. Entitled “Handing Down the
Plates,” it begins a few pages earlier and ends here with “Records hidden
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421–1827.” It seems doubtful that this secondary time line is intended
to take up where the main time line prematurely ends, for other significant events are omitted as well: the final battles at Cumorah, the
demise of the Nephite civilization, Mormon’s death, and Moroni’s
parting prophecies and exhortations. Since the rest of the timechart
is so flush with time points, this abrupt truncation is rather glaring,
perhaps another casualty of the design shop.
The section of the timechart entitled “The Restoration” could be
fleshed out to more adequately cover the coming forth of the Book
of Mormon. For example, one can easily get the impression that the
Book of Mormon was translated in about a year (July 1828–June 1829,
a period beginning after the loss of the 116 pages of transcribed manuscript), rather than in just under three months. This is because the
timechart neglects to note the momentous arrival of Oliver Cowdery
in Harmony, Pennsylvania, on 5 April 1829 or his assumption of
scribal labors two days later, at which point Joseph’s work of trans
lation proceeded in earnest until its completion around 1 July.6 What’s
more, this part of the timechart omits any mention of scribal help,
though it does track Oliver’s and Martin Harris’s other activities.
Although the timechart notes that the plates were temporarily taken
from Joseph Smith after the incident of the lost manuscript, it does not
provide a date for their return nor mention that the interpreters were
taken away as well. The date typically assigned to the return of the plates
and interpreters is 22 September 1828,7 but Joseph’s own account and
other evidence suggest a date in early July of that year.8 Furthermore, in
1885 David Whitmer recollected that the angel reclaimed from Joseph
Smith both the plates and the “spectacles” but returned only “a Urim
6. BYU Studies 46/4 (2007): 12, 16. This issue is devoted to a chronology of the life of
Joseph Smith, with pp. 10–18 covering the coming forth of the Book of Mormon.
7. History of the Church, 1:21–23. This date also appears in Lucy Mack Smith’s 1845
history, the relevant portion of which is reproduced in John W. Welch, ed., Opening the
Heavens: Accounts of Divine Manifestations, 1820–1844 (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book,
2005), 162.
8. See Larry E. Morris, “The Conversion of Oliver Cowdery,” Journal of Book of
Mormon Studies 16/1 (2007): 81 n. 7.
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and Thummim of another pattern.”9 On the other hand, Lucy Mack
Smith’s 1844–45 and 1853 histories differ on whether it was the plates
or interpreters that were taken by the angel for a season.10
Given the discrepancies in the historical record, it would be understandable that Timechart avoids these issues if not for two things: (1)
the publisher’s note on the inside front cover avers that “this timeline
suggests approximate years . . . [whenever] actual dates are not known
. . . [or] different historical sources give conflicting dates”; (2) two time
lines in the attached booklet address these matters but muddle the
picture. Reassurances aside, the timechart neglects to approximate a
date for when Joseph resumed his translation work—certainly not an
egregious oversight, just disappointing for a mega time line, especially
since the Book of Mormon time line on page 4 of the booklet does provide a date for this event: 22 September 1828.11 Similarly frustrating
is the Joseph Smith time line on page 3. It notes that in July 1828 “the
Urim and Thummim device [was] taken for a short time” and that in
the summer of 1828 “the Urim and Thummim and plates [were] again
taken for a short time” (emphasis added), with no mention of when
the plates were first taken.
To be sure, many readers will not notice these lapses, but those
keenly interested in the Book of Mormon translation will quickly notice
deficiencies. Discrepancies in the historical record could be effectively
addressed in the time lines with appropriate hedge words that would
confer on Timechart a level of rigor that readers would appreciate.
And the lack of coordination between the restoration section of the
timechart and the shorter time lines in the booklet bearing on the same
topic are easily rectified by beefing up the timechart in a few spots, even
if it means dropping or resizing an image or two. This is well worth
doing because the timechart is the book’s prize feature, the master time
9. Quoted in John W. Welch, “The Miraculous Translation of the Book of Mormon,”
in Welch, Opening the Heavens, 88, 154.
10. Welch, Opening the Heavens, 88, 108 n. 44.
11. This time line mentions only that Joseph resumed his translation on 22 September
1828, not that the plates and interpreters were reportedly returned to him on this date—
perhaps an attempt to obfuscate the question of precisely when the power and means to
translate were restored to Joseph.
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line that readers will naturally turn to for information (rather than to
the easily overlooked, topic-specific time lines buried in the booklet).
Indeed, the timechart’s very length implies thorough coverage.
The captions for the more than two dozen paintings (not counting several duplications) could be improved since in most cases they
merely restate the titles of the works when these titles already appear
in the adjacent credit lines. This banal practice is aesthetically displeasing and can even create confusion. For example, readers unfamiliar with the Mormon story will be nonplussed by the page xi caption “Let Him Ask in Faith,” which accompanies an identically titled
painting of Joseph Smith’s first vision. There is no obvious clue that
it is Joseph being depicted, let alone his momentous vision. Since a
painting of Joseph translating the plates carries a helpful descriptive
caption (p. xii), one wonders why the same was not done elsewhere.12
Other photo captions will baffle non–Latter-day Saint readers too:
“Endowment House” (p. xiii; its purpose and location are not discoverable in the text), “Dedication of South America” (p. xiv; the nature
of this dedication is unspecified, and the dignitaries in the photo are
not identified), “The First Presidency and Quorum of the Twelve”
(p. xvi; the awe-inspiring Christus statue behind them goes unnamed
and unlocated), to name a few. In many cases, readers will have to
search hard (sometimes on different pages) for the information that
will put illustrations in context; in other cases, they will search in
vain. Why would a relatively large photo like the one of Carthage
Jail on page 13 of the booklet carry that name only as its caption (in
12. Perhaps it was judged that the title of Simon Dewey’s painting of Joseph translating the plates, By the Gift and Power of God, would puzzle readers unfamiliar with the
scriptural quotation. Yet it is unfortunate that the caption used, “Joseph Smith Translates
the Book of Mormon by Inspiration,” though ultimately true and suited to the artist’s
interpretation, gives the impression that Joseph did not use an interpreting device (either
the Urim and Thummim or the seer stone) while translating, a view that contradicts the
historical and scriptural record (e.g., History of the Church, 1:19; Doctrine and Covenants
10:1; 20:8; Joseph Smith—History 1:62, 71n), including several eyewitness accounts. For
a study that draws on these accounts and on textual evidence to illuminate the mechanics of the translation process, see Royal Skousen, “Translating the Book of Mormon:
Evidence from the Original Manuscript,” in Book of Mormon Authorship Revisited: The
Evidence for Ancient Origins, ed. Noel B. Reynolds (Provo, UT: FARMS, 1997), especially
pp. 61–66 and the conclusion and bibliography on pp. 90–91.
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small point size) when five unbroken inches of caption space remain?
Expand the caption by adding “where the Prophet Joseph Smith was
martyred in June 1844” and interested readers can locate that date
among the descriptive entries on that page and learn more.
A few picayune editorial matters concern stylistic inconsistencies
for like items: the time points and accompanying text in the timechart
are randomly left-justified, centered, or right-justified, creating a jumbled look that impedes easy scanning; some of the four-digit dates
on page iv have commas while others do not; illustration captions
throughout the book variously employ headline-style capitalization
(e.g., “Brigham Young’s Nauvoo Home”) and sentence-style capitali
zation (e.g., “Sagwitch and his wife”).
Such oversights can plague any publication project that is not thoroughly and competently proofread.13 Yet Timechart readers hunting for
specific information will not notice many of the technical blemishes
pointed out here—or at least the aggregate effect will certainly not be
enough to impugn the whole book. Indeed, editing and proofreading
lapses are not necessarily indicative of poor content, though a lack of
professional care in those areas may reflect similar haste and sloppiness in conception. Though many readers are oblivious to such seeming
trifles or are forgiving when they do spot them, a publisher and author
would be ethically remiss to engage in such Newtonian rationalization
and do nothing.14 Accuracy and reliability are the raison d’être of any
reference work; and the presence of even small lapses—be they factual
errors or stylistic or artistic infelicities—can mar credibility and distract
13. The average comparison proofreader (one who compares clean copy with edited
copy in order to catch discrepancies) misses about one error in ten. Industry standards
range from allowing one miss per typeset page (a low standard) to allowing one miss
every hour (a high standard). Peggy Smith, Mark My Words: Instruction and Practice in
Proofreading, 3rd ed. (Alexandria, VA: EEI, 1997), 137–38. While occasional proofreading errors are inevitable, multiple read-throughs, each with a different focus (typography,
typos, inconsistencies, etc.) can considerably reduce error frequency.
14. The story is told that Sir Isaac Newton “prevented a misprint from being corrected
in his Principia, saying that competent readers would automatically correct it for themselves.” Jacques Barzun, “Behind the Blue Pencil: Censorship or Creeping Creativity?” in
On Writing, Editing, and Publishing: Essays Explicative and Hortatory, 2nd ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1986), 105.
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readers. Naturally this is a concern for Latter-day Saints wanting to see
their history and belief portrayed in the best possible light (i.e., depicted
fairly, accurately, and in accordance with the highest professional standards), though it applies equally to any consumer seeking clear and
trustworthy information and a product worth its price.
This discussion calls attention to the quality-control challenges
endemic in projects like this one for which the collaborating author,
editor, designer, publisher, and printer live far apart (in this case
across the world)15 and work for different interests. Although today’s
advanced communications technologies make distance nearly irrele
vant and publishers often outsource work to book packagers—who
offer not just printing and binding but an increasingly ambitious array
of “value-added” editing, typesetting, design, proofreading, and distribution services as well (in turn often outsourced)—these developments can actually create more room for error as publications projects
are routed through disparate shops and countless hands, diffusing
responsibility for the inevitable errors introduced along the line.16
Nearly three decades ago, editing—and its cousin proofreading, it is
fair to say—was said to be in decline partly because corporate takeovers
of major publishing houses made “return on investment” the watchword
and editors now were pressured to hunt down the next bestseller rather
than take time to edit to high literary standards that had become passé
amid the frenzied atmosphere of mass consumerism.17 One observer
laments that
15. Timechart’s author notes this global effort in a report for Meridian Magazine,
an online publication: “This Mormon timechart project was truly global in scope,
with the writer and image researcher located in Utah, the editor in Ohio, the design
team in Connecticut, the publisher in England, the map illustrators in India, and the
printer in China” (Christopher Kimball Bigelow, “Introducing The Timechart History of
Mormonism,” http://www.ldsmag.com/books/070504timechart.html [accessed 8 October
2008]). No proofreader is mentioned here or in Timechart’s colophon, perhaps because
the role is often an anonymous one in the industry or because, given the kinds of errors
that slipped through, a dedicated proofreader was not employed in this project.
16. The For Dummies books alluded to earlier use book packagers to good effect, but
those books are not pictorial presentations that require the kind of intensive, multilevel
proofreading at issue here.
17. See R. Z. Sheppard, “The Decline of Editing,” Time, 1 September 1980, 70–72; also
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,922149,00.html (accessed 26 May 2008).
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editors then [about 1970] . . . were a breed of compulsively
orderly and fanatically precise individuals who ruthlessly
stalked and destroyed typos, solecisms, and factual inaccuracies. . . . They placed literature high above crass commerce.
. . . The new breed of editorial animal . . . looks down his or
her nose at line editing and production details. The time and
money pressures of today’s monolithic and highly competitive publishing business have devalued good bookmaking.
The result is books that fall apart, prematurely yellow with
age, and are scandalously rife with typos.18
Certainly Timechart is not “scandalously” inferior in any way, but
the highly collaborative process that apparently contributed to diminished quality control on the production end furnishes a cautionary
tale about modern bookmaking. In small degree it also reflects the
somewhat parlous state of editing and proofreading, once-discrete
tasks that now are often absorbed into other functions,19 relegated to
untrained or unseasoned personnel, or dispensed with in the push to
save money and the rush to get into print.
The timechart aside, the other sections in the book are well
conceived and make for interesting browsing. Attention to current
scholarship in a few areas would enhance the book’s value as a reliable reference tool. Two items have to do with Book of Mormon–
related maps. The map of Book of Mormon geography (p. C, on the
reverse side of the timechart) ignores the best model to date—John L.
Sorenson’s theoretical reconstitution of Mormon’s “mental map.”20
Like Sorenson’s, Timechart’s map is a theoretical model based, it
would seem, on internal evidence from the Book of Mormon rather
18. Richard Curtis, “Are Editors Necessary?” in Gerald Gross, ed., Editors on Editing:
What Writers Need to Know about What Editors Do, 3rd ed. (New York: Grove, 1993),
31–32.
19. For example, writers or editors doubling as proofreaders of their own work—once
a firm taboo in publishing (since protracted closeness to a text blinds one to its flaws) but
now, with the proliferation of desktop publishers and book packagers seeking a share of
Big Publishing’s profits by utilizing small staffs and a lean business model, increasingly
an unfortunate necessity.
20. See generally John L. Sorenson, Mormon’s Map (Provo, UT: FARMS, 2000).
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than force-fitted through selective proof-texting to a predetermined
real-world location. While it is true that numerous geographical correlations have been proposed and the issue of fixing Book of Mormon
events in a real-world setting is far from settled, the majority of Latterday Saint scholars accept Sorenson’s limited-geography model situated
in Mesoamerica as the best to date. A pioneer in this field, Sorenson,
an anthropologist who has pursued the puzzle of Book of Mormon
geography for over fifty years, has published widely on the topic and
is known for his command of the literature, prodigious research, and
keen synthesis of complicated research data. Thus it is unfortunate that
the Timechart map of unspecified authorship is second-rate. Whereas
Sorenson’s map meticulously takes into account textual clues such as
geographical features, population sizes, distances, ecology, directions,
and climate, Timechart’s map appears to be a poor imitation (indeed,
at first glance the two maps look alike) whose hasty construction muddles several firm spatial relationships. It is frustrating that the map’s
provenance is unspecified, since curious readers cannot examine the
interpretive bases behind the proposed identifications.
Immediately suspect are several cities located far inland when
textual clues indicate they are by or somewhat near the seashore.21
Directly left of the “East Wilderness” label is the counterintuitive
“South Wilderness” label. Since there is in fact a west wilderness (Alma
8:3; 22:28), the obvious adjustments should be made. The map also has
two cities named Mulek, when that city should be located south of
Bountiful near the sea and the other site is the city of Melek. Moreover,
the hourglass-shaped map should be tilted 45 degrees for a plausible
directional orientation that makes sense of the east, west, and north
seas, which are incongruous in the Timechart map.22 In sum, to the
21. These cities include Moroni, Nephihah, Lehi, Morianton, Omner, Gid, and
Mulek. See Alma 50:13; 51:26.
22. A south sea is not identified on the Timechart map. Though presumed external
correlations should not guide the directionality of a theoretical map, in this case the map,
which needs to be rotated either right or left to account for the north and south seas
(see Helaman 3:8), could reasonably be rotated to the left à la Sorenson’s model since a
geographical correlation with any of the possible narrow necks of land in the Americas
virtually demands that orientation.
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trained eye, this map reflects the kind of haphazard, “ad hoc modeling” that Sorenson laments in his compendious Geography of Book of
Mormon Events,23 which meticulously evaluates dozens of such maps
and establishes criteria for pursuing this study responsibly.24
The other Book of Mormon–related map, which traces Lehi and
Sariah’s journey through Arabia, is titled “Possible Route of Lehi’s
Journey” yet actually plots multiple routes. Without attribution, it
appears to show S. Kent Brown’s proposed northerly arc that, after
Nahom, skirts the fractured terrain of the al-Mahrah plateau. But at
the same time it charts a more direct easterly route that has been proposed, with slight variations, by other researchers.25 Readers unfamiliar with the journey of Lehi’s group through the Arabian wilderness
are left to assume that, on the eastern leg of the journey, the group
became lost and trekked in two vast “circles” of several hundred miles
each—certainly not what any map on the subject intends to show. This
may be a quibble since the map will work if Route in the title is corrected to Routes, though the absence of appropriate credit and source
documentation here and elsewhere in the book remains a concern.
Of course, even the best-intentioned nonspecialist author cannot
cover the waterfront of potential error in a commercial venture of this
kind. Budget and time constraints being what they are, it is hardly
feasible to engage a crew of subject-matter specialists to verify every
date, fact, and assertion. And the narrow specialization in academia
today makes it difficult to find one content specialist to do the job of
many specialists with equal aplomb when it comes to content review.
Even scholars who manage to indulge catholic interests cannot keep
up on all the latest thinking and findings arising in complementary
fields of academic endeavor. And while reputable publishing houses
23. John L. Sorenson, The Geography of Book of Mormon Events: A Source Book
(Provo, UT: FARMS, 1992), 209.
24. In May 2008 John Sorenson examined said map in Timechart and rated it
inferior.
25. See the routes that S. Kent Brown proposes in his study “New Light from Arabia
on Lehi’s Trail,” in Echoes and Evidences of the Book of Mormon, ed. Donald W. Parry,
Daniel C. Peterson, and John W. Welch (Provo, UT: FARMS, 2002), 58. For a handy comparison of those routes with others, see the map in Journal of Book of Mormon Studies
15/2 (2006): 77 (compare p. 53).
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ensure that nonfiction works pass a technical review before they are
accepted for publication, independent authors and small publishers,
even if convinced of the need for such quality control, typically cannot afford this added cost. Complicating this picture is the fact that
even significant scholarly findings—if reported by the media—tend to
have a short shelf life in the public mind and may take years to gain
acceptance in the academy.26 This being the case, an apparent plus
is that Timechart editor Jana Riess, a member of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, holds a PhD in American religious history
from Columbia University and is the religion book review editor for
Publisher’s Weekly, credentials that engender confidence in the book’s
overall accuracy and quality.
Anyone with a mind avid for Mormon trivia and neatly packaged information-bites will enjoy perusing this book. It could make
a nice gift for those who would use it as a study aid or as a tantalizing
missionary tool to display in the home for guests. It would seem that
many readers, Latter-day Saints or not, will find the external correlations with secular history, as well as some of the cultural trivia, of at
least passing interest.
The publisher’s vision for the Timechart series is admirable if not
exaggerated. This series is designed, the claim goes, so that “various
elements interact and spark off other events,” making “the forces that
create history . . . tangible as the streams flow across the pages.”27 This
calls to mind the supernova of time lines—science historian James
Burke’s “Knowledge Web,” an interactive online resource that maps
connections between people, places, events, things, and ideas that
have led to technical innovations and, in many cases, to social change.
Like Timechart, the ever-evolving “K-Web” aims to “put learning into
26. That is, if they gain acceptance at all, since old, cherished theories die hard in
academia. A case in point is the longstanding debate over cultural contact between the
hemispheres in ancient times. Despite a veritable boatload of hard evidence supporting
the “diffusion hypothesis,” this view struggles to find legitimacy within the academic
mainstream. See John L. Sorenson, “Ancient Voyages Across the Ocean to America:
From ‘Impossible’ to ‘Certain,’ ” Journal of Book of Mormon Studies 14/1 (2005): 5–17;
also Don L. Brugger, “Making the Case for Cultural Diffusion in Ancient Times,” Insights
26/4 (2006): 1, 6.
27. http://www.worthpress.co.uk (accessed 26 March 2008).
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a context that makes it easier to see the greater relevance” of synchronicities throughout history.28 With constellations of navigable “knowledge nodes,” Burke’s K-Web promises to deliver where Timechart
cannot—by showing more convincingly in an immersive 3-D learning environment how certain ideas and events actually did interrelate
and “spark off” each other to shape history. Of course, Timechart’s
chronology of scriptural personalities and events randomly aligned
with secular milestones wisely avoids any such correlations, though
the series’ promotional plugs would lead one to believe otherwise.
But Timechart’s status as the preeminent Book of Mormon time
line seems secure for quite some time. Only a clairvoyant K-Web programmer could top it by expanding the K-Web to include evidences
of divine providence in human affairs, in which case the Book of
Mormon (let alone the restoration of the gospel) might get a little
more of the attention it deserves. In the meantime, Timechart serves
ably enough as a comprehensive time line and historical and cultural
overview of Mormonism.

28. http://www.k-web.org (accessed 30 March 2008).

Where Much Is Promised, Less Is Given

Brant A. Gardner

Review of Diane E. Wirth. Decoding Ancient America: A Guide to the Archaeology of the
Book of Mormon. Springville, UT: Horizon Publishers, 2007. 110 pp. $12.99.

D

iane Wirth is quite well-read in Mesoamerican art and art history. She has attended the Texas Maya workshops and has also
taken classes from some of the stars of Mesoamerican scholarship.
That background is apparent in the breadth of the Mesoamerican
information she covers in Decoding Ancient America. She addresses
topics certain to intrigue a Latter-day Saint audience hungry for
external proof of the Book of Mormon. Some of the information she
presents has appeared before in her works on the Book of Mormon
or those of other Latter-day Saint scholars. However, there are some
additional new ideas in this book, making it more valuable than simply a synopsis of previous work. In virtually all chapters, Wirth also
provides some examples culled from some of the best modern secular
works on Mesoamerica.
The first chapter begins by limiting Book of Mormon lands to the
area known as Mesoamerica, or roughly from Mexico City south to
a little farther south of the current border between Guatemala and
Honduras and El Salvador. She does not review the history of this particular geographic proposition but bolsters it with specific archaeological elements mentioned in the Book of Mormon that are found in that
area. These include cement, roads, fortified cities, a tropical climate,
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and writing systems. None of these receive extensive treatment; they
are mentioned more to justify the concentration on this geographical
area that will be the subject of later chapters.
The next chapter gives an overview of the Mulekites and the
Jaredites, two of the three immigrant nations mentioned in the Book
of Mormon. Wirth then discusses what she considers to be unusual
archaeological data that might indicate the arrival of foreigners, such
as artistic representation of bearded figures (her label is “bearded foreigners”) and the Mesoamerican legend she labels as “seven tribes,”
which she compares to Lehi’s sons. The third chapter concentrates
on the Egyptian influence on Old World Israel, followed by a discussion of parallels between Hebrew and Nephite festivals, with a focus
on comparing a modern Maya harvest festival to the Feast of the
Tabernacles.
Wirth next discusses Mesoamerican knowledge of the creation
and Adam and Eve and then continues her theme of finding remnants
of Nephite teachings in Mesoamerican religion (the latter discussion
touching on rebirth and baptism and concepts of death and resurrection). A chapter on Quetzalcoatl and Jesus Christ reprises her understanding of the topic as articulated in a Journal of Book of Mormon
Studies article.1 Wirth then takes up the tree of life in Mesoamerica,
comparing Old World imagery to that of the New World and emphasizing Izapa Stela 5, commonly known in Latter-day Saint literature
as the “Lehi Stone.” The final chapter justifies a Mesoamerican Hill
Cumorah in addition to the one in New York.
Decoding Ancient America is short, easy to read, filled with facts
that appear to support a connection between the Book of Mormon
and Mesoamerica, and copiously illustrated with line drawings of art
relevant to her discussion. The typical Latter-day Saint reading audience will enjoy this book, and the information from its “proofs” may
begin to show up on apologetic defenses of the Book of Mormon in
Internet chat rooms and blogs.
1. Diane E. Wirth, “Quetzalcoatl, the Maya Maize God, and Jesus Christ,” Journal
of Book of Mormon Studies 11 (2002): 4–15.
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More Can Be Less
Wirth’s book, however, presents some problems. Although much
of her information is excellent, aspects of the work decrease the value
of the conclusions drawn. One problem is perhaps an issue only for
scholars in the field. Either Wirth or the editors have chosen to use
bibliographic entries as though they were endnotes. The text has
appropriate references where Wirth is citing other scholars, but the
endnotes themselves are to entire works and not to specific pages.
Thus it is difficult to verify her interpretation of the sources used. Only
those who are already very familiar with the sources will be able to
check her work.
More important, however, are two problems with the way Wirth
uses her broad reading of Mesoamerican materials: her uncritical use
of some secondary sources and a flawed methodology that creates false
positives rather than firm connections between the Book of Mormon
and Mesoamerica.
Incautious Reading of Secondary Sources
Latter-day Saints are excited to see the Book of Mormon vindicated by empirical research, and many enjoy reading and writing
about such findings. However, Latter-day Saint scholarship on the
Book of Mormon, particularly when it comes to comparisons with
Mesoamerica, is of uneven quality. Along with the very good there is
the marginally good (and sometimes much worse). The typical Latterday Saint reader lacks the necessary training to discern between reliable and unreliable scholarship. Wirth has not helped her readers to
assess the quality of her secondary sources.
Wirth draws on Bruce Warren to demonstrate an amazing
linguistic correlation between a Mesoamerican king’s name and a
Jaredite king named in the Book of Mormon.2 Wirth cites Warren
2. Blaine M. Yorgason, Bruce W. Warren, and Harold Brown, New Evidences of
Christ in Ancient America (Provo, UT: Book of Mormon Research Foundation, Stratford
Books, 1999), 17–18. Although three authors are listed, this particular information is
clearly from Warren.
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and is obviously repeating his analysis. Hence the following: “This
points to evidence that not all of the Jaredites were destroyed in their
last battle in Mesoamerica. In fact, many years later in the Maya city
of Palenque, Chiapas, Mexico, an Olmec king named U-K’ix-Chan
is mentioned. In the Mayan language, x is pronounced ‘sh.’ Therefore
K’ix would be pronounced ‘Kish,’ and Kish is a Jaredite name (see
Ether 10:17–18)” (p. 13).
Commendably, Wirth does add a little caution to Warren’s assertion
since she understands the long time difference between the Jaredites
and the time of Palenque. Yet despite the key qualification “many years
later,” she offers no analysis that would allow the connection to be made
over the large time gap or that would satisfactorily address the cultural
and geographic differences involved. Most importantly, she relies on
Warren’s understanding and not on the most recent interpretation of
the Mayan glyph that bears the king’s name.
Warren’s use of the translation “K’ix” for the stingray spine
(and the claimed connection to the Jaredite name Kish) is based on
an outdated reading of the glyph. Mark A. Wright, a PhD candidate
in Mesoamerican studies at the University of California, Riverside,
pointed out to me that the “K’ix” reading of the glyph has been shown
to be incorrect. He provided the following from Stanley Guenter’s article that describes the new reading: “While the ‘thorn’ in this name is
normally read as K’IX, Marc Zender (personal communication 2001)
and Albert Davletshin (2003) have recently suggested KOKAN, a word
for ‘fish spine’ in Yukatek, as the glyph is occasionally complemented
by –na (e.g., Palenque Tablet of the 96 Glyphs).”3 It is easy to see how
Wirth might not have been aware of a new reading of a single glyph,
but the new reading underscores the caution that should be taken
when making leaps of vision over the extensive difference between
time, place, and culture to draw connections that seem parallel.
The next example comes from her reading of Aztec mythic material. This is a particularly difficult task since the best records we have of
3. Stanley Guenter, “The Tomb of K’inich Janaab Pakal: The Temple of the Inscriptions at Palenque,” 9 n. 14, http://www.mesoweb.com/articles/guenter/TI.pdf (accessed 23
September 2008), emphasis in original.
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Mesoamerican myths and legends come from a time after the Spanish
conquest, which places nearly a thousand years between the recording of the myth and the end of the Book of Mormon. In addition,
the majority of the recorded Mesoamerican myths and legends come
from peoples and languages that had nothing to do with the Book of
Mormon. Finally, the very process of determining how to reconstruct
those myths from the way the Spanish interpreted and recorded them
into their more native, precontact state is a complex task.4 Very few
Latter-day Saint writers who attempt to handle Mesoamerican materials have spent the time necessary to master this complex body of
material. Thus it is not surprising that some writers’ enthusiasm leads
them to see connections where none exist. The problem is compounded
when an original fanciful connection is perpetuated by other writers.
Wirth is guilty of perpetuating such incorrect information that will
unfortunately become more accepted simply by its repetition and the
fact that most Latter-day Saint readers lack the background to know
the errors.
Wirth describes the fascinating parallel between a Mesoamerican
origin myth of seven tribes arriving in the New World in seven ships
and the seven sons of Lehi arriving in a ship:
There is a great tradition in Mesoamerica of the people’s
ancestors originally coming from seven tribes. There are
several examples of this tradition in art, but first we need to
understand what caves mean to Mesoamericans, even today.
Caves are damp and can give shelter, especially in the rain
forests of Central America. Rain was also believed to come
from caves in the mountains. These legends, as depicted in
Mesoamerican art, show that seven tribes came from seven
caves. These caves are considered to be like a mother’s womb.
A mother’s womb is a protective enclosure and is also associated with water. (p. 17)
4. See my paper “The Impact of the Spanish upon the Record of Native Oral
Tradition among the Nahua,” http://frontpage2k.nmia.com/~nahualli/Quetzalcoatl/
crucible.htm (accessed March 2008), for an analysis of issues involved in reconstructing
the precontact Quetzalcoatl mythology.
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She then indicates that “Sahagun, an early Spanish friar, stated that
the Indians believed that these caves referred to a ship or ships that
brought their seven ancestral tribes to this land” (p. 17). This becomes
implicitly parallel to the arrival of the Lehites by ship and the seven
sons who became the heads of seven tribes. Even on the surface, this
“parallel” has problems. It assumes a continuation of the veneration
of all of Lehi’s sons when the Book of Mormon makes it clear that
what becomes important is not the individual tribes but the collective
terms Nephite and Lamanite, into which the tribal identifications are
subsumed (see Jacob 1:13–14). There is no indication why a Lamanite
would continue to venerate Nephi’s line or why a Nephite would venerate Lamanite heritage.
It is true that there is a legend of descent from seven caves, but
it is an Aztec origin myth.5 The Aztecs were relative newcomers to
Mesoamerica, not arriving until the Book of Mormon had been closed
for over six hundred years. Even the artistic representation of the
myth that Wirth uses as an illustration (p. 18) confirms that it is a
myth hailing from northern Mexico or southwestern United States.
Around the depicted landscape intended to be above the seven-lobed,
womblike cave are saguaro cacti. These grow only in the region comprising the Sonoran Desert and a little outside of Arizona. They cannot grow in any area connected to the Book of Mormon. In both time
and location, Wirth’s parallel myth is far from the Book of Mormon.
Wirth does not explain that contradiction between her “parallel” and
the text.
5. Some part of this tale may have been integrated after the Aztec’s arrival in
Mesoamerica. Mary Ellen Miller, in The Art of Mesoamerica from Olmec to Aztec
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1986), 68–69, makes this observation: “During excavations to install Sound and Light at Teotihuacan in 1971, a cave was found under the
pyramid. Ancient rituals there may have hallowed the site. The cave itself features several
small chambers, almost in a clover-leaf configuration. Ceramics recovered indicate the
cave’s use from Late Formative through Classic times, and it could well be an extremely
ancient focus of worship. The later Aztecs claimed to have come to Tenochtitlan from a
mythic place called ‘Chicomoztoc,’ or Seven Caves; might not the underground chambers of the Pyramid of the Sun have been an ancient sacred place to them as well as to the
Teotihuacanos?”
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More importantly, however, she has incautiously repeated an
argument from other Latter-day Saint writers that was ill-advised in
the original and becomes all the more so when she perpetuates their
error. Tracing the history of this error is made more difficult by the
bibliography-as-endnote system and the general impression that this
book was pulled together quickly rather than carefully re-vetted for
its sources. Wirth cites Bernardino de Sahagún as the source for the
seven caves as ships. She then notes that it is Sahagún as quoted in one
of her earlier books. Although I have not been able to trace her original
footnote, I am fairly certain that the actual origin of her source (based
on the very similar story, reference, and error) is Milton R. Hunter and
Thomas Stuart Ferguson’s Ancient America and the Book of Mormon.
They report: “Concerning the origin of these peoples, the report the
old men . . . give is that they came by sea from the north . . . , and true
it is that they came in some wooden boats but it is not known how they
[the boats] were hewn, but it is conjectured by a report found among
all these natives that they came from seven caves, and that these seven
caves are the seven ships or galleys in which the first settlers of this
land came, as gathered from likely conjectures.”6 Both Hunter and
Ferguson’s footnote and Wirth’s endnote cite Sahagún’s Historia
general de las cosas de Nueva España and specifically the very same
“introduction to Book 1” in the very same edition. I have never seen
any reference to the caves as ships in any other work that I recall. I also
confess to not completely doing my homework and finding that particular edition. However, I have searched through another excellent
Spanish edition of that work. There is no Sahaguntine introduction
to Book 1. Sahagún’s Book 1 deals with the Aztec gods and does not
cover this origin myth. There is nothing like this in Book 1. There is a
possible Sahaguntine passage to which it might be related that comes
later in the text: “It is said that the first peoples who came to settle this
land of Mexico, which is now called West India, arrived in that port
with ships in which they passed that sea; and arriving there, and going
6. Milton R. Hunter and Thomas Stuart Ferguson, Ancient America and the Book of
Mormon (Oakland, CA: Kolob Book, 1950), 30, emphasis in original.
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by that location they named it Pantlan.”7 Sahagún does give an origin
myth of arrival by sea, but it is not connected to seven caves.
There was an authentic myth of seven caves, known as Chicomoztoc.
They were very clearly considered caves, not ships.8 Neither Sahagún
nor anyone else familiar with either the meaning of the word chicomoztoc or with the legends would have made the error of suggesting
that they were rather ships. That assertion is probably the unnamed
editor’s, perpetuated in Hunter and Ferguson and apparently twice
now in Wirth (in her earlier book and now this one).
Wirth perpetuates an even greater error of fact when she repeats
the marvelous story of a personage who appeared from the sky in
a great light and spoke like thunder (p. 76). She has also referenced
this myth in an article in the Journal of Book of Mormon Studies,9
though in this book she provides a different source than she did for
her article.10
I attempted to trace this reference, because it is unquestionably
the best putative New World remembrance of Christ’s appearance at
Bountiful. What I found, however, was that the cited source was a
poet (Tony Shearer) who had read the Book of Mormon and included
this passage in a poetic retelling of the Quetzalcoatl tale. Shearer
attributed the quotation to a Juan de Córdova but didn’t give a specific
source, so it is impossible to be certain that he took it from the real
Juan de Córdova or simply exercised his poetic license in the attribu7. Bernardino de Sahagún, Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España, ed. Angel
María Garibay Kintana (Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1969), 3:203 (my translation).
8. Mary Miller and Karl Taube, An Illustrated Dictionary of the Gods and Symbols of
Ancient Mexico and the Maya (London: Thames and Hudson, 1993), 60.
9. Wirth, “Quetzalcoatl, the Maya Maize God, and Jesus Christ,” 15.
10. In this book she references Juan de Córdova, Arte en Lengua Zapoteca (Mexico
City, 1578), and Tony Shearer, Beneath the Moon and Under the Sun (Albuquerque: Sun
Publishing, 1975). In the Journal of Book of Mormon Studies article she gives what I believe
to be the original source, Bruce W. Warren and Thomas Stuart Ferguson, The Messiah in
Ancient America (Provo, UT: Book of Mormon Research Foundation, 1987). Warren cites
Shearer, who attributes the statement, without a specific reference, to a Juan de Córdova.
Wirth may have examined Shearer since finding the quotation in Warren and Ferguson,
but I strongly doubt she examined Juan de Córdova’s Arte, since I did examine that text
and did not find the quotation. Had he provided a page number, I would gladly admit my
error. Without it, I believe that it is not in Córdova’s grammar.
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tion. Juan de Córdova wrote a grammar of the Zapotec language (the
work Wirth secondarily references in this book). I was able to examine that grammar. At the end there is some text describing culture,
but I was unable to find this particular quotation. I believe that the
story was invented by Shearer and informed directly from his reading
in the Book of Mormon.11 The marvelous parallel between putative
Mesoamerican legend and the Book of Mormon is really a parallel
between the Book of Mormon and itself, hardly an external “proof.”
Unfortunately, this incautious approach to reading secondary
sources is not limited to repeating mistakes from Latter-day Saint
authors. Wirth “decodes” information very differently from her
source. When discussing the mythology of Tezcatlipoca (whom she
paints as a decoded Lucifer), she notes:
In Mesoamerica, legends say that Quetzalcoatl hit Tezcatlipoca
with a club, knocking Tezcatlipoca from the heavens and
down into the waters of the earth. When Tezcatlipoca was
cast out, his foot was ripped off as he was being thrown out of
heaven (see Fig. 20). This story may be compared to Revelation
12:7–9. Tezcatlipoca’s foot was replaced by a smoking mirror,
through which he saw a dark future for mankind (see Fig. 21).
(pp. 43–44)
In the above excerpt, I have kept the references to the figures even
though I am not reproducing them here. Tracing this statement tells
us much about the way Wirth is decoding Mesoamerican material
because those references are given as support for her position. Her
reading of the myth is at odds with the way I remembered it, so I
checked her source (Brundage’s The Phoenix of the Western World).12
I was looking for confirmation that the severing of the foot took place
as Tezcatlipoca was knocked from the sky and that the smoking mirror was used to see “a dark future for mankind.”
11. See also Brant A. Gardner, Second Witness: Analytical and Contextual Commentary on the Book of Mormon, Volume 6, Fourth Nephi–Moroni (Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford Books, 2007), 392–94, where I provide more information on this passage.
12. Burr Cartwright Brundage, The Phoenix of the Western World: Quetzalcoatl and
the Sky Religion (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982).
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Without a specific page reference, I searched all references to
Tezcatlipoca in Brundage. I found the most likely location of her
source both because it discussed the myth of the severed foot and
because it had the same line drawing illustration she included in
her work (which she does footnote to Brundage rather than to the
original).13 Neither of the two questionable readings in Wirth are
found in Brundage. In the first, Brundage clearly notes that the foot
is severed after his presence on earth, a fact corroborated by the illustration that clearly shows a battle with an earth monster (the very
illustration that Wirth used in support of her retelling). The story of
the loss of the foot is, as Brundage indicates, a lost myth. We have
the story in pictures but no text of the myth.14 The myth of the celestial battle between Quetzalcoatl and Tezcatlipoca does not lead to
the story of Tezcatlipoca’s lost foot. The final reference to a figure
shows Tezcatlipoca painted with a smoking mirror in place of a foot,
but that cannot be support for the idea that he saw “a dark future
for mankind.” As with other Mesoamerican deities, Tezcatlipoca is
ambiguously good and bad. Polished obsidian mirrors were used
for divination among many Mesoamerican tribes, and the idea that
Tezcatlipoca foresaw a “dark future” must be another “decoding”
because it does not faithfully represent the Mesoamerican ideology.
In both cases, Wirth’s decoding adds information that makes the
text appear much more parallel to her thesis that Tezcatlipoca was a
parallel to Satan. Without a background in Mesoamerican mythology,
a reader will be amazed at the similarities—even though in reality the
similarities are part of the decoding and are not found in the original
mythology.
13. Brundage, Phoenix of the Western World, drawing on p. 239. Compare http://
www.famsi.org/research/loubat/Vaticanus%203773/page_26.jpg (accessed 23 September
2008), where the differences are slight and relegated to detail rather than to important
interpretive content.
14. Brundage, Phoenix of the Western World, 238.
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Parallelism as a Methodology
Over thirty years ago, eminent Mayanist Michael Coe bemoaned
the state of what has been called “Book of Mormon archaeology.”
There is no reason to doubt that his opinion continues to be shared by
non–Latter-day Saint Mesoamericanists:
In hundreds of motels scattered across the western United
States the Gentile archaeologist can find a paperback Book
of Mormon lavishly illustrated with the paintings of Arnold
Friberg depicting such scenes as Samuel the Lamanite prophesying on top of what looks like the Temple of the Tigers in
Chichen Itza, Yucatan.
Any curious archaeologist can hear guides in L.D.S. visitor
centers from Sharon, Vermont, to Los Angeles confidently lecturing that the Nephites built the Maya “cities” and expounding on other subjects that are usually the preserve of experts
in these matters. Small wonder that the outside archaeologist
often feels bewilderment if not downright hostility when confronted with things he is sure cannot be true.15
Coe had been reading Latter-day Saint literature on the Book of
Mormon that relied heavily on the methodology of parallelism to
draw connections between Mesoamerica and the Book of Mormon.16
In that methodology, two things that appear similar in disparate cultures are assumed to be connected because of the similarity. The passage of time and criticism of the methodology17 has not diminished its
15. Michael Coe, “Mormons and Archaeology: An Outside View,” Dialogue: A
Journal of Mormon Thought 8/2 (1973): 42.
16. Regarding studies of Book of Mormon geography, Latter-day Saint authors produced little based on any different methodology until the publication, twelve years later,
of John L. Sorenson’s An Ancient American Setting for the Book of Mormon (Salt Lake
City: Deseret Book and FARMS, 1985). Even Sorenson frequently follows the parallelist
methodology.
17. Latter-day Saint historian William Hamblin has pointed out problems with the
methodology of parallels that Hugh Nibley used: “Nibley’s method does contain some
weaknesses. The first, and perhaps most important, is Nibley’s view that the ‘East’ is
somehow unchanging. In reality the Near East has witnessed some of the most tremendous periods of social, economic, technological, political, and cultural transformations
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use in Latter-day Saint literature.18 As with the example I noted above
concerning the myth of Tezcatlipoca’s severed foot, the methodology
too easily creates superficial parallels that, in Coe’s words, the expert
“is sure cannot be true.”
Wirth compares two elements and, when there is a similarity,
presumes that the similarity is an indication of a historical connection between the two. For example, she notes that “in order to understand how the Mesoamerican culture was influenced by the Jaredites,
Lehites, and Mulekites, we need to understand the cultures of the
Middle East where these three groups came from” (p. 21). In spite of
her assertion, Mesoamericanists have developed a fairly detailed picture of Mesoamerica without relying upon a Near Eastern interpretation. Wirth’s is therefore hardly an accepted interpretive basis. Both
the idea that we must understand the ancient Near East to understand
Mesoamerica and the idea that the Nephites and Lamanites had sigin world history. . . . To me his case is weakened by including these other marginal
parallels.
“A second methodological problem is that in attempting to draw parallels between
ancient Near Eastern cultures and the Book of Mormon, Nibley often ignores equally significant differences. What is important here is not that the differences between the Book
of Mormon and ancient Near Eastern cultures somehow threaten to undermine the historicity of the Book of Mormon, but rather that the differences are often just as important
evidence as parallels in obtaining a more complete understanding of the ancient historical setting.” William J. Hamblin, “Time Vindicates Hugh Nibley,” review of An Approach
to the Book of Mormon, by Hugh Nibley, Review of Books on the Book of Mormon 2/1
(1990): 123–24.
Martin Raish expressed a similar view: “Many LDS writers provide what I call shopping lists to prove their points. They assemble rather impressive-looking lists of words,
customs, and architectural features which are found both in the Old World and the New.
The longer the list, of course, the greater the ‘proof.’ Unfortunately such an approach is
rarely of any real value. . . . To be meaningful, such a list must cite a complex system . . . or a
unique manner . . . which is found only in the two cultures in question.” “All That Glitters:
Uncovering Fool’s Gold in Book of Mormon Archaeology,” Sunstone 6/1 (1981): 13.
18. In addition to Wirth, the methodology underlies the arguments in David G.
Calderwood, Voices from the Dust: New Insights into Ancient America (Austin, TX:
Historical Publications, 2005); John L. Lund, Mesoamerica and the Book of Mormon: Is
This the Place? (np: The Communication Company, 2007); Bruce W. Warren and Thomas
Stuart Ferguson, The Messiah in Ancient America (Provo, UT: Book of Mormon Research
Foundation, 1987); and Yorgason, Warren, and Brown, New Evidences of Christ in Ancient
America.

Wirth, Decoding Ancient America (Gardner) • 27

nificant cultural impact on Mesoamerica are controversial assumptions. They require argumentation, but Wirth never indicates that
there is any controversy at all. She accepts the propositions, and they
form the foundation of her arguments.
Because Wirth understands there are issues with the kinds of parallels one finds in Mesoamerican material when placed against the Middle
Eastern background of the Book of Mormon, her method requires
another conceptual reading (perhaps the definition of her “decoding”) of the material. It must be posited that what we see is a distorted
remembrance of Book of Mormon practices, and therefore dissimilarities are due to apostasy and similarities are due to remembrances. She
notes: “Some gospel stories managed to seep through to the existing
Mesoamerican population as the truth became quickly distorted by
apostasy” (p. 35). This same interpretive scheme is repeated frequently:
“many ceremonies became distorted over time” (p. 27); “most of these
stories are weak imitations of what their ancestors possessed” (p. 35);
“thus the Aztecs thought the precious and sacred beliefs they once possessed were gone” (p. 36); and “the apostasy, around ad 150–200, was a
time of forgetting true gospel principles. By ad 231, the apostasy was in
full swing . . . , but still a small glimmer of truth remained from what the
Nephites once knew” (p. 36).
Wirth’s methodology (and perhaps understanding of her task of
decoding) is that one finds the similarity to something that the Latterday Saint people believe and then suggest that it appears because of a
continuation of that belief from Nephite times. All differences that
might make it “unparallel” are assumed to be part of the process of
apostasy. Wirth explains her understanding of how Nephite ideas
traveled through time:
The Maya nobles made grand monuments and painted
pottery with detailed scenes that told stories. But the commoners in ancient times spread ideas by word of mouth and
through their household art. This was the method by which
most traditions passed from one generation to the next. Can
you guess what happened?
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What happened was similar to the “telephone game” children play in which one person whispers something into the ear
of the person next to him, and that person passes on the message to the next to him, and that person passes on the message to the next person, until the message has gone all the
way around a circle of children. The original message always
becomes distorted because it is transferred to more and more
people. (p. 36)
What Wirth misses is that the telephone game is a very different process from oral transmission (the process by which most information
was transmitted in Mesoamerica). The telephone game relies on three
elements: the possibility of mishearing a whisper rather than regular speech, an emphasis on very short-term memory, and no corrective mechanism for the message. None of these elements describe the
transmission of oral traditions.
In particular, oral tradition’s corrective mechanisms are very
strong. Oral traditions are told out loud to a number of people, including many (and typically most) who have heard it before. Any significant
errors are immediately corrected by the community. Oral traditions
do change, and they may also have remarkable longevity.19 In some
oral traditions, there is extremely high accuracy in the passing of the
most important stories precisely because they are practiced to become
virtually verbatim to the version from the teacher. Wirth’s assumption
of how one decodes the material is based on a flawed understanding of
the process of oral transmission. As a result, although Wirth has read
well and widely, her decoding of ancient Mesoamerica with respect to
the Book of Mormon is more an exercise in creative parallelism rather
than convincing argumentation.
An example of the problem of parallels and interpretations comes
from her chapter that presents a new insight on the connection
19. Albert B. Lord, “Yugoslav Epic Fold Poetry,” in The Study of Folklore, ed. Alan
Dundes (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 267–68. Lord recorded two instances
of the same performance around twenty years apart. There were certainly differences, but
he notes: “This single example indicates very well the essentially conservative character
of the tradition in so far as the major thematic material is concerned.”
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between a Maya ceremony and the Hebrew Feast of Tabernacles. After
a section describing the Hebrew ceremony and then the Maya Cha
Cha’ac ceremony, “which is still practiced today in Yucatan, Mexico,”
she presents the two parallels more directly:
Rain was a very important objective for both the Feast of
Tabernacles and the Cha-Cha’ac ceremonies. In both ceremonies, liquid was poured on the altar while the king (Israel) or the
shaman (Mesoamerica) prayed for rain. It was at the Feast of
Tabernacles in Jerusalem that Christ spoke of the “living water”
(see John 7:36–38). The Lord was saying, in so many words, that
he was the living water from which all should drink.
We do not know if the Maya ever knew the significance
of water in this sense, but the Nephites did. It was Jehovah
(Christ) who spoke through the prophet Jeremiah when he
said, “They have forsaken me the fountain of living waters”
(Jeremiah 2:13). Jeremiah lived in Lehi’s time.
. . . When the Cha-Cha’ac ritual was completed, as is similar to the Sukkot, the Maya sat around the table/altar and
feasted on the food that was prepared for this occasion. This
was a time of joy, whether performed by the Hebrews or the
Maya. (p. 30)
This is a fascinating parallel. We have a Hebrew festival that appears to
be very similar to a Maya festival. How could the Maya have received
such knowledge without the Nephite influence? Wirth uses that question as its own answer, with no attempt to find out whether or not
there really is another explanation for the parallels she draws.
At issue is the nature of the parallels themselves. She acknowledges that the modern Maya perform this ceremony. She assumes,
without any evidence, that it was performed anciently. While that is
certainly possible, some argument to that fact is required in order to
bridge the gap of nearly sixteen hundred years between the close of the
Book of Mormon and this modern practice.
Even if we could accept the great difference in time, we have a Maya
ceremony compared to a Hebrew ceremony. The unstated assertion
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is that it is a remembrance of faithful Nephite practice. The problem
with that assertion is that the Nephites were probably in Zoque territory from about 200 bc to the end of their days. The Maya would
have fallen under the label of “Lamanite.” Wirth never tells us how a
faithful Nephite ceremony would cross linguistic, cultural, and (most
importantly) hate-laden boundaries to be adopted (faithfully) by apostate Lamanites.
A final problem here is the very assumption of causality in the
parallels. For her case to be effective, Wirth would need to demonstrate that the two ceremonies exhibit unique features that would be
difficult to replicate by independent invention. Unfortunately, these
parallels between the two ceremonies are quite easily explained by
independent invention based on a similar goal and a similar approach
to manipulating the spiritual world. For example, Wirth notes that
both ceremonies include a prayer for rain (pp. 27, 29). The parallel of
the pouring of water is just as likely to be an independent realization
that poured water is a form of invoking the falling water of rain.
One of the failings of the methodology of parallels is that much
of what is “parallel” comes in the art of the telling. Similarities are
heightened and differences typically ignored. In this case, Wirth overstates the parallels. She says of the Hebrew ceremony: “Tvedtnes also
says that Sukkot (the Feast of Tabernacles) was ‘the reenactment of
Yahweh’s [Jehovah’s/Christ’s] enthronement as king of the universe
and controller of the elements’ ” (p. 28). For the Maya, she notes that
“when a Maya shaman was in charge of the Cha-Cha’ac, he was considered their supreme god, just as the Hebrew king represented God”
(p. 29). While both statements are true, Wirth sees them as directly
parallel. Their important differences are left unexamined.
In most ceremonies, the practitioners enter a state where they represent deities (or representatives of a different realm), so that in and
of itself is not a compelling connection between the two ceremonies.
We must assume that Wirth did not notice the significant conceptual
difference between acting as a god and being seated as a king. In par-
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ticular, the Maya idea of deity is sufficiently different from the Hebrew
conception as to make precise comparisons more difficult.20
Wirth’s chapter on Quetzalcoatl and Jesus Christ will certainly
be popular because it presents some new perspectives while retaining
the old connection between the two. Her analysis is very heavily based
on both the perception of parallels and the dismissal of differences as
apostasy from the true remembrance. I am particularly familiar with
the sources and issues of this historical and methodological problem
and have written extensively on the issue.21 In a word, I find no evidence that supports the conclusions Wirth draws. She does not engage
my research.
Similarly, although she at least acknowledges a contrary position
concerning Izapa Stela 5, she does not engage that argument but glosses
over it: “Latter-day Saint archaeologists do not completely agree with
the interpretation of this stela, but even so, there appear to be strong
parallels between the design of Stela 5 and similar themes found in the
Near East” (p. 85).22 When parallels are proposed as evidence in the
face of contrary data, more is required than the simple assertion that
the parallel is “strong.”
Although impressing non–Latter-day Saint archaeologists like
Michael Coe is never the ultimate goal of Latter-day Saint scholarship on
the Book of Mormon, many of the reasons why Coe found such efforts
20. Karl Taube, The Major Gods of Ancient Yucatan (Washington, DC: Dumbarton
Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1992), 8; and Stephen D. Houston and David
Stuart, “Of Gods, Glyphs, and Kings: Divinity and Rulership among the Classic Maya,”
Antiquity 70 (1996): 290.
21. See my studies “The Christianization of Quetzalcoatl,” Sunstone 10/11 (1986):
6–10; “Digging for Quetzalcoatl’s Christian Roots,” http://frontpage2k.nmia.com/
~nahualli/LDStopics/DigQ/DigQ%20TOC.htm (accessed 23 September 2008); and most
recently an expanded discussion in Second Witness, 5:353–95.
22. Wirth cites John E. Clark as one archaeologist who holds a contrary opinion.
See Clark’s study “A New Artistic Rendering of Izapa Stela 5: A Step Toward Improved
Interpretation,” Journal of Book of Mormon Studies 8/1 (1999): 22–33. I strongly suggest that when a believing Latter-day Saint archaeologist of high professional standing,
such as John Clark, disagrees with an interpretation, he or she deserves a fair hearing
rather than a summary dismissal. For the record, I agree with Clark. Regarding the Near
Eastern parallels that Wirth sees in the Book of Mormon, the same could also be said for
Scandinavia and the Far East. Tree of life symbolism is widespread, and Wirth does not
examine the imagery outside the Near East. See Gardner, Second Witness, 1:154–56.
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unconvincing should be warning signals that some of the arguments set
forth by Latter-day Saints really are unacceptable. This is not to say that
stronger connections between Mesoamerica and the Book of Mormon
are not to be expected. In fact, John E. Clark, a prominent Latter-day
Saint archaeologist who specializes in Mesoamerica, has noted: “As seen
by science, the Book of Mormon is stronger today than it was in 1830,
1844, 1950, or even 2000, so I expect it will continue to become stronger in the future. . . . The absolute percentages of confirmed items will
change, of course, but not likely the pattern. If the book were a hoax, we
would not expect any more than about 1 percent of the items to be confirmed beyond random chance, but several hundred items supporting
the book’s historical validity have already been verified.”23
As I noted at the beginning, Wirth’s mentors are excellent and her
familiarity with Mesoamerican materials is impressive and encouraging. Her knowledge of the field is an obvious improvement over what
many other Latter-day Saint authors bring to the discussion. Along
with her accomplishments, I would like to see a similar upgrade in her
caution with secondary sources and particularly in the methodology
she uses when comparing cultural aspects seen in the Book of Mormon
with what is known about Mesoamerica. When she applies her talents
to those improvements, I will be first in line for the next book.

23. John E. Clark, “Archaeological Trends and Book of Mormon Origins,” in The
Worlds of Joseph Smith: A Bicentennial Conference at the Library of Congress, ed. John W.
Welch (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2006), 95.

“Common-Sense” Meets the Book of
Mormon: Source, Substance, and
Prophetic Disruption
Terryl L. Givens

T

homas O’Dea’s opinion of the Book of Mormon’s importance in
Mormonism is evident in his choice to make it the first chapter
following his introduction. He spends little more than a page summarizing the Book of Mormon before he immediately turns to the question that seems inevitably to impose itself at the forefront of so many
Book of Mormon discussions: how do we explain its origin? Such a
preoccupation does not self-evidently present itself; one would not
expect to find, and in fact does not find, that accounts of the Qurʾan,
for instance, typically exhibit the felt burden of “explaining” the reve
lations that constitute that book of scripture. That the question arises
so starkly in the case of the Book of Mormon may have to do with
the striking nearness in our past of such claims to supernaturalism—
“seeing visions in the age of railways,” as Charles Dickens marveled.1
Even though O’Dea, like virtually all non-Mormon scholars
who have tackled the subject before and since, could not bracket the

This essay originally appeared in Cardell K. Jacobson, John P. Hoffmann, and Tim B.
Heaton, eds., Revisiting Thomas F. O’Dea’s The Mormons: Contemporary Perspectives
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2008), 79–98. Reprinted here courtesy of the
University of Utah Press, this updated version includes additional documentation and
minor editorial adjustments. Thomas O’Dea (1915–1974) was a respected Catholic sociologist whose 1957 book The Mormons (University of Chicago Press) was generally sympathetic towards the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
1. Charles Dickens, “In the Name of the Prophet—Smith!” Household Words (19 July
1851): 385.
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problem of the book’s origin, the respect and seriousness of intent he
accorded Mormons and their book of scripture were certainly historic
milestones. O’Dea was able to take the Book of Mormon seriously precisely because he did not take seriously Mormon claims for its origin.
By matter-of-factly naturalizing the supernatural story of its coming
forth, he could consider the problem one of simple environmental
influence—a “common-sense explanation,” as he put it (p. 24).
He quickly dismisses the Spaulding theory of authorship as an antiMormon ploy before rejecting, on the charge that medical evidence is
lacking, I. Woodbridge Riley’s 1902 theory that made “bad ancestry
and epilepsy” the catalysts to Joseph Smith’s visions. Apparently, O’Dea
believed dubious progenitors alone cannot account for spontaneous
revelations. Instead, O’Dea follows in the track laid down by Alexander
Campbell in 1831. In his rather vehement assault on the Book of
Mormon, Campbell characterized the work as a mishmash of
every error and almost every truth discussed in New York for
the last ten years. He decides all the great controversies;—infant
baptism, ordination, the trinity, regeneration, repentance, justification, the fall of man, the atonement, transubstantiation,
fasting, penance, church government, religious experience, the
call to the ministry, the general resurrection, eternal punishment, who may baptize, and even the question of free masonry,
republican government, and the rights of man.2
With heftier scholarly credentials but a like hostility to Mormonism’s founder, Fawn Brodie employed the same approach in her
influential 1945 biography.3 She cites the above passage from Camp2. Alexander Campbell, “Delusions,” The Millennial Harbinger, 7 February 1831,
93. This quotation also appears, with slight variation in mechanics, in Campbell’s book
Delusions. An Analysis of the Book of Mormon; with an Examination of Its Internal
and External Evidences, and a Refutation of Its Pretences to Divine Authority (Boston:
Benjamin H. Greene, 1832), 13.
3. Brodie’s was by no measure an attempt at objective history. In her own words,
though raised a Latter-day Saint, she had become “convinced before I ever began writing
that Joseph Smith was not a true Prophet.” Confessing afterward to resentment at having
been “conned” by the church, she set out to account for “the whole problem of [Smith’s]
credibility.” “Biography of Fawn McKay Brodie,” interview by Shirley E. Stephenson,
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bell approvingly, arguing that “the book can best be explained, not
by Smith’s ignorance nor by his delusions, but by his responsiveness
to the provincial opinions of his time.” The book, she writes in terms
that parallel Campbell’s, is “absolutely American, . . . an obscure compound of folklore, moral platitude, mysticism, and millennialism.”4 So
it is that O’Dea also opts for this “simple common-sense explanation,”
which he attributes to Brodie rather than to its original expositor,
Campbell. O’Dea’s characterization of Smith’s motives, however, was
less hostile than either. True enough, he thinks Smith a deceiver (after
slipping into the wrong tense at one point in the “translation,” O’Dea
writes, Smith had to scramble “to keep from exposing himself before
his scribe” (p. 40). So it is far from clear, having stripped Smith’s modus
operandi of a supernatural character, exactly what O’Dea might mean
by his conclusion that “an atmosphere of religious excitement . . . led
[Smith] from necromancy into revelation, from revelation to prophecy, and from prophecy to leadership of an important religious movement” (p. 24).
It is perhaps inevitable that, bidden or unbidden, preconceptions
about the origins of a book so thoroughly immersed in supernaturalism and controversy will condition the reading of the text. But by
raising the question of origins at the outset, stipulating a naturalistic origin, and then defining the book summatively as “an American
document” “in content as well as origin” (p. 26), O’Dea (like Brodie)
has transformed his whole enterprise in this chapter into an elaboration of, and only of, those Book of Mormon themes that correspond
to religious and political concerns of early-nineteenth-century New
York. This is lamentable. Not because supernatural origins are precluded, but because such reductionism impoverishes the text and
one’s openness to any mystery or surprises it may have yielded under a
less constraining paradigm. This is apparent when one considers how
robbed one would feel if an otherwise perceptive and astute critic were
30 November 1975. Oral History Collection, Fullerton State University, Fullerton, CA.
Cited in Newell G. Bringhurst, “Fawn Brodie and Her Quest for Independence,” Dialogue:
A Journal of Mormon Thought 22/2 (Summer 1986): 79.
4. Fawn M. Brodie, No Man Knows My History: The Life of Joseph Smith, the Mormon
Prophet (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), 69, 67.
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to apply the same method to Hamlet. What would be lost in proving
its “origins and content” are comprehended through the “simple common-sense explanation” of its being an Elizabethan document that in
a straightforward, unproblematic manner reflects religious and political ideas swirling about in early-seventeenth-century England?
So also is it too simple to call the Book of Mormon “obviously an
American work growing in the soil of American concerns” in terms
of its “plot” and “patriotism” and “conception of government” (pp. 32,
34). Richard Bushman, writing in 1976, argues convincingly that any
alleged correspondence between the Book of Mormon themes and
nineteenth-century American political culture, though superficially
appealing, collapses upon inspection. He locates in political literature of the 1820s three “of the most obvious contemporaneous ideas
about government and the American Revolution”: revolution as heroic
resistance to tyranny, the stimulus of enlightened ideas about human
rights, and the merits of (largely Lockean) constitutional principles.
The Book of Mormon text, he demonstrates,
was an anomaly on the political scene of 1830. Instead of heroically resisting despots, the people of God fled their oppressors
and credited God alone with deliverance. Instead of enlightened people overthrowing their kings in defense of their natural rights, the common people repeatedly raised up kings, and
the prophets and the kings themselves had to persuade the people of the inexpediency of monarchy. Despite Mosiah’s reforms,
Nephite government persisted in monarchical practices, with
life tenure for the chief Judges, hereditary succession, and the
combination of all functions in one official.
“In view of all this,” he concludes, “the Book of Mormon could be
pictured as a bizarre creation, a book strangely distant from the time
and place of its publication.”5
Even among non-Mormon readers of the text, no consensus has
emerged on the question of the Book of Mormon’s relationship to
5. Richard L. Bushman, “The Book of Mormon and the American Revolution,” BYU
Studies 17/1 (Autumn 1976): 17–18.
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Smith’s environment. Some critics have continued to ferret out connections to contemporary issues—but at times they see diametrically
opposed influences. Like Campbell and Brodie, more recent scholars
have drawn attention to the book’s engagement with theological issues
of contemporary relevance. Ironically, O’Dea thought it patently obvious that “the doctrine of the book is wholeheartedly and completely
Arminian” (p. 28), whereas Marvin Hill follows Brodie in writing,
“Theologically the Book of Mormon was a mediating text standing between orthodox Calvinists and emerging Arminians,” and he
points to “passages which are strongly anti-Universalist” as evidence
of “the Calvinistic inclinations in the text.”6 Even Mormon scholar
Thomas Alexander agrees in an influential 1980 essay that the Book
of Mormon betrays a “pessimistic” assessment of human nature that
Smith only gradually moved beyond.7 Echoing this appraisal of the
Book of Mormon’s purported Calvinism, one scholar contrasts it with
the radical humanism of Smith’s later preaching and asks, referring
to a sermon expounding the doctrine of theosis, “Was the Book of
Mormon buried with King Follett?”8 The same scholar insists that
“while human beings are, as some Mormons are fond of repeating,
‘gods in embryo’ in the sense that they are the spirit offspring of a
divine being, the Book of Mormon teaches that humans are also devils in embryo in the sense that, without a savior, they would naturally
devolve into diabolical, not divine, beings.”9 Community of Christ
scholar Bruce Lindgren cites Helaman 12:4–7, referring to human
foolishness, vanity, evil, and “nothingness,” as further proof that the
book is “pessimistic about human nature.”10
6. Marvin S. Hill, Quest for Refuge: The Mormon Flight from American Pluralism
(Salt Lake City: Signature, 1989), 21.
7. Thomas G. Alexander, “The Reconstruction of Mormon Doctrine: From Joseph
Smith to Progressive Theology,” Sunstone, July–August 1980, 24–33.
8. J. Frederic Voros Jr., “Was the Book of Mormon Buried with King Follett?”
Sunstone, March 1987, 15–18.
9. Voros, “Was the Book of Mormon Buried?” 16.
10. A. Bruce Lindgren, “Sign or Scripture: Approaches to the Book of Mormon,”
Dialogue 19/1 (September 1986). See his “Sin and Redemption in the Book of Mormon,”
Restoration Studies II (Independence, MO: Herald House, 1983), 201–6.
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Jon Butler, in a different vein, explores frontier cultural continuities with Alma 36. In this conversion narrative, Alma the Younger
lapses into three days of unconsciousness, only to be restored three
days later, spiritually reborn of God through the mercy of Jesus Christ.
Butler writes that “during Methodist ‘love-feasts,’ some participants
fainted.” In one recorded case, a man “‘continued so long, that his
flesh grew cold.’ . . . But the man did not die and, like others, was
physically revived and spiritually reborn. ‘He began to praise God for
what he had done for his soul.’”11 O’Dea likewise noted similarities
to the “dignified revivalism of New England” (pp. 28, 40). Other parallels that continue to emerge in environmental discussions include
nineteenth-century antimasonry and anti-Catholicism.
The author’s view of human nature is not the only point of controversy among theorists of the Book of Mormon’s origins. Alexander
Campbell was absolutely confident in asserting that “there never
was a book more evidently written by one set of fingers.”12 Philastus
Hurlbut and Eber D. Howe propounded in 1833 that the real author
was Solomon Spaulding, whose manuscript Sidney Rigdon reworked
with Joseph Smith.13 “The book of Mormon is a bungling and stupid
production,”14 wrote one journalist, a “farrago of balderdash,” decreed
Edmund Wilson.15 Critics have “failed to note the intellectuality of
the Book of Mormon” (p. 30), and “there are places where the Book
of Mormon rises to impressive heights” (p. 37), complains O’Dea,
11. Jon Butler, Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 240.
12. Campbell, “Delusions,” 93. Partially reprinted in Francis W. Kirkham, A New
Witness for Christ in America (Independence, MO: Zion’s Printing, 1951), 2:104–09. A
useful overview of Book of Mormon critics, with a lively rebuttal, is the nine-part series
by Hugh Nibley, “‘Mixed Voices’: A Study on Book of Mormon Criticism,” first published
in the Improvement Era (May–June 1959) and reprinted in Nibley, The Prophetic Book of
Mormon (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book and FARMS, 1989), 148–206.
13. Hurlbut first proposed the connection, which Howe then elaborated in print as
Mormonism Unvailed (1834).
14. “The Mormons,” The Religious Herald, 9 April 1840, 1.
15. Bernard deVoto, “The Centennial of Mormonism,” American Mercury 19 (1930):
5; Edmund Wilson, The Dead Sea Scrolls 1947–1969 (Glasgow: William Collins and Sons,
1985), 275.
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again following Brodie.16 Clearly, O’Dea’s treatment, although it represented progress in its tone, enhanced our understanding of the Book
of Mormon very little, by remaining within the narrow constraints of
a facile environmentalism.
Recognizing the ultimate insufficiency of cultural influences
to account for the Book of Mormon taken as a whole, an intrigued
observer like Harold Bloom, perhaps the most famous contemporary (non-Mormon) admirer of Joseph Smith, refers to the prophet
as an authentic “religious genius.”17 Many Mormons would be happy
for the compliment. Such a tribute, however, as foremost historian of
Mormonism Richard Bushman realizes, is still just another kind of
intellectual failure to come to terms with the golden bible. “Genius, by
common admission, carries human achievement beyond the limits of
simple historical explanation, just as revelation does. To say that the
Book of Mormon could only be written by a genius is logically not
much different from saying God revealed it. In both cases, we admit
that historical analysis fails us.”18
At the same time, Bloom does move us beyond the confines of
environmentalism by at least acknowledging there is more here than
can be dispatched of by a glance at the Manchester Library holdings.
Although he seems more intrigued by the writing Smith later produced purporting to be the “Book of Abraham” than by the Book of
Mormon, Bloom was himself impressed by Joseph Smith’s uncanny
ability to tie into occult and kabbalistic traditions, with no vehicle of
transmission apparent—or even plausible—in the immediate cultural
16. Though considering the Book of Mormon an imposture from first to last, Brodie
also acknowledged its “elaborate design” and noted that “its narrative is coherently
spun,” revealing “a measure of learning and a fecund imagination.” Fawn Brodie, No
Man Knows My History: The Life of Joseph Smith the Mormon Prophet (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1945), 69.
17. Harold Bloom, The American Religion: The Emergence of the Post-Christian
Nation (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 80.
18. Richard L. Bushman, “The Secret History of Mormonism,” Sunstone, March
1996, 66–70. Compare Rodney Stark’s criticism of Max Weber: “When Weber wrote
that ‘We shall understand “prophet” to mean a purely individual bearer of charisma,’ he
said nothing more than that charismatics have charisma.” Rodney Stark, “A Theory of
Revelations,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 38/2 (1999): 304.
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context. Other scholars have also, moving beyond Bushman, argued
for connections to sources and ideas that are “strangely distant” from,
rather than contiguous with, New York folk culture and proximate
religious currents. Expanding the search from Smith’s neighborhood
to the entire Western occult tradition, John Brooke has gone further
afield than most in his search for influences and sources. As one review
fairly characterizes his study,
Brooke attempts to find hermeticism, Freemasonry, and
alchemy in the translation process and text of the Book of
Mormon. . . . Brooke searches for any and every thought or
act of Joseph Smith and other early Mormons that he can see
as related—however vaguely—to hermetic, Masonic, alchemical, or other occultic ideas. He first focuses on ideas of priesthood, mysteries, temples, cosmology, and preexistence. . . .
Joseph’s marriage, sex life, and plural marriages are seen as
“replicat[ing] the hermetic concept of divinization through
the coniunctio, the alchemical marriage.”19
Brooke concedes that the question of how these elements might have
been conveyed from “late-sixteenth-century Europe to the New York
countryside in the early nineteenth century” is “problematic.”20
It is, of course, possible that a genuinely ancient record could
appear, shrouded in spurious stories about its recovery. For most readers, however, ancient Israelites in America who kept records on plates of
gold are just as incredible as angel messengers and miraculous “interpreters.” O’Dea does not explicitly state why the Book of Mormon does
not deserve consideration as ancient history or ancient scripture, but
implies that it is the modern resonance of the content—nowhere more
baldly in evidence than in its explicit messianism. “The expectations
of the Nephites are those of nineteenth-century American Protestants
19. William J. Hamblin, Daniel C. Peterson, and George L. Mitton, “Mormon in
the Fiery Furnace, Or, Loftes Tryk Goes to Cambridge,” review of The Refiner’s Fire: The
Making of Mormon Cosmology, 1644–1844, by John L. Brooke, Review of Books on the
Book of Mormon 6/2 (1994): 8.
20. John L. Brooke, The Refiner’s Fire: The Making of Mormon Cosmology, 1644–1844
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), xiv.
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rather than of biblical Hebrews,” he writes, adding there is but little “difference between what a Nephite prophet and a New York revivalist says”
(p. 39). Indeed, Latter-day Saints today are even more unabashed about
proclaiming the text a pre-Christian testament to Christ than they were
in 1957, when O’Dea published The Mormons. Since 1982, the scripture
has borne the subtitle “Another Testament of Jesus Christ.”
Perhaps the most that can be offered in this regard is that Book
of Mormon writers seem themselves aware of the anomalous nature
of their prophecies, always couching them in the context of extraordinary revelation. Lehi preaches the time of the Messiah’s coming
apparently based on an inspired dream (1 Nephi 10:2–4). Nephi refers
to the coming Messiah as Jesus Christ, “according to . . . the word of
the angel of God” (2 Nephi 25:21). His mother’s name, Mary, was likewise made known to King Benjamin “by an angel from God” (Mosiah
3:2–8). Alma knows the Savior shall be born of Mary in Jerusalem
because “the Spirit hath said this much unto me” (Alma 7:9), and so
on. Still, the Book of Mormon’s Christocentrism is radically pervasive
and explicit and detailed, vastly more so than the vague messianic
prophecies of an Isaiah or Psalmist. If the extensive supernaturalism
surrounding Smith’s production of the Book of Mormon is not immediately dissuasive, the pre-Christian Christianity of the Nephites
frequently is. Perhaps, since both ultimately rely on an embrace or
rejection of highly personalized, extracanonical revelation, one to
modern prophets like Joseph Smith and the other to ancient dispersed
Israelites, Latter-day Saint apologists have concerned themselves but
little with the scripture’s most prima facie anachronicity.
As for the other elements of the record amenable to historical investigation, Mormons had before 1957 produced little evidence to lend
them particular plausibility. O’Dea wrote at a moment when Mormons
were just beginning to apply the tools of archaeology to buttress their
belief in the Book of Mormon as an authentic, ancient text. Brigham
Young University had created a chair in that discipline in 1945, and a
few years later fieldwork began in southeastern Mexico—deemed the
heart of Book of Mormon lands by Latter-day Saint scholars. Thomas
Ferguson, an amateur scholar, became a fund-raiser, proponent, and
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organizer behind the effort to solve “the paramount problem of origins of the great civilizations of Middle America.”21 The solution, he
clearly believed, was to be found by corroborating archaeologically
the account given in the Book of Mormon. Mormons devoured the
products of the effort, such as the 1950 publication by Ferguson and
Milton R. Hunter, Ancient America and the Book of Mormon. Similar
titles quickly followed, but non-Mormon scholars paid no attention,
and serious scholars within the church criticized such efforts for doing
more harm than good to the cause of Book of Mormon apologetics.
O’Dea apparently was oblivious to their efforts, or felt the evidence
mustered in such volumes beneath notice.
More serious—and durable—work was being done at this time by
Hugh Nibley, whose publications on the Book of Mormon remain the
standard for apologetic research. A recent outline of his contributions
surveys forty-five topics in which he finds historical corroboration
for Book of Mormon themes, practices, and textual elements.22 From
Egyptian etymologies for personal names, the word for “honeybee”
(deseret), and the motifs of luminous stones and dancing princesses
in the book of Ether to the practice of olive culture and the naming
of geographical features, Nibley excavates a host of ancient cultural
information to make the Book of Mormon appear naturally congruent with a Middle Eastern setting. His analysis includes comparing Lehi’s rhetoric with the qasida, or desert poetry, and examining
Book of Mormon assemblies in the light of new-year rites described
in Old World texts. He finds ancient precedents for unusual phrase
ology (such as “the cold and silent grave, from whence no traveler can
return” and the often-mentioned “land of Jerusalem”) and for the
book’s introductory and concluding style of colophons. He verifies the
historical correctness of Nephi’s hunting weapons (bows and slings)
21. Alfred V. Kidder and Thomas Stuart Ferguson, “Plan for Archaeological Work in
an Important Zone in Middle America,” cited in Stan Larson, Quest for the Gold Plates:
Thomas Stuart Ferguson’s Archaeological Search for the Book of Mormon (Salt Lake City:
Freethinker Press, 1994), 43.
22. Daniel McKinlay, “Appendix: Echoes and Evidences from the Writings of Hugh
Nibley,” in Echoes and Evidences of the Book of Mormon, ed. Donald W. Parry, Daniel C.
Peterson, and John W. Welch (Provo, UT: FARMS, 2002), 453–88.
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and finds a striking etymology for the peculiar word Hermounts, a
Book of Mormon wilderness infested with wild beasts. In Egypt he
locates a district called Hermonthis, named after Montu, the Egyptian
god “of wild places and things.” Ritual games in which life and limb
are forfeit, peculiar rites of execution, and hiding up treasures unto
the Lord—all are Book of Mormon elements that find Old World antecedents under Nibley’s expansive scholarship.
For all his efforts, Nibley found few to pay attention to his work
outside Mormon circles. One prominent scholar of Near Eastern studies, though completely unpersuaded by Smith’s angel stories, nonetheless agreed with Nibley that one cannot explain away the presence in
the Book of Mormon of genuinely Egyptian names, such as Paanchi
and Pahoran, in close connection with a reference to the text as written in “reformed Egyptian.”23 Otherwise, Nibley registered little outside impact.
A few decades after O’Dea wrote, Book of Mormon scholarship
gathered new life with the formation of the Foundation for Ancient
Research and Mormon Studies (FARMS) in 1979. In the years since,
scholars associated with that institute are growing in confidence that
“there is mounting up a considerable body of analysis demonstrating
that at least something of the strangeness of the Book of Mormon is
due to the presence in it of other ancient and complex literary forms
which Joseph Smith is highly unlikely to have discovered on his own,
and showing as well that its contents are rich and subtle beyond the
suspicions of even the vast majority of its most devout readers.”24
As even a determined skeptic admits, it is hard to ignore the “striking coincidences between elements in the Book of Mormon and the
ancient world, and some notable matters of Book of Mormon style.”25
23. William F. Albright to Grant S. Heward (25 July 1966). Cited in John A. Tvedtnes,
John Gee, and Matthew Roper, “Book of Mormon Names Attested in Ancient Hebrew
Inscriptions,” Journal of Book of Mormon Studies 9/1 (2000): 45.
24. Daniel C. Peterson, “Editor’s Introduction: By What Measure Shall We Mete?”
Review of Books on the Book of Mormon 2 (1990): xxiii.
25. David P. Wright, “‘In Plain Terms That We May Understand’: Joseph Smith’s
Transformation of Hebrew in Alma 12–13,” in New Approaches to the Book of Mormon,
ed. Brent Lee Metcalfe (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1993), 165n.
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In a much-heralded 1998 paper, two Evangelicals, Paul Owen and Carl
Mosser, acknowledge that “in recent years the sophistication and erudition of LDS apologetics has risen considerably . . . [and] is clearly
seen in their approach to the Book of Mormon.” As difficult as it may
be to accept, “LDS academicians are producing serious research which
desperately needs to be critically examined,” they insist.26
John Welch first noted how chiasmus, or inverted parallelism, a
poetic structure common in antiquity, turns out to be pervasive in
the Book of Mormon.27 Though it is common, in small doses, to many
poets across time, the examples in the Book of Mormon are at times
remarkably intricate and prolonged. Donald Parry and others have
focused on many other examples of Hebraic structures in the Book of
Mormon.28 And John Sorenson has made an impressive case, based
on both geographical and anthropological approaches, for an ancient
American setting for the Book of Mormon, working with some seven
hundred geographical references in the text.29 Other scholars have followed Nibley in arguing for compelling parallels involving coronation
festivals and other cultural practices.30
26. Carl Mosser and Paul Owen, “Mormon Apologetic, Scholarship, and Evangelical
Neglect: Losing the Battle and Not Knowing It?” Trinity Journal, n.s., 19/2 (1998): 181, 185,
189. James White is an Evangelical who does not share Owen and Mosser’s respect for the
work at FARMS. An author himself of anti-Mormon works, White provides some anecdotal evidence to support his claim that FARMS scholarship is at times smug, ad hominem, and misapplied. See his “Of Cities and Swords: The Impossible Task of Mormon
Apologetics,” Christian Research Journal 19/1 (Summer 1996): 28–35. Of this article,
Mosser and Owen say it is “nothing more than straw man argumentation” (202). The
only other example of an attempt to refute Mormon scholarship they can identify is John
Ankerberg and John Weldon, Behind the Mask of Mormonism: From Its Early Schemes to
Its Modern Deceptions (Eugene, OR: Harvest House, 1992), which they dismiss as “ugly,
unchristian, and misleading” (203).
27. John W. Welch, “Chiasmus in the Book of Mormon,” BYU Studies 10/1 (1969):
69–84.
28. See, for instance, Donald W. Parry, The Book of Mormon Text Reformatted
According to Parallelistic Patterns (Provo, UT: FARMS, 1992).
29. John L. Sorenson, An Ancient American Setting for the Book of Mormon (Salt Lake
City: Deseret Book and FARMS, 1996).
30. Nibley first cast the Benjamin speech as an ancient year-rite festival in 1957. See
his book An Approach to the Book of Mormon, 3rd ed. (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book and
FARMS, 1988), 295–310.
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More recent work has involved mapping the possible route of Lehi’s
family through the Arabian wilderness and finding a number of striking fits. Candidates for the Valley of Lemuel have been argued, a general
route along the Incense Trail agreed upon, and consensus reached that
the point of departure in the verdant land Bountiful “must have been
located along the southern coast of Oman.”31 One of the most vocal
critics of Book of Mormon historicity has scoffed that archaeologists
have no more chance of finding evidence of Book of Mormon placenames “than of discovering the ruins of the bottomless pit described in
the book of Revelations [sic].”32 Yet in the 1990s, archaeologists found
altars near Sanaʾa, Yemen, that confirm unequivocally the historicity
of a place-name (Nahom) mentioned early in the Book of Mormon.
This discovery was made at the very locale where one would expect the
name to appear if the record is authentic.33 In this instance, at least,
hard archaeological evidence sustains in very focused, dramatic fashion
a specific claim made by the Book of Mormon a century and threequarters ago. As of 2005, researchers at FARMS felt confident enough
of the accumulated evidence to produce a film, Journey of Faith, that
recapitulates the journey of Lehi from Jerusalem to the Arabian Sea.34
Others have worked assiduously to establish the plausibility of
Israelite settlement of the New World, either directly, by establishing linguistic parallels (as in the work of Brian Stubbs, a published
expert on the Uto-Aztecan languages who claims a high percentage
31. Terry B. Ball, S. Kent Brown, and Arnold G. Green, “Planning Research on Oman:
The End of Lehi’s Trail,” Journal of Book of Mormon Studies 7/1 (1998): 12–21. An overview of Lehi’s trail is given in S. Kent Brown, “New Light from Arabia on Lehi’s Trail,” in
Parry, Peterson, and Welch, Echoes and Evidences of the Book of Mormon, 55–125.
32. Michael Coe, quoted in Thomas W. Murphy, “Lamanite Genesis, Genealogy, and
Genetics,” in American Apocrypha: Essays on the Book of Mormon, ed. Dan Vogel and
Brent Lee Metcalfe (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 2002), 68.
33. The altar inscription is “NHM.” Interpolating the correct vowels with certainty is
not possible. However, it is certain that what Smith spelled as “Nahom” would have been
rendered “NHM.” A more exact match, in other words, is not possible.
34. Journey of Faith, DVD (Provo, UT: Neal A. Maxwell Institute for Religious
Scholarship, Brigham Young University, and Timpanogos Entertainment, 2006). The
subsequent book version, edited by S. Kent Brown and Peter Johnson, is Journey of Faith:
From Jerusalem to the Promised Land (Provo, UT: Neal A. Maxwell Institute for Religious
Scholarship, 2006).
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of Semitic connections in both grammar and morphology),35 or indirectly, by compiling massive bibliographies of diffusionist evidence (as
in the work of John Sorenson and Martin Raish, who published PreColumbian Contact with the Americas across the Oceans in 1996).36
More recently, Sorenson and Carl Johannessen have collated an
impressive array of biological evidence to the same ends.37
None of these items, of course, taken singly, constitutes decisive
proof that the Book of Mormon is an ancient text. Even their cumulative weight is counterbalanced by what appear to be striking intrusions into the Book of Mormon text of anachronisms, nineteenthcentury parallels, and elements that appear to many scholars to be
historically implausible and inconsistent with what is known about
ancient American cultures. In addition to the echoes of nineteenthcentury folk magic, anti-Catholicism, and religious debates, the Book
of Mormon entails an array of dilemmas for the believer. However,
some of the purported gaffes noted by critics turn out to be bull’s-eyes:
Alma is not a Latin feminine, for example, but an ancient Hebrew
name attested by the Dead Sea Scrolls.38 The purported “Reformed
Egyptian” of the plates does in fact turn out to reflect a genuine mingling of Egyptian and Hebrew cultural traditions in the exilic era,39
and referring to the “land of Jerusalem” has ancient precedents.40 The
barley mentioned in the Book of Mormon was roundly mocked by
35. “Was There Hebrew Language in Ancient America? An Interview with Brian
Stubbs,” Journal of Book of Mormon Studies 9/2 (2000): 54–63.
36. John L. Sorenson and Martin H. Raish, Pre-Columbian Contact with the Americas
across the Oceans, 2 vols. (Provo, UT: Research Press, 1990).
37. See their study “Biological Evidence for Pre-Columbian Transoceanic Voyages,”
in Contact and Exchange in the Ancient World, ed. Victor H. Mair (Honolulu: University
of Hawai’i Press, 2006), 238–97.
38. Hugh W. Nibley, review of Bar-Kochba, by Yigael Yadin, BYU Studies 14/1 (1973):
121; Paul Y. Hoskisson, “Alma as a Hebrew Name,” Journal of Book of Mormon Studies 7/1
(1998): 72–73; Terrence L. Szink, “Further Evidence of a Semitic Alma,” Journal of Book of
Mormon Studies 8/1 (1991): 70.
39. John A. Tvedtnes, “Ancient Texts in Support of the Book of Mormon,” in Parry,
Peterson, and Welch, Echoes and Evidences of the Book of Mormon, 233–35; William J.
Hamblin, “Reformed Egyptian,” FARMS Review 19/1 (2007): 31–35.
40. John A. Tvedtnes, “Cities and Lands in the Book of Mormon,” in Pressing Forward
with the Book of Mormon: The FARMS Updates of the 1990s, ed. John W. Welch and Melvin
J. Thorne (Provo, UT: FARMS, 1999), 164–68; Daniel C. Peterson, “Not Joseph’s, and Not
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critics as recently as 1979 and 1982.41 By the next decade, a best-selling
book referred to a variety of barley as a Native American staple.42
The most recent development in the Book of Mormon wars has been
a flurry of claims that DNA evidence proves the absence of any genetic
link between Native American populations and an Israelite heritage.
Unfortunately, inflated claims by disaffected Mormons and extensive
media exposure have granted a degree of gravity to these allegations
far in excess of their potential for scientific merit. Quite simply, DNA
would be a relevant tool in the debate only if a number of extraordinary
conditions were present. The science can get quite complicated, but the
assumptions on which it is based are not. As Michael Whiting, a molecular biologist and member of a scientific review panel for the National
Science Foundation, points out, at least ten factors make the hypothesis
of American Indian–Israelite connections untestable.43 Among these
are the unlikelihood of the Book of Mormon peoples remaining genetically uncontaminated by any other peoples during their thousand-year
presence in this hemisphere. One would also have to ignore the effects
of genetic contamination among indigenous populations that doubtless
occurred in the fifteen centuries after Book of Mormon history ends.
One would also have to know precisely who, among the vast American
Indian populations of today, are the descendants of what the Book of
Mormon calls “Lamanites.” The very small size of the founding genetic
pools and the shifting genetic identity of the Middle Eastern host population also present challenges to experimental validation.
Rebutting such objections, critics point out that the Book of Mormon’s (noncanonical) introduction refers to the American Indians in
Modern,” in Parry, Peterson, and Welch, Echoes and Evidences of the Book of Mormon,
211.
41. Latayne Colvett Scott, The Mormon Mirage (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1979),
82; Rick Branch, “Nephite Nickels,” The Utah Evangel 29/10 (October 1982): 1. I thank
Matthew Roper for these references from his essay “Right on Target: Boomerang Hits and
the Book of Mormon,” http://www.fairlds.org/FAIR_Conferences/2001_Boomerang_
Hits_and_the_Book_of_Mormon.html (accessed 27 August 2008).
42. Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fate of Human Societies (New York:
Norton, 1997), 150.
43. Michael F. Whiting, “DNA and the Book of Mormon: A Phylogenetic Perspective,”
Journal of Book of Mormon Studies 12/1 (2003): 24–35.
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toto as the principal descendants of the Lamanites and that generations
of church leaders and members have asserted the monopoly of Book
of Mormon peoples in this hemisphere. At this stage of the debate, it
is clear that church teachings, rather than the Book of Mormon itself,
are the vulnerable target. As Book of Mormon scholars have been
pointing out for generations, the scripture itself nowhere claims that
the Jaredites or Lehites established or sustained a presence in the utter
absence of other indigenous or subsequently arrived groups. Similarly,
the record nowhere imputes to them a hemispheric dominion. In fact,
as John Sorenson and others argued long before DNA was a buzzword,
the actual dominions intimated in the geographical references more
nearly approximate the modest size of Palestine than half the globe.
As long ago as 1927, Janne Sjodahl wrote that “students should be cautioned against the error of supposing that all the American Indians
are the descendants of Lehi, Mulek, and their companions,”44 and
in 1938 the church’s Department of Education published a Book of
Mormon study guide that included the statement “The Book of Mormon deals only with the history and expansion of three small colonies
which came to America and it does not deny or disprove the possibility of other immigrations, which probably would be unknown to its
writers.”45 Finally, the Book of Mormon explicitly makes Lamanite a
political and religious, rather than ethnic, designation by the record’s
conclusion.46
This leaves unaddressed, of course, the very real—and problematic
—doctrinal and cultural interpretations of the Book of Mormon that
44. Janne M. Sjodahl, An Introduction to the Study of the Book of Mormon (Salt Lake
City: Deseret News Press, 1927), 435.
45. William E. Berrett, Milton R. Hunter, et al., A Guide to the Study of the Book of
Mormon (Salt Lake City: Department of Education of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints, 1938), 48. The limited-geography model centered in Mesoamerica was originally put forth by a Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (now called
Community of Christ) researcher, Louis E. Hill, in two books: Geography of Mexico and
Central America from 2234 b.c. to 421 a.d. (Independence, MO: n.p., 1917) and Historical
Data from Ancient Records and Ruins of Mexico and Central America (Independence,
MO: L. E. Hill, 1919). This model was widely introduced to Latter-day Saints by Jesse A.
and Jesse N. Washburn beginning in the 1930s.
46. Matthew Roper and John L. Sorenson, “Before DNA,” Journal of Book of
Mormon Studies 12/1 (2003): 11.
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still infuse Latter-day Saint rhetoric and writings. In Mormon popular idiom, Lamanite has long meant and continues to mean “Native
American.” In that regard, it may well be that even Book of Mormon
devotees can find the DNA debates salutary for necessitating a more
careful scrutiny of the textual foundations that support traditional
interpretations.
Just as the DNA controversy has focused attention on the parame
ters of the designation Lamanite in ways that makes its broad application difficult to sustain, other pressures on conventional Book of
Mormon geography (the “hemispheric model”) have similarly been
followed by a shrinking Book of Mormon stage. Since shortly after
O’Dea wrote, scholars at Brigham Young University have zeroed in
on Mesoamerica as the theater of operations for Book of Mormon history, but it was only with the work of John Sorenson in the 1980s that
that model gained general currency.
Narrowing the target solves many problems but incurs others. At
least one objection that so stymied formidable Book of Mormon scholar
B. H. Roberts would have been largely obviated by claiming a limited
model of Book of Mormon settlement. “How to explain the immense
diversity of Indian languages, if all are supposed to be relatively recent
descendants of Lamanite origin?” asked a correspondent.47 If the clan
of Lehi is not the source of an entire hemispheric civilization, and the
Book of Mormon not the record of half the globe’s history for a thousand
years, then a great many objections are indeed seen to be straw men.
Similarly, the daunting population problems are potentially resolved
if Book of Mormon peoples are seen as coexisting with and occasionally assimilating other contemporaneous groups. On the other hand,
by locating with geographical precision the alleged locale for the book’s
millennium-long history, there is no place to hide.
John Clark is one anthropologist who believes the fifty years since
O’Dea have brought more than a redefinition of the Book of Mormon’s
scope. “Only during the last fifty [years],” he writes, “has American
47. The question, posed by one “Mr. Couch,” was passed on by W. E. Riter to James E.
Talmage, 22 August 1921, in B. H. Roberts, Studies of the Book of Mormon, ed. Brigham D.
Madsen, 2nd ed. (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1992), 35.
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archaeology been capable of addressing issues of history and generating reliable facts.”48 Most impressive, he believes, is the congruence
of time lines for the major population groups in the Book of Mormon
and in Mesoamerica. The Olmec civilization, not dated until a decade
after O’Dea wrote, is now considered to have flourished until the
fifth century bc, just when the Jaredite people were annihilated. The
largest upland and lowland Maya cities were similarly destroyed or
abandoned at the same time the Nephite civilization came to its catastrophic end in the fifth century ad. Clark frankly acknowledges that
many problems remain unsolved, but insists the trend is toward fewer,
not more, discrepancies between the record and historical knowledge.
Evaluating sixty criticisms of three nineteenth-century works, for
instance, Clark finds that 60 percent of them have been resolved in
favor of the Book of Mormon. He mentions as examples Old World
steel swords and metal plates and New World cement, barley, and
writing systems.
Clearly, many anachronisms and improbabilities remain. “The
most frequently mentioned deficiencies of the book,” Clark continues,
“concern the lack of hard evidence in the New World for the right
time periods of precious metals, Old World animals and plants and
Book of Mormon place names and personal names. . . . Other probable items await full confirmation, including horses, Solomon-like
temples, scimitars, large armies, a script that may qualify as reformed
Egyptian, and the two hundred years of Nephite peace.”49
Smith was himself confident that time would vindicate his claims
regarding the Book of Mormon. “We can not but think the Lord has
a hand in bringing to pass his strange act, and proving the Book of
Mormon true in the eyes of all the people,” he wrote. “Surely ‘facts
are stubborn things.’ It will be as it ever has been, the world will prove
Joseph Smith a true prophet by circumstantial evidence.”50 So far,
however, it may be that historical approaches are more effective tools
48. John E. Clark, “Archaeological Trends and Book of Mormon Origins,” in The
Worlds of Joseph Smith: A Bicentennial Conference at the Library of Congress, ed. John W.
Welch (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), 87.
49. Clark, “Archaeological Trends,” 95.
50. Times and Seasons, 15 September 1842, 922.
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in the hands of critics than in the hands of believers. This is not necessarily because the balance of evidence weighs more heavily in the
former’s favor. Rather, it is because supporting historical research can
do little to ground or establish religious faith that is not already present, while contrary historical evidence can do much to disable interest and serious investigation on the part of the uncommitted. History
as theology is indeed perilous, as Grant McMurray, past president of
the Community of Christ, has warned51—and his denomination has
found a more comfortable and uncontroversial niche in Protestantism
by retreating from foundational historical narratives about Joseph
Smith and the Book of Mormon. The same impulse led him to say,
upon his succession, that his members needed to move from being “a
people with a prophet” to being a “prophetic people.”52
The Latter-day Saints, however, have opted to make the Prophet
Joseph Smith—and the particular history he related—not just an essential part of Mormon theology, but the foundation of Mormonism’s theology. Retreat from that commitment is not a possibility in a church
and tradition that has erected its entire doctrinal edifice as a logically
interconnected series of historical propositions, running from Smith’s
visitation by embodied deities in the Sacred Grove through his translation of actual gold plates to the receipt of priesthood keys by a whole
series of resurrected beings.
The Book of Mormon’s place as Latter-day Saint scripture is constituted in part by the role it has consistently played as both the evidence
and very ground of Joseph Smith’s prophetic calling, a divine sign of the
opening of a new dispensation that he and he alone was authorized to
initiate, the ground and evidence and physical embodiment of a rift in
heaven through which angels and authority and revelations poured forth
in torrents. It is not what the Book of Mormon contains that Mormons
value, but what it enacts. And that miraculous enactment is its history.
This history begins with prophets inscribing their words on gold plates
two and a half millennia ago; becomes a long history of providential
51. Grant McMurray made this statement in his keynote address at the Mormon
History Association annual meeting, Kirtland, Ohio, 22 May 2003.
52. “RLDS Head Downplays his Role as a Prophet,” Salt Lake Tribune, 29 June 1996, D1.
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preservation; includes divine assurances and prophecies of the manner,
timing, and agency by which it would be committed to a future generation; and culminates as a marvelous work and a wonder, whispering out
of the dust, in Isaiah’s words, delivered up to Joseph Smith by a messenger from the presence of God, and translated by means of priestly
oracles that attest to Smith’s role as seer and revelator, the record itself
testifying of, and embodying, and provoking millions to experience
personally the principle of dialogic revelation—all this is what the Book
of Mormon means to a Latter-day Saint.
“Christianity,” Arthur Schopenhauer wrote, “has this peculiar
disadvantage of not being, like other religions, a pure doctrine, but
is essentially and mainly a narrative or history, a series of events . . . ;
and this very history constitutes the dogma, belief in which leads to
salvation.”53 If this is true of Christianity in general, it is doubly true
of Mormonism in particular. It is therefore hard to bracket the book’s
claims to historical facticity when those claims are both integral to the
religious faith of Mormons and the warp and woof of the record. In
this latter regard, the Book of Mormon is much more like the book of
Exodus or Acts than Psalms or the Sermon on the Mount.
What can and should be done is to reshift the focus from what
the book is to what it enacts. The question, Is the Book of Mormon
true scripture? can be reframed to become, How does new scripture
come to be constituted? In other words, it is important to ask not what
truth it contains, but what truths it reveals. The irony of the search for
a common ground where believers and skeptics, the devout and the
curious, and academics of any persuasion can find agreement is that
the common ground has always been quite obvious. From the fulminations of the Baptist Religious Herald editorialist who confessed
in 1840, “We have never seen a copy of the book of Mormon,” and
then proceeded to damn it unreservedly as a “bungling and stupid
production”54 to the generations of Mormon converts who have testified to its truthfulness, the key truth and point of consensus about the
53. Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays,
trans. E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974), 2:369.
54. “The Mormons,” 1 (see n. 14 herein).
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Book of Mormon has been the same and is revealed in O’Dea’s own
comic but potent insight: “The Book of Mormon has not been universally considered by its critics [or its followers!] as one of those books
that must be read in order to have an opinion of it” (p. 26).
Whether by guile or by inspiration, Smith unarguably produced
something more momentous than a pastiche of biblical verses and
nineteenth-century cultural flotsam and jetsam. O’Dea rightly appreciated that the Mormons were effectively reenacting in the “conditions of
nineteenth-century America the experience of the biblical Hebrews.”55
But he failed—and this was a major failing—to comprehend the significance of the Book of Mormon as a reenactment, and hence demystification and radical reconceptualization, of the very notion of sacred
scripture. To reduce the Book of Mormon to the uncomplicated reworking (by “a normal person living in an atmosphere of religious excitement”) of a few “basic themes,” as O’Dea denominates them (pp. 24,
26)—Arminian ideas from here, a little anticlericalism there, with some
dashes of New England revivalism—is entirely to miss the essence of the
book’s phenomenal power to instill discipleship and to incite hatred, to
found a major religious tradition and to incite hostility, opposition, and
displacement. The Book of Mormon embodies the principle laid down
by William Cantwell Smith and William A. Graham and endorsed by
Shlomo Biderman: “The element of content is not the major factor in
establishing scripture. . . . Because of the enormous diversity of what is
said in scripture, it cannot be defined or characterized by its content.”56
Rather, Biderman writes, “to understand scripture is to understand the
conditions under which a group of texts has gained authority over the
lives of people and has been incorporated into human activities of various important kinds.”57 Joseph Smith understood, as did his disciples
and detractors, that scripture is what is written by prophets and that
what prophets produce is scripture. The Book of Mormon was a sign of
Smith’s claim to prophet status, even more emphatically and concretely
55. Thomas F. O’Dea and Janet O’Dea Aviad, The Sociology of Religion, 2d ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983), 86.
56. Shlomo Biderman, Scripture and Knowledge: An Essay on Religious Epistemology
(New York: Brill, 1995), 12–13.
57. Biderman, Scripture and Knowledge, 50.
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than was his claim to holy visitations from God and Christ and receipt
of priesthood keys from John the Baptist and Peter, James, and John.
The latter were portents and indications of his call; the former was the
very execution and evidence of the office.
What Smith produced was, of course, of “enormous diversity”:
migrations and genealogies and sermons and wars and prophecies
and midrash and allegories and details on horticulture, military tactics, and a monetary system. Ultimately, however, this daunting diversity was a distraction. It was the book’s transgression of boundaries
and limits through a series of paradoxical displacements that constituted Smith’s real work of prophetic disruption. The Book of Mormon
affirmed the Bible’s status as scripture, even as it undermined it.
“These last records,” the book prophesied of itself, “shall establish the
truth of the first, which are of the twelve apostles of the Lamb.” But as
Nephi reveals in his next sentence, to “establish” the truth of the Bible
actually entailed establishing its insufficiency. “[These records] shall
make known the plain and precious things which have been taken
away from them” (see 1 Nephi 13:39–40). Even as it affirms “the gospel
of Jesus Christ” and guarantees its restoration in purity, the Book of
Mormon demolishes the Bible’s monopoly on its articulation: “I shall
speak unto the Jews and they shall write it; and I shall also speak unto
the Nephites and they shall write it; and I shall also speak unto the
other tribes of the house of Israel, which I have led away, and they shall
write it; and I shall also speak unto all nations of the earth and they
shall write it” (2 Nephi 29:12).
The book testifies to Christ’s incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection, then explodes their sublime historical uniqueness by reenacting Christ’s ministry and ascension in a New World setting. Similarly,
it affirms Jehovah’s covenants with Israel, even as it specifies America
as a separate “land of promise” and then chronicles a whole series of
portable Zions founded and abandoned in successive waves.
Such multiple disruptions galvanized or offended those who
knew the Book of Mormon or its message, but they were the unmistakable focus of proselytizing and criticism alike. As such, the Book
of Mormon revealed a great deal—and still does—about the bois-
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terous interplay of democratic yearnings and covenantal elitism; of
visionary utterance with its promise and danger; of the longing for
religious tradition, stability, and boundaries; and of the appeal of religious dynamism and exceptionalism. The Book of Mormon, in terms
of origin and production, may still be a conundrum for the majority
who approach it. But it may serve much more effectively than it has as
a lens to better understand the conceptual universe it both engaged
and provoked, and to affect the hearts and minds of those who cannot
read it with indifference.

A Brief Survey of
Ancient Near Eastern Beekeeping
Ronan James Head

And they did also carry with them deseret, which, by interpretation, is a honey bee; and thus they did carry with them
swarms of bees. (Ether 2:3)

T

he figure of the honeybee has played a small but interesting role
in American history. For example, Tammy Horn, in Bees in
America: How the Honey Bee Shaped the Nation,1 describes how the
English colonization of the New World was analogized through the
use of the bee. New colonies were “hived off” to prosper in America,
the new “land of milk and honey.”2 The industry of the bee—and its
sought-after honey and wax—made it a popular symbol of a righteous
economy.3 The skep hive is well known in Masonic heraldry, a symbol

1. Tammy Horn, Bees in America: How the Honey Bee Shaped a Nation (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 2005).
2. The European honeybee was introduced to North America with the early
English colonists, but the period before 1850 represents a rather primitive time for
American apiculture. Foulbrood spores, and the German wax moth in particular, devastated bee colonies in the early nineteenth century. Also, the lack of a smoker made
apiculture a cumbersome affair. In 1851 Lorenzo Langstroth invented a hive with
removable frames that made it easier to manage bee colonies and protect them from
intruders. Still, conditions before 1850 were favorable enough for beekeeping that New
York state was described as a “beekeeper’s paradise.” Eva Crane, The World History of
Beekeeping and Honey Hunting (London: Duckworth, 1999), 307. This was generally
true of the United States east of the Mississippi.
3. Crane, World History of Beekeeping, 604–7.
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also used by the Latter-day Saints for the land of Deseret.4 The hive
on the seal of the state of Utah (and elsewhere) is a direct allusion to a
bee described in the Book of Mormon, and although the use of the bee
as a symbol of industry is not restricted to Mormonism, Deseret, the
particular name of the Mormon bee, is unique.5
The Book of Mormon narrates three migrations from the Old to
the New World. The first—that of the Jaredites—involved the migration of a small band of people, led by the brother of Jared, from what
the Book of Mormon calls the “great tower.” The brother of Jared and
his companions are described as being well prepared for a long migration when they left the tower. Ether 2:1–3 describes their provisions on
their initial journey: flocks, fowls, fish, bees, and seeds. Only the bees
are described by their original Jaredite name, deseret:
And it came to pass that Jared and his brother, and their families, and also the friends of Jared and his brother and their
families, went down into the valley which was northward,
(and the name of the valley was Nimrod, being called after
the mighty hunter) with their flocks which they had gathered
together, male and female, of every kind. And they did also
lay snares and catch fowls of the air; and they did also prepare
a vessel, in which they did carry with them the fish of the
waters. And they did also carry with them deseret, which, by
interpretation, is a honey bee; and thus they did carry with
them swarms of bees, and all manner of that which was upon
the face of the land, seeds of every kind.
4. See J. Michael Hunter, “The Mormon Hive: A Study of the Bee and Beehive
Symbols in Nineteenth-Century Mormon Culture” (master’s thesis, California State
University, Dominguez Hills, 2004).
5. “The beehive and the word deseret have been used variously throughout the history of the Church. The territory settled by the Mormon pioneers was called the State of
Deseret. The emblem of the beehive is used in the seal of the State of Utah and is a common decoration in Utah architecture, symbolizing industriousness. Brigham Young’s
house in Salt Lake City is called the Beehive House. Early Sunday schools were part
of the Deseret Sunday School Union. A vital part of the Church Welfare Program carries the name Deseret Industries.” Stephen Parker, “Deseret,” in Daniel H. Ludlow, ed.,
Encyclopedia of Mormonism (New York: Macmillan, 1992), 1:371.
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Because the Old World Jaredites are portrayed as migratory beekeepers of some prowess, and given the commitment of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to the historicity of the Jaredite
account, it is hoped that the following survey of Near Eastern6 apiculture will be of interest to students of the Book of Mormon.
Near Eastern Apiculture
Before humans directly husbanded bees, “honey hunting” was the
favored method for acquiring wild honey and is still practiced in some
parts of the world today. Intrepid hunters smoke bees out of the hive
and take the honeycombs. Evidence of honey hunting reaches back to
the Upper Paleolithic period (ca. 15,000 bc).
The so-called European honeybee (apis mellifera) is found in the
Near East from central Iran, across the Zagros and Taurus Mountains
into Anatolia and the Levant, and into Egypt (but not in Iraq or the
Arabian Desert). As will be seen, the evidence for hive beekeeping in
the ancient Near East is strong.7
6. The setting of the Jaredite homeland at the “great tower” is assumed by most Latterday Saints to mean the Tower of Babel mentioned in Genesis 11, a story of obvious Near
Eastern origin: “[The Brother of Jared:] A Book of Mormon prophet. He and his brother
founded the Jaredite nation when they led a colony of people from the Tower of Babel to
a promised land in the western hemisphere.” Guide to the Scriptures, s.v. “Jared, Brother
of,” http://scriptures.lds.org/gsj/jrdbrthr (accessed 10 September 2008). For more on the
Jaredites and Deseret, see R. C. Webb [J. E. Homans], Joseph Smith as a Translator (Salt
Lake City: Deseret News Press, 1936), 42–45; John L. Sorenson, “Years of the Jaredites”
(FARMS paper, 1969), available at maxwellinstitute.byu.edu (accessed 23 September 2008);
Hugh Nibley, The Message of the Joseph Smith Papyri: An Egyptian Endowment, 2nd ed. (Salt
Lake City: Deseret Book and FARMS, 2005); Nibley, Abraham in Egypt, 2nd ed. (Salt Lake
City: Deseret Book and FARMS, 2000); Nibley, Lehi in the Desert; The World of the Jaredites;
There Were Jaredites (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book and FARMS, 1988); Paul Y. Hoskisson,
“An Introduction to the Relevance of and a Methodology for a Study of the Proper Names
of the Book of Mormon,” in By Study and Also By Faith: Essays in Honor of Hugh W. Nibley,
ed. John M. Lundquist and Stephen D. Ricks (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book and FARMS,
1990), 2:126–35; Kevin L. Barney, “Robert C. Webb,” By Common Consent (18 October
2006), http://www.bycommonconsent.com/2006/10/robert-c-webb (accessed 17 September
2008); and Kevin L. Barney, “On the Etymology of Deseret,” BCC [By Common Consent]
Papers 1/2 (3 November 2006), http://www.bycommonconsent.com/2006/11/bcc-papers-1
-2-barney (accessed 17 September 2008).
7. The evidence for hive beekeeping in other early Eurasian civilizations (such as the
Indus Valley and China) is slight. See Crane, World History of Beekeeping, 163.
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The earliest evidence for hive beekeeping (apiculture) comes from
the Old Kingdom of Egypt (third millennium bc).8 A stone bas-relief
from the sun temple of Niuserre Any at Abu Gurob depicts the gathering, filtering, and packing of honey, demonstrating that from a very
early period beekeeping was well established in Egypt. Peasant beekeepers in Egypt today use much the same technology as that shown
on ancient tomb paintings in Thebes.9 Typical pipe hives made of mud
or clay are about a meter long and are stacked together, imitating logs.
The ends are sealed except for small holes that allow the bees passage.
Ancient Egypt was rich with bee imagery: the tears of Re were
believed to become bees, the Pyramid Texts state that Nut can appear as
a bee, and the temple of Neith at Sais was called “the house of the bee.”
Most famously, the symbol of the bee was used in royal titulature from
the very foundation of the Egyptian state.10 By the first dynasty (3100–
2900 bc), the king was known as nsw bty, “He of the Reed and the Bee,”
the bee being the heraldic symbol of the Red Land (Lower Egypt). For
“superstitious reasons” on two occasions, this title was written instead
with the red dšrt crown of Lower Egypt replacing bty.11
There are no textual references to beekeeping in ancient SyriaPalestine prior to the late Hellenistic period.12 The Hebrew word for
honey, debaš, like Akkadian dišpu, can refer to both bee honey and any
number of sweet substances. Thus Canaan may have been the “land of
8. Crane believes that Egyptian apiculture was initiated in the bee-rich Nile delta
during the Predynastic period. See Crane, World History of Beekeeping, 171.
9. See Crane, World History of Beekeeping, 163–66.
10. Douglas J. Brewer, Donald B. Redford, and Susan Redford, Domestic Plants and
Animals: The Egyptian Origins (Warminster, Eng.: Aris and Phillips, 1993), 125.
11. Alan Gardiner, Egyptian Grammar, Being an Introduction to the Study of Hieroglyphs,
3rd rev. ed. (Oxford: Griffith Institute, 1957), 503–4. One also notes the bee antenna on the
dšrt sign. A further connection between dšrt and bees and bee products has to do with the
different grades of honey in ancient Egypt, one of which was called dšrt —“red” honey. See
Brewer, Redford, and Redford, Domestic Plants and Animals, 127 passim.
12. There is no clear evidence for apiculture from the Late Bronze Age archive at
Ugarit in Syria, but it is interesting to note in passing that the word for “honey” is nbt,
which in other Semitic languages means “bee.” See Gregorio del Olmo Lete and Joaquín
Sanmartín, A Dictionary of the Ugaritic Language in the Alphabetic Tradition (Leiden:
Brill, 2003), 618–19, s.v. “nbt.”
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milk and fruit syrup.”13 Explicit biblical mentions of bee honey refer to
wild honey (e.g., Deuteronomy 32:13). It must be noted, however, that
our understanding of ancient Levantine apiculture is changing: until
recently it was believed that no conclusive archaeological evidence for
beekeeping in the Levant had been found, but this has changed in
light of the excavations at Tel Rehov in Israel, where an apiary dating
to the tenth or ninth century bc was recently discovered.14
Regarding ancient Turkey, “the land of the Hittites was a beekeeping country . . . since the earliest times of recorded history.”15 The
bee features in the oldest Hittite myths, those of the vanishing god
Telepinu.16 Laws of the Hittite Old Kingdom (ca. 1650–1430 bc) refer
to apiculture. One example reads,
[If] anyone steals [2] or 3 bee hives, formerly the offender
would have been exposed to bee-sting. But now he shall pay 6
shekels of silver.17
I am not aware of references to beekeeping in ancient Iran
before the Sassanid period (ad 224–651), but peasant beekeeping is
widespread in Iran today. Eva Crane notes that Iran has a greater variety of traditional hives than any other area.18
13. John the Baptist’s famous honey was probably not from bees and was certainly
not cultivated in any case. See James A. Kelhoffer, “John the Baptist’s ‘Wild Honey’ and
‘Honey’ in Antiquity,” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 45 (2005): 59–73.
14. Tel Rehov excavations press release, 2 September 2007: “Hebrew University excavations reveal first Biblical period beehives in ‘Land of Milk and Honey’” (http://www
.rehov.org/bee.htm, accessed 10 September 10, 2008). This validates Edward Neufeld’s
assertion that the Levant was home to pre-Hellenistic apiculture. “Apiculture in Ancient
Palestine (Early and Middle Iron Age) within the Framework of the Ancient Near East,”
Ugarit-Forschungen 10 (1978): 219–47.
15. Harry A. Hoffner Jr., Alimenta Hethaeorum; Food Production in Hittite Asia
Minor (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1974), 123.
16. “Hannahanna sent a bee: You go search for [my son] Telipinu. When you find
[him], sting his hands and feet and make him stand up. Then take wax and wipe him off.
Then purify him and make him holy again. Then conduct him back here to me.” Harry A.
Hoffner Jr., trans., Hittite Myths, ed. Gary M. Beckman (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990),
18.
17. Hittite Laws 92. Harry A. Hoffner Jr., “The Hittite Laws,” in Martha T. Roth, Law
Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, ed. Piotr Michalowski (Atlanta: Scholars
Press, 1995), 211–47, quotation on p. 228.
18. Eva Crane, The Archaeology of Beekeeping (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 51.
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Evidence for apiculture in Mesopotamia (ancient Iraq) is scarce. In
a culture that has produced literally hundreds of thousands of extant
cuneiform tablets detailing every conceivable aspect of life, including
agriculture, the silence on beekeeping is striking. One notable problem surrounds the Mesopotamian word for “honey.” Akkadian dišpu
(Sumerian làl) refers either to date syrup (Arabic dibs) or honey, so it
is difficult to know which one is intended in a given passage.19 The bee
does not feature prominently in Mesopotamian texts and not at all in
art of the region. Most of the Akkadian words for “bee” appear only
in lexical texts20 (i.e., not in everyday usage), and there is no technical
vocabulary associated with beekeeping. The first recorded mention of
beekeeping in the cuneiform record comes from the stele of Šamašreš-uzur, a regional governor on the Syrian Euphrates in the middle of
the eighth century bc who claimed to have brought down bees from
the mountains (presumably the Taurus, an area with a rich beekeeping tradition), and had been the first to do so:
I, Šamaš-reš-uzur, the governor of the land of Suhu and Mari,
I brought bees (habūbītu)—that collect honey and which from
the time of my fathers and forefathers no-one had seen nor
brought to the land of Suhu—down from the mountains of
the Habha-people and settled them in the gardens of the town
of Algabbaribani. They collect honey and wax. I am proficient in the “cooking” of the honey and wax and so can the
gardeners.21
Such stelae are prone to bombast, but given the absence of beekeeping in the cuneiform record, we should perhaps take Šamaš-rešuzur at his word. That bee products might have been an expensive
import in Babylonia is suggested by the cost of honey. In the Ur III
19. See Konrad Volk, “Imkerei im alten Mesopotamien?” in Horst Klengel and
Johannes Renger, eds., Landwirtschaft im Alten Orient (Berlin: Reimer, 1999), 284.
20. See, for example, Benno Landsberger with Anne D. Kilmer, The Fauna of Ancient
Mesopotamia, part 2 (Rome: Pontificium Institutum Biblicum, 1962), 35.
21. Antoine Cavigneaux and Bahija Khalil Ismail, “Die Statthalter von Suḫu und
Mari im 8. JH. v. Chr.,” Baghdader Mitteilungen 21 (1990): 400, specifically col. iv, line
13–col. v, line 3.
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period (twenty-second century bc), one shekel of silver bought only
two pounds of làl (“honey”). In contrast, the same amount of silver
could have bought three hundred liters of dates.22 In Mesopotamia the
scarcity of bees is simple to explain: most of the Iraqi Plain is simply
too hot and with a flowering season too short to sustain apiculture
(without modern technology). Only in the mountainous north are
native honeybees found.23
Some ancient cultures attached a great deal of significance
to bees and bee products. We have seen the high price of honey in
Mesopotamia. Across the Near East its value was found in its use as a
sweetener, in brewing beer, and as an ingredient in magico-medicinal
recipes.24 Wax was used for writing boards and in the lost-wax method
of sculpture.25 In Egypt honey was also used for funerary offerings
and temple rituals and as rations for important officials. In the Middle
Kingdom (2040–1640 bc) an important state official was called the
“Overseer of the Beekeepers.”26
Nomadic Beekeeping
Both the ancient world and contemporary traditional apiculture
elicit some evidence for nomadic beekeeping, what the Germans call
Wanderbienenzucht. Ancient hives (and modern Near Eastern peasant
hives) were most often shaped like pipes or logs (where bees naturally
swarm) and were made from pottery, wicker, mud, clay, and wood. All of
these hives would be portable on pack animals and boats. Pliny the Elder
(ad 23–79) describes the moving of hives along the River Po:
22. Volk, “Imkerei im alten Mesopotamien,” 284, suggesting we are dealing here with
bee honey and not date syrup.
23. Volk, “Imkerei im alten Mesopotamien,” 290.
24. Mesopotamian medical texts indicate that honey was used in medicinal treatments for the eyes, ears, and mouth; served as an anti-inflammatory; and was taken internally when mixed with a drink. See The Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of
the University of Chicago, ed. Ignace J. Gelb et al. (Chicago: Oriental Institute, 1959),
3:161–62, s.v. “dišpu.”
25. In the lost-wax method, a sculpture is made from wax and encased in clay. Molten
metal is poured into the clay and the wax runs out; when the clay is broken, a metal sculpture remains.
26. Brewer, Redford, and Redford, Domestic Plants and Animals, 127.
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When food for bees is lacking in the immediate neighbourhood, the inhabitants put their hives in boats and take them
by night five miles upstream. The bees emerge at dawn, feed
and return every day to the boats. They change the position
of the boats until they sink low in the water under the weight
and it is realised that the hives are full. Then the boats are
brought back and the honey harvested.27
Writing in 1740, a French traveler described migratory beekeeping in Egypt: at the end of October (the end of the flowering season
in Upper Egypt), the hives were placed on boats and floated down the
Nile. At places where plants were still in flower, the boats were halted
and the bees allowed to forage.28 Around 250 bc an Egyptian papyrus records the petition of beekeepers from the Faiyum oasis begging
for their hives to be moved by donkey due to irrigation flooding.29
Beekeepers in modern Israel move their hives from the Galilee region
to the Golan region and back according to the season. An interesting reenactment of the Jaredite bee exodus is found in the Mormon
pioneer story. Two contemporary commercial beekeepers in Idaho tell
the story of a great-grandfather “who brought bees to Utah, strapped
to the back of a covered wagon, with Brigham Young.”30
The value of bees in a nomadic journey would be high because of
the calorific value of a regular honey supply. Honey is also a useful
trading commodity. Libyan nomads, for example, traded honey and
wax for sugar, tea, rice, and cloth.31 Migratory beekeeping was the
means through which bee species were introduced to new regions. For
example, it is thought that beekeeping was introduced to Iran from
Pakistan via Baluchistan.32
27. Natural History XXI.43.75.
28. See Crane, Archaeology of Beekeeping, 42.
29. From Zenon Papyri (P.Cair.Zen. IV 59368). See Crane, World History of Bee
keeping, 348; and Campbell C. Edgar, Zenon Papyri in the University of Michigan
Collection (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1931).
30. See Horn, Bees in America, 80–81.
31. Neufeld, “Apiculture in Ancient Palestine,” 224–25. He also notes the presence of
nomadic beekeeping in West Africa.
32. Crane, World History of Beekeeping, 354.
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Pre-Columbian American Beekeeping
The apis mellifera species was not found in the New World until it
was imported from about the seventeenth century ad onward.33 The
indigenous American bee is the melipona (a stingless bee). It produces
only about one kilogram of honey per year (compared with apis mellifera, which can produce fifty kilograms). Nevertheless, pre-Columbian
Americans did indeed have knowledge of beekeeping and made the
most of the melipona.34 Cortés wrote to the king of Spain in 1519 about
the extent of beekeeping among the Indians of Cozumel (Mexico):
The only trade which the Indians have is in bee hives, and
our Procurators will bear to Your Highness specimens of the
honey and the bee hives that you may commend them to be
examined.35
The earliest archaeological evidence for American apiculture
comes from the Late Preclassic Maya period (ca. 300 bc–ad 300).36
Modern peasant apiculture in the Yucatán is reminiscent of Egyptian
beekeeping: hives (often hollowed-out logs) are stacked vertically on a
rack. The lost-wax technique was known in the New World,37 and the
ancient Maya pantheon included a bee god called Ah Mucan Cab.38
A Final Note
Any study of the possible material culture background of historical Book of Mormon peoples has to make careful use of the
interesting data provided by Ether 1–3, including the suggestion
that the Jaredites were migratory apiculturalists. This brief study
33. Crane, Archaeology of Beekeeping, 33.
34. Crane, World History of Beekeeping, 288–98.
35. Charles F. Calkins, “Beekeeping in Yucatán: A Study in Historical-Cultural
Zoogeography (PhD diss., University of Nebraska, 1974), as quoted in Crane, World
History of Beekeeping, 292. Calkins cites the original translated source as Hernán Cortés,
Letters of Cortés: The Five Letters of Relation from Fernando Cortes to the Emperor
Charles V, trans. and ed. Francis A. MacNutt (New York: Putnam, 1908), 1:145.
36. The Inca and Aztec civilizations settled at altitudes too high for apiculture.
37. Crane, Archaeology of Beekeeping, 246.
38. Crane, World History of Beekeeping, 291.
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has demonstrated the widespread evidence for beekeeping, including migratory beekeeping, in the ancient Near East. A further discussion of this evidence, and the implications that may arise from it,
will be the subject of future research.

Elder Ezra Taft Benson’s Incredible
Experiences in Postwar Europe
Larry E. Morris

Review of Frederick Babbel. On Wings of Faith: My Daily Walk with a Prophet. Springville,
UT: CFI, 1998. vii + 190 pp., with index. $13.98.

C

FI (Cedar Fort, Incorporated) has done a great service by reprinting this outstanding book, which was originally published by
Bookcraft in 1972. The author, Frederick Babbel, accompanied Elder
Ezra Taft Benson on a mission to war-ravaged Europe early in 1946,
just months after the end of World War II. Drawing largely on his diary
entries, Brother Babbel produced an inspiring and compelling book.
As Sheri Dew writes in her biography of President Benson,
Three days before Christmas 1945, President George Albert
Smith convened a special meeting of the First Presidency and
Council of the Twelve. With World War II over, it was necessary to reestablish contact with the Saints in Europe and
distribute much-needed welfare supplies, he said, and the
First Presidency had determined that a member of the Twelve
should go to Europe for an undetermined length of time to
supervise this delicate assignment.1

1. Sheri L. Dew, Ezra Taft Benson: A Biography (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1987),
197. Ezra Taft Benson died in 1994 at age ninety-four; Frederick Babbel died in 2001 at age
eighty-five. For a recent article on Elder Benson’s experiences in Europe, see Gary James
Bergera, “Ezra Taft Benson’s 1946 Mission to Europe,” Journal of Mormon History 34/2
(2008): 73–112.
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Although forty-six-year-old Ezra Taft Benson had been an apostle
for only two years and had the largest and youngest family of anyone in
the Twelve, he received the call to preside over the European Mission.
Frederick W. Babbel, a young married man who had served in the
German-Austrian mission from 1936 to 1939, and who had then served
in the U.S. armed forces, was called as secretary to President Benson.
“Before President Benson and I left for this mission in Europe,”
Babbel writes, “we had been set apart and given special blessings by
the First Presidency” (p. 15). In addition, the First Presidency—George
Albert Smith and his counselors, J. Reuben Clark Jr. and David O.
McKay—had promised President Benson in his letter of appointment
that “your influence [will] be felt for good by all you come in contact
with, and . . . you and they [will] be made to feel that there is a power
and spirit accompanying you not of man” (p. 43). Throughout the
book, the author offers moving descriptions of how this promise was
fulfilled. Although he and President Benson faced seemingly insurmountable obstacles in attempting to visit the Saints so soon after
the war, a special spirit accompanied them. As one Latter-day Saint
chaplain noted, “President Benson, you have more influence, more
power and authority with government officials, than any general in
the United States Army!” Babbel adds that he “certainly felt to concur
with this remark. With each passing day the evidence continued to
mount and assure us that the Lord was truly with this dedicated servant and his watchcare was over us daily” (pp. 9–10).
President Benson and Brother Babbel’s experiences with two
American army officers illustrated how blessed they were in their callings. In Paris they called on a colonel and explained that they wished
to visit the Saints in Germany, reviewing with the colonel “our projected itinerary for traveling through all the four military zones in
Germany and Austria as well as making a trip into Czechoslovakia.”
The colonel was astonished. “Mr. Benson, are you crazy?” he
exclaimed. “Don’t you realize there has been a war here and that to
date no civilian travelers have been permitted to enter these military
areas to conduct the kind of work you suggest?” (p. 26, emphasis
added). The colonel further announced that the military had no pro-
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visions for taking care of visitors and that all food, accommodations,
and travel facilities were restricted for military use.
In an attitude that was typical during his service in Europe,
President Benson was neither deterred nor discouraged. He “quietly
asked whether or not permission might be granted if we could purchase a car to make the trip.” The colonel replied that such a thing
was simply not possible because of an acute shortage of automobiles.
Furthermore, no gasoline was being made available to civilians in
Germany.
“After the colonel had made several other incredulous outbursts,
President Benson asked: ‘If I could arrange for transportation, food,
and military permission, do you think we might make it?’”
The exasperated colonel could hardly contain himself. “If all those
things could be arranged, you might get into the American Zone, but
to arrange for these things is impossible!”
Thinking he had seen the last of Ezra Taft Benson, the colonel
sent the men on their way. But in another response that also proved
typical, President Benson said, “Let’s get busy!” (pp. 26–27). Get busy
they did, and before the day even ended they had purchased an army
truck from the Army Liquidation Commission. President Benson next
attempted to obtain automobiles. After visiting thirty French government officials and industrial executives, he arranged to buy two new
French Citroen cars. The French government also made a limited supply of gasoline available.
With this information in hand, President Benson and Brother
Babbel “approached a rather surprised colonel. There was something
about President Benson’s humble, confident manner that struck a
responsive chord this time, and within a few minutes the necessary
military orders had been prepared for us to enter the American Zone
of Germany and pass through the French Zone en route.”
The two men thus became the first Americans not on government assignment to enter these areas after the war. “What a glorious
demonstration of the power of the Lord! A few days previously, all of
these developments were considered to be impossibilities, humanly
speaking. Today they had become realities” (p. 31).
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And although the colonel was helpful, he was skeptical of how
four-star general McNarney, stationed in Frankfurt and in command
of all American forces in Europe, would respond to the situation. Still,
President Benson and Brother Babbel inched their way through wartorn Germany, confident they could accomplish their mission.
Finely crafted prose brings vivid images of what the two experienced: “The city of Freiburg in the French Zone of Germany presented a sickening sight of stunned, listless people shuffling among
the blackened, twisted ruins of this once-beautiful city. It was in an
almost complete state of ruin. . . . We were horrified by the wanton
destruction that greeted us” (p. 33).
When President Benson and Brother Babbel finally reached
Frankfurt and managed to meet with General McNarney (despite the
best efforts of one of the general’s aides to delay such a meeting), “it
was evident that [the general] regarded the interview as strictly a perfunctory one which he was anxious to terminate as quickly as possible
so that he might get on with more pressing matters.” But President
Benson, with his unique combination of gentleness and power, warmly
shook the general’s hand and stood there “looking squarely at him
and talking very earnestly. This was a crucial moment. So much of our
future success seemed to hang on the outcome of this interview.”
At first, the general was simply irritated, but when he heard that
the two hoped to travel through all four military zones in Germany
and Austria, as well as in Czechoslovakia, he was shocked they would
even consider such a thing. President Benson, however, “continued
to gaze intently into the general’s eyes as he talked with him, and he
spoke with such feeling and conviction that the general’s eyes became
moist with tears and his cold militaristic manner gave way to a warm,
spirited expression of ‘Mr. Benson, there’s something about you that I
like. I want to help you in every way that I can!’”
Although the military had previously processed all relief supplies,
the general said the regulations could possibly be altered to accommodate relief from the church. He then suggested that President Benson
begin gathering supplies. “When President Benson informed him that
we had ninety large welfare storehouses bulging with food and cloth-
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ing, which could be ready for shipment within twenty-four hours, one
could fairly feel the general’s astonishment. He then agreed to give us
written authorization to make our own distribution through our own
channels.” In exchange, President Benson offered to give a good deal
of food to an existing program for feeding needy children. After this,
“General McNarney seemed willing to consider favorably our every
request” (pp. 43–44).
In the months that followed, President Benson and Brother Babbel
journeyed throughout Europe, administering spiritual and material
relief to the beleaguered Saints, many of whom were on the verge of
starvation. “By the end of the first year we had received and, for the
most part, distributed 92 railway carloads of welfare supplies (about
2,000 tons). These consisted of food, clothing, utensils, medical supplies, and a host of sundry items. . . . Welfare supplies and packages were
shipped primarily from the United States and Canada. Distribution was
made in Britain, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Finland,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Germany” (p. 164).
President Benson departed for the United States in December of
1946, and Brother Babbel remained for a few months. In a ten-month
period, they had traveled more than 60,000 miles, as one report said,
“by plane, train, automobile, ship, jeep, truck, bus, and horse and
buggy” (p. 178). Virtually all of this travel was made under difficult
and uncomfortable circumstances. Going by air, for example, often
meant surviving turbulence and frigid temperatures in the unheated
cargo compartment of a military plane. Brother Babbel recalled, “At
seven thousand feet altitude it was so intensely cold that we had to
resort to moving around in the plane to keep our blood circulating.
Finally we were so thoroughly chilled that we were unable to move
without extreme effort” (p. 21).
Through a highly readable narrative and an excellent eye for
detail, the author tells a compelling story, one that deserves a wide
readership. On Wings of Faith shows the power of faith and also shows
just how inspired the First Presidency was when they called Ezra Taft
Benson to this assignment. As Brother Babbel concludes,
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Miracles? . . . They just seemed to take place almost hourly.
There’s hardly a thing you can read about in the Old or New
Testament but what I have been blessed to see or participate in a
parallel experience. I have seen the blind healed, the lame made
to walk, the barren blessed to have children. I have seen people
at the point of death restored to life. I have seen the power of
faith in the lives of men and women and children under some
of the most difficult circumstances you can imagine, but the
power of God was there. (p. 181, emphasis in original)

Mormon Culture: A Worldview

Cherry B. Silver

Review of Terryl L. Givens. People of Paradox: A History of Mormon Culture. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2007. xvii + 414 pp., with index. $29.95.

T

erryl L. Givens has written a provocative book. His study is
richly textured, full of allusions and comparisons, ideologically
penetrating, colorful, and filled with vitality. As in his earlier works,
The Viper on the Hearth and By the Hand of Mormon,1 Givens writes
for an educated general audience about Mormon literary values, history, and beliefs. Readers interested in Mormon writers, artists, and
thinkers should enjoy Givens’s assessments. A background in the
humanities will enable readers to savor Givens’s ambitious placement
of Mormon thought within high Western culture. And having an
interest in theology enables one to follow his first four chapters on the
peculiar, paradoxical teachings of Joseph Smith that lead to a distinctive worldview.
Givens presents us with a theoretical analysis of the Latter-day
Saint faith and its paradoxes, appearing in part 1, “Foundations and
Paradoxes in Mormon Cultural Origins.” The other two parts of the
book are entitled “Beginnings (1830–1890): The Dancing Puritans” and

1. Terryl L. Givens, The Viper on the Hearth: Mormons, Myths, and the Construction
of Heresy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) and By the Hand of Mormon: The
American Scripture That Launched a New World Religion (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002).
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“A Movable Zion (1890–Present): Pioneer Nostalgia and Beyond the
American Religion.”
Chapters 5 and 11, however, comprise virtually a monograph in
themselves and focus on the battles between liberal proponents and
orthodox guardians of the life of the mind. A further subtext deals with
five traditional categories of culture—architecture, music and dance,
theater and film, literature, and visual arts. Givens explores these in
two historical waves, representing the beginnings of Mormonism to
1890 and then 1890 to the present. Readers can pick their specialty or
enjoy the composite collection.
Paradox
Givens’s four paradoxes in Mormon thinking encompass authority/freedom, certainty/searching, sacred/temporal, and chosen/universal. Chapter by chapter Givens validates his underlying theory that
Latter-day Saints wrestle with contradictions in their thinking and
that these contradictions prompt complex cultural manifestations.
In chapter 1 Givens begins with the iron rod and the Liahona
division within Latter-day Saint thinking:
The consequence of these two traditions of emphasis on freedom and authority is an ever-present tension in Mormon culture between submission to an ecclesiastical authoritarianism
without parallel in modern Christianity and an emphasis on
and veneration for the principle of individual moral agency.
(p. 15)
For intellectuals and artists, the tension is especially stark.
Intellectual inquiry and artistic exploration should thrive
in a culture like the Mormon one, which opposes as evil any
attempt “to deprive us of the slightest respect for free agency.”
At the same time, LDS artists and intellectuals find themselves constrained by the church’s insistence that all inspiration is not equal, and they discover that the same prophetic
prerogatives that impeded [Oliver] Cowdery’s exercise of

Givens, People of Paradox (Silver) • 75

autonomy may cramp the style of maverick intellectuals and
artists today. (p. 16)
The paradox explored by Givens in chapter 2 concerns the certainty of Latter-day Saints that their religion offers answers to eternal
questions. At the same time they remain indeterminate or open in
their belief systems. The confluence of certainty and searching may be
either fruitful or just puzzling, he argues.
For many observers, the supreme confidence and amplitude
of Mormon’s pronouncements upon their own faith smack of
spiritual arrogance and self-complacency. But these tendencies operate in tandem with a powerful countercurrent: salvation is for Mormons an endless project, not an event, and is
therefore never complete, never fully attained, never a realized state or object of secure possession. (p. 28)
Like the contest between authoritarianism and independence,
the uneasy coexistence of certainty and searching spurs vigorous debates in the Mormon intellectual community and
provides fodder for artists who both explore and depict the
cultural tensions that result. (p. 33)
Chapter 3 contrasts the preoccupation of Latter-day Saints with
the practicality of temporal matters and their aspirations to the sacred
and the eternal. As New York Herald’s editor James Gordon Bennett
depicted the paradox: “They are busy all the time establishing factories to make saints and crockery ware, also prophets and white paint”
(cited on p. 37). Givens elaborates further on the relation of sacred
space to bricks and mortar in Mormon kingdom building:
The paradox that results from these contrary tendencies is a
culture that sacralizes and exalts the mundane even as it naturalizes and domesticates the sacred. That men and women
may become Gods is taken literally enough by Mormons to
affront the orthodox. And the reality of divine intrusions into
the human sphere—of actual heavenly ministrants, celestial
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epiphanies, miraculous artifacts, is not explained away as
myth or metaphor, but brazenly celebrated. (p. 42)
In chapter 4 he explains that Latter-day Saints stand apart from
other religions, being elite in their own eyes, a chosen lineage and a
“peculiar people,” yet seeking truth wherever it is to be found and
eager, through their family history searches, to tie all peoples together.
Latter-day Saints now claim a global perspective, yet they have been
tied to American culture for a century and a half. Paradoxes continue,
Givens argues.
What aspects of Mormonism are themselves culturally particular rather than theologically essential? This is a question
that pertains not just to matters of faith and practice, but
to matters of cultural expression. Because art and intellect,
like worship, can suffer from both embracing too much and
embracing too little. In balancing covenantal obligations with
life in Babylon, dangers lurk in both directions. Exclusivity
can produce pride, self-righteousness, and spiritual sterility.
But at the same time, to accept and esteem everything is to
value nothing. (Only an auctioneer can equally appreciate all
art, said Oscar Wilde.) (p. 61)
In Givens’s explorations of these four general paradoxes, the reader
tastes the heart of his message. His skillful blending of theology and
humanities leads Givens to situate Joseph Smith and the Mormons
in the middle of centuries-old intellectual and cultural contests. He
recounts, for example, theories of human possibilities as given by
Jonathan Edwards, Dante, Milton, Goethe, and Byron, then turns to
Joseph Smith’s illuminating vision that “a godly destiny is precisely
what humans are called to pursue. . . . In so literally embracing the
divine potential in man, Mormons ennoble human nature to such a
degree that even the most exuberant Renaissance humanists would
blanch” (pp. 41–42). This potential is not just intuitive but requires
schooling too: “What is surprising, rather, is how quickly Joseph
would nonetheless turn to incorporate the intellectual with the mystical, ancient learning with modern revelation, formal schooling with
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heavenly authority, making of the new faith an amalgam that Harold
Bloom has called ‘a purely American gnosis’ ” (p. 69).
With such emphasis on intellectual play, this text invites readers to
discover their own interests mirrored in Givens’s work. For example,
in the cover blurbs, historian Richard Bushman praises his rearrangement of historical perspectives. Laurie F. Maffly-Kipp finds connections “to broader impulses in Christian and American theology and
aesthetics.” Sociologist Rodney Stark likes touring “the remarkable
achievements of Mormon culture,” whose successes he has charted in
his own studies.
Intellectual history
Chapter 5 offers examples of Latter-day Saint intellectual aspirations in the early period. Givens ranges from the School of the Prophets
in Kirtland to the University of Deseret in Utah Territory. He delves
into the battles between the Godbeites with their Liberal Institute and
the ambitious theological studies written by Parley and Orson Pratt
(pp. 94–98).
In passing Givens pays tribute to the influence of the early
Polysophical Society (1854–56) and the Wasatch Literary Association
(1874–78), groups of Saints who fulfilled Joseph Smith’s ambitions for
high culture in their desert home (pp. 92–93). For data on the latter he is indebted to Ronald Walker’s detailed study “Growing Up in
Early Utah: The Wasatch Literary Association, 1874–1878.”2 It is evident throughout that Givens builds on the studies of dozens of other
researchers. His encyclopedic explanations come from his comprehensive readings of materials covering two centuries, both primary
and secondary sources, which he skillfully weaves into an exciting
narrative of challenge and resolution.
In chapter 11 Givens explores a series of twentieth-century cultural wars, primarily between the church establishment and independent thinkers. Whether Givens treats the black issue or feminism,
2. Walker published the original article in Sunstone, November/December 1981,
44–51, and more recently in Qualities That Count: Heber J. Grant as Businessman,
Missionary, and Apostle (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2004), 61–80.
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Book of Mormon authenticity or correlation, there is indeed much
to be considered relating to twentieth-century Latter-day Saint life.
His topics range from science and religion to church education, history and faith, the Mormon intellectual today, academic freedom, and
Book of Mormon studies.
Givens begins by considering basic conflicts between religion
and science, finding Latter-day Saint response to Darwin’s Origin of
Species (1859) rather moderate, yet
an inconsistent story, a mixture of both fundamentalism and
radicalism, orthodox opinions and unexpected openness, as
the case study of evolution illustrates. Traditional Christian
belief regarding creation was rooted in three tenets: God created the earth out of nothingness (ex nihilo creation), the
process lasted six literal days, and all of this transpired about
6,000 years ago. Mormonism did not align itself behind any
of those three articles of faith. (p. 198)
Givens nicely introduces the work and ideas of James E. Talmage,
John A. Widtsoe, and Joseph F. Merrill as scientist apostles who wrote
both theology and technical books (pp. 199, 201). He also heralds B. H.
Roberts as “far and away the most important Mormon historian of the
era—and perhaps the most complete man of learning in church history” (p. 201), yet acknowledges Roberts’s failure to convince church
leaders to support his major work, The Truth, the Way, the Life: An
Elementary Treatise on Theology, without changes relative to science,
which Roberts refused to make.
The disputed passages were largely a consequence of the doctrinal speculations and conceptual bridges that he found
necessary to achieve a perfect synthesis of the LDS scriptural corpus with the science—especially paleontology—of
his day. . . . But more controversially for Latter-day Saints, he
cited Lord Kelvin’s theory of extraterrestrial origins of life as
compatible with his view that Adam and Eve were translated
beings brought here from another sphere (thereby preserving

Givens, People of Paradox (Silver) • 79

the scientific validity of evolution while exempting the human
family). (pp. 203–4)
Contemporary readers will probably feel relieved that church
leaders resisted endorsing such claims. However, Givens points out
the loss of exploratory energy when conservative writers and teachers
replaced this professional cadre. Particularly he notes “the influence
of an ultra conservative CES [Church Educational System]” where
“it became increasingly rare to call men with scholarly backgrounds
to leadership positions” (p. 207). Following the lead of researcher
Armand Mauss, he cites the mid-century domination of President
J. Reuben Clark, “a staunch conservative and defender of orthodoxy”
(p. 206). Giving an insider view of competitive ideas within the church
administration and its educational system, Givens depicts tensions in
uncompromising language: “The strains of reconciling Zion and the
world, spirit and matter, the sacred and the mundane, had proven too
much” (p. 209). Here appears what to me looks like a key point in
his argument. Paradox may be fruitful or disastrous as the pendulum
swings from one force to another.
Givens continues to explore tensions resulting from the paradox
between authority and freedom of thought:
If science was the bugbear that challenged the limits of Joseph
Smith’s intellectual utopianism and ecumenicism in the second era of the church’s existence, history was the fiery furnace
of Mormonism’s most recent generations. (p. 211)
Under Book of Mormon studies, he introduces mid-twentiethcentury anthropologist M. Wells Jakeman, who brought a new dimension to Brigham Young University research. Givens acknowledges
the solid contributions made in Mesoamerican studies by John L.
Sorenson, the erudition of Hugh Nibley, and the significant research
published by the Foundation for Ancient Research and Mormon
Studies (FARMS) (pp. 220, 228–30).
As Givens summarizes the unfolding drama, two forces caused
tightening of church controls over historical writing—suspicion of
intellectuals and the spectacular growth in membership globally
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(p. 231). Givens is obviously well-informed and fair-minded but determined not to soft-pedal the emotional intensity of differences. For
instance, in the concern for how to write the Mormon story, he depicts
the importance to both the institution and its thinkers:
LDS doctrine as a whole is rooted inescapably in history;
its claims to divine authority and restored truth are entirely
dependent on the narratives of LDS origins. . . . What this
means in practice is that challenges to orthodox accounts of
the church’s past strike at the very heart of the faith. . . .
. . . Some portray the battle over Mormon history as
between efforts at honest, full disclosure and paranoid, statist control of information. Others see it as a conflict between
faith-inspired scholarship and a secular mania for debunking
and humanizing the sacred. . . .
When intellectuals demand a less sanitized version of
Mormon history, they are generally insisting on greater scrutiny into the details and cultural contexts surrounding certain
key moments and pivotal events in the church’s first seventyfive years. (pp. 222–23)
Givens mentions the Mountain Meadows Massacre as one of those
pivotal events and focuses on Juanita Brooks’s significant 1950 book
(pp. 211–12).3 Curiously, he does not describe the current monumental
study by church scholars Ronald Walker, Richard Turley, and Glen
Leonard that will open church sources and authentically document
the tragedy,4 but, in a footnote, does mention Will Bagley, the terrier
nipping at their heels with his accusatory account (p. 382 n. 119).5
3. Juanita Brooks, The Mountain Meadows Massacre (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1950).
4. Ronald W. Walker, Richard E. Turley, and Glen M. Leonard, Massacre at Mountain
Meadows (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) has appeared since the publication
of Givens’s People of Paradox, but knowledge about this project has been widespread for
years.
5. Givens points out that Will Bagley, Blood of the Prophets: Brigham Young and
the Massacre at Mountain Meadows (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002),
was rebutted by Robert D. Crockett, “A Trial Lawyer Reviews Will Bagley’s Blood of the
Prophets,” FARMS Review 15/2 (2003): 199–254.
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Givens welcomes present “signs that the Mormon leadership
believes they have weathered the worst of the storms, and are confident that even full disclosure cannot, ultimately, damage the foundations of Mormon belief” (p. 239). This decade the church published
seventy-four DVDs for public use, representing 400,000 images
from its historical archives of basic research documents. The Book
of Mormon critical text project began publication in 2001, including
“an analytical transcription of the printer’s copies and extant original Book of Mormon manuscript, a comprehensive history of textual
changes, and an analysis of every textual variant” (p. 239).6 Presently
the Joseph Smith Papers are being prepared for publication, anticipating “two dozen volumes comprising all contemporary documents
relating to his life” (p. 239).
Concluding this aspect of his study, Givens returns to the paradox of certainty, contrasting sure knowledge like that of the brother of
Jared in beholding the finger of Christ with present-day uncertainty
as “an inescapable condition of the adult human condition” (p. 239).
His own stance is quite clear, judging by his sources and by the intensity of his description, that opening church sources to a broad range
of interpretations will only benefit the Mormon community. And his
audience obviously must join in applauding an intellectual openness
or take offense at his line of reasoning.
Aspects of Mormon Culture
Looking at People of Paradox for its insights into the history of
Mormon culture, readers can enjoy the treatment of artists and artifacts that Givens generously offers in two broad swaths, from beginnings to 1890 and thereafter through the twentieth century.
Under the theme of architecture in chapter 6, Givens necessarily treats the Kirtland, the Nauvoo, and the Brigham Young–inspired
temples—St. George, Manti, Logan, and Salt Lake—plus the Tabernacle
on Temple Square and gives a passing look at ward meetinghouses. In
temples Givens sees “an architecture that reflects the sacred-temporal
6. Royal Skousen has been the prime mover for this monumental project.
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polarity that Mormonism has always collapsed” and in meetinghouses
“a stark minimalism” (pp. 113, 114). Larger tabernacles, he believes, created “a middle ground between Puritan austerity and Catholic ornateness.” The golden age of early architecture after the Manifesto of 1890
resulted in “wonderfully diverse and aesthetically indulgent examples”
of ward chapels. No longer preaching the gathering, “Mormons,” he
argues, “would have to limit their physical imprint to their sacred edifices, rather than entire communities” (p. 115).
Second-generation Mormon culture begins with chapter 11 on
recent church architecture. As might be expected, the author applauds
individuality in design. He follows Paul Anderson’s careful analysis
of meetinghouses and temples to express appreciation for the movement away from fortresses, epitomized in the granite spires on the
Salt Lake Temple, to buildings that blended with the environment like
the Polynesian temple in Laie, Hawaii, or its prairie counterpart in
Cardston, Alberta, Canada (p. 247). Building booms have led to functional, standardized plans for both chapels and temples. Returning to
his theme, Givens emphasizes the mundane mingling with the sacred,
“the jarring juxtaposition of cinderblock meetinghouses with gymnasiums, on the one hand, and ethereal temples on the other” (p. 250).
Situating Latter-day Saint music in the American Protestant tradition in chapter 7, Givens reviews selections in the Emma Smith
hymnal, many coming from the Methodist tradition and over a third
of Latter-day Saint authorship, expressing their distinctive faith that
they were the new Israel. Although the University of Nauvoo launched
a music department, more memorable was the reputation of William
Pitt’s Nauvoo Brass Band. Music led to dancing, despite Puritan concerns. “Mormonism could have gone the route of more-fundamentalist faiths, banning an activity with clear tendencies toward worldliness. Instead the church opted to embrace dancing, institutionalize it,
and thereby turn it into an instrument of socialization and harmless
amusement” (p. 135). He also traces the beginnings of the Tabernacle
Choir from early singing schools. Hymn writing accompanied the
Saints’ migration west. Both the band and the choir advanced in their
new home.
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The Tabernacle Choir symbolized “Mormonism’s entry into a
new era of public respectability” with its performance at the 1893
World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago (p. 253). In chapter 13 the
author describes tours and recordings leading to a weekly national
radio broadcast in 1929. He also includes the points of tension Michael
Hicks sees: “the will to progress versus the will to conserve, the need
to borrow from outsiders versus the need for self-reliance, and the love
of the aesthetic versus the love of utility” (cited on p. 255).7 After he
analyzes the contributions of choir directors Evan Stephens, Richard
P. Condie, and J. Spencer Cornwall, it is surprising that Givens does
not give his opinion on the work of Jerold Ottley and Craig Jessop,
well within the scope of his study. With composers, likewise, he discusses B. Cecil Gates and Leroy Robertson, particularly Robertson’s
Oratorio from the Book of Mormon. He names as successor to that
oratorio Merrill Bradshaw’s oratorio The Restoration. However, he
includes neither Crawford Gates’s serious religious music (except
Symphony No. 2 for the Hill Cumorah Pageant, p. 268) nor Robert
Cundick’s The Redeemer.
Instead he turns to the genre of pop musical with comments on
Doug Stewart and Lex de Azevedo’s Saturday’s Warrior (1974), seen by
over 1.5 million people but criticized for “its trivialization of missionary
work and sacred doctrines” as well as for “slick sophistication, misleading if not heretical theology, and stereotyping toward bigotry, quoting
Eugene England” (p. 260).8 Along with this he describes pop bands parodied in film by Sons of Provo, Latter-day Saint comic films like The RM
and Singles Ward, and Gladys Knight’s Saints Unified Voices as examples
of “the challenge of multiculturalism” (p. 262) and “a culture that does
not sufficiently discriminate between the sublime and the banal, the profoundly Christian and the (merely) culturally Mormon” (p. 260).
Chapter 8 on theater helps define the proactive Mormon outlook
toward drama, as Social Hall and the Salt Lake Theatre welcomed local
7. Michael Hicks, Mormonism and Music: A History (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1989), 153.
8. Citing Eugene England, “The Dawning of a Brighter Day: Mormon Literature
after 150 Years,” BYU Studies 22/1 (1982): 17.
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and out-of-town talent. Givens speculates on why spectacle and light
dramatic fare are still common but tragedy less often enacted. “Some
Mormon thinkers have recognized in this lack a cultural impoverishment” (p. 151). With a missionary message to proclaim and an emphasis
on finding joy in the life of faith, “the consequence for Mormon culture
has been an affinity for art forms that celebrate life rather than those
that investigate its tragic dimensions or probe its pathos” (p. 152).
As he turns to recent drama, musical theater, and film in chapter 14,
Givens is at his best as a critic of aesthetics, offering astute comments
on Clinton Larson’s The Mantle of the Prophet and Other Plays (1966)
and Martin Kelley’s And They Shall Be Gathered (1969). Reviewing the
success of Carol Lynn Pearson and Lex de Azevedo’s The Order Is Love
(1971), he describes the interplay of tensions between the pragmatism
of the Orderville experiment and the outside world with its individuality, aesthetic beauties, and style (p. 269). He likes Orson Scott Card’s
Stone Tables (1973) and The Apostate, as well as Robert Elliot’s Fires
of the Mind (1974) and Thomas Roger’s Huebener (1976), the story of
the seventeen-year-old Latter-day Saint boy in Germany who opposed
the Nazi regime. Again works focused on conflict fit Givens’s theory
of paradox: “Huebener is the most conflicted instance in Mormon
history of an individual caught between . . . legitimate institutional
imperatives and the quest for personal integrity” (p. 271).
Fascination with the history and effect of cinema leads to thorough coverage of Mormon film (pp. 271–83). Much of this parallels
BYU Studies’s special issue “Mormons and Film,”9 where Givens’s
own article “There Is Room for Both”: Mormon Cinema and the
Paradoxes of Mormon Culture” (pp. 164–87) is excerpted from his
book. He focuses on Richard Dutcher’s films God’s Army, Brigham
City, and States of Grace. He also admires Ryan Little’s independent
film Saints and Soldiers (2004) as “an effort to address more universal themes and experiences through the lens of an LDS sensibility”
(p. 278). He describes in detail Greg Whiteley’s artistically filmed
documentary New York Doll (2005), where Killer Kane, a rock star,
converts to Mormonism, becomes a volunteer at the Family History
9. See BYU Studies 46/2 (2007).
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Library adjacent to the Los Angeles Temple, and is called back for a
reunion concert. For the finale, rock music morphs into a Tabernacle
Choir hymn. “Surprisingly, there is no discomfort, no discordance at
all between the image and the music. And that seems to be the point:
not merely a God or universe capacious enough to embrace diversity,
but a universe in which the real and palpable possibilities of infinite
transformation make all difference negligible” (p. 283). Such blends of
astute commentary with theoretical insights mark Givens’s approach.
The time he spends on film suggests his fascination with this art form
as a religious conveyance.
In chapter 9 on early Mormon writing, Givens notes that, although
centered in the Romantic era, “Mormonism from its very birth has
found itself out of sync with the literary aesthetic that develops out
of these Romantic agonies” (p. 158). Instead language is realistic.
Returning to Joseph Smith’s personal history, the author, along with
professor-poet Arthur Henry King, finds the style “noteworthy for its
understated, dispassionate tone” (p. 159). Givens argues that in reporting visions Joseph managed “assimilation of supernatural experience
to naturalistic discourse,” although as spokesman for the Lord his
speech “is marked by distinctive diction and syntax, and with lasting
effect on Mormon conceptions of sacred language” (p. 161). Nephi’s
simple telling of his personal story in the opening chapter of the Book
of Mormon influenced the style of Mormon diaries, and, for example,
that of Artemisia Sidnie Myers, later Foote, recounting the dire events
of the Haun’s Mill Massacre with straightforward accounting.
As to high art, Givens celebrates Parley P. Pratt as “eloquent” in sermons and autobiography with “rhetorical flourishes” (p. 165), a fine poet
and satirist as well (pp. 169–70). Among poets, Givens mentions John
Lyon and quotes from Eliza R. Snow. Although popular novels were
mostly considered “literary decadence” (p. 171), home literature—safe
fiction with morally improving themes—filled Mormon publications in
late-nineteenth-century Utah like the Woman’s Exponent, Contributor,
Juvenile Instructor, and Young Woman’s Journal.
Turning to twentieth-century literature in chapter 15, Givens
mentions the ambitions of Orson F. Whitney to write an epic poem
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in the style of Milton and O. U. Bean’s adaptation of B. H. Roberts’s
short story “Corianton: A Nephite Story” into a play that ran in the
Salt Lake Theatre and transferred briefly to Broadway (pp. 286–87).
He treats literature under the headings of the lost generation, poetry,
short fiction, the contemporary novel, science fiction, and the essay.
Givens offers extensive commentary on Children of God (1939),
by Vardis Fisher; The Giant Joshua (1941), by Maurine Whipple; and
A Little Lower Than the Angels (1942), by Virginia Sorensen, noting
“with these three novels, writers proved capable of serious engagement
with Mormonism as a literary theme and fostered a new era of public
exposure of its history” (p. 287). Ever mindful of his thesis, he draws
readers from particular works back to the general notion of paradox:
No one has succeeded better than Whipple at capturing
the recurrent Mormon paradox: the independence and loneliness of an exiled people. Not since the myth of the Pilgrims has
the saga of a second Canaan been so compellingly told. . . .
Planning and building worlds, whether earthly Zions or
celestial habitations, is an enduring feature of the LDS ethic.
Even if the endeavor, like Enoch’s Zion of old, is one that
accentuates the rift, rather than the relation, with the earthly
city of man. Of course, the initial exuberance of a people gathering in Missouri to build a literal Zion has gradually metamorphosed into the quieter contentment of a people satisfied
with a Zion that is now figuratively rendered as the church
itself. Still, Mormonism’s immersion in a rhetoric of founding
epiphanies, supernatural manifestations, dialogic revelation,
and ongoing spiritual experiences sometimes collapses, in
parallel fashion, the distance that separates gold plates from
suburban testimony meetings. (pp. 289–90)
Not every reader will welcome the movement from critique to theory
throughout this study of Mormon culture, but the distinction of his
work is his engagement with ideas. If, at some points, Givens embeds
those ideas in heavy literary language to the peril of comprehension,
that is a hazard the patient reader can weather. Givens’s tone manifests
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an ironic humor essential to his stance as an informed, professional,
and independent critic.
Other significant insights into Mormon literature include distinctions among the craft of poets as diverse as Clinton F. Larson, Carol
Lynn Pearson, Emma Lou Thayne, and Susan (Elizabeth) Howe. He
samples contributions of story writers Levi Peterson, Douglas Thayer,
Donald Marshall, Kevin Cassity, and Karen Rosenbaum without forgetting the notable story “Sayso or Sense,” by Eileen (Gibbons) Kump.
In his summary, Givens notes the present mainstreaming of Mormon
peculiarities into contemporary idioms, seeing polarizing forces tugging at these artists:
Most religions accommodate the sad truth that the
days of Pentecost are past. But in a religious culture like the
Mormons’, where buoyant optimism, living prophets, and
the discourse of private revelations, testimony, and spiritual
experiences dominate, the pressures to continually reenact
the founding epiphanies of the first Prophet make for a culture that is spiritually vibrant but also, at times, quietly polarizing. . . . One need only turn to LDS intellectual culture to
see a population vigorously working to carve out a niche for
themselves in a church they find increasingly inhospitable to
closet doubters and zealous revisionists alike. . . .
But writers have belabored a second polarization as well,
and that is the isolation of those who know, or are supposed
to know, from a larger culture that appears, by contrast,
benighted and inferior. (p. 313)
Among notable novels, Givens reviews Levi Peterson’s Backslider
(1986), Michael Fillerup’s Beyond the River (1995), Alan Mitchell’s
Angel of the Danube (2000), and Margaret Blair Young’s Salvador
(1992). All treat young people coming of age, the middle two through
the missionary experience. Givens nicely points out what brings satisfaction in this fiction as he pays tribute to Young’s achievement: “A
Mormon version of Heart of Darkness, the novel achieves what the
great Mormon novel has to: moral complexity, an unflinching gaze
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into the universe’s tragic dimension, and a celebration of life that is
stripped of sentimentality but not sentiment” (p. 319).
Readers of science fiction will be pleased that Givens does not
neglect the achievements of Orson Scott Card in science fiction and
particularly commends his Ender’s saga. He also calls attention to
the contribution of Brigham Young University’s student magazine
the Leading Edge, since “speculative fiction,” using the preferred SF
term, has been a fertile field for young Latter-day Saint writers, where
“the reality of multiple inhabited worlds is not the only doctrine that
invites creative speculation of an LDS bent” (p. 320). He concludes this
section with a nod to essay writers Eugene England, Elbert Peck, and
Levi Peterson, just an introductory view, in my opinion, to a notable
sector of Mormon writing.10
Chapter 10 on visual art introduces readers to the early portrait
painters Sutcliffe Maudsley and William Warner Major (p. 181) and
to landscape artists George Ottinger, Dan Weggeland, and Alfred
Lambourne. Givens offers the astute insight that artists who actually
walked the trails to Zion “tend to emphasize the domestication of nature
by the hand of man over the pristine beauty of a land unspoiled by the
colonizer’s spade” (p. 186). Further, Givens sees their work “as a modern counterpart to Renaissance persecution narratives by the masters”
because they look sympathetically at the lives of a driven people (p. 187).
This attitude is fixed in C. C. A. Christensen’s historic panoramas, and
Givens puts touring art shows like this into historical perspective by
comparing Christensen with John Banvard, an early American painter
of panoramas of the Mississippi River (pp. 184, 188).
He extends his overview of visual artists in chapter 16 to cover
the art missionaries of the 1890s. De rigueur, he notes the work of
LeConte Stewart among Utah’s landscape artists; Minerva Teichert,
who tells the Mormon story through her murals; and Arnold Friberg,
who produced epic paintings. He evaluates sculptures by Cyrus Dallin
and Mahonri Young and the interpretive bronzes of Avard Fairbanks.
10. Cherry B. Silver, “Elegant Angst: Mining the Treasures of Mormon Personal
Essays, 1982–2001,” Irreantum: Magazine of the Association for Mormon Letters 5/1
(2003): 36–41.
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He deplores the trend of “orthodox illustration” represented by the
church and its turning for depictions of scriptural stories to Carl
Bloch, a nineteenth-century Danish painter, and to contemporary
non-Mormons Harry Anderson, Tom Lovell, and Kenneth Riley.
Revitalizing the use of Latter-day Saint artists, however, he sees, “by
1956, tentative efforts . . . to forge an aesthetic that would incorporate
LDS religiosity into studio art. . . . With the Art and Belief movement,
accomplished artists would experiment with themes more explicitly
identifiable with Mormon theology and culture” (p. 333). An exhibition entitled Art and Belief in the winter of 1966–67 featured work
by Dale T. Fletcher, Trevor Southey, Gary E. Smith, Dennis Smith,
and Larry Prestwich. Since then, publications such as Dialogue have
featured Latter-day Saint artists in their pages and on their covers. The
Springville Art Museum, under director Vern Swanson, has collected
broadly and, as Givens footnotes, produced a landmark collection,
Utah Painting and Sculpture (1997). The Museum of Church History
and Art has sponsored international art competitions. Its senior curator, Richard Oman, however, feels that Givens downplays the impact
of the Museum in promoting and purchasing significant new art.11
This neglect may simply be a consequence of multiplying resources
for him to evaluate. Givens does point out “church preference for noncontroversial art” with “a tendency to veer toward the sentimental”
in such painters as Greg Olsen (he writes Grey Olsen) and Liz Lemon
(Swindle) (p. 335). He calls attention to the notable work of Walter
Rane and the international achievement of James C. Christensen and
concludes by honoring the Mormon Artists Group in New York City,
seeing potential for further expansiveness.
With the church possessing a membership that has since
the mid-1990s shifted to a predominantly non-American
one, Utah landscapes and even pioneer history will have less
resonance to Mormon ears and eyes, and the center of gravity will continue to shift further afield. Even renditions of
scriptural characters and motifs will necessarily be rethought
11. Richard Oman, personal interview with the author, March 2008.
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and reworked, to lose their American coloration and cultural naїveté, as had to happen to the blue-eyed Jesus of the
Victorians.
. . . As response to the international art exhibit shows,
however, art holds forth the promise of giving the most immediate, vibrant, and creative expression to the diversity of an
international Mormon culture. (pp. 337–38)
In his conclusion, Terryl Givens moves beyond the skepticism
characteristic of much of his analysis to reveal the innate excitement he feels about Mormon art and culture: “As an ethnic culture,
Mormonism may still be in its adolescence. But Joseph Smith appears
to have provided that culture with sufficient tensions and paradoxes to
generate vigorous artistic and intellectual expression for another 200
years. The competing centrifugal and centripetal forces that characterize Mormonism show no sign—fortunately—of imminent resolution”
(pp. 343–44). It is such unresolved tension that has attracted Givens
to this extended study of the life of the Mormon mind and should
earn the reader’s admiration. He speaks to readers who will appreciate
the power of Mormon theology to motivate cultural achievements in
an indeterminate world where individual efforts matter but perfect
results are seldom achieved.
Evaluation
What would improve Givens’s analysis of this world of religion
and culture? Updating of sources, I would say, and in several cases
more background or accuracy of detail.
For example, to illustrate the wit and literary acumen of young
adults involved in the Wasatch Literary Association established in 1875,
Givens, drawing on Ronald Walker’s research, cites verses from a poem
written by Bud Whitney that refers to Mrs. Sears and “little Em.”
Each Sunday morn to visit Mrs. Sears,
The lovely form of little Em appears.
Unconscious, half of all her blooming charms,
Yet well inured to love and loves alarms.
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White gauzy skirts pinned backward hard and tight,
Still other charms afford the eager sight. (p. 93)
Givens cleverly points out the poem’s purposeful imitation of Oliver
Goldsmith’s “Deserted Village.” But to my mind it would deepen the
significance of the quotation if Givens identified the subjects of the
caricature and placed them in their historical context. “Bud” Whitney
was Horace Gibson Whitney, later drama critic and managing editor
of the Deseret News. The females are children of Emmeline B. Wells,
in whose parlor the Wasatch was founded. Mrs. Sears was Isabel
Modalena Whitney, daughter of Newel K. Whitney and Emmeline,
thus a cousin once removed to “Bud” and married to an up-and-coming merchant, Septimus W. Sears. “Little Em” was Emma Whitney
Wells, first daughter of Emmeline and Daniel H. Wells. She was one of
the charter members of the Wasatch who could safely and affectionately be parodied. As Walker points out, the attraction of such light
literary entertainment for children of prominent church families worried President Young and motivated him to sponsor an association
within the church for young men. To lead the Y.M.M.I.A., he tapped
Junius F. Wells, son of Daniel Wells, and also called Orson F. Whitney
and Rulon S. Wells on missions, as if to harness properly the Wasatch’s
spontaneous intellectual activity.12 I find these links fascinating. My
urging, then, is for Givens to deepen the insights he offers with helpful
historical background.
A second suggestion is to check for accuracy in detail. In chapter 9, for instance, Givens links home literature with the Woman’s
Exponent, which was as much a news and political journal as a site for
poetry, essays, and occasional fiction. Contemporary publications—
the Contributor, Juvenile Instructor, and Young Woman’s Journal—
indeed featured stories, poetry, and articles of general interest. In one
respect, Givens’s reference to the Woman’s Exponent is abbreviated
and misleading. He mentions only the founding editor Louisa Lula
Greene (not with her married name, Richards, by which she is usually
cited) but does not refer to her long-term successor, editor Emmeline B.
12. See Walker, Qualities That Count, 72.
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Wells. As biographer Carol Cornwall Madsen explains, Wells “served
as sole proprietor and publisher” for thirty-five years. Givens mistakenly writes, “Founded as a semi-private venture, the magazine eventually became the official organ of the church’s relief society and would
run until 1914” (p. 177). In fact, it remained a private paper and was
only “official” in reporting church women’s activities and taking a
prochurch editorial stance. Ironically, when Emmeline finally offered
the publication to the Relief Society, that organization declined to take
it on and instead, in 1915, established its own quite different publication, the Relief Society Magazine, with Susa Young Gates as editor.13
Such limitations in reporting, I believe, arise from the range of
Givens’s readings. He cites many early journal articles like Leonard
Arrington’s in the 1971 Dialogue and Maureen Ursenbach Beecher’s
in 1978 as well as collections of essays on Mormon women and writers published in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s. He has looked at originals of
several publications, including the Times and Seasons, Messenger and
Advocate, and the Contributor, but perhaps not the Woman’s Exponent,
because the editors are clearly listed on the masthead. Evidently he
did not have access to the 2006 Emmeline B. Wells biography nor the
extensive earlier articles on her work with the Woman’s Exponent by
Carol Cornwall Madsen. He misses full biographies on subjects of
interest, like T. Edgar Lyon Jr.’s John Lyon: The Life of a Pioneer Poet
(1989). And of course scholarship rolls on. The reader might like to
know about books in process, particularly Jill Mulvay Derr and Karen
Lynn Davidson’s analysis of Eliza R. Snow poetry to be completed in
2008. Because Oxford University Press did not print a bibliography
for People of Paradox, the reader is dependent on scanning through
hundreds of footnotes to locate appropriate sources.
Overall, Givens has situated Mormon culture and its worldview
within the mainstream of Western thought. He is uniquely qualified,
as a specialist in American intellectual history and comparative literature, to theorize and make judgments. His critiques of individual
works are necessarily limited in scope, but this major study cannot be
13. Carol Cornwall Madsen, An Advocate for Women: The Public Life of Emmeline B.
Wells: 1870–1920 (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 2006), 43–45; 63 n. 40.
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ignored in present and future discussions of how Mormons think and
what they are capable of creating.

The Armor of God:
Understanding the Metaphor
Sandra A. Thorne

Review of Kim B. Clark. Armor: Divine Protection in a Darkening World. Salt Lake City:
Deseret Book, 2007. 282 pp., with index. $21.95.

To see the armor of God whole, and to put all of it on, we must
comprehend that Christ is at the center. (p. 266)

T

o the saints living in Ephesus, the apostle Paul wrote an important letter about living the gospel in a difficult world. In the paragraph we now know as Ephesians 6:10–17, he crafted a profound metaphor, comparing the spiritual strengths of the faithful to the various
elements of armor worn by a soldier for protection on the battlefield.
Armor: Divine Protection in a Darkening World is a thorough dis
cussion of Paul’s metaphor that moves these inspired symbols out of
the realm of the simplistic caricatures that have sometimes been used
to describe them. Kim Clark explores the various elements of the metaphor by discussing concrete approaches to living the gospel and receiving its blessings. Clark has given us a mature, insightful perspective on
Paul’s teachings. He does not discuss Paul, his calling, his mission, or
the Saints who received this epistle; instead he focuses on the meaning
this sermon has for us—the recipients of the restored gospel in the last
dispensation.
Believers know that the word of the Lord is their protection in this
world, but just how does it protect? Clark offers perceptive discussion
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of gospel principles that have the potential to create the spiritual
strengths needed to arm oneself for “perilous times” (2 Timothy 3:1).
Specific references in the book to the symbols of Paul’s metaphor are
not as frequent as I expected—until I understood the depth of the discussion. The principles addressed are not poorly connected concepts
but crucial elements of the process of attaining the mighty change of
heart described in Mosiah 5:2 and Alma 5:12–14.
In the introduction, Clark describes his experience of searching for answers to his own concerns about the conflict between the
world’s ways and the ways of the gospel. He contemplated the passage
in Ephesians and began to gather insights about what it means to create and wear the armor of God. His desire to share those insights with
his family led him to write this book.1
As I read, I underlined passages that were meaningful to me,
and there were many. I appreciated the opportunity to read what he
learned in his quest for understanding.
In addition to chapters on the specific symbols of armor, Clark
includes three chapters discussing the importance of the covenants
Latter-day Saints enter into. Covenants allow one to “ ‘put on’ or ‘take
on’ something heavenly to help us in our earthly journey” (p. 17). He
draws from the teachings of King Benjamin in the Book of Mormon
to emphasize the need for baptism and repentance. We receive blessings when we embrace the process of repentance: “Without the Spirit,
the pain of guilt is just plain old pain and suffering. When the Spirit is
involved, however, those feelings are tinged with hope. . . . In this way,
what is painful and full of sorrow becomes godly” (p. 25).
My desire to improve my spiritual connection to the temple cove
nants made one of Clark’s insights especially meaningful to me: “I
believe there are three kinds of knowledge in the temple, and three
ways in which we learn. The first includes specific facts about the
plan of salvation, and specific information we need to know in order
to progress eternally. . . . The second kind of knowledge—symbolic
knowledge—is different. . . . What we learn depends very much on
1. Likely because of that focus, Clark includes many examples of family experiences;
some of them work well, but others seem strained.
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us—what we need, our preparation, our sensitivity to the Spirit, our
attention and focus. . . . The third kind of knowledge we receive in the
temple is an eternal perspective. This knowledge builds on and comes
from the first two, but adds a broader vision, a divine framework, and
a heavenly vantage point” (pp. 65–68).
That Paul’s metaphor is perfectly applicable these many centuries
after it was written is evidence of the eternal nature of who we really
are and the eternal nature of the war that people of faith wage—a war
“not against flesh and blood, but . . . against the rulers of the darkness
of this world” (Ephesians 6:12). Here we find guidance and protection
at that crucial point where all things spiritual meet all things earthly.
“The armor of God really is like armor. It is the armor of light, the sure
protection against the ‘wiles of the devil’ and the ‘fiery darts of the
wicked.’ But the whole armor of God is more than protection. It also
confers on us the capacity to be on the Lord’s errand in building the
kingdom of God in the great battle against evil in the world. When we
put on the whole armor of God, we are prepared to serve him on the
front lines of that battle” (p. 272).

Faith, Reason, Knowledge, and Truth

Richard N. Williams

T

he premise of this essay is that a glorious restoration has taken
place in our time. We have come to understand that the history
of the world is marked in dispensation units. The world has suffered
through periods of relative darkness, ignorance, and error. It has also
been blessed with periods of truth and light. You and I have the blessed
privilege of living in the full light of day—the dispensation of the fulness of times. This, as they say, changes everything. The scripture in
Isaiah 29:14 and repeated in 2 Nephi 27:26 concerning the “marvelous
work and a wonder” of the restoration is well known to all of us. We
are not as familiar with the verse that follows. I quote from 2 Nephi
27:27, where the prophet spoke of those who are not enlightened nor
made joyful at the news of the restoration of the fulness of the gospel. These people respond: “Surely, your turning of things upside down
shall be esteemed as the potter’s clay.” This is a powerful metaphor.
The implications of the restored gospel are dramatic and farreaching. Elder Neal A. Maxwell and Elder Dallin H. Oaks have pointed
out that a notable aspect of the apostasy was that ideas and philosophies
prevalent in that day and largely Greek in origin were incorporated into

Richard N. Williams was a professor of psychology and assistant to the associate academic vice president at Brigham Young University when this devotional address was
given at BYU on 1 February 2000. A slightly revised version of this talk is reprinted here
with the author’s permission.
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the doctrine of the church.1 Since religion went significantly wrong in
large part because of those ideas and presuppositions, we Latter-day
Saints ought to be as wary of accepting them in our academic disciplines and social institutions as we are in our religion.
The restored gospel of Jesus Christ has the potential to redefine
and redeem our understanding of faith, reason, knowledge, and truth
in ways that liberate us from problems that, lacking the restoration
perspective, continue to vex and trouble the world and, too often, the
souls of many of us.
Among all the factors contributing to the apostasy, three are preeminent: first, the loss of the understanding of the true nature of God
and thus of our own nature and purpose; second, the loss of apostolic
authority and the special witness it provides; and, third, the loss of the
fulness of the gifts of the Spirit. It is interesting to me that these three
things were among the very first restored in our dispensation. These
three essential characteristics of the true church bear directly on our
experience and understanding of faith, reason, knowledge, and truth.
Faith and Reason
Discourse about the relationship between faith and reason is centuries old, very sophisticated, and finely nuanced. What I present here
will be incomplete, but I trust not misleading. I believe that discussions
of faith and reason have suffered over the centuries because they have
not been informed by the truths of the restored gospel. When thus
informed, the classic and timeworn tensions between faith and reason
disappear. Faith is seen in a new light. In turn, the proper understanding of faith and reason casts new light on common understandings of
knowledge and truth.
It seems unarguable that reason—our capacity and tendency to
“make sense” and to engage in consistent, meaningful understanding and expression—is intrinsic to our nature. Scholars have had a
tendency, however, to privilege reason over other expressions of
1. Neal A. Maxwell, “From the Beginning,” Ensign, November 1993, 18–20; Dallin H.
Oaks, “Apostasy and Restoration,” Ensign, May 1995, 84–87.
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our nature. The effect has been that reason has achieved unassailed
authority in matters of knowledge and truth. In recent years various postmodern movements have mounted serious challenges to the
hegemony of reason, noting that it is as capable of being deployed for
oppressive as for noble purposes. In my own scholarly career, I have
enjoyed the luxury of using powerful postmodern arguments against
the excesses of modern rationalism and then using powerful rationalist arguments against the excesses of postmodernism. Through this
endeavor I have come to the conclusion that reason as we contemporaneously understand and experience it is fallible, but mostly not pernicious. It is like any other human language—good for certain things,
not so good for others.
Early in the Christian era, attempts were made to reconcile the
life-changing power of faith with the compelling persuasive power of
reason. Most attempts at reconciliation during the apostate period had
one of two results. One result was that faith and reason were reconciled because the foundations of faith were shown ultimately to be reasonable—as in those views that fold easily into a general “natural law”
perspective. Those aspects of faith that were reasonable were retained,
not as faith, but as part of reason; what aspects of faith seemed not
reasonable were dismissed as mystical. Thus faith and mysticism, as
the “unreasonable,” became strongly connected. The second approach
upheld both faith and reason as different approaches to knowledge,
ultimately leading to different kinds of knowledge. Reason was thought
to lead to certainty, scientific knowledge, and knowledge of the essential. Faith was thought to lead to knowledge of the religious, of that
which, by implication, cannot be known with rational certainty. It is
easy to see that these two approaches to reconciling faith and reason
are essentially the same. Briefly put, reason trumps faith.
But the reconciliation thus achieved has never been a happy one.
As the philosophy of mind progressed and as science and technology
developed, reason came to be more and more powerful and persuasive, whereas faith came to be concomitantly less persuasive and the
sort of knowledge it provided more mystical and ephemeral. Finally,
with the Enlightenment, knowledge was grounded ultimately in
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what was intuitively perceived as true by the rational mind, and real
knowledge became associated with rational certainty—grounded in
that which was rationally and logically impossible to doubt. The unintended result of this powerful analytic approach to reason was that
faith came to be understood in opposition to certainty and was thus
always vulnerable to doubt. In fact, faith, in a very real sense, came to
be that which one believes in the face of doubt.
Thus it is fair to say that the modern view is essentially that reason and logic ultimately ground knowledge and truth, whereas faith
is what we are forced to rely on when we lack indubitable certainty.
Faith, on this view, is a sort of positive thinking, what we cling to
when we do not know. It is a believing haunted from its fringes by
doubt. This is the seemingly paradoxical stuff that many self-styled
intellectuals exult in—a seedbed of tragic heroism characterizing the
lives of thoughtful persons. This view has, unfortunately, even found
its way into Latter-day Saint culture. However, this understanding of
faith and reason is unsatisfactory because it obscures the nature of and
attenuates the power of faith. Furthermore, it does not square with the
increased knowledge provided by the restoration.
If we push the traditional understanding of faith and reason just
a bit, we arrive at some rather odd conclusions. If faith is what we
“settle for” in the absence of knowledge, then the more we know
the less faith we need, or, indeed, the less faith we can have. The
more faith we have, the less we know. God, who has all knowledge,
has no faith at all. This line of thinking feeds the stereotype that
only the ignorant need or have faith. Religion is a crutch, you know.
Sometimes this view of faith provides fuel for faith crises, particularly for people who base their identity and worth on their intellectual powers of reason and logic. We Latter-day Saints are in a peculiar position vis-à-vis this understanding of faith because we often
begin our most poignant expressions of our faith with the words “I
know.” I believe we can enrich faith and expand our view of knowledge and truth by entertaining an alternative conception of faith and
its relation to reason. For example, the idea of faith as what we cling
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to in the absence of knowledge does not work very well scripturally.
Permit me to paraphrase Hebrews 11:3–5:
Through [what we cling to when we don’t know] we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God. . . .
By [what we cling to when we don’t know] Abel . . . obtained
witness that he was righteous. . . . By [what we cling to when
we don’t know] Enoch was translated.
Nevertheless, this definition of faith and its presumed contrast
with reason is so strong that it even moves us to translate the Doctrine
and Covenants admonition to “seek learning, even by study and also
by faith” (D&C 88:118) into a proclamation of our belief in two types
of knowledge—one coming by reason and one by faith. Often, even
at Brigham Young University, we academics divide truth neatly into
sacred truths and secular truths. In our reason-driven intellectual
pursuits we are on the trail of what we call secular truths, and we even
claim to have found some. Although this is a convenient way of speaking about our disciplines, we should ponder why the phrase secular
truth is not found in scripture. In fact, my computer tells me that
truth is never used in scripture in the plural except in two passages
(D&C 52:17; 66:1), both referring to things the Lord had previously
revealed and was recalling in the present. Rather than a scriptural
distinction between types of truths, we find the Lord’s proclamation
that “all things unto [Him] are spiritual” (D&C 29:34). From Doctrine
and Covenants 29:31–35 we learn that there are temporal (not secular)
and spiritual created things, but this does not necessarily imply that
there are secular truths. If the distinction between sacred and secular
truth were a genuine epistemological watershed, we might reasonably
expect in holy writ at least a mention of it. Indeed, most scriptural
references to the secular are quite negative. Sometimes we may receive
through spiritual means answers to temporal questions and problems.
However, it never seems to flow the other direction. This would seem
to imply that all things are indeed spiritual, even when their application is temporal. It may be that, from the perspective of the restoration,
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the categories of faith, reason, and truth do not have quite the same
meaning we have received from our intellectual traditions.
In place of the common conceptual dimension anchored by faith
at one end and reason at the other, I suggest that there are really two
dimensions. It might be helpful to picture them as perpendicular to
one another. One dimension is anchored on one end by reason and on
the other end by its opposite: irrationality, promiscuous subjectivity,
or even solipsism. The other dimension is anchored on one end by
faith and on the other by the opposite of faith. I have pondered a bit
about what the opposite of faith is. I believe the anchor opposite faith
is darkness, nihilism, despair—that state of the soul that comes from
living “without God in the world” (Ephesians 2:12; Alma 41:11; see
Helaman 13:38; Mormon 2:12–13). To portray faith and reason in this
relationship leads us to the conclusion that faith is not what one settles
for in the absence of reason and knowledge; it is a type of knowledge,
sure and trustworthy and eminently attainable. Portrayed in this way,
one could very well have great faith and be also entirely reasonable
and rational. That is to be strived for.
The other three quadrants created by our axes are interesting. One
can have faith and be irrational. This is one stereotype of religious
people. Depending on what standards are used to judge rationality, this might be a positive or a problematic lifestyle. One can also
have little faith and yet be very reasonable, rational, and logical. We
meet many such persons in academic life and in the broader culture.
Finally, there is a possibility of being both dark and despairing as well
as beyond the pale of reason.
I want to consider briefly the scriptural case for the suggestion
that faith is not merely a state of mind contrived to fill the void created by the absence of reasoned knowledge but rather a very important kind of knowledge. First, I want to consider chapters 30 to 35 of
Alma in the Book of Mormon. These chapters, I believe, must be read
as a whole. Chapter 29 brings the mission to the Lamanites to a close.
Chapter 36 begins the account of Alma’s blessing of his sons, and the
account of the Lamanite wars follows. Chapters 30 to 35 have a separate message.
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In chapter 30 we meet Korihor, the antichrist. He propounded
insidious and destructive doctrine. However, he “had much success,”
and what he taught was “pleasing unto the carnal [that is, earthly]
mind” (v. 53). Much of Korihor’s preaching centered on the nature of
knowledge. His major premise was that we can know only what we
can see. From this it followed that no one can know the future and
that prophecy is impossible and, thus, merely foolish tradition. From
this line of analysis his other doctrines followed. His arguments were
both reasonable and logical. If they were to be faulted or refuted, such
refutation had to be aimed at the major premise—the starting point
of the argument.
Significantly, this is always where reason shows itself to be finite
and vulnerable. In chapter 30 Alma immediately responded to Korihor
by challenging his starting point and offering an alternative major
premise. This teaches us something very important about faith and
its relation to reason and knowledge. Interestingly, chapter 31 introduces us to the Zoramites, who espoused religious doctrines similar
to Korihor’s. They, too, believed that the words of the prophets were
foolish traditions, and they were proud “that their hearts were not stolen away to believe in things to come, which they knew nothing about”
(Alma 31:22).
Korihor and the Zoramites so persuasively presented their view of
faith, knowledge, and truth that Alma, as well as Moroni, sensed that
it needed a powerful response. It is no coincidence, then, that what
follows in chapter 32 is perhaps the most profound exposition on faith
in all of scripture. It is a discourse on faith and knowledge. Space will
not permit the complete analysis it deserves, but I have come to believe
that Alma 32 is a discourse on two types of “perfect” knowledge. One
type propounded by Korihor is knowledge grounded purely in sensory experience and reason. The other type of knowledge is grounded
in a different kind of experience and is manifested as faith.
Alma begins the discourse by reminding us that “there are many
[including, notably, Korihor] who do say: If thou wilt show unto us
a sign from heaven, then we shall know of a surety; then we shall
believe” (v. 17). He then makes a subtle but important point bearing

106 • The FARMS Review 20/1 (2008)

on the nature of faith, reason, belief, and knowledge. He says that this
attitude is not faith because “if a man knoweth a thing he hath no
cause to believe, for he knoweth it” (v. 18). We can easily read this as
the old contrast between knowing and clinging to faith that we have
come to expect. However, Alma might also be pointing out that what
we see or otherwise experience sensorially—for example, a visual fact
or event—is not the sort of thing that requires belief or produces faith.
If I meet a friend on the sidewalk, he will not ask, “Do you believe I
am here?” If he were to do that, I would try to get him professional
help. By the same token, when I bump my head, no one asks whether
I believe I really bumped it or whether I believe I am in pain. Faith,
as usually understood, and belief are irrelevant to such experiences.
What matters is what they mean for us and what we do about them. It
is not by seeing a sign but by responding to it that we enter the domain
where faith can be understood.
Alma goes on in verse 19 to point out that lacking this sort of
sensory knowledge and residing in belief is a great blessing, a protection from the condemnation that comes from sinning against certain
kinds of knowledge. The veil between this life and the next is, it seems,
a great protection to people like me who might not be quite able to stop
sinning, even in the factual and unarguable presence of God himself. I
am grateful to live in a world of belief and faith for now while I prepare
to live better.
In that verse we all know so well, Alma teaches us that faith, like
belief, is not to have this sort of “perfect knowledge” (Alma 32:21).
Faith is like belief in this way, but Alma makes it clear that it is not
merely belief. Faith grows into a knowledge that is, in its crucial attributes, perfect. In contrast to knowledge founded on what we see, and
also subtly different from mere belief, faith is allied with “hope for
things which are not seen, which are true.” Faith thus is not a clinging
to in the absence of knowledge of truth but a hope for what is true. A
skeptic might well want to call Alma’s bluff at this point: “Okay, how
can you hope for what is true if you don’t already know it?” (Korihor
was a clever man.) The answer is that faith leads to and indeed already
is just such knowledge because it is the hope of truth; if it were not,
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it would not be real hope. Faith is not a placeholder for truth. As we
learn later in the chapter, it is more like the seed of truth—alive, growing, pushing upward. After reminding us that God speaks to us and
after reiterating the importance of being humble, Alma asks us in
verse 27 to begin not with mere belief but with a “desire to believe”—
the first stirrings of faith. He invited us “to an experiment.” Note that
an experiment is not the same as sight or rationality. It engages the
entire person.
If we exercise our faculties and develop the moral character necessary for the experiment to work, the seed, which is the true word of
Christ, “swelleth, and sprouteth, and beginneth to grow” (v. 30). Alma
then makes the crucial distinction: “Are ye sure that this is a good
seed? I say unto you, Yea” (v. 31). And in conclusion:
And now, behold, is your knowledge perfect? Yea, your knowledge is perfect in that thing, . . . for ye know that the word hath
swelled your souls, and ye also know that it hath sprouted up,
that your understanding doth begin to be enlightened, and
your mind doth begin to expand. O then, is not this real? I say
unto you, Yea. (Alma 32:34–35)
We have come a long distance in our understanding of faith. We
have come from faith not being a perfect knowledge to a knowledge
which is perfect. I believe that this entire process whereby we begin to
experience the fruits of truth and to know one thing and then another
is faith. Understood as this process, faith leads us to a knowledge as
sure and as perfect as any we could ever want. Faith could not become
knowledge unless it already was knowledge. In a very real sense faith
is knowledge—not the knowledge whose claim to perfection is in sensory experience or in rational argument, but the knowledge whose
claim to perfection is in discernible and undeniable experience. Note
the image Alma uses to describe the experience of this sure knowledge: “Ye have tasted this light” (v. 35). There is nothing unsure about
the experience of taste. Alma’s use of taste is significant. Psychologists
have discovered many visual illusions that demonstrate that what we
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see is often not what is really there. However, not a single “taste illusion” has ever been discovered.
Interestingly, after having told us that our knowledge is perfect
in verse 34, Alma says in verses 35 and 36 that it is not perfect and
that we still need faith. So we have a knowledge that is perfect and not
perfect. I take this to mean that this entire process of faith gives us
knowledge that is perfect in the sense of being sure, nothing lacking,
but that it is not perfect in the sense of coming to an end. Here again
the contrast with knowledge anchored only in reason is sharp. As reason is understood in our modern age, the point of reason or logical
analysis is to bring a question or argument to a close. Having made the
logical argument, there is nothing more to know on the matter—that
is the goal of perfect reason. As children of the eternal God, with a
destiny described as “eternal progression,” what might we expect but a
perfect knowledge that continues, a knowing that is a way of life—we
might say eternal life—the rewards of which are fruit “most precious,
. . . sweet above all that is sweet,” so that we can be “filled, that [we]
hunger not, neither shall [we] thirst” (v. 42).
Chapters 33 and 34 of Alma are aimed at explaining how this
faith experiment works, how we know by faith. Chapter 33 teaches of
the role of scriptures and prayer. Chapter 34 reframes the question of
faith. The question the Zoramites had was how to plant the seed and
do the experiment. Amulek, no doubt moved upon by the Spirit, tells
us what the real question of faith is: “And we have beheld that the great
question which is in your minds is whether the word be in the Son of
God, or whether there shall be no Christ” (Alma 34:5).
Faith is anchored in Jesus Christ, the Son of God, and the knowledge of him is both sure and possible. The contrast between faith as
sure knowledge and the knowledge reason can provide is evident
when we compare Amulek’s testimony of Christ as the anchor to sure
knowledge with the conclusion of many Nephites just before His coming: “And they began to reason and to contend among themselves, saying: that it is not reasonable that such a being as a Christ shall come”
(Helaman 16:17–18). Not “reasonable,” but nonetheless true.
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Knowledge
As noted above, historically, faith and reason have been distinguished by the different types of knowledge each produces. This
unhappy resolution meant that reason was granted preeminence over
faith, laying claim to certain knowledge. Faith became the absence of
knowledge. However, there is another distinction between the sort of
knowledge associated with faith and the sort associated with reason.
We can perhaps understand the distinction better by referring to a
distinction made in Latinate languages between two types of knowledge. I will refer to the Spanish verbs saber and conocer. Although the
difference is complex, at least it can be said that saber means to know
such things as facts, to assert propositional knowledge, and to know
that something is the case. Conocer, on the other hand, is “to be intimately acquainted with.” It is used to express knowledge of persons,
places, and experiences. I might say that I know my wife, and no one
could reasonably ask, “Are you sure?” This kind of knowing is a type
to which traditional issues of rational certainty do not apply. And yet
it is no less sure than propositional knowledge. Indeed, in many ways
it is more sure. We must remember that our faith is faith in the Lord
Jesus Christ. Faith in a person is a very different thing from faith that
some proposition is true.
The perfect knowledge of reason is only as perfect as its anchors—
those premises from which all processes of reason must begin. If the
premises are true, reason may take us to truth—a propositional truth
giving us confidence that our sense of the world corresponds with
what is. The problem is that all reason must begin with premises that
reason itself cannot validate—except on other premises, thus begging
the question. If Alma was right, faith leads us to another kind of perfect knowledge—to truth—and reason, in a way, leads us away. That
is, once we know what is true, reason provides a wonderful tool for
sorting out our obligations, anticipating consequences, and persuading others that what we know is true. Truth, I am convinced, can be
rendered reasonable, but it does not arise from reason.
For example, the truth of Mormonism does not rest on reason. We
do not draw our authority, our identity, or our mission from any set of
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propositions or from any interpretation of doctrine. We do not draw
upon theology at all as justification for our truth claims. The truth of
Mormonism rests on the occurrence of certain events. Chief among
the founding events are these: the Father and the Son either appeared
to Joseph Smith in New York or they did not; there either were gold
plates holding a history of real people or there were not; apostles and
prophets laid hands on Joseph Smith and Oliver Cowdery or they did
not. We can go beyond this. The truth of the gospel of Jesus Christ
itself rests on the occurrence of events. There was a Man, Jesus, or
there was not; he overcame the whole of sin and darkness in the garden or he did not; the tomb was empty or it was not. The truth of an
event is very different from the truth of a proposition. The truth of
propositions is established by reason and argument, the difficulty of
which I have just described. The truth of events is established by witnesses. Because of the restoration of the true gospel, we are blessed
with an abundance of witnesses. This is why the apostolic authority of
special witnesses and the restoration of the gifts of the Spirit are essential to the true church. Scriptures also witness of these things, and we
Latter-day Saints have an embarrassment of riches where scripture is
concerned. In this context, faith is not what we cling to when we do
not know truth; rather, faith is the knowledge of truth nourished by
good acts. It is strengthened by witnesses capable of penetrating our
very souls and culminates in the palpable fruits of sure and certain
experience.
Faith is neither a placeholder for knowledge nor what we cling to
in its absence. The common reading of faith as a placeholder led me for
some years to misread a very important passage from Hebrews: “Faith
is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen”
(Hebrews 11:1). I used to translate this scripture to mean faith is only
evidence, not the real thing—it is only a hope that unseen substances
are real. But I misread. Straightforwardly it says faith is substance, it
is evidence—the evidence Alma talked about, the evidence God gives
us by many witnesses, the evidence we give to each other, and what we
evidence in our own lives. It is not the substitute for things hoped for
but their very substance. Faith as this substance “maketh an anchor to
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the souls of men, which would make them sure and steadfast, always
abounding in good works” (Ether 12:4).
One of the supernal blessings of the restored gospel is knowing
that the anchor of faith is itself anchored in the embodied God whose
existence is not established by reason but whose literal existence itself
grounds our knowledge of him. He only is the God who can say:
Arise and come forth . . . that ye may thrust your hands into
my side, and . . . feel the prints of the nails in my hands and in
my feet, that ye may know that I am the God of Israel, and the
God of the whole earth, and have been slain for the sins of the
world. (3 Nephi 11:14)
Faith in him is in every sense truth. It is knowledge perfect in every way.
It is true that in this life we must live by faith. We are consigned
to live outside the presence of our God. The purpose of life is to be
proven even as we prove God’s promises. God declared:
We will make an earth whereon these may dwell; and we will
prove them herewith, to see if they will do all things whatsoever
the Lord their God shall command them. (Abraham 3:24–25)
The test of life is to do the will of our God. Faith is not the part of
the test designed to make it difficult to return to him; it is what our
God has given us to make it possible to return to him. The trial of faith
is not to see what we will do without him but to see what we can do
with him. I believe we are asked to live by faith not so much to pass
the test of being on our own but because we need to learn things of
eternal and enduring import that we cannot do alone. We must learn
to know how to respond to witnesses. We must learn to know in the
very important way faith makes it possible to know—which kind of
learning might not develop otherwise. We must live by faith. For this I
am most grateful, because to live by faith is to live with God.
The Savior has said, “I am . . . the truth” (John 14:6). He also
warned us: “Wherefore, let all men beware how they take my name in
their lips” (D&C 63:61).
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Let us, then, be clear in our vision as we pursue and proclaim
truth. After being involved for years as a scholar in issues of faith,
reason, knowledge, and truth, I have learned that it is much easier for
the Lord to make a good man or woman smart than it is to make a
smart man or woman good. May we be protected from crises in our
faith occasioned by the precepts of men. May we experience faith as a
blessing and not as a burden.

Some Puzzles from
the Joseph Smith Papyri
John Gee

A

lthough the concept of preexistence is alluded to in various
Latter-day Saint scriptures, the clearest discussion comes from
the Book of Abraham, and it is almost the only reason that Latter-day
Saints use that book. Of the 378 quotations of the Book of Abraham in
general conferences of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
since 1942, 238, or 63 percent, come from the section on the preexistence in Abraham 3:18–28.1 The next most commonly cited passage
is the section on the Abrahamic covenant in Abraham 2:6–11, which
is cited 43 times for 11 percent of the citations. This situation is mirrored in the church’s lesson manuals, where the Book of Abraham
is cited 206 times—again the section on the preexistence is the most
commonly cited (28 percent) and the Abrahamic covenant is second
(22 percent).2 Whatever else the Book of Abraham says is of comparatively minor importance to Latter-day Saints. My topic, therefore, a
mote in our eyes but a beam in the eyes of the critics, is irrelevant to
the doctrine of Christ.

This article is based on a presentation given at the 2007 FAIR (Foundation for Apologetic
Information and Research) conference in Sandy, Utah.
1. Information taken from http://scriptures.byu.edu/ (accessed 28 August 2008).
2. From an analysis of the curriculum materials on http://lds.org. This includes
Primary, Aaronic Priesthood, Young Women, Sunday School, Relief Society, and
Melchizedek Priesthood materials. It does not include missionary, seminary, or institute
materials.

114 • The FARMS Review 20/1 (2008)

Some individuals are so intimately acquainted with the discussions about the Book of Abraham and the Joseph Smith Papyri that
they are inseparably wedded to them. Some are somewhat acquainted
with the arguments but perhaps not yet on a first-name basis. Others
are vaguely aware that some discussion exists but have not yet been
introduced to it. I hope I have something for all of these groups. For
those who are new to the discussion, allow me to introduce what I
affectionately refer to as the mess of the Joseph Smith Papyri.
The fullest discussion of the origins of the Joseph Smith Papyri
in the church’s curriculum materials is in the Gospel Doctrine manual for the Old Testament, which says, “The book of Abraham is a
translation that the Prophet Joseph Smith made from some Egyptian
papyri.”3 That is it. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
has no official position on how the Book of Abraham was translated
or from what papyrus. That the church takes no official position,
however, does not mean that individual members do not have some
opinions on the subject. Church members tend to fall into four groups
regarding the translation of the Book of Abraham. The smallest group,
comprising about one-half of 1 percent of Mormons—according to
my informal, admittedly unscientific surveys—thinks that Joseph
Smith translated the Book of Abraham from the existing fragments
that were in the Metropolitan Museum of Art. The next largest group
thinks that Joseph Smith translated the Book of Abraham from papyrus fragments that no longer exist. About one-third think there is or
was no connection between the Book of Abraham and any papyrus
fragments. The largest group, more than half of church members, do
not care where the Book of Abraham came from. Critics routinely
assert that the Latter-day Saint position is the one that is actually the
least popular of all. They want it to be our position because it is the
most convenient straw man. The only eyewitness to the translation
process to describe it was Joseph Smith’s scribe Warren Parrish, who
after he left the church claimed, “I have set by his side and penned
down the translation of the Egyptian Hieroglyphicks as he claimed to
3. Old Testament: Gospel Doctrine Teacher’s Manual (Salt Lake City: The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1996), 1.
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receive it by direct inspiration from Heaven.”4 The majority of Latterday Saints are probably comfortable leaving discussion of the translation of the Book of Abraham at that, and I will leave it at that here
too except to say that no theory about the translation accounts for all
the evidence. I would, however, like to look at the papyri themselves
and some of the puzzles surrounding them, namely, What papyri did
Joseph Smith have? and What do we know about the ancient owners
of the papyri?
Historical Overview
The saga of the Joseph Smith Papyri begins in the early part of
the nineteenth century during the pillaging of Egypt that at that
time passed for archaeology. One of those involved in the plunder
and pillage was Antonio Lebolo. He exhumed one of the most spectacular caches of mummies and papyri from Thebes that Egyptology
has ever known. (I used to think the accounts of several hundred
mummies5 were vastly exaggerated—I am no longer so sure.) Lebolo
was acting as an agent procuring antiquities for Bernadino Drovetti
but kept a few for himself. These were sent via Albano Oblasser to
America, paraded around the country, and sold off piecemeal until
the remainder were sold by Michael Chandler to the Church of Jesus
Christ in July 1835. The church got four mummies and at least five
papyri. After the death of Joseph Smith’s mother in 1856, the papyri
were sold to Abel Combs, who sold part of the collection to the
Wood Museum in St. Louis, which eventually relocated to Chicago
and burned to the ground in the Chicago Fire of 1871. The other part
of the collection Combs kept for himself, and that passed through
various hands until it was acquired by the Metropolitan Museum of
Art in 1947. The Metropolitan Museum of Art knew that they had
acquired “papyrus fragments of hieratic Books of the Dead, once the
property of the Mormon leader Joseph Smith.”6 “The Metropolitan
Museum was fully aware of what the papyri were when they first
4. Warren Parrish, letter to the editor, Painesville Republican, 15 February 1838.
5. History of the Church, 2:348−49.
6. “Review of the Year 1947,” Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletins 7/1 (1948): 17.

116 • The FARMS Review 20/1 (2008)

saw them in 1918, and they knew what they were doing when they
acquired them.” Klaus Baer recalled, “I saw photographs of them
for the first time in 1963, I believe, and was asked at the time, on
my honor not to tell anyone where they were and to keep the whole
thing confidential.”7 The guard had changed at the museum, and
the new curators were not as keen to have the papyri as the previous curators had been. Henry Fischer, curator of the Department of
Egyptian Art at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in the late 1960s,
explained how the museum decided to deal with their religious hot
potato: “We knew, since [Aziz Atiya] worked in Salt Lake City and
was acquainted with leaders of the Mormon Church, that he might
very tactfully find out how they felt about it. So we simply informed
him about this in confidence, and I think he handled the matter very
nicely.”8 The newspapers garbled the story by wrongly making Atiya
the discoverer of the documents, which disturbed Fischer. He wrote
to Atiya as follows:
Although I was already aware that your version of the “discovery” of these documents had caused considerable confusion, it was startling to read that you had informed me of their
existence.
While I have taken pains to avoid any outright contradictions of what you have said, I do not see why either I or the
other members of my department—past and present—should
be put in the position of being ignorant about facts we could
not fail to have known.9
The Metropolitan Museum of Art gave the papyri back to the
church in 1967. The papyri have now remained in one set of hands for
the longest time since their excavation.
7. Klaus Baer to Jerald Tanner, 13 August 1968, cited in Boyd J. Peterson, Hugh
Nibley: A Consecrated Life (Salt Lake City: Greg Kofford Books, 2002), 316.
8. Norman Tolk, Lynn Travers, George D. Smith, and F. Charles Graves, “An
Interview with Dr. Fischer,” Dialogue 2/4 (1967): 58.
9. Henry G. Fischer to Aziz S. Atiya, 2 January 1968, Aziz S. Atiya Papers,
Manuscripts Division, University of Utah Marriott Library.
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Physical Papyri
The papyri we currently have are eleven groups of fragments from
three different papyri, containing two partial copies of what is usually
misnamed “the Book of the Dead” and part of a copy of what is usually misnamed “the Document of Breathings Made by Isis.” The extant
fragments do not contain any text from the Book of Abraham.
We know what we currently have, but how much papyri did Joseph
Smith have? Critics want to minimize the amount of papyri originally
owned by Joseph Smith, preferably to an amount not much more than
what we currently have, because they do not want a Book of Abraham
to have ever existed. As Richard Bushman has noted, “people who
have broken away from Mormonism . . . have to justify their decision to leave. They cannot countenance evidence of divine inspiration
in [Joseph Smith’s] teachings without catching themselves in a disastrous error.”10 So critics who have left the church cannot allow Joseph
Smith to have gotten anything right, even as a guess or by accident.
They will go to extreme lengths and propound convoluted theories
to have something else, anything else, to believe in. The critic Dale
Morgan, himself such a defector, wrote in a moment of candor: “With
my point of view on God, I am incapable of accepting the claims of
Joseph Smith and the Mormons, be they however so convincing. If
God does not exist, how can Joseph Smith’s story have any possible
validity? I will look everywhere for explanations except to the ONE
explanation that is the position of the church.”11 So the critics cannot
allow themselves to say, as Latter-day Saints can say, “Whether or not
there was a Book of Abraham actually contained on the portion of
papyri that did not survive is something that cannot be determined
by scholarly means.”
A Latter-day Saint who has faith, that is, trust in God, can examine such issues without being bothered or without having to know all
10. Richard Lyman Bushman, Joseph Smith: Rough Stone Rolling (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2005), xix.
11. Dale Morgan to Juanita Brooks, 15 December 1945, in Dale Morgan on Early
Mormonism: Correspondence and a New History, ed. John P. Walker (Salt Lake City:
Signature Books, 1986), 87.
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the answers to all the questions we might have. In fact, insisting on the
answers to all our little questions is a sign of a lack of faith or trust;
for example, if we insist that our spouse or employees must account for
every moment out of our presence, it is a sign that we do not have faith
or trust in them. Abraham, for example, was able to say, “Thy servant
has sought thee earnestly; now I have found thee; thou didst send thine
angel to deliver me from the gods of Elkenah, and I will do well to hearken to thy voice” (Abraham 2:12–13). He trusted God on the basis of
one past experience without having to know all the details about how
the Lord was going to fulfill his promises. Likewise, a Latter-day Saint
who trusts God and his prophets, that is, spokesmen, does not need to
see the actual Egyptian characters on the papyrus or know any of the
details about the translation of the Book of Abraham in order to accept
it and act with confidence that this life is a time of testing when God
“will prove [us] herewith to see if [we] will do all things whatsoever the
Lord [our] God shall command [us]” (Abraham 3:25). This is the reason
why, for the vast majority of Latter-day Saints, the particulars of the
translation of the Book of Abraham are not an issue.
Still, “as all have not faith”—and most of us either want faith or
desire to help those who want it—we are commanded to “seek learning, even by study and also by faith” (Doctrine and Covenants 88:118).
Learning is a partial substitute for and an aid to faith. So what do we
actually know about the papyri Joseph Smith had?
Between the current fragments and some very bad copies of characters from the papyri, we know that Joseph Smith had papyri or portions of papyri from at least five individuals:
• Horos, son of Osoroeris and Chibois
• Semminis, daughter of Eschons
• Amenothis, son of Tanoub
• a woman with the unique name of Noufianoub
• a man named Sesonchis
Comparing the copies of the papyri with the fragments indicates that
in no case do we have a complete record of what Joseph Smith had
from these two sources alone.
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Eyewitnesses from the Nauvoo period (1839–1844) describe “a
quantity of records, written on papyrus, in Egyptian hieroglyphics,”12
including (1) some papyri “preserved under glass,”13 described as
“a number of glazed slides, like picture frames, containing sheets
of papyrus, with Egyptian inscriptions and hieroglyphics”;14 (2) “a
long roll of manuscript”15 that contained the Book of Abraham;16 (3)
“another roll”;17 and (4) “two or three other small pieces of papyrus,
with astronomical calculations, epitaphs, &c.”18 Only the mounted
fragments ended up in the Metropolitan Museum of Art and were
subsequently given back to the Church of Jesus Christ. The eyewitnesses not only describe the papyri, but they also describe specific
vignettes or pictures on the papyri. When eyewitnesses described the
vignettes as being on the papyri mounted under glass, they can be
matched with the fragments from the Metropolitan Museum of Art.
On the other hand, when the vignettes are described as being on the
rolls, the descriptions do not match any of the currently surviving
fragments. Gustav Seyffarth’s 1859 catalog of the museum in St. Louis
indicates that some of the Joseph Smith Papyri were there.19 Those
papyri moved with the Wood Museum to Chicago and were burned
in the Chicago Fire in 1871. Whatever we conjecture their contents to
be is only that: conjecture.
12. William S. West, A Few Interesting Facts Respecting the Rise, Progress, and
Pretensions of the Mormons (Warren, OH, 1837), cited in Jay M. Todd, The Saga of the
Book of Abraham (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1969), 196.
13. Josiah Quincy, Figures of the Past from the Leaves of Old Journals (Boston: Roberts
Brothers, 1883), 386.
14. Henry Caswall, The City of the Mormons; or, Three Days at Nauvoo, in 1842
(London: J. G. F. & J. Rivington, 1842), 22.
15. Charlotte Haven to her mother, 19 February 1843, “A Girl’s Letters from Nauvoo,”
Overland Monthly and Out West Magazine, December 1890, 624.
16. Jerusha W. Blanchard, “Reminiscences of the Granddaughter of Hyrum Smith,”
Relief Society Magazine 9/1 (1922): 9; Charlotte Haven to her mother, 19 February 1843,
Overland Monthly, 624.
17. Charlotte Haven to her mother, 19 February 1843, Overland Monthly, 624.
18. Oliver Cowdery to William Frye, 22 December 1835, Latter Day Saints’ Messenger
and Advocate 2/3 (1835): 234.
19. Gustav Seyffarth, Catalogue of the St. Louis Museum 1859, cited in Todd, Saga,
296−98.
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Both Mormon and non-Mormon eyewitnesses from the nineteenth century agree that it was a “roll of papyrus from which [Joseph
Smith] translated the Book of Abraham,”20 meaning the “long roll of
manuscript,” and not one of the mounted fragments that eventually
ended up in the Metropolitan Museum of Art.21 So the intellectual
position that some members follow and that the critics would have us
adopt as the position of the church is not in accord with the historical
evidence.
How big were the rolls?
One way to answer that question is to take the standard size for
a papyrus roll and just use that. “In the Ptolemaic period a roll was
usually c. 320 cm long and c. 32 cm high.”22 I have used such estimates before, but those figures are not entirely satisfactory. As Mark
Depauw has pointed out in a later study, the measurements of papyri
vary throughout the Ptolemaic period, with different standards applying at different times.23
One can take a more scientific—that is, mathematical—approach
because the circumference of a scroll limits the amount of scroll that
can be contained inside it. Thus, we can determine by the size of the
circumference and the tightness of the winding how much papyrus can be missing at the interior end of a papyrus roll. Friedhelm
Hoffmann has already developed such a formula in calculating the
amount of material missing from the end of Papyrus Spiegelberg,
20. Jerusha W. Blanchard, “Reminiscences of the Granddaughter of Hyrum Smith”;
see also Charlotte Haven to her mother, 19 February 1843, Overland Monthly, 624.
21. For the distribution of the manuscript fragments, see John Gee, “Eyewitness,
Hearsay, and Physical Evidence of the Joseph Smith Papyri,” in The Disciple as Witness:
Essays on Latter-day Saint History and Doctrine in Honor of Richard Lloyd Anderson,
ed. Stephen D. Ricks, Donald W. Parry, and Andrew H. Hedges (Provo, UT: FARMS,
2000), 188−91; John Gee, A Guide to the Joseph Smith Papyri (Provo, UT: FARMS, 2000),
10−13.
22. P. W. Pestman, The New Papyrological Primer, 2nd ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994), 4−5.
23. Mark Depauw, “The Royal Format of Early Ptolemaic Demotic Papyri,” in Acts of
the Seventh International Conference of Demotic Studies, ed. Kim Ryholt (Copenhagen:
The Carsten Niebuhr Institute of Near Eastern Studies, University of Copenhagen, 2002),
85−100, specifically 89. Readers of Depauw, whose native language is not English, should
note that he consistently interchanges the terms “height” and “width,” meaning in all
cases “height.”
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from which he was able to determine that there were five columns
missing from the text.24 I will not bore you with the derivation of the
formula; it has been in print over a decade. If S = the average difference between the winding measurement, and E = the length of the
last winding, then the theoretical length of the missing portion is Z,
so that Z≈((E2-6.25)/2S)-E.25 We can apply this to the Joseph Smith
Papyri and obtain some usable results.
For the scroll of Noufianoub, the final winding length is 7.8 cm
and the average difference is .33 cm. The formula says that there are 74
cm missing, which is just over 2 feet. Thus this vignette was at the very
end of the roll it was on. Unfortunately there is no way of knowing
how much was missing from the beginning of the scroll.
For the Semminis scroll, the final winding length is 14 cm and the
average difference is .25 cm. Thus there were 365.5 cm left in the scroll.
This is the equivalent of 143.9 inches, or nearly 12 feet. The vignette
in Joseph Smith Papyrus II is the furthest vignette into the Semminis
scroll and normally occurs about halfway through the Book of the
Dead,26 which means that the total scroll would be about 20 to 24 feet
long. This is longer than some scrolls27 but shorter than others.28
For the scroll of Horos, the initial winding length is 9.7 cm, the last
winding is 9.5 cm, and there are seven windings in total. This leaves
us with an average value of .03333 for S. E is, as already stated, 9.5 cm.
Plugging this into the equation gives 1250.5 cm of missing papyrus.
This is the equivalent of 492.3 inches, or 41 feet of missing papyrus.
24. Friedhelm Hoffmann, “Die Länge des P. Spiegelberg,” in Acta Demotica: Acts of Fifth
International Conference for Demotists (Pisa: Giardini Editori e Stampatori, 1994), 145−55.
25. Hoffmann, “Länge des P. Spiegelberg,” 151.
26. P. BM 10479 in Malcolm Mosher Jr., The Papyrus of Hor (London: British
Museum Press, 2001), plate 6 (frame 7 out of 12). P. Turin 1791, in R. Lepsius, Das
Todtenbuch der Ägypter nach dem hieroglyphischen Papyrus in Turin (Leipzig: Wigand,
1842), plate XLI (out of LXXIX). pQeqa, in Martin von Falck, Das Totenbuch der Qeqa
aus der Ptolemäerzeit (pBerlin P. 3003) (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006), tafel 6 (out of
10). pBerlin P. 10477, in Barbara Lüscher, Das Totenbuch pBerlin P. 10477 aus Achmim
(mit Photographien des verwandten pHildesheim 5248) (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2000),
tafel 9 (out of 20); pHildesheim 5248, in Lüscher, Totenbuch pBerlin P. 10477, tafel 28 (8
out of 19).
27. E.g., pQeqa at 472 cm; von Falck, Totenbuch der Qeqa, 1.
28. E.g., pBerlin P. 10477 at 952.4 cm; Lüscher, Totenbuch pBerlin P. 10477, 1.
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Would such a thing be unusual? No. P. Turin 1791 is 57 feet 3 inches
(= 1745 cm) long,29 P. Nesmin is 1280 cm long,30 and the ritual roll of
Imouthes in the Metropolitan Museum of Art is 1088.6 cm,31 428.6
inches, or 35 feet 8 inches long, while his Book of the Dead is longer
still. So such a length is not out of the question. While we know that
the scroll of Horos had a text of the Document of Breathings Made by
Isis, about one in four of those documents contain additional texts.32
So the presence of additional texts would not be unusual.
The size of Horos’s scroll at first seems excessive, even though it
is not unheard of. When I first plugged the numbers in a few years
ago and got the result, I checked the measurements and then checked
them again. Then I checked the formula again. Then I rechecked the
formula’s derivation. Then I rechecked the assumptions behind the
formula. Then I simply dismissed them and went back to the standard
roll length. I had always assumed that the Semminis roll would be the
longer one since the Book of the Dead is a much longer composition
than the Document of Breathings Made by Isis and my initial estimates of the length of the Semminis roll, based on the length of the
text preserved and the percentage of the Book of the Dead preserved,
had been almost twenty feet. It was only after plugging the numbers
from the other Joseph Smith Papyri into the formula that I realized
that the formula does give reasonable results. I have since realized that
having a long roll of Horos brings all the nineteenth-century eyewitnesses into agreement.
One might thoughtlessly suppose that one could make measurements from just any photograph. Most of the photographs, however,
are not to scale (and making measurements of the Statue of Liberty
from photographs, for example, might lead to the conclusion that it
is only two inches high). Even if the photographs were to scale, pho29. Lepsius, Das Todtenbuch der Ägypter, 4.
30. Jacques J. Clère, Le Papyrus de Nesmin: un livre des morts hiéroglyphique de
l’époque ptolémaïque (Cairo: IFAO, 1987), 6; Mosher, Papyrus of Hor, 29.
31. Jean-Claude Goyon, Le Papyrus d’Imouthès Fils de Psintaês (New York:
Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1999), 7.
32. Marc Coenen, “An Introduction to the Document of Breathing Made by Isis,”
Revue d’Egypte 49 (1998): 42.
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tography can also introduce other distortions. Measurements from
photographs are suspect and extremely susceptible to distortion.
Calculations from such sources are therefore problematic.
If we look at the nineteenth-century eyewitnesses and ask the
question, Which of the five known rolls that Joseph Smith had do
the eyewitnesses identify as the source of the Book of Abraham? we
come up with some useful information. Charlotte Haven and Jerusha
Blanchard identify the long roll as being the source of the Book of
Abraham (see notes 16 and 17). On the other hand, William Appleby
identifies the Book of Abraham as having been written by a poor
scribe,33 which matches the Horos roll. Only if the Horos roll is longer
than the Semminis roll do the nineteenth-century eyewitnesses agree.
And for that to be the case, the unmounted portion of the Horos roll
has to be longer than the twelve feet left on the Semminis roll. One
could take the average for S of only the last four windings (.05 cm)
and still come up with a value for Z of 830.5 cm, or 27 feet 3 inches,
and Horos’s roll would still be longer than the Semminis roll and well
within the range of comparable Ptolemaic rolls.
Furthermore, a lengthy Horos roll accommodates the otherwise
problematic testimony of Gustav Seyffarth, who describes Facsimile 3,
which is on the roll of Horos, and claims that a portion of the text he saw
was an invocation to Osiris.34 If all there was on the Horos roll was the
Document of Breathings Made by Isis, then the problem is that there is
no invocation to Osiris in the portion of that text that Seyffarth would
have seen, or anywhere in the document for that matter. With a longer
roll, Seyffarth’s testimony can be accounted for because there would
certainly be room for an invocation to Osiris on the roll (if Seyffarth is
accurate in his interpretation) and who knows what else.
Horos, Son of Osoroeris
Although scholarship is unable to tell us whether or not there was
a Book of Abraham on the roll of Horos, perhaps we can tell something
33. William I. Appleby journal, 5 May 1841, Family and Church History Department
Archives, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, MS 1401, 71−72.
34. Catalogue of the St. Louis Museum, 1859, cited in Todd, Saga, 298.
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about the individual who owned the papyrus and the likelihood that the
Book of Abraham might have interested him. To do so requires moving
from the mess of the Joseph Smith Papyri to their message. The puzzle
that is before us is to determine what we can know about Horos.
The beginning of the roll of Horos lists Horos’s name, titles, and
parents. Horos bore three titles, or high-ranking positions, at some
point in his life, perhaps concurrently, perhaps sequentially: prophet
of Amonrasonter, prophet of Min who Massacres his Enemies, and
prophet of Chespisichis. The last two titles are rare, the second one
being extremely rare (only four men are known to have borne it).
Horos’s names and titles allow him to be linked with a number
of other texts, such as an inscription on the statue of his father, now
in the Walters Art Gallery in Baltimore.35 These texts yield a family
tree covering eight generations from Horos’s grandfather to his greatgreat-great-grandsons. Thanks to a graffito on the small temple of
Medinet Habu, we can date the family. Horos’s third-great-grandson
was alive in 37 bc under the reign of Cleopatra VII, his son died before
153 bc, and two of his grandsons died between 146 and 124 bc. This
would place Horos as roughly contemporary with Ptolemy V, which
means that this roll from the Joseph Smith Papyri was contemporary
with the Rosetta Stone.36 Horos probably lived through the revolt of
Haronnophris and Chaonnophris,37 and the priests of Amonrasonter
seem to have some special connection with the revolt.38 Horos was
also probably well acquainted with all three of the languages of the
Rosetta Stone. Two of them, hieroglyphs and Demotic, he probably
knew better than any Egyptologist alive today.
Horos’s titles link him directly with three of the temples at Karnak.
Prophet of Amonrasonter links him as prophet in the main temple at
35. Walters Art Gallery 22.213, in George Steindorff, Catalogue of the Egyptian
Sculpture in the Walters Art Gallery (Baltimore: Walters Art Gallery, 1946), 70 and pls.
XXXIX, CXVIII.
36. For the most recent treatment see Stephen Quirke and Carol Andrews, The
Rosetta Stone (London: British Museum, 1988).
37. See P. W. Pestman, “Haronnophris and Chaonnophris: Two Indigenous Pharaohs
in Ptolemaic Egypt (205–186 B.C.),” in Hundred-Gated Thebes, ed. S. P. Vleeming (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1995), 101−37.
38. Pestman, “Haronnophris and Chaonnophris,” 131−32
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Karnak. Prophet of Min who Massacres his Enemies links him with
the Montu temple north of the main temple. Prophet of Chespisichis
links him with the small temple of Chespisichis southwest of the main
temple. Let’s take these titles in order.
The first title is prophet of Amonrasonter. This means that he was
employed in the great temple of Karnak. We know a considerable amount
about this temple, the largest surviving one in Egypt.39 As prophet, he
probably would have been initiated in the festival hall.40 We have two of
its daily rituals preserved. In the first of them, the prophet lit a lamp and
an incense burner and chanted on his way into the holy of holies. There
he saw God and worshipped him face to face.41 The other daily ritual
was the execration ritual, in which a wax figure of an enemy—with the
enemy’s name written in fresh ink42—was spat upon,43 trampled under
the left foot,44 smitten with a spear,45 bound,46 and placed on the fire.47
Any priest or prophet at Karnak would have been intimately acquainted
with both of these rituals. The temple also had a library that would have
had king-lists, annals, prophecies and chronicles, compendia of each
nome, medical texts, wisdom and ethical teachings, books of lucky
days, dream interpretation manuals, astrological and astronomical
texts, lexical texts, geographies, festival books, ritual books, glorification texts, hymns, cult prescriptions, construction manuals, manuals
of painting and relief, manuals of purification, offering manuals, calendars of feasts, manuals of cultic receipts, inventories, property-list
39. For an overview, see Paul Barguet, Le temple d’Amon-Rê à Karnak: Essai d’exégèse,
2nd ed. (Cairo: IFAO, 2006).
40. Dimitri Laboury, “Archaeological and Textual Evidence for the Function of
the ‘Botanical Garden’ of Karnak in the Initiation Ritual,” in Sacred Space and Sacred
Function in Ancient Thebes, ed. Peter F. Dorman and Betsy M. Bryan (Chicago: Oriental
Institute, 2007), 27−34, specifically 29.
41. P. Berlin 3055, in Rituale für den Kultus des Anon und fürden Kultus der Mut,
Hieratische Papyri aus den Königlichen Museen zu Berlin 1 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1901).
42. P. Bremner-Rhind 23/6−7, in Raymond O. Faulkner, The Papyrus Bremner-Rhind
(British Museum No. 10188) (Brussels: FERE, 1933), 46.
43. P. Bremner-Rhind 22/2−5, in Faulkner, Papyrus Bremner-Rhind, 42.
44. P. Bremner-Rhind 22/5−9, in Faulkner, Papyrus Bremner-Rhind, 42−43.
45. P. Bremner-Rhind 22/9−17, in Faulkner, Papyrus Bremner-Rhind, 43−44.
46. P. Bremner-Rhind 22/17−23, in Faulkner, Papyrus Bremner-Rhind, 44−45.
47. P. Bremner-Rhind 22/23−23/16, in Faulkner, Papyrus Bremner-Rhind, 45−47.
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instructions, oracle texts, priestly correspondence, temple day-books,
and accounts.48 From the library in Thebes, the earlier Greek writer
Hecataeus wrote an account of Abraham.49
Horos was also prophet of Min who Massacres his Enemies. The
term for “massacre,” sm, “to slay,” “is also the verb used of slaughtering or sacrificing animals” and can be used as a term for the “sacrificial offering.”50 “The texts specify that this is done by the knife held
in the right hand and the foe in the left or with the harpoon. The [sacrifice] is dismembered and portions of him are put into the brazier
as offerings.”51 The term for enemy, ḫryw,52 can also mean “sacrificial
victim.”53 The only place where representations of the rituals associated with Min who Massacres his Enemies appear is on the interior portions of the Bab el Abd, the gate in the enclosure wall of the
Montu temple north of the great temple of Amun at Karnak.54 The
gate was built by the Pharaoh Ptolemy III Euergetes, the contemporary of Horos’s grandfather Chabonchonsis, who is the earliest known
prophet of Min who Massacres his Enemies, and the decoration finished by Ptolemy IV Philopater.55 Unlike most of the deities featured
on the gateway, Min who Massacres his Enemies did not have his own
temple in the Montu complex because his rituals were performed in
the courtyard of the Montu temple.56 Two rituals are associated with
him; one of them is labeled “subduing sinners,”57 and the other is the
48. Donald B. Redford, Pharaonic King-Lists, Annals and Day-Books: A Contribution
to the Study of the Egyptian Sense of History (Mississauga, Canada: Benben Publications,
1986), 215−23.
49. Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis 5.113; see John A. Tvedtnes, Brian M. Hauglid,
and John Gee, eds., Traditions about the Early Life of Abraham (Provo, UT: FARMS, 2001), 3.
50. Penelope Wilson, A Ptolemaic Lexikon (Leuven: Peeters, 1997), 839.
51. Wilson, Ptolemaic Lexikon, 839.
52. Wilson, Ptolemaic Lexikon, 745.
53. Wilson, Ptolemaic Lexikon, 746. Note the hieroglyphic spellings.
54. The information in this section is taken from John Gee, “History of a Theban
Priesthood.” Proceedings of “Et maintenant ce ne sont plus que des villages . . .” Thèbes et
sa région aux époques hellénistique, romaine et byzantine (forthcoming).
55. Dieter Arnold, Temples of the Last Pharaohs (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), 167−68.
56. Aufrère, Le propylône d’Amon-Rê-Montou à Karnak-Nord, 271−83.
57. Sydney H. Aufrère, Le propylône d’Amon-Rê-Montou à Karnak-Nord (Cairo:
IFAO, 2000), 284−91.
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burning of enemies. Both scenes come from the execration ritual. The
first scene identifies Min who Massacres his Enemies with Reshep,58
a foreign deity imported into Egypt much earlier, and like many nonEgyptian deities imported into Egypt, he is given a different Egyptian
name. The second scene says that he “smites his enemies in the temple
of burning” and then “burns them on the altar of burnt offerings.”59
The gods also “overthrow your enemies in the slaughterhouse (nm.t),
they sacrifice [the enemy] in your altar (ʿḫ).”60
The term for this altar of burnt offerings, ʿḫ (Coptic aÒ), is
described in a number of contemporary texts:
P. Onchsheshonqy tells the story of a rebellion against Pharaoh
led by Harsiese, Pharaoh’s chief physician. The plot is unsuccessful,
and the conspirators are rounded up. “Pharaoh caused an altar (ḫw.t)
of earth to be built at the gate of Pharaoh’s palace. He caused Harsiese,
son of Rameses to be placed on an altar (ʿḫ) of copper with all the men
who he had, and all the men who were in the plot against Pharaoh.”61
P. Vandier tells a story of a group of priests who are jealous of
Meryre and have him put to death so that the Pharaoh can live longer
and Pharaoh can marry Meryre’s wife. But Meryre appears to Pharaoh
in a vision and reproves him. As a consequence, Pharaoh “caused all the
priests to be brought outside the prison. . . . Pharaoh went with them to
Heliopolis. He caused them to be killed . . . [He caused] them to be placed
on the altar (ʿḫ) before Mout who carries her brother in Heliopolis.”62
In P. Rylands IX, the cry goes forth against one set of enemies,
“Let our lord bring these young men, who have abandoned our ways,
and let them be placed on an altar (ʿḫ)!”63
58. Aufrère, Le propylône d’Amon-Rê-Montou à Karnak-Nord, 288−89.
59. Aufrère, Le propylône d’Amon-Rê-Montou à Karnak-Nord, 271−83.
60. Aufrère, Le propylône d’Amon-Rê-Montou à Karnak-Nord, 271−83.
61. P. Onch. 4/3−5, in S. R. K. Glanville, Catalogue of Demotic Papyri in the British
Museum, vol. II, The Instructions of ʿOnchsheshonqy (London: British Museum, 1955),
plate 4.
62. P. Vandier 5/11−12, in Georges Posener, Le Papyrus Vandier (Cairo: IFAO, 1985),
76−77.
63. P. Rylands IX 13/10−11, in Günther Vittmann, Der demotische Papyrus Rylands 9
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1998), 1:61, 2:494−95.
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P. Petese II, published in 2006, begins with the fragmentary text,
“Necho caused to set up . . . an altar (ʿš) . . . you, yourself, they would
have placed you on the altar,”64 and then unfortunately breaks off.
Thus stories about slaughtering and then burning people on an
altar were common in the time of the Joseph Smith Papyri, and Horos,
the owner of Joseph Smith Papyrus I, had a professional interest in
such things.
The temple of Chespisichis was first mentioned by Lepsius, who
listed it as Temple V.65 By 1885, when Wiedemann visited the site,
he found it “almost entirely in ruins.”66 The temple walls had been
disassembled and used to fence a garden, and the inscriptions were
“almost entirely destroyed,” but he found some (probably reused)
blocks of the Eighteenth Dynasty king Thutmosis III (1479–1425 bc),
as well as fragments from the Twenty-ninth Dynasty king Nepherites I
(399–393 bc), Ptolemaic material, and some fragments he thought
belonged to the Twenty-sixth Dynasty king Piye.67 Later work indicates that the cult of Chespisichis seems to have existed only since
the Nineteenth Dynasty,68 where he is particularly known as a healer.69 He is said to be one who “publishes the book of death and life.”70
He is a savior god who rescues from all manner of sickness, death,
and catastrophe.71 Two other places depict him: the temple of Tod,
located a few miles south of Thebes, and on the Ptolemaic gateway of
the main Chonsu temple at Karnak. At the Tod temple, the inscrip64. P. Petese II Fragment C1 1, in Kim Ryholt, The Petese Stories II (P. Petese II)
(Copenhagen: The Carsten Niebuhr Institute of Near Eastern Studies, University of
Copenhagen, 2006), 31.
65. C. R. Lepsius, Denkmaeler aus Aegypten und Aethiopien (Berlin: Nicolaische
Buchhandlung, n.d.), Abt. I, Bl. 75; Paul Barguet, Le temple d’Amon-Rê à Karnak. Essai
d’exégèse (Cairo: IFAO, 1962), 7−8.
66. A. Wiedemann, “Sur deux Temples bâtis par des Rois de la 29e dynastie à Karnak,”
Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology (1885): 110−11.
67. Wiedemann, “Sur deux Temples bâtis par des Rois de la 29e dynastie à Karnak,”
111; Barguet, Le temple d’Amon-Rê à Karnak, 8.
68. Georges Posener, “Philologie et archéologie égyptiennes,” in Annuaire du Collège
de France 67 (1967−68): 349.
69. I. E. S. Edwards, Oracular Amuletic Decrees of the Late New Kingdom (London:
British Museum, 1960), 1:1.
70. BM 10083 r. 1−6, in Edwards, Oracular Amuletic Decrees, 2:plate Ia.
71. BM 10083, in Edwards, Oracular Amuletic Decrees, 2:plates Ia−IIIa.
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tion refers to “subduing the weaklings (bdš.w, a derogatory term for
foreigners72)” and depicts a jackal-headed figure wielding knives
under the name of Chespisichis.73
The only inscription that really remains of the temple of
Chespisichis is a single stele, now in the Louvre (C 284), more commonly known as the Bentresh stele.74 Stylistically, the Bentresh stele
most closely matches the style of Ptolemy IV,75 although Ptolemy III
has also been argued.76 Lanny Bell reported the discovery of another
copy of this text back in 1979, but he never published it.77 The Bentresh
stele tells the story of an otherwise unattested king named Ramses,
whose names are a mixture of those of Ramses II and Thutmosis III,
who made his annual trip to Mesopotamia to collect tribute. He marries a princess of Bakhtan, perhaps a corruption of the Egyptian word
for “Hittite” rather than a reference to Bactria, modern Afghanistan.78
When the princess’s sister Bentresh gets sick, first a priest is sent, and
then the god Chespisichis, to heal her of her illness—she had been
possessed by an angel. Finally, after many years, Chespisichis appears
to the ruler of Bakhtan in a dream and requests that he be sent back to
Egypt, and much tribute comes with him.
We can be fairly confident that as prophet of Chespisichis, Horos
would have read this text at some point in his life. The god appearing
in visions and dreams, Egyptian presence in Syria and Mesopotamia,
72. Wilson, Ptolemaic Lexikon, 339.
73. Tod I 144−45, in Jean-Claude Grenier, Tôd: Les inscriptions du temple ptolémaïque et romain (Cairo: IFAO, 1980), 221.
74. For publication, see Michèle Broze, La princesse de Bakhtan (Brussels: FERE,
1989).
75. John Gee, “Stylistic Dating of Greco-Roman Stele II: Heads and Hands” (paper
presented at the American Research Center in Egypt Annual Meetings, Atlanta, Georgia,
25 April 2003).
76. Sergio Donadoni, “Per la data della ‘Stele di Bentres,’” Mitteilungen des Deutschen
Archäologischen Instituts, Abteilung Kairo 15 (1957): 47−50.
77. Lanny Bell, “The Epigraphic Survey,” in The Oriental Institute Annual Report,
1978–79 (Chicago: Oriental Institute, University of Chicago, [1979]), 25.
78. Anthony Spalinger, “On the Bentresh Stela and Related Problems,” Journal of the
Society for the Study of Egyptian Antiquities 8 (1977): 11−18; Scott N. Morschauser, “Using
History: Reflections on the Bentresh Stela,” Studien zur Altägyptischen Kultur 15 (1988):
203−23, specifically 210.
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angels interfering in human affairs, sicknesses caused by spiritual
beings, and a savior—all of these are elements shared between the
world of Horos and the Book of Abraham.
Facsimile 1
Next in the roll of Horos is a vignette that we know as Facsimile 1.
The facsimiles from the Book of Abraham are three illustrations floating like islands in the sea of thousands of pages of words in our
scriptures; hence they draw interest. Despite that interest, there is no
emphasis put on them in the church. Of the current curriculum materials, Facsimile 1 is mentioned only once, in an optional enrichment
activity in a lesson for eight- through eleven-year-olds.79 Facsimile 2
has been mentioned only once in general conferences of the church in
the last sixty-five years.80 I cannot help but wonder if the critics attack
the facsimiles because they are relatively insignificant in the church.
The facsimiles, like all vignettes, present a number of challenges,
and it is worth remembering a few things about (1) the placement of
vignettes, (2) the drawing of vignettes, and (3) the identification of
figures on vignettes.
(1) With regard to the placement of vignettes, I will provide a
number of quotations from Egyptologists about Late Period documents in general and Ptolemaic texts in particular. The list is lengthy
because it is a common thing, but everyone seems to want to treat the
Joseph Smith Papyri as a special exception to a general rule, and I do
not think we should do so. From Malcolm Mosher, who specializes
in Late Period religious texts: “In documents from the 21st Dynasty
on, misalignment of the text and vignette of a spell can occur, with
the text preceding the vignette, or vice versa.”81 “While this type of
problem can be observed sporadically from the late New Kingdom on,
79. Primary 6: Old Testament (Salt Lake City: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints, 1996), 35−38.
80. Spencer W. Kimball, in Conference Report, April 1962, 60−61.
81. Malcolm Mosher Jr., “The Ancient Egyptian Book of the Dead in the Late Period:
A Study of Revisions Evident in Evolving Vignettes, and the Possible Chronological or
Geographical Implications for Differing Versions of Vignettes” (PhD diss., University of
California at Berkeley, 1989), 1:53.
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it is more common in the Late Period.”82 “The problem is particularly
acute where more spells are textually represented for such a group than
there are vignettes. . . . It can be difficult to determine which spells have
a vignette and which do not.”83 “A similar problem to misalignment
frequently encountered in Late documents is where the vignette for a
particular spell is associated with the wrong text and the correct text
is not found in the document.”84 From Henk Milde, probably the foremost authority on papyrus vignettes: “Unfortunately, the connection
between text and picture is not always clear cut.”85 “One has to take
into account at least the following difficulties in vignette research, that
are here placed in eight categories. . . . 1. Spatial discrepancy between
text and vignette. . . . 2. Incorrect combination of text and vignette in
the original. . . . 3. Incorrect combination of text and vignette in studies
and editions of the Book of the Dead. . . . 4. Unclear relation between
text and vignette. . . . 5. Transfer or omission of pictorial elements. . . .
6. Emendation of the picture. . . . 7. Combination and contamination of
pictorial elements of different vignettes. . . . 8. Conglomeration of texts
under a vignette.”86 From Jean-Claude Goyon, who has published so
many Late Period Papyri: The vignettes “often do not have but a very
distant connection with the discussion written beneath.”87 From Marc
Étienne, of the Louvre: “The vignettes do not always correspond to
the chapters which the text prescribes.”88 This is particularly the case
in Documents of Breathings Made by Isis: “The relation between the
vignettes and the text is not straightforward. . . . The vignettes are not
meant to illustrate the contents of the composition.”89 In other words,
the vignettes in the Document of Breathings Made by Isis usually do
82. Mosher, “Ancient Book of the Dead in the Late Period,” 1:53−54.
83. Mosher, “Ancient Book of the Dead in the Late Period,” 1:54.
84. Mosher, “Ancient Book of the Dead in the Late Period,” 1:54.
85. Henk Milde, “Vignetten-Forschung,” in Totenbuch-Forschungen (Wiesbaden:
Harrassowitz, 2006), 221.
86. Milde, “Vignetten-Forschung,” 221−31.
87. Jean-Claude Goyon, Le Papyrus du Louvre N. 3279 (Cairo: IFAO, 1966), 2.
88. Marc Étienne, “Livre des Morts au nom de Hor,” in La mort n’est pas une fin:
Pratiques funéraires en Égypte d’Alexandre à Cléopâtre, ed. Alain Charron (Arles: Musée
de l’Arles antique, 2002), 145.
89. Coenen, “Introduction to the Document of Breathing,” 41.

132 • The FARMS Review 20/1 (2008)

not match the text and may not even belong to it. This would explain
why “the vignette of the P. Joseph Smith I” represents “new themes
and contain[s] a variety of unique features.”90 The vignette in P. Joseph
Smith I is, in fact, unique. After looking at vignettes in thousands of
documents from the Saite period on, I have not found any exact match
or anything really very close.
(2) Furthermore, in vignettes from the Ptolemaic period, “the
genders of the various figures are often incorrect. . . . The genders of
priests and deities are occasionally confused.”91
(3) Finally, I wish to mention something about the perils of identifying iconography in vignettes. The bulk of iconographic study in
Egyptology is based on New Kingdom material, and there is a danger in applying such iconographic experience to Ptolemaic materials
from a millennium later. For instance, in the New Kingdom, a jackalheaded figure might be Anubis, but in the Ptolemaic period, jackalheaded figures might be Osiris, or Shesmu, or Isdes, or the Khetiu,
while Anubis might have a human or lion head.
Egyptologists, and many others, point to parallels in the roof chapels of the Dendara Temple as parallels for Facsimile 1. There are over
forty lion couch scenes in these chapels, most of which are labeled as
local variants of the same scene. What the critics do not do, however,
is read the inscriptions. In the Dendara texts, the word for the lion
couch, nm.t,92 is either homophonous or identical with the word nm.t,
“abattoir, slaughterhouse,”93 as well as a term for “offerings.”94 This is
picked up in the inscriptions. For example, in the central scene in the
innermost eastern chapel, we read, “He will not exist nor will his name
exist, since you will destroy his town, cast down the walls of his house,
and everyone who is in it will be set on fire, you will demolish his
90. Coenen, “Introduction to the Document of Breathing,” 40.
91. Malcolm Mosher Jr., “The Book of the Dead Tradition at Akhmim during the
Late Period,” in Perspectives on Panopolis: An Egyptian Town from Alexander the Great
to the Arab Conquest, ed. A. Egberts, B. P. Muhs, and J. van der Vliet (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
2002), 206−7.
92. Wilson, Ptolemaic Lexikon, 516−17.
93. Wilson, Ptolemaic Lexikon, 521−22.
94. Wilson, Ptolemaic Lexikon, 522.

Some Puzzles from the Joseph Smith Papyri (Gee) • 133

district, you will stab his confederates,95 his flesh being ashes, the evil
conspirator consigned to the lion couch / slaughterhouse,96 so that he
will no longer exist.”97 In another scene, Bastet (who is not pictured)
“is your protection every day; she has commanded her messengers98
to slaughter your enemies.”99 Symmetrical with this scene we have
another scene with a broken inscription that mentions “ashes” and
continues, “to burn his flesh with fire.”100 So here we have both a scene
and descriptions that parallel the Book of Abraham. Furthermore, in
the same chapel we have depictions of Anubis and the sons of Horus
(presumably the figures under the lion couch in Facsimile 1) holding
knives. Anubis is here identified as the one “who smites the adversaries with his might, since the knife is in his hand, to expel the one who
treads in transgression; I am the violent one who came forth from
god, after having cut off the heads of the confederates of him whose
name is evil.”101 The human-headed son of Horus is identified above
his head as “the one who repulses enemies” and “who comes tearing
out (šd) the enemies who butchers (tḫs) the sinners.”102 The baboonheaded son of Horus says: “I have slaughtered those who create injuries
in the house of God in his presence; I take away the breath from his
nostrils.”103 The jackal-headed son of Horus says: “I cause the hostile
foreigners to retreat.”104 Finally, the falcon-headed son of Horus says:
“I have removed rebellion (ḥy).”105 So the inscriptions from Dendara
95. For this interpretation of wnp, see Wilson, Ptolemaic Lexikon, 234.
96. Reading ww ḏw ḥsb r nm.t as opposed to Cauville’s reading of ww ḏw r ḫbt in
Sylvie Cauville, Le Temple de Dendara: Les chapelles osiriennes (Cairo: IFAO, 1997), 1:105;
see Christian Leitz, Quellentexte zur ägyptischen Religion I: Die Tempelinschriften der
griechisch-römischen Zeit (Münster: LIT, 2004), 172 T101.
97. Dendara X 200, in Cauville, Temple de Dendara: Les chapelles osiriennes, 1:200.
98. For the reading wpwty for this sign, see Leitz, Die Tempelinschriften der griechischrömischen Zeit, 156, C26. Cauville reads this as šmy(w) but still translates as “messagers”;
see Sylvie Cauville, Dendara: Les chapelles osiriennes (Cairo: IFAO, 1997), 1:122-23.
99. Dendara X 232, in Cauville, Le Temple de Dendara: Les chapelles osiriennes,
1:232.
100. Dendara X 227, in Cauville, Temple de Dendara: Les chapelles osiriennes, 1:227.
101. Dendara X 215, in Cauville, Temple de Dendara: Les chapelles osiriennes, 1:215.
102. Dendara X 217, in Cauville, Temple de Dendara: Les chapelles osiriennes, 1:217.
103. Dendara X 217, in Cauville, Temple de Dendara: Les chapelles osiriennes, 1:217.
104. Dendara X 217, in Cauville, Temple de Dendara: Les chapelles osiriennes, 1:217.
105. Dendara X 217, in Cauville, Temple de Dendara: Les chapelles osiriennes, 1:217.
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associate the lion couch scene with the sacrificial slaughter of enemies.
Nor are they the only depictions of lion couch scenes to do so. A papyrus in Berlin, for example, contains instructions that it is “to stab (or
cut)106 your disobedient ones,107 to sacrifice your apostates, to overthrow your enemies every day.”108 “May your flames shoot out against
your enemies each and every day so that you remain while your adversaries are overthrown.”109 Another frequently occurring lion couch
scene contains the description “the lords of truth . . . cause the sacrifice of the evildoers.”110 This is interpreted as being either “Seth and
Isdes”111 (a knife-wielding jackal-headed deity),112 or “Sobek (a deity
usually depicted as a crocodile), who is in the water.”113 The Sons of
Horus, “Imseti, Hapi, Duamutef, and Qebehsenuef,”114 are described
as forming “the council around (or behind) Osiris who cause the sacrifice of the evildoers”115 by “placing knives into the evil doers” and
106. Wilson, Ptolemaic Lexikon, 480.
107. Wilson, Ptolemaic Lexikon, 337−38.
108. P. Berlin 3162 5/6−7, in J. Frank-Kamenetzky, “Der Papyrus Nr. 3162 des Berl.
Museums,” Orientalistische Literaturzeitung 17 (1914): 152.
109. P. Berlin 3162 6/6-7, cf. 8/3−4, in Frank-Kamenetzky, “Papyrus Nr. 3162 des Berl.
Museums,” 152, 154.
110. BD 17, in Herman Grapow, Religiöse Urkunden = Urkunden V (Leipzig: J. C.
Hinrichs, 1915-17), 39−40; Ursula Rößler-Köhler, Kapitel 17 des ägyptischen Totenbuches
(Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1979), 328, 332.
111. BD 17, in Urkunden V 41.
112. Émile Chassinat, Le Temple d’Edfou (Cairo: IFAO, 1928-60, specifically 1930),
5:143; Christian Leitz, Lexikon der ägyptischen Götter und Götterbezeichnungen (Leuven:
Peeters, 2002), 1:560. The jackal-headed Isdes holding the knife might be referred to later
in BD 17 section 26: “I have been saved from the hand of this god whose face is a dog and
whose skin is human” (Urkunden V 26), though in later times it is Anubis who has the
face of a dog (P. Mag. 7/3, 14/28, in Demotic Magical Papyrus of London & Leiden, vol.
II, ed. Francis L. Griffith and Herbert Thompson [London: H. Grevel & Co., 1905], 2:pls.
VII, XIV; PGM XIXb 8, in Karl Preisendanz, Papyri Graecae Magical: Die Griechischen
Zauberpapyri [Leipzig: Teubner, 1931], 2:144) and is also connected in a fragmentary tale
with killing a man. Kim Ryholt, “A Parallel to the Inaros Story of P. Krall (P. Carlsberg
456+P. CtYBR 4513): Demotic Narratives from the Tebtunis Temple Library (I),” Journal
of Egyptian Archaeology 84 (1998): 153, 157, 165.
113. BD 17, in Urkunden V 42.
114. BD 17, in Urkunden V 42.
115. BD 17, in Urkunden V 39−40; Rößler-Köhler, Kapitel 17 des ägyptischen
Totenbuches, 328, 332.
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“incinerating the souls of the evil-doers.”116 They are said to be “put
in place by Anubis.”117 Excluding a sacrificial dimension to lion couch
scenes is un-Egyptian, even if we cannot come up with one definitive
reading at this time.
Document of Breathings
The next thing we know for certain is that the roll of Horos was
misnamed Document of Breathings Made by Isis. Why is it misnamed? The problem comes with the interpretation of the term snsn
as “breathing,” an interpretation that goes back to Heinrich Brugsch’s
1868 dictionary.118 But as recent studies have shown, snsn never means
“to breathe.”119 Instead, here it means something like “to fraternize,
fellowship, associate, join.” Quaegebeur has suggested that it be interpreted as a Letter of Recommendation Made by Isis;120 the translation
of breathing permit is simply impossible. Examination of the titles of
those who possessed a copy of this text121 shows that almost all the
men were prophets of Amonrasonter, while the women held corresponding feminine titles. Most of the possessors of the text are known
to be members of the same family, and the rest probably were as well.
It is commonplace among the critics to assert that this document
is a prayer to an Egyptian god. This, however, is unsustainable by
any careful reading of the document itself. The majority of the text
consists of “words spoken by the gods who follow Osiris”122 to the
116. BD 17, in Urkunden V 42.
117. BD 17, in Urkunden V 39−40; Rößler-Köhler, Kapitel 17 des ägyptischen
Totenbuches, 328, 332.
118. Heinrich Brugsch, Hieroglyphisch-demotisches Wörterbuch (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs,
1868), 4:1254.
119. John Gee, “A New Look at the ʿnḫ p by Formula,” Proceedings of IXe Congrès
International des Études Démotiques, ed. M. Chauveau, D. Devauchelle, and G. Widmer
(forthcoming).
120. Jan Quaegebeur, “P. Brux. Dem. E. 8258 un lettre de recommandation pour l’audelà,” in Studies in Egyptology Presented to Miriam Lichtheim, ed. Sarah Israelit-Groll
(Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1990), 2:776−95.
121. Conveniently gathered in Marc Coenen, “Owners of Documents of Breathing
Made by Isis,” Chronique d’Égypte 79/157–158 (2004), 59–72.
122. Document of Breathings Made by Isis §11.
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individual123 and employs a formula that is used to address mortals
rather than gods.124 Space will not permit much exploration of this
fascinating text; those interested can see the second edition of the late
Professor Hugh Nibley’s commentary Message of the Joseph Smith Papyri.
I only note that Professor Nibley’s commentary in no way exhausts the
possibilities.
Facsimile 3
The last item known to be on the roll of Horos was Facsimile 3, for
which I have published some preliminary explorations in an appropriate Egyptological venue. I also note that every single facsimile
from the Book of Abraham has been connected to Abraham using
ancient Egyptian evidence and that the connection has been made in
Egyptological publications.
Conclusions
Since, for the most part, Latter-day Saints and Egyptologists agree
that the preserved portions of the Joseph Smith Papyri do not contain
the Book of Abraham, there is the possibility of detente between the
two because scholarship cannot tell what was or was not on the missing papyri. Egyptologists could stick to what is knowable from the
remains, and Latter-day Saints could trust God about the origins of
the Book of Abraham. Our trust (or faith) in God becomes, for those
fortunate enough to possess it, “the basis of what we hope for, the evidence of things unseen” (Hebrews 11:1, my translation). Those who
have it require no other proof. Those who have chosen not to trust
God will not “be persuaded, though one rose from the dead” (Luke
16:31). If we had the papyrus from which the Book of Abraham was
translated—and I testify that we do not—the critics would not believe
it; and most of them could not read it anyway. One of the ironies of the
Joseph Smith Papyri is that critics (and even some Egyptologists), who
123. Document of Breathings Made by Isis §2−11.
124. Jan Assmann, Images et rites de la mort dans l’Égypte ancienne (Paris: Cybele,
2000), 39.
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are quick to point out what the papyri are not, are otherwise uninterested in what they contain. They could be a laundry list, a get-well
card, or the greatest piece of literature ever written; it does not matter
so long as they are not the Book of Abraham, so long as they are not
scripture, so long as they do not contain the words of God, so long as
they are not conveyed by a prophet of God. Here, though, is another
great irony. The Rosetta Stone ends with a passage that directs that
it be written “on a stone stele in the writing of words of god (hieroglyphs), the writing of letters (Demotic), and the script of the foreigners (Greek).”125 For the Egyptians, hieroglyphs are literally the “words
of God.” For the Egyptians, the Joseph Smith Papyri contain the words
of God, conveyed by a prophet of God, just as for Latter-day Saints, the
Book of Abraham contains the words of God, conveyed by a prophet
of God.

125. Rosetta Stone, hieroglyphic version, line 14, in Urkunden II 197.
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or much of the twentieth century, few geologists believed, in spite
of evidence to the contrary, that continents could drift. Continental
drift was called “geopoetry” because there was no known mechanism
to drive continents through the hard oceanic crust. Now continental
drift is “geoscience” because the theory of plate tectonics explains the
motion. Similarly, cosmology was once considered to be nonscience
because there was no way to test hypotheses. Now there is powerful
observational evidence and an impressive theoretical base for the science of cosmology.
Observational and experimental evidence for evolution are sufficient to justify the assertion that the origin of living species by evolution from ancient species is as close to being a fact as any historical
description can ever be. The theory of evolution (especially with regard
to the mechanisms that drive evolution) is very advanced, although
not yet complete. But how did life begin in the first place? Is the origin
of the first living cells a science? That is one of the major questions
explored in Frank Salisbury’s book The Case for Divine Design.
James Farmer passed away suddenly on Sunday morning, 17 August 2008, not long after
completing this essay.
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Except for religious fundamentalists, including the Creationist1
community, few informed people doubt that evolution has produced
our biological world. This book largely ignores the debate on evolution per se and concentrates on a new version (“intelligent design,” or
ID) of an old idea (namely, the watchmaker analogy made famous by
William Paley in 1802; see appendix B in Salisbury’s book).
One of the basic premises of ID is that some essential structures
or processes are too complex to have arisen by chance. The concept
of “irreducible complexity” has been used by Creationists for a long
time. A commonly cited example is the vertebrate eye. A structure or
process that requires many different parts, not one of which is functional without all of the others, could not have arisen by sequential
addition of the parts, one at a time. In the case of the eye, that argument failed when scientists discovered that each part made the lightdetecting apparatus more adaptive, even in the absence of some or all
of the other parts. More recently, the supposed irreducible complexity
of subcellular processes and structures has attracted a great deal of
attention (see examples in appendix C).
The Creationists have eagerly adopted the subcellular version of
irreducible complexity in an attempt to force public schools to teach
ID in science classes as a way to undermine the teaching of evolution.
The one court case to date denied their attempts, ruling that ID is
not science. Like nearly all other scientists, Salisbury agrees that ID is
not science, since there is no apparent way to support it or refute it by
observation or experiment. However, he apparently finds ID to be an
attractive possible explanation for the origin of life.
1. In this review, the lowercased word creationist refers to anyone who believes
that God was involved in some way in the creation of life. When I capitalize the word
Creationist, I am referring to members of political groups who have attempted, for the
last few decades, to persuade school boards, and subsequently courts, to mandate the
inclusion of their religious views about evolution in public school textbooks and other
teaching materials, as well as the teaching of those ideas in science classes. The Creationist
community has tried to make a case for what they call “creation science” largely by ignoring the discoveries of science, by appealing to magic, or by dismissing those discoveries
because they do not agree with an absolutely literal interpretation of the Bible, particularly Genesis. Salisbury briefly reviews some Creationist beliefs in appendix A.
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In chapter 1, Salisbury briefly examines the nature of scientific
research as a way to discover how the world works. He also discusses
the role of scripture, belief, and revelation in discovering religious
truth. In several places, he uses the differences in these two approaches
to explain why ID is not science. He also makes a good case for why
some scientists’ statements about the origin of life are not yet science
either. He points out that research on the origin of life could become
science in the future if someone were to figure out how to do relevant
experiments that address the crucial questions. He emphasizes the
danger of basing belief in God on ignorance about something that
might someday be explained.
In chapter 2 and elsewhere, Salisbury shows that evidence for
evolution of living organisms from more primitive forms over vast
periods of time is very strong. However, he correctly points out that it
cannot be shown that God had no hand in the history of life. Salisbury
suggests that perhaps God occasionally tweaked the process to accomplish what he had in mind. Salisbury repeatedly uses a probability
argument (especially in chapter 4) to suggest that it is reasonable to
infer that a designer occasionally crafted new DNA sequences to produce novel kinds of proteins during the history of life. He does not
make the claim that this proves the existence of God, but apparently
he finds it a compelling argument that strengthens his own belief. I
am not so convinced by this part of the book. Probability arguments
are always treacherous since they depend so strongly on assumptions
about the nature of things that we do not know and, in many cases,
cannot know.2 I am also troubled by the fact that, so far at least, there
2. These are post hoc probability arguments. Salisbury calculates the probability
that something could have happened, even though we now know that it did happen. Once
something has happened, then the probability that it could have happened is 1 (certainty).
For instance, roulette wheels have occasionally produced a very long sequence of red
(or black). Consider a run of twenty blacks in a row. If we make the slightly simplifying
assumption that the probability of black is 0.5, then the probability of twenty in a row is
(0.5)20 = 0.00000095, or about one chance in a million. Someone who observes such an
unlikely run might conclude that it could not be due to chance, but of course it can be.
One should also be aware that, if the roulette wheel is unbalanced, the chance of such
an unlikely run might be much higher (or lower). Is our universe “unbalanced” in that
formation of unlikely DNA sequences is more likely than we think?
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is no convincing evidence of directionality, steady progression to an
end, in the evolutionary record. Although Homo sapiens is the only
species of our genus to survive, there were many other species, now
extinct, that diverged from our direct-line ancestors.
Human beings and every other living thing we have looked at carefully are continuing to evolve, and recently mutated genes that make
organisms better adapted to their environment have been described.
For instance, a mutation appeared in humans in a town in Italy just
a few hundred years ago that prevents cholesterol from damaging the
arteries of those who have the mutant gene. These people routinely live
for about a century.3
Chapter 5 may be the most important chapter in the book. Salisbury
shows quite convincingly that, with regard to the origin of cellular life,
there is no scientific hypothesis that is supported by experiment or
observation. Since the book was written, more work has been published,
but in my opinion it does not invalidate Salisbury’s arguments.4
Just as I dislike false claims made by Creationists, I dislike false
claims or misstatements made by some scientists and textbook writers
who say that we know how life began. In fact, we do not. The claims
are made because of the philosophical beliefs of the people who write
and adopt the texts and because of pressure from the general scientific community. In my experience, many scientists are atheists or
are indifferent to religion.5 If one believes there is no god, it is obvi3. “A Rare Protein Mutation Offers New Hope for Heart Disease Patients,” Berkeley
Lab Research News, 17 May 2002, http://www.lbl.gov/Science-Articles/Archive/LSD
-Milano-Bielicki.html (accessed 21 August 2008).
4. These are a few of the more interesting recent articles: Claudia Huber and Günter
Wächtershäuser, “α-Hydroxy and α-Amino Acids Under Possible Hadean, Volcanic
Origin-of-Life Conditions,” Science 314 (2006): 630–32; Jeffrey L. Bada et al., “Debating
Evidence for the Origin of Life on Earth” (letter), Science 315 (2007): 937–38 (see in Science
315 Günter Wächtershäuser and Claudia Huber’s response, 938–39); Irene A. Chen,
“The Emergence of Cells During the Origin of Life,” Science 314 (2006): 1558–59; W. M.
Napier, J. T. Wickramasinghe, and N. C. Wickramasinghe, “The origin of life in comets,”
International Journal of Astrobiology 6 (2007): 321–23; Philipp Baaske et al., “Extreme
accumulation of nucleotides in simulated hydrothermal pore systems,” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104 (2007): 9346–51.
5. An interesting recent book review discusses several aspects related to this subject:
Olle Häggström, review of Irreligion: A Mathematician Explains Why the Arguments for
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ous that life must have originated spontaneously because there is no
other possibility, and it is only a matter of time until we discover how
it occurred. It would be much more honest for textbooks to say that
while we do not know how life originated, future research may shed
light on the matter—and perhaps it will.
There are scientific hypotheses about prebiotic (chemical) evolution, based on experiments showing that complex organic molecules
can arise spontaneously, in the laboratory and in nature, from a mixture of simple molecules and a source of energy. The prebiotic hypotheses seem credible and worthy of more research.6 The origin of living
cells is a much more difficult problem. Although the term irreducible
complexity has become a red flag to many scientists, it seems appropriate in this context. A cell worthy of the name must have both an
information storage mechanism (presumably RNA or DNA) that
contains useful information and a translation mechanism to put the
information into usable forms. In Salisbury’s opinion, and mine, the
“RNA world” hypothesis does not solve the problem. The problem is
difficult enough that Nobel Prize–winner Francis Crick coauthored a
paper with Leslie Orgel suggesting that perhaps the first living cells
were carried to earth from some other place.7 It is also not clear how
eukaryotic cells (the kind found in plants, animals, fungi, etc.) could
have arisen from the apparently earlier prokaryotic cells (bacteria and
Archaea), although there is good evidence that some parts of eukaryotic cells were derived from symbiotic prokaryotes.
Michael Behe, a biochemist at Pennsylvania’s Lehigh University, is
the foremost spokesman for ID in the scientific community, where his
ideas have had a very hostile reception. In chapter 6 Salisbury reviews
Behe’s ideas and the responses of his critics and then discusses his
God Just Don’t Add Up, by John Allen Paulos, Notices of the American Mathematical Society
55 (2008): 789–91, http://www.ams.org/notices/200807/tx080700789p.pdf (accessed 20
August 2008).
6. An excellent, short commentary on this work is available on the Internet:
Eugene V. Koonin, “An RNA-making reactor for the origin of life,” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104/22 (2007): 9105–6,
http://www.pnas.org/content/104/22/9105 (accessed 20 August 2008).
7. F. H. C. Crick and L. E. Orgel, “Directed Panspermia,” Icarus 19/3 (1973): 341–46.
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own views on the matter. Behe continues to publish, and his critics
continue to respond.8 Although Salisbury has a lot of sympathy for
Behe’s ideas, he makes it very clear that he does not consider ID to be
science or to be appropriate for the science classroom.9
To be sure, feelings within the scientific community about ID and
irreducible complexity are strong. To illustrate, a research paper on
the origin of eukaryotic cells10 provoked a critical letter that, after a
technical discussion, ended with this paragraph:
Finally, and most disturbing, if contemporary eukaryotic cells
are truly of “irreducible nature,” as Kurland et al.’s title declares,
then no stepwise evolutionary process could have possibly
brought about their origin, and processes other than evolution
must be invoked. Is there a hidden message in their paper?11
What I find most disturbing about this paragraph is that it sounds
very similar to comments made by some Latter-day Saint Creationists
about Latter-day Saint scientists who are perceived to be friendly
to the theory of evolution. Are scientists justified in being so thinskinned when it comes to ID? Perhaps they are. The Creationists have
been so dishonest, so aggressive, and so single-mindedly antiscience
for over a hundred years that scientists generally detest them and all
that they stand for. It is not surprising that many scientists (including
me) are very wary about anything the Creationists say. Unfortunately,
ID per se has come to be seen as guilty by association with Creationist
literature. I do not condemn members of the scientific community for
8. Michael J. Behe, The Edge of Evolution: The Search for the Limits of Darwinism
(New York: Free Press, 2007); Sean B. Carroll, “God as Genetic Engineer,” Science 316
(2007): 1427–28; Michael J. Behe, “Addressing Cumulative Selection” (letter), Science 318
(2007): 196 (see in Science 316 Sean B. Carroll’s response, 196).
9. For a current summary of Salisbury’s position, see Frank B. Salisbury, “Simple
answers to creation” (letter), Deseret News, 2 May 2008, section A14.
10. C. G. Kurland, L. J. Collins, and D. Penny, “Genomics and the Irreducible Nature
of Eukaryote Cells,” Science 312 (2006): 1011–14.
11. William Martin et al., “The Evolution of Eukaryotes” (letter), Science 316 (2007):
542–43 (see in Science 316 C. G. Kurland et al.’s response, though it does not address the
quoted paragraph). Both letters are available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/
full/316/5824/542c (accessed 21 August 2008).

Salisbury, The Case for Divine Design (Farmer) • 145

their reaction, but I wish they were more aware of the identity of their
true enemies.
In chapter 7 and appendix D, Salisbury makes his personal scientific and religious views explicitly clear. They are interesting, and for
what it is worth, I feel much the same way.
Salisbury’s book is a sound introduction to most of the topics
related to the origin of life. It contrasts the possibilities of spontaneous
generation of life with a creationist view. It is written for an intelligent
reader who is not necessarily well-grounded in science. I strongly recommend the book to anyone who is troubled by the often acrimonious
debate concerning evolution and creation.

“Days of Miracle and Wonder”:
The Faith of Sam Harris
and the End of Religion
Gregory L. Smith

Review of Sam Harris. The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason. New
York: W. W. Norton, 2004. 336 pp., with index. $13.95.

S

These are the days of miracle and wonder
And don’t cry baby, don’t cry. . . .1

am Harris is frightened. And, as he would tell us, people who are
frightened often do or say things that are not rational (pp. 38–39).
Harris’s attack on “faith” and the Abrahamic religions began on 12
September 2001 in the midst of “collective grief and stupefaction,” and
it shows (p. 323). He describes how he and his fiancée visited France
but “had decided to avoid obvious terrorist targets while traveling.”
“First on our list of such places,” reports Harris, “was the American
embassy in Paris. Paris is home to the largest Muslim population in
the Western world.” The embassy was “the last place we would have
willingly visited while in France” (p. 55). Whatever else might be said
about this bit of self-revelation, it is assuredly not rational. Harris
has the same lifetime risk of being struck by a meteor as being killed
by a terrorist.2 Having lived in Paris, I can assure him that bands of

1. Paul Simon, “The Boy in the Bubble,” Graceland (Warner Bros., 1986).
2. This example is from John Mueller, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of
the Omnipresent Enemy,” Foreign Affairs 85/5 (September/October 2006): 8, who notes
that the lifetime risk of an American being harmed by terrorism is about 1:80,000. Harris
assumes a far greater risk every time he enters a motor vehicle.
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the Muslims he so distrusts are a far greater risk in the warrens of
Marseilles or in the public housing projects of the Paris banlieue than
are terrorists on Place de la Concorde. Harris is, however, frightened
for himself and his civilization. He is at war with a terrorist enemy—
his consequent assault savors of scorched earth, not precision bombing. This approach might destroy the enemy he fears, but whether
anything worth saving would remain is another matter.
Harris’s account begins, as polemics often do, with dehumanization of the enemy and an emphasis on the magnitude of the threat
about which Something Must Be Done. In Harris’s case, this is
couched in an evocative account of a suicide bomber who straps nails,
ball bearings, and rat poison to himself before detonating a bomb on
a commuter bus. Horrible as this is, Harris saves the worst for last:
“Why is it so easy, then, so trivially easy—you-could-almost-bet-yourlife-on-it easy—to guess the young man’s religion?” (pp. 11–12).
“The Bomb in the Baby Carriage”
Despite Harris’s confidence, this exercise may not be as trivially
obvious as he assumes. At present, in the public mind, suicide bombing is widely associated with Muslim fundamentalism. A rational
approach to this question, however, would seem to demand that we
actually consider the evidence behind our collective gut reaction.
Harvard’s Alberto Abadie analyzed domestic and international
terrorism and concluded that “countries with intermediate levels of
political freedom are shown to be more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly
authoritarian regimes. . . . [Thus] transitions from an authoritarian
regime to a democracy may be accompanied by temporary increases
in terrorism.”3 Abadie notes that this explains the past prevalence of
terrorism in Spain and Russia, locations for which Harris’s trivially
3. Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,”
October 2004, National Bureau of Economic Research working paper no. W10859, p. 3;
available at Social Science Research Network, http://ssrn.com/abstract=611366 (accessed
August 2008). This quotation also appears in an updated version of this paper published
in American Economic Review 96/2 (May 2006): 51.
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easy guess about the religion (or even religiosity) of terrorists is probably wrong. We must ask if being Muslim is simply a matter of historical contingency—those areas with nonresponsive governments, poor
law enforcement, and significant political grievances tend (at present)
to contain Muslims.
Harris might retort that religion still drives such conflicts. Again,
Abadie’s data argue otherwise, since “only the measure of linguistic fractionalization shows a significant association with terrorism.”
When income, degree of political freedom, and linguistic fractionalization are adjusted for, “ethnic and religious fractionalization are not
significantly associated with terrorist risk.”4 Education and a larger
proportion of males aged 15–24 likewise had no impact on rates of
terrorist activity.5
If terrorism is not affected by religious differences, perhaps the specific choice of suicide bombing is? Harris makes much of the “apoca
lyptic” strain in Islam and the other Abrahamic religions, arguing
that this makes them willing—even eager—to turn to suicide bombing because of their beliefs about the afterlife (see pp. 31–33, 38–39,
123–34, 223). But Robert Pape’s widely reported research calls this
tidy assumption into question. In his analysis of 188 suicide attacks
conducted from 1980 to 2001, Pape found that while acts of terrorism
declined from the 1980s (e.g., 666 in 1987) to the twenty-first century (e.g., 348 acts in 2001), suicide terrorism increased markedly.6
Indeed, suicide terrorism was rare before the 1980s—yet surely Islam
held much the same eschatology during the preceding one and a half
millennia. And given that the purported rewards for martyrdom are
the same whether one kills a few or a thousand infidels, Harris cannot
argue that the availability of weapons of mass destruction has suddenly made suicide terrorism attractive to Muslims. Clearly there is
more to the story than he sets out.
4. Abadie, “Roots of Terrorism,” 6, emphasis added.
5. Abadie, “Roots of Terrorism,” 7 n. 10.
6. Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political
Science Review 97/3 (August 2003): 343. Pape’s thesis has been expanded into a fulllength book: Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New
York: Random House, 2005).
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Harris seems to realize that his theory is on shaky ground. Having
assured his readers that one could “almost bet your life” on a suicide
bomber being a Muslim, he then caches a remarkable admission in an
endnote:
Some readers may object that the bomber in question is most
likely to be a member of the Liberations Tigers of Tamil
Eelam—the Sri Lankan separatist organization that has perpetuated more acts of suicidal terrorism than any other group.
Indeed, the “Tamil Tigers” are often offered as a counter
example to any claim that suicidal terrorism is a product of
religion. But to describe the Tamil Tigers as “secular”—as
R. A. Pape . . . and others have—is misleading. (p. 229 n. 2)
This would seem to be an important point—the Tamil Tigers
are responsible for more suicide bombing than anyone else—and yet
Harris inserts this inconvenient fact in a footnote. He likewise objects
to labeling them as “secular,” though, as Pape notes, they are more
than secular: they are Marxist/Leninist with a secular agenda.7 Pape
likewise points out that even a third of Muslim terrorist attacks express
secular aims.8 How does Harris justify his reading? “While the motivations of the Tigers are not explicitly religious, they are Hindus who
undoubtedly believe many improbable things about the nature of life
and death” (p. 229 n. 2).
The Tigers want a Tamil state; this is an avowedly secular goal—
one not merely “not explicitly religious.” Harris gives us no evidence
for the purportedly Hindu quality of the Tigers’ ideology or the “many
improbable things” that he (in a display of “faith”) assures us they
“undoubtedly believe”:
The cult of martyr worship that they have nurtured for decades
has many of the features of religiosity that one would expect
in people who give their lives so easily for a cause. Secular
Westerners often underestimate the degree to which certain
7. Pape, “Suicide Terrorism,” 343.
8. Pape, “Suicide Terrorism,” 343.
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cultures, steeped as they are in otherworldliness, look upon
death with less alarm than seems strictly rational. I was once
traveling in India when the government rescheduled the exams
for students who were preparing to enter the civil service: what
appeared to me to be the least of bureaucratic inconveniences
precipitated a wave of teenage self-immolations in protest.
Hindus, even those whose preoccupations appear to be basically secular, often harbor potent religious beliefs. (p. 229 n. 2,
emphasis in original)
Harris’s argument, then, seems to break down syllogistically as
follows:
A. Some Hindus in India have some crazy beliefs about the
afterlife and are not afraid to kill themselves (not others) over
trivial matters because of them.
B. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka are nominally Hindu.
Conclusion: Therefore, despite their Marxist/Leninist ideology (which awaits no afterlife at all), and despite their
avowedly secular aims, the Tamil Tigers have crazy beliefs
about the afterlife that make them willing (or cause them) to
use suicide terrorism.
At the least, this is not ironclad reasoning. This is the first—but not
last—instance of Harris’s tendency to label anything that he considers
irrational as “religious,” from Islam to Maoism.9 “Religion” becomes
an epithet for whatever Harris feels is “unjustified belief.”
Despite Harris’s hand waving, Pape has not been rebutted. Far from
being acts based on irrationality, “suicide terrorism follows a strategic
logic. . . . The vast majority of suicide terrorist attacks are not isolated
or random acts by individual fanatics,” which might be expected if religious beliefs were the driving force. After all, one group of dead heretics
is surely as good as another if a reward in the afterlife is your motivation.
Instead, suicide attacks form “part of a larger campaign . . . to achieve a
9. Harris describes Stalin and Mao (who “paid lip service to rationality, [but] communism was little more than a political religion . . . both cultic and irrational”) and
Germans’ “abject (and religious) loyalty to Hitler” (pp. 79, 100, emphasis in original).
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specific political goal.”10 Other analyses point out that suicide bombers’
decisions need not be irrational, and “it is possible to explain such acts
in rational choice terms, and that, while such acts are indeed extreme,
they are merely an extreme example of a general class of behavior in
which all of us engage.”11
Furthermore, the goals sought by suicide bombers are decidedly
secular, firmly anchored in the here and now: “Suicide terrorism is
specifically designed to coerce modern democracies to make significant concessions to national self-determination. . . . Every suicide terrorist campaign from 1980 to 2001 has been waged by terrorist groups
whose main goal has been to establish or maintain self-determination
for their community’s homeland by compelling an enemy to withdraw.” Pape notes further that suicide terrorism is on the rise for the
prosaic reason that terrorists have learned that it pays dividends that
are secular, not eschatological.12 Suicide attacks killed thirteen people
on average (not counting the 9/11 attacks), while nonsuicide terrorism killed less than one person per attack.13 Suicide terrorists made
significant gains for their cause in 50 percent of cases, while conventional states’ attempts to coerce others succeed only about a third of
the time.14 This is a strategic logic that needs no scriptural exegesis.
Harris might insist that the suicide bomber’s actions reflect his
own religious beliefs and needs, but Ronald Wintrobe’s analysis argues
that the suicide bomber “intensifies his participation in group activities. . . . He gives up some of his own values and substitutes the values
of the group for them. . . . Such trades imply that a person is more and
more giving up his identity for that of the group . . . and losing the
capacity to make decisions based on values other than those of the
leader.” Thus the leaders’ frankly secular goals become increasingly
10. Pape, “Suicide Terrorism,” 344.
11. Ronald Wintrobe, “Can Suicide Bombers Be Rational?” (5 November 2001;
revised 15 May 2002, 5 January 2003), 2, http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/cpolit/
papers/suicide.pdf (accessed 9 May 2008).
12. Pape, “Suicide Terrorism,” 2, 351–55, emphasis added.
13. Pape, “Suicide Terrorism,” 346.
14. Pape, “Suicide Terrorism,” 351.
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important and may reach a point where “rational suicide for the group
is possible.”15
Wintrobe notes that “religious ‘exchange’ would appear to provide
a simple explanation of the events of 9/11. Religion promises an afterlife, so the individual, to the extent that he is convinced by this, may
not be making a sacrifice at all in martyring himself.”16 This is Harris’s
argument distilled to its essentials. “However,” cautions Wintrobe,
neither the desire for social cohesion nor religiosity are sufficient conditions for terrorist activity. Indeed, many deeply
religious people are obviously among the least likely candidates for this role. . . . What differentiates the [terrorist] from
these others? A high level of social cohesion may make the
individual member of a group ready to sacrifice himself, but
the leader of the group or some other individual with whom
one identifies still has to order the individual to commit terrorist acts. . . .
In short, in these failed [Muslim] states one expects to see
pockets of extreme social cohesion, with charismatic leaders
subject to no central control providing solidarity and social
services, educating their members that their problems are
caused by an external enemy and demanding that they take
radical actions against that enemy to help their fellows.17
It goes without saying that such a dynamic is possible for both theists
and atheists.
“Boy in the Bubble”: Error, Contradiction, and Misapprehension
The Abrahamic religions, for Harris, are particularly insidious
because of the premium they place on “faith.” Faith, in his view, is
nothing but a decision to believe in spite of a lack of evidence, or even
against evidence. “It should go without saying,” huffs Harris, “that
these rival belief systems are all equally uncontaminated by evidence”
15. Wintrobe, “Can Suicide Bombers Be Rational?” 3.
16. Wintrobe, “Can Suicide Bombers Be Rational?” 26.
17. Wintrobe, “Can Suicide Bombers Be Rational?” 36, 38, emphasis in original.
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(p. 15). But Harris does not leave it without saying, and the utter lack
of evidence for any claim made by any Abrahamic religion is a constant refrain, as if repetition could substitute for the presentation of
actual evidence.18 Harris might well claim the evidence is equivocal
or unpersuasive or conflicting. But he overreaches: do believers really
advance no evidence whatever for their beliefs?
Harris may dispute whether the evidence adduced by theists is,
in fact, adequate, but to argue that Christians do not seek and value
such evidence is nonsense. For example, St. Justin Martyr held that
“reason directs those who are truly pious and philosophical to honor
and love only what is true, declining to follow traditional opinions.”19
The Catholic Encyclopedia declares that
the evidence upon which we assent to this Divine truth must
also be itself Divine, and there must be as close a relation
between that truth and the evidence upon which it comes
to us as there is between the coloured object and the light;
the former is a necessary condition for the exercise of our
visual faculty, the latter is the cause of our actual vision. But
no one but God can reveal God; in other words, God is His
own evidence.20
Anglican theologian W. H. Griffith-Thomas insists that faith
“affects the whole of man’s nature. It commences with the conviction
of the mind based on adequate evidence,” includes “the certainty of
evidence,” and is “not blind, but intelligent.”21
18. See, for example, Harris, End of Faith, 16, 19, 23, 25, 48, 62, 65, 66, 67, 72, 76, 221.
19. Justin Martyr, The First Apology II, in The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr
and Irenaeus, vol. 1, Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1995), 163. Many more examples from Christian thinkers are conveniently collected online at http://christthetao.homestead.com/articles/
FaithandReason.pdf (accessed 18 March 2008).
20. Hugh T. Pope, “Faith,” in The Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: Robert Appleton
Co., 1909), 753.
21. W. H. Griffith-Thomas, The Principles of Theology: An Introduction to the Thirtynine Articles (London: Longmans, Green, 1930), xviii–xix; cited in Alister McGrath,
Dawkins’ God: Genes, Memes, and the Meaning of Life (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007),
86, 171.
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“Every religion,” complains Harris, “preaches the truth of propositions for which no evidence is even conceivable” (p. 23, emphasis in
original). This represents a spectacular failure of the imagination. The
Abrahamic religions are all revealed—that is, they argue for direct
divine communication via theophany or angelic messengers, at least
in principle. Surely it is at least conceivable that an angel could appear
or that God could unequivocally reveal himself.
I wonder if Harris has ever even spoken to an articulate believer.
“Ignorance is the true coinage of this [religious] realm—‘Blessed are
those who have not seen and have believed’ (John 20:29)” (p. 65).
Ironically for Harris, this statement by the risen Christ is preceded by
most of the disciples handling his resurrected body, and it is followed
by the claim that “many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of
his disciples[;] . . . these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus
is the Christ, the Son of God” (John 20:30, 31). The New Testament
author, then, does not advocate belief that is not based on evidence. He
provides, rather, eyewitness testimony of Christ and signs as a basis
for belief. One may choose to discount such evidence, but to claim
that no evidence is offered, or that the type of evidence (eye-witness
testimony) is illegitimate, is arbitrary if not absurd.
Harris’s advocacy of Eastern spiritual disciplines betrays a double
standard. While dismissive of the entire Western religious tradition,
he is deeply enamored of Buddhist meditation, which he believes is
“supported by a wealth of evidence,” can “uncover genuine facts about
the world,” and can be “personally transformative” (p. 40).
Harris insists that “to be ruled by ideas for which you have no evidence (and which therefore cannot be justified in conversation with
other human beings) is generally a sign that something is seriously
wrong with your mind” (p. 72). He is again insisting that Christians,
Jews, and Muslims have no evidence for their beliefs—but by this
standard he cannot justify many of his. After all, he cannot prove to
another human being that he has thoughts or that he acts on thoughts
or beliefs. Our own thoughts and experiences are not public knowledge. Such trite positivism ought to have died out years ago.
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Theistic private experiences, inspirations, intuitions, revelations—
these cannot be “justified” publicly, and so Harris dismisses them.
Yet he insists in the next breath that “intuition” is a valid, even vital
faculty for ethics and that this “is no less true in science” (p. 183).
How can Harris’s intuition about ethics be publicly confirmed? Unless
I share the intuition, we are at an impasse.22 Why are intuitions about
moral behavior and science valuable, even vital, but intuition about
God illegitimate?
Likewise, Harris seems to grant other Buddhist ideas a free pass.
“The place of consciousness in the natural world is very much an open
question,” he assures us, and “the domain of our subjectivity constitutes a proper (and essential) sphere of investigation into the nature of
the universe: as some facts will be discovered only in consciousness, in
first-person terms, or not discovered at all” (pp. 208–9). A theist might
well say the same thing about the existence of God or the expression
of God’s will. Such things are not to be discovered by syllogism or a
randomized controlled trial, but simply in the first-person encounter
with God within one’s inner self. Theists have said such things about
God, repeatedly, so it is no surprise that Harris goes to great lengths
to caricature the Western tradition as consisting solely of those who
either embrace or ignore the idiocies written in their holy books, the
inerrant word of God (pp. 17–18). There are doubtless some who fit
that description, but this does not exhaust the richness and variety of
the Abrahamic tradition.
Eventually Harris insists that “spiritual intuitions,” despite their
internal, subjective nature, can be studied rigorously among practition
ers. One needs only substitute “divine revelations” into his argument:
As in any other field, [divine revelations] are amenable to
inter-subjective consensus, and refutation. Just as mathematicians can enjoy mutually intelligible dialogue on abstract
ideas (though they will not always agree about what is intuitively “obvious”), just as athletes can communicate effectively
about the pleasures of sport, mystics can consensually eluci22. I take up Harris’s treatment of ethics in the following section.
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date the data of their sphere. Thus, genuine [revelation] can
be “objective”—in the only normative sense of this word that
is worth retaining—in that it need not be contaminated by
dogma. As a phenomenon to be studied, spiritual experience
[i.e., revelation] is no more refractory than dreams, emotions,
perceptual illusions, or, indeed, thoughts themselves. (p. 220)
One can only offer a hearty “Amen, brother!” Those who have had
such experiences have no difficulty communicating with others about
them and managing to compare notes, as a visit to any Latter-day
Saint testimony meeting can demonstrate. This is not to say (as with
the mathematicians) that each will agree on every point. As Joseph
Smith always warned, true revelation will properly make us wary
of dogma and creeds, which restrict rather than expand revelatory
possibilities.23
But with respect to the Western tradition, Harris is in the posture of
the innumerate dunce who complains that all the mathematicians’ talk
of calculus and manifold spaces is mere gobbledygook. What serves as
evidence for them—often quite profound and compelling evidence—
moves him not at all. He is like a couch potato who has never known a
runner’s high and so cannot understand why some people would jog to
the store when they have a Hummer in the driveway.
“This Is the Long Distance Call”: Mysticism and Revelation
“Mysticism is a rational enterprise. Religion is not,” insists Harris.
This is a dubious claim, without serious qualification or special pleading, since a key aspect of mysticism is its ineffability.24 Mystical texts will
tell you how to achieve such states, but they can say little about content.
23. “I cannot believe in any of the creeds of the different denominations, because they
all have some things in them I cannot subscribe to, though all of them have some truth.
I want to come up into the presence of God, and learn all things; but the creeds set up
stakes, and say, ‘Hitherto shalt thou come, and no further;’ which I cannot subscribe to.”
Joseph Smith, History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, ed. Brigham H.
Roberts (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1980), 6:57. See also History of the Church, 5:215.
24. See Hugh Nibley, “Prophets and Mystics,” in The World and the Prophets, ed.
John W. Welch, Gary P. Gillum, and Don E. Norton (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book and
FARMS, 1987), 102–3.
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“The mystic has reasons for what he believes,” Harris insists, “and these
reasons are empirical” (p. 221). So, as we will see, do many who believe
in divine revelation. While Harris’s attack is focused on all Western theists, he raises issues that are particularly germane to a Latter-day Saint
audience. I will now consider these issues in some detail.
Harris’s attitude represents one pole of an increasingly common
attack from secularists against theism generally and the Church of
Jesus Christ in particular. Harris’s view strikes me as the minority
stance since he believes that real truths of value can be derived from
mysticism. Far more common is the claim, as voiced by one tediously
verbose critic, that
recent scientific studies show that spiritual experience is “real”
in the sense that while a person perceives herself to be having
a spiritual experience the brain does things that are consistent
with what neurologists would expect to produce profoundly
moving mental states (see Andrew Newberg et al., “Why God
Won’t Go Away”).25
For a secularist, scientistic critic, believers’ religious experiences don’t
tell us anything about reality outside of the person experiencing them,
and we can thus dismiss any claim that the Latter-day Saints’ revelatory experience says something about “truth.” “You had an experience,” the critic can condescend, “and the experience was ‘real,’ but it
didn’t mean anything larger since other religions can make the same
sorts of claims.”
Neuroradiologist Andrew Newberg and colleagues have used
functional brain imaging to study a variety of meditating subjects:
[Our] experiment with Tibetan meditators and Franciscan
nuns showed that the events they considered spiritual were,
in fact, associated with observable neurological activity. In a
reductionist sense, this could support the argument that religious experience is only imagined neurologically, that God is
25. Bob McCue, “Notes for Van Hale’s Radio Show,” e-mail posting, 5 September
2004 (copy in author’s possession).
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physically “all in your mind.” But, a full understanding of the
way in which brain and mind assemble and experience reality
suggests a very different view.26
Critics in Harris’s mold, who embrace meditation as a window into
important truths, and the more reductionistic critics who argue that
spiritual experiences mean nothing at all both have little to say about
the phenomenon of revelation in the Church of Jesus Christ. This
broader issue is worthy of consideration.
Phenomenon or Epiphenomenon?
A neuroimaging team might study a patient who reports that he
is “seeing” an apple. The team could demonstrate that certain areas
in the occipital cortex light up in a predictable pattern whenever the
patient reports “seeing” an apple. The skeptics would have us believe
that because this reported sensation can be detected on a PET scan,
there is no such thing as literal vision and no literal apple! This is
counterintuitive at best. Without knowing whether an apple was, in
fact, in front of the patient’s open eyes during the scan, there would
be no way to tell from the radiology data whether the apple existed or
not. For spiritual matters, it is impossible to crack open the scanner
and spot the apple (or its absence).
Put simply, all cognition must cause brain level changes. Everything
we think, feel, experience, or sense must induce a change at the level
of the neurons. Is it any surprise that similar experiences will provoke
similar areas of the brain to behave in similar ways, since we know
that the brain is anatomically specialized for a variety of functions?
Whether such brain changes are all that is happening is, of course, the
intriguing question. Newberg makes this point repeatedly.27
So the key question remains: Are brain changes the “phenomenon”
(i.e., the whole of the experience, a “hallucination” of an apple), or are
they an “epiphenomenon” (i.e., caused by something outside of the brain:
26. Andrew Newberg, Eugene G. D’Aquili, and Vince Rause, Why God Won’t Go
Away: Brain Science and the Biology of Belief (New York: Ballantine, 2001), 36.
27. For example, see Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 36–37.
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light traveling from an apple, striking the retina, and influencing the
neurons)? There’s no way to tell, by this—or any—set of experiments.28
Newberg argues that the changes wrought by spiritual experiences are
every bit as “real” as those from standard sensory phenomena.
Spirits in a Material World?
Functional brain studies might cause problems for religious traditions that believe “spirit” is an ineffable class of existence quite separate from the physical universe. The materialistic changes seen on a
brain scan might suggest that something quite prosaic and physical is
going on, rather than the person is receiving some numinous message
for which only the human spirit is “tuned.” Such an argument, however, completely falls apart in a Latter-day Saint worldview. Indeed,
Latter-day Saints might find it strange if there were not such physical
changes associated with spiritual experiences: “There is no such thing
as immaterial matter. All spirit is matter, but it is more fine or pure,
and can only be discerned by purer eyes” (Doctrine and Covenants
131:7). Thus for the Saints there is no radical spirit/matter dichotomy.
Spirit is matter, though less easily detected by mortal eyes. If a spiritual
experience is to have an effect upon a mortal being, it would not be
surprising to find detectable physical changes in the gross “nonspiritual” matter that we can study. We won’t detect the actor, necessarily,
but we might expect to see the effect of the action. Nancey Murphy, of
Fuller Theological Seminary, understands this: “If we recognize the
brain does all the things that we [traditionally] attributed to the soul,
then God must have some way of interacting with human brains.”29
For Latter-day Saints, brain and spirit/soul are the same type of thing
(matter), so this is no surprise at all.
28. “At this point in our research, science had brought us as far as it could, and we
were left with two mutually exclusive possibilities: either spiritual experience is nothing more than a neurological construct created by and contained within the brain, or
the state of absolute union that the mystics describe does in fact exist and the mind has
developed the capacity to perceive it. Science offers no clear way to resolve this question.”
Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 147.
29. Cited in Michael Shermer, How We Believe: The Search for God in an Age of Science
(New York: W. H. Freeman, 1999), 65.
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Are All “Spiritual” Experiences Equivalent?
Secular critics often assume, if only tacitly, that studies on Eastern
mystics and Franciscan nuns are somehow applicable to Latter-day
Saint revelatory experiences. To my knowledge, no studies have been
done on Latter-day Saint members who claim to be receiving revelation. Just because some patients may hallucinate about apples does not
mean that true sightings of true apples (or true oranges!) cannot also
occur.30
Note the description of one meditating test subject:
Whatever Robert calls this deeper consciousness, he claims
that when it emerges during those moments of meditation
when he is most completely absorbed in looking inward, he
suddenly understands that his inner self is not an isolated
entity, but that he is inextricably connected to all of creation.
Yet when he tries to put this intensely personal insight into
words he finds himself falling back on familiar clichés that
have been employed for centuries to express the elusive nature
of spiritual experience. “There’s a sense of timelessness and
infinity,” he might say. “It feels like I am part of everyone and
everything in existence.”31
This description is typical of the mystical traditions found in the
Eastern religions beloved by Harris, and it has some parallels to those
of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Pigeonholing such a widespread
tradition is always risky, but I will chance it. In general, mysticism
seeks a direct, unmediated experience of and union with the world
or the divine through spiritual discipline. The description offered to
30. This is not to claim that Franciscan or Buddhist experiences are mere fictions.
I am simply pointing out that one type of “spiritual hallucination” would not rule out
“true spiritual” experiences any more than visual hallucinations rule out true vision.
“A false ghost,” wrote Chesterton, “disproves the reality of ghosts exactly as much as a
forged banknote disproves the existence of the Bank of England—if anything, it proves
its existence.” Gilbert K. Chesterton, “IX—Authority and the Adventurer,” Orthodoxy
(New York: Dodd, Mead, 1908); available online at http://www.leaderu.com/cyber/
books/orthodoxy/ch9.html (accessed 17 September 2008).
31. Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 2.
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Newberg is typical: “It feels like I am part of everyone and everything
in existence.”
Newberg goes to great lengths to describe mystical states, which
can be sought by theists and atheists:32
Mystical experience . . . is nothing more or less than an uplifting sense of genuine spiritual union with something larger
than the self. . . . Mystical states are often characterized by
strong, contradictory emotions. . . . Time and space are perceived as nonexistent, and normal rational thought processes
give way to more intuitive ways of understanding. The mystic frequently experiences intimations of the presence of the
sacred or the holy, and often claims to have seen into the most
essential meaning of things, resulting in a rapturous state that
has been described as “an interior illumination of reality that
results in ultimate freedom.”33
This is, however, far from the Latter-day Saint revelatory tradition in
general and also from my own experience. The Saints view God as
an embodied individual with whom one may communicate directly.
Rather than looking in, one is speaking out. Rather than seeking
union with the Divine or dissolving one’s own duality, one is seeking
two-way communication with It as a (lesser) partner. Such revelation
is always twofold, involving emotional content coupled with rational
information and insight. Terryl Givens has aptly labeled this concept
“dialogic revelation.”34 In one of the earliest Latter-day Saint articulations of the process, the Lord told Oliver Cowdery, “You have supposed that I would give it unto you, when you took no thought save it
was to ask me. But, behold, I say unto you, that you must study it out
in your mind” (D&C 9:7–8).
32. Andrew B. Newberg and Mark Robert Waldman, in Born to Believe: God, Science,
and the Origin of Ordinary and Extraordinary Beliefs (New York: Free Press, 2007), 215–
45, describe experiments on an atheist who meditates on the idea of “God.”
33. Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 101.
34. See the discussion in Terryl L. Givens, By the Hand of Mormon: The American
Scripture That Launched a New World Religion (New York: Oxford University Press,
2002), 209–39.
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Critics of the Church of Jesus Christ often insist that Latter-day
Saint revelation is exclusively or primarily emotional, something that
might be “felt by simply watching a Hollywood movie,” but this is
a fundamental misrepresentation.35 The united witness of mind and
heart is key in Latter-day Saint doctrine. A Latter-day Saint revelatory experience has as much—or more—intellectual content as it does
emotions of peace or joy: “If you desire a further witness, cast your
mind upon the night that you cried unto me in your heart, that you
might know concerning the truth of these things. Did I not speak
peace to your mind concerning the matter? What greater witness can
you have than from God?” (D&C 6:22–23). Notice that information is
spoken to the “mind” and the peace then follows. And the solution for
later doubts or concerns is not reliance on “a feeling,” but an admonition to recall specific information communicated earlier.
Character of the Mystical Experience
I well remember a university class on medieval Judaism in which
I had my first encounter with mysticism. I was (and still am) struck by
the utter novelty and strangeness of those religious ideas. This isn’t to
say that I doubt the reports of the mystics; I just have no religious point
of reference for identifying with them. Who is the Mormon equivalent
of St. John of the Cross? Where are the Latter-day Saint manuals of
spiritual discipline? What is the Mormon Ein Sof ?
Newberg also indicates that “transcendent” moments with music
may derive from the same neurochemistry.36 As a lifelong audiophile,
I do know something about those experiences, whether engendered
by Bach or the Beatles, and can see the parallels to the Jewish mystics’
concepts. But they are not like revelation. To better appreciate this difference between mysticism and revelation, consider Newberg’s report
35. This characterization comes from an anti-Mormon DVD, Search for the Truth:
Jesus Christ/Joseph Smith, placed anonymously at thousands of homes across the United
States and Canada beginning on 27 March 2007. See http://en.fairmormon.org/Search_
for_the_Truth_DVD (accessed 19 March 2008).
36. Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 77–80.
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on the demands of the mystical experience that he and his colleagues
seek to neuroimage:
Virtually all mystical traditions identify some sense of
union with the absolute as the ultimate spiritual goal.
Correspondingly, nearly all those traditions have developed
rigorous systems of training and initiation, designed to help
the devoted reach that rarefied state.37
The authors here verify what Harris claims—that this is not an easy
thing to learn and that it takes time, practice, and special techniques that are targeted at achieving the mystical experience.38 Zen
Buddhists used “koans . . . to loosen the grip of the conscious mind.”
Kabbalists “performed complicated mental manipulations of numbers and images to reach the same end” and “aimed . . . to annihilate
the ego. . . . To this end, they used meditation, controlled breathing,
and other contemplative techniques to silence the mind.” Christian
mystics “relied upon intense contemplative prayer, fasting, silence,
and various forms of mortification to free their minds from mundane
matters” and “believe[d] that God could only be known by a mind
that has been cleansed of all distracting thoughts and images.” Islamic
(Sufi) mystics aim for “ʾfana, or annihilation,” via “a combination of
fasting, sleepless vigils, chanting, and contemplation, all intended to
induce altered states.”39
While such devotion and effort is impressive, I just cannot draw
any parallels here to the Latter-day Saint revelatory experience as I
have lived it or been taught it. Contrast the disciplines of the mystics
with the Latter-day Saint approach, in which prospective converts are
asked to receive the Book of Mormon with faith in Christ and then
“ask God.” For Latter-day Saint revelation, there are no physical ges37. Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 103.
38. “Mysticism, to be viable, requires explicit instructions, which need suffer no
more ambiguity or artifice in their exposition than we find in a manual for operating a
lawn mower.” Harris, End of Faith, 217, emphasis in original. “Like any skill that requires
refinements in perception or cognition, the task of recognizing consciousness prior to the
subject/object dichotomy can be facilitated by an expert.” Harris, End of Faith, 218.
39. Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 103–5.
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tures aside from kneeling and bowing the head (and even these are not
essential). There are no candles, altered lighting, controlled breathing,
or focus on images of God or the Void. There is no music or special
preparations. Prayers are extemporaneous and unscripted. There is no
“vain repetition,” no iteration of meaningless or rote phrases. There
are no sessions with spiritual trainers.
In fact, fasting is the only common element, and proselytes are
not generally exposed to this Latter-day Saint practice until after their
baptism—most new members report revelation without resorting to a
fast. Furthermore, I suspect that missing two meals a month has little
to do with the prolonged, frequent fasts and mortification to which
the mystics subject themselves.
Even more important to my mind than the vast differences in
technique is the gulf between the mystical and Latter-day Saint revelatory end product. Newberg repeatedly emphasizes that “all [mystical
traditions] are based on a common insight: The first step in attaining
mystical union is to quiet the conscious mind and free the spirit from
the limiting passions and delusions of the ego,”40 with one ultimately
experiencing union with the transcendent. Rabbi Eleazar is quoted to
bring the point home: “If you consider yourself as ‘something,’ and
pray to Him for your needs, God cannot clothe Himself in you. God is
infinite and cannot be held in any kind of vessel that has not dissolved
itself into No-thing.”41
Joseph Smith, of course, got himself in enormous trouble for
claiming revelation that did not conform to the mystical pattern. He
did not, as mysticism scholar Evelyn Underhill said of the mystics,
“persist . . . [in saying] that God in his absolute Reality is unknowable—is dark—to man’s intellect.”42 (Note again that the intellect plays
a key role in Latter-day Saint revelation.)
In contrast to mystical experiences, the revelation enjoined upon
every Latter-day Saint member, and upon which I base my continued
40. Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 103.
41. Newberg, D’Aquili, and Rause, Why God Won’t Go Away, 104.
42. Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 347–48, quoted in
Givens, By the Hand of Mormon, 76.
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membership in the church, is a conversation. It is a discussion. There
is no effort to dissolve oneself into the Infinite or to become absorbed
in God or Christ. Rather, such revelation is a simple, even matter-offact, act of discourse. There is no sense of space and time being nonexistent. It does not require great preparation. It need not always be initiated on the petitioner’s end. Far from disposing of them, this practice
puts my needs or ego all too uncomfortably front and center, whether
I want them there or not.
To be sure, many members will talk about how they “felt” when
they prayed. It is to fundamentally misunderstand these experiences,
however, if we assume (as critics often do) that this talk of “feeling”
means simply—or only or primarily—“emotion.” We are stymied, in a
sense, because we have no good word for what happens that does not
also have other secular connotations that the critic could also misinterpret if he chose. Hugh Nibley’s description is apt:
[The critic] cannot conceive how anyone could possibly
acquire knowledge by any method other than his. He cannot believe that any man has experienced anything which he
has not experienced. . . . “I have never seen a vision,” says the
[skeptic], “therefore Joseph Smith never had one. I have seen
dreams [or had unitary brain experiences or mystical insight],
therefore I will allow him that.”43
Despite what I will not say about such experiences, I can at least say
this: one of the most significant products of such experiences is their
ability to transform my behavior and character. I am too familiar with
the experience of trying mightily to alter some behavior, thought, or
fault and not succeeding. But if I engage in a few moments of dialogic
revelation, fundamental, deep-rooted parts of my nature that have
resisted my best efforts can be altered for the long term. Is there emotion with this? Of course, but that emotion is partly a reaction to what
has happened; it is not simply the happening itself. If a wealthy benefactor walked up and handed me a million dollars, I would doubtless have a few stirrings of happiness—but I would hardly then pre43. Nibley, “Prophets and Scholars,” in Nibley, The World and the Prophets, 31.
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sume that there never was any money to begin with. When Christ can
remake a lifetime of error in me, I think I am more suited than the
critic to decide if this is merely neurons firing in the dark.
Harris argues that “almost every problem we have can be ascribed
to the fact that human beings are utterly beguiled by their feelings
of separateness” and insists that “a spirituality that undermined such
dualism, through the mere contemplation of consciousness, could not
help but improve our situation” (p. 214). This may be, but the same
separateness and isolation from self and others can also be countered
by the revelatory tradition, which has the advantage of being focused
on an external reality of God’s law and love rather than being an
inward reflection on mere subjectivity. If we wish to heal our relationships with other humans, I would argue that there can be a substantial
and beneficial difference between an interpersonal relationship of love
with the divine and merely “recognizing consciousness prior to the
subject/object dichotomy” (p. 218). The former models what we must
achieve with others; the latter does not. Revelation tells us about facts
outside and superior to ourselves; mysticism can at best only show us
things about ourselves. Both are potentially valuable, but they are not
equivalent. A Latter-day Saint revelatory experience is far removed
from mysticism’s personal dissolution into a Nirvana with little information communicated except an inarticulate connectedness, where
one merely “pay[s] extraordinarily close attention to his moment-bymoment experience of the world” (pp. 234–35).
Critics generally want to persuade us that Latter-day Saints and,
say, devotees of Buddhist meditation
(a) would have similar neuroimaging results, and hence
(b) are experiencing “the same thing,” which
(c) certainly has no relationship to an outer reality.
But such a critic has no data to establish (a). The vast differences in
intent, technique, and reported content for Latter-day Saint experiences suggest caution in assuming (b), while (c) is not the conclusion
of those who conducted the studies, and this either/or decision cannot
be settled by science anyway.

168 • The FARMS Review 20/1 (2008)

“Baby with the Baboon Heart”: A Science of Ethics?
I conclude with the most disturbing part of Harris’s analysis. His
appeal to Eastern mysticism constitutes a fairly pedestrian attack
on religion. The recommendations that Harris makes, however, are
troubling.
Of Hebrews 11:1, Harris claims that “read in the right way, this
passage seems to render faith entirely self-justifying: perhaps the very
fact that one believes in something which has not yet come to pass
(‘things hoped for’) or for which one has no evidence (‘things not
seen’) constitutes evidence for its actuality (‘assurance’)” (p. 64). Such
a reading is, as we have seen, the “right way” only because it provides a
caricature of Christian belief that Harris can then brush aside.
Harris himself provides an excellent example of exactly the type
of faith he disparages. “Faith is nothing more than a willingness to
await the evidence,” he sniffs (p. 66). This isn’t the case, but if it is,
Harris certainly manifests plenty of “faith”:
If we better understood the workings of the human brain,
we would undoubtedly discover lawful connections between
our states of consciousness, our modes of conduct, and the
various ways we use our attention. What makes one person
happier than another? Why is love more conducive to happiness than hate? Why do we generally prefer beauty to ugliness
and order to chaos? . . . Is the ego an illusion, and, if so, what
implications does this have for human life? Is there life after
death? These are ultimately questions for a mature science of
the mind. If we ever develop such a science, most of our religious texts will be no more useful to mystics than they now
are to astronomers. (p. 20, emphasis added)
There is no evidence that science will ever be able to address these
issues. But Harris is quite comfortable, even confident, that if he waits
for the evidence to arrive, it will: “Science will not remain mute on
spiritual and ethical questions for long” (p. 43). He even advocates
closer attention to “a body of data attesting to the reality of psychic
phenomena, much of which has been ignored by mainstream science”
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(p. 41). So Harris, while dismissing the entire Abrahamic tradition,
thinks ESP has not been looked at closely enough? Were a theist to
suggest that “mainstream science” is simply ignoring valid data on the
reality of God, he would be laughed out of court.
Harris’s “faith” reaches its apogee when he advocates “a science
of good and evil” (pp. 170–203). He points out that if one discards a
“rule-making God,” then moral statements like “Murder is wrong” do
not “seem . . . anchored to the facts of this world in the way that statements about planets or molecules appear to be” (p. 170). However, he
is confident—even faith-filled—that science can save us: “A rational
approach to ethics becomes possible once we realize that questions of
right and wrong are really questions about the happiness and suffering
of sentient creatures. If we are in a position to affect the happiness or
suffering of others, we have ethical responsibilities toward them” (pp.
170–71). But is this really obvious? I readily grant Harris’s conclusion:
we do have an ethical duty to ameliorate and avoid unnecessary suffering. But my conclusion is based on a theistic worldview. This does
not, contrary to Harris’s assertion, derive simply from God “making rules.” Instead it reflects the very nature of reality. God merely
informs us about the facts of the universe: we will be happier, and we
will maximize our potential as beings in his image, if we work, as he
does, to maximize human happiness.
While I applaud Harris’s conclusion, it certainly does not follow
inevitably from science or anything else. What if I am not made happier by seeking to remove suffering? What if I prefer, rather, to cause
suffering or to remain indifferent to it? There are such people in the
world: and if there is no overarching moral reality—if we really are
just bags of self-aware meat—why should I waste my short span of
existence before oblivion by doing that which makes me unhappy?
Harris’s answer is that we rely on “moral intuition,” “a term that
we simply cannot do without, because it denotes the most basic constituent of our faculty of understanding. While this is true in matters
of ethics, it is no less true in science” (pp. 182–83). And, the theist
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could add, in matters of belief in God.44 But if Stalin, Mao, and Pol
Pot are truly happier exercising tyranny and slaughtering millions,
and their moral intuition tells them this is proper, how can they be
gainsaid?
“We simply do not need religious ideas to motivate us to live ethical lives,” argues Harris (p. 172). And I agree. There are many moral
atheists, some of whom are more moral than many theists. But a moral
atheist is moral in spite of the logical consequences of her epistemology, not because of them. In a Latter-day Saint framework, it is not
surprising that many, even most, atheists would follow a clear moral
compass, for “the Spirit of Christ is given to every man, that he may
know good from evil” (Moroni 7:16, emphasis added).
Harris then goes on to argue that free will (what the Saints know
as moral agency) is an illusion since “either our wills are determined
by prior causes, and we are not responsible for them, or they are the
product of chance, and we are not responsible for them” (p. 263). If
this is so, then what moral authority can ethics have at all? If my will
is beyond my control, why castigate me for violations of a moral code,
however derived? Harris is, needless to say, guilty of a false dichotomy.
Joseph Smith provides a third option: being eternally self-existent, we
have no prior cause and are also not due to chance.45 It is strange that
Harris indicts terrorists and religious believers for immoral behavior
that he claims is not freely chosen. If we intuit anything about our
choices, it is that they seem free, and we really do have the sense that
what we decide truly matters. In so vital a matter for ethics, surely our
intuitions ought to carry significant weight.
The most disturbing thing about Harris’s “faith,” however, is not
his naïve scientific triumphalism—his scientism. Rather, this moral
44. For an argument along these lines for the rationality of belief in God, see Alvin
Plantinga, “Rationality and Religious Belief,” in The Experience of Philosophy, ed. Daniel
Kolak and Raymond Martin (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1993), 275–90.
45. “We say that God was self—existant [sic] who told you so? It’s correct enough but
how did it get into your heads—who told you that man did not exist upon the same principle.” Joseph Smith, as reported by William Clayton, 7 April 1844; quoted in Andrew F.
Ehat and Lyndon W. Cook, eds., The Words of Joseph Smith: The Contemporary Accounts
of the Nauvoo Discourses of the Prophet Joseph (Provo, UT: Religious Studies Center,
Brigham Young University, 1980), 359.
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muddle is disquieting because of where Harris’s fear of terrorism and
religious believers leads him: “I hope to show that the very ideal of religious tolerance—born of the notion that every human being should be
free to believe whatever he wants about God—is one of the principal
forces driving us toward the abyss” (p. 15).
It is not, then, amoral actions that ought to be opposed—it is religious beliefs themselves. The very idea that every person has a right
to his or her own opinions about God is too dangerous for Harris.
One suspects he has not thought carefully about what might happen
to people like him—indeed what has happened—if a theistic majority reached a similar conclusion about his beliefs or thoughts. Harris
has already detailed the Inquisition in exquisite detail, but such things
apparently don’t bother him if he is on the side of Torquemada in
defense of Civilization and Reason (pp. 80–87). His crusading zeal
is not reserved for violent fanatics, for they are only a symptom of a
greater problem:
The greatest problem confronting civilization is not merely
religious extremism: rather, it is the larger set of cultural and
intellectual accommodations we have made to faith itself.
Religious moderates are, in large part, responsible for the religious conflict in our world, because their beliefs provide the
context in which scriptural literalism and religious violence
can never be adequately opposed. (p. 45, emphasis added)
Thus those who justify violence and terror with faith are not the real
problem, but those who do not justify violence and terror. Harris’s intuition may make this self-evident, but the logic escapes me. “Religious
moderation still represents a failure to criticize the unreasonable (and
dangerous) certainty of others” (p. 39). So religious moderates by definition never criticize fundamentalists? Nonsense.
“Dying in the Corner of the Sky”
Harris is frightened, and certain of his own rectitude. This leads
him to exactly where he claims it leads religious extremists: “Some
propositions are so dangerous that it may even be ethical to kill people
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for believing them” (pp. 52–53). Once again, for Harris it is not the
action that counts; it is the very fact of holding a belief or opinion.
Some beliefs or opinions are worthy of death because of what people
might do. There are “terrible consequences that have arisen, logically
and inevitably, out of Christian faith” (p. 106, emphasis added). For
Harris contingency plays no role, and there is no poor exercise of free
will—which doesn’t exist anyway. Christianity and its doctrines lead
inexorably—inevitably—to historical tragedy. One wonders if he has
read Marx.
It follows, then, that the rational observer (read Harris) can intuit
the ultimate and inevitable consequences of religious belief. What sort
of response is warranted? Harris argues that torture is morally permissible, even required, so he is not afraid to get his hands dirty (pp.
192–99). In a particularly chilling passage, he compares believers to a
plague worthy of quarantine or eradication:
Given the link between belief and action, it is clear that we can
no more tolerate a diversity of religious beliefs than a diversity
of beliefs about epidemiology and basic hygiene. . . . Do we
“tolerate” these [false] beliefs [about disease spread]? Not if
they put our own health in jeopardy. . . . It is not difficult to
imagine a culture whose beliefs relative to epidemiology [the
control of disease] could systematically impose unacceptable risks on the rest of us. There is little doubt that we would
ultimately quarantine, invade, or otherwise subjugate such a
society. (pp. 46, 233)
Once again, Harris wants to launch a preemptive strike on beliefs.
This rhetoric is uncomfortably close to the “Jewish bacillus” that
infected the German body politic.46 And the dragnet will be wide.
“We have a problem with Christianity and Judaism as well [as Islam].
It is time we recognized that all reasonable men and women have a
common enemy. It is an enemy so near to us, and so deceptive, that
we keep its counsel even as it threatens to destroy the very possibility
46. David John Cawdell Irving v. Penguin Books Limited, http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.
cgi/people/i/irving.david/libel.suit/transcripts/day004.15 (accessed 17 September 2008).
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of human happiness. Our enemy is nothing other than faith itself”
(p. 131, emphasis added). His own words provide a rebuke to his species of fundamentalism:
As a man believes, so he will act. Believe that you are the member of a chosen people [the scientifically and morally enlightened], awash in the salacious exports of an evil [religiously
tolerant] culture that is turning your children away from God
[reason], believe that you will be rewarded with an eternity of
unimaginable delights [believe this is the only hope for preservation of your civilization] by dealing death to these infidels
[religious fanatics and their religiously moderate enablers]—
and flying a plane into a building [torture or extermination
of people of faith, regardless of whether they have done anything] is scarcely more than a matter of being asked to do it. It
follows, then, that certain beliefs are intrinsically dangerous.
(p. 44, emphasis in original)
Would Harris act on his theories? I hope not. But, by his logic, he
will. Or someone else will.
The frightening thing is not that Harris can drape such concepts with
the banner of reason or that he is oblivious to the self-contradiction in his
stance. That is nothing new. The frightening thing is that so many have
praised his book and that so few evangelizing atheists have decried the
totalitarian stream that runs through it.
Embracing Christianity or Western theism is not yet a thoughtcrime. But if Harris has his way, it apparently will be. All for the
greater good—Deus vult!

Still Losing the Battle . . .
Still Not Knowing It:
An Open Letter to Hank Hanegraaff
L. Ara Norwood

Review of Hank Hanegraaff. The Mormon Mirage: Seeing Through the Illusion of Mainstream Mormonism. Charlotte, NC: Christian Research Institute, 2008. 52 pp. Free with a
donation to the publisher.

The evangelical world needs to wake up and respond to contemporary Mormon scholarship. If not, we will needlessly
lose the battle without ever knowing it.1
Dear Hank:
It’s a pleasure to be writing to you. I have followed your career
over the years ever since you emerged as the heir apparent to Walter
Martin’s Christian Research Institute as the “Bible Answer Man.” I
honestly wondered whether you’d get the job over Craig Hawkins, and
I think you’ve done a decent job building on Martin’s foundation. I listen to your radio program from time to time, and I have always been
impressed with the way you calmly but earnestly articulate your views
on the air. You sound congenial most of the time, and while many of
the questions your listening audience poses to you are not often what
one could call “deep,” it’s clear you take your job very seriously in trying to offer sound answers and other resources to those who call in. I
am also impressed with the fact that, as a father of nine, you seem to
1. Carl Mosser and Paul Owen, “Mormon Scholarship, Apologetics, and Evangelical
Neglect: Losing the Battle and Not Knowing It?” Trinity Journal, n.s., 19/2 (1998): 204.
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take the idea of family very seriously, and I appreciated the 9 July 2008
blog entry you wrote entitled “The Enduring Legacy of a Father.”2 I
consider you a moral man, and a gentleman.
I have read your new publication, a booklet entitled The Mormon
Mirage. It may interest you to see how a Latter-day Saint perceives
your work on his faith. I wonder if you would consider publishing my
review in your Christian Research Journal.
Frankly, I find The Mormon Mirage rather thin, not just in terms
of size but in terms of substance. While you treat subjects as diverse
as Mormon-Evangelical relations, the Book of Mormon and other
Latter-day Saint scriptural records, priesthood, the deity of Christ,
original sin, the biblical canon, the Trinity, resurrection, the virgin
birth, salvation by grace, the millennium, temple oaths, and plural
marriage, your comments on these matters are brief—barely skimming the surface, highly one-sided, and largely inaccurate, as is often
the case with this genre of writing.
Latter-day Saints and their evangelical detractors do not usually
have a meaningful or substantive exchange. Instead, the pattern goes
like this: the critic makes all sorts of irresponsible and inaccurate
statements against Latter-day Saint teachings, all the while betraying
no clear understanding of the great conversation3 that has been going
on in Latter-day Saint circles about those same issues. The Latter-day
Saint apologist then points out the erroneous premises used by the critics in their attacks on all things Latter-day Saint and demonstrates that
the answers to the flawed and misleading claims against the restored
gospel have already been addressed, usually in print. Neither side ever
gets around to a meaningful discussion of the issues in question, as the
time is spent, at least by the average Latter-day Saint scholar, pointing
out the critic’s plethora of missteps. If the critic would take the time
to get the basics correct, a meaningful exchange could take place. All
of this demonstrates that the critic is, for the most part, mis- or unin2. http://hankhanegraaff.blogspot.com/2008/07/enduring-legacy-of-father.html
(accessed 30 July 2008).
3. For a useful discussion of the “great conversation” metaphor, see Neil Postman,
The End of Education (New York: Vintage, 1995), 124–25, 128.
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formed. Unfortunately, Hank, like your fellow critics, you appear to
manifest no real understanding of the various issues you write about,
at least from the Latter-day Saint perspective.
While I won’t take the time to respond to everything, or even
most things, you write about, for that would be tedious and unnecessary, I will comment on the first three items in your booklet. Your
publication opens with a statement by Sandra Tanner. Although
only fifty-five words in length, it is instructive for how larded with
error it is:
The Mormon church has a PR department probably better
than anybody else. And they are very careful in painting a
public image that tries to make Mormonism sound like it’s
just about the same as evangelical Christianity, but it really
isn’t. . . . I think it’s kind of similar to saying that a cat is a
dog. (p. 2)
First, a small item: she claims the church has a PR department.
The church does not, at least not by that name. She probably has
in mind its Public Affairs department. I know, a small quibble. I’ll
move on.
Second, she claims that department is “probably better than anybody else.” I assume she is trying to say that it is her view that the
Public Affairs Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints is superior to that of similar departments in other organizations. This raises several questions. What sorts of organizations does
she have in mind when she makes this comparison? Other churches?
Other nonprofit groups? Other U.S. corporations? She is unclear.
If she means other U.S. corporations, I wonder if you would agree
with her. Do you think the Public Affairs Department of the Church
of Jesus Christ is “better than” the equivalent departments of such
firms as Apple Computer, IBM, Southwest Airlines, or Procter &
Gamble? Also, in what sense does she believe the church’s Public
Affairs Department to be superior? Superior in terms of trained

178 • The FARMS Review 20/1 (2008)

staff?4 talent? budget?5 awards garnered?6 Again, one can only wonder since she gave a very vague, murky statement, one that you chose
to open your publication with. I have to wonder why you opted to
lead with her statement.7
Third, she makes the allegation that this “PR department” tries
very hard to make “Mormonism sound like it’s just about the same
as evangelical Christianity.” What evidence does she provide for this
allegation? None that I can see. And I will tell you right off that this is
erroneous.8 We Latter-day Saints do not want our church to resemble
evangelical Christianity, nor for that matter mainstream or liberal
Protestantism, Eastern Orthodoxy, or Jainism. To suggest otherwise is
to demonstrate that even after spending her entire adult life in a career
attempting to undermine my church, Sandra Tanner and those who
follow her have failed to understand us. I am not talking about agreeing with us, or acknowledging that our doctrinal positions are sound
4. The Public Affairs Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
employs about thirty-eight people in the United States. This number includes about five
secretaries. In addition, about eighteen other full-time employees work in various foreign countries. There are also another thirty or so couples who serve as Church-service
missionaries. While recent hires for this department have tended to include people with
direct experience in fields such as public affairs, advertising, or journalism, many of the
full-time staff include people who have had careers as college professors, accountants,
businessmen, medical doctors, lawyers, and computer experts; there is even a former
lobbyist and a former government analyst. Personal communication with Mark Tuttle,
18 March 2008.
5. While the operating budget of the church’s Public Affairs Department is not a
public matter, there is no advertising budget per se. Most of the budget covers the salaries
of the full-time employees; much of it covers expenditures associated with things like
luncheons hosted by the department and training materials. One can be assured that the
church’s public affairs budget does not come even remotely close to the multimilliondollar budgets of large public firms.
6. The church’s Public Affairs Department does rather good work on a shoestring
budget. Over the years it has earned several Creativity in Public Relations Awards (CIPRA),
a number of Bronze Anvil Awards, a Silver Anvil Award (the latter two bestowed by the
Public Relations Society of America), and two Golden World Awards (presented by the
International Public Relations Society), as well as several Certificates of Excellence and six
Angel Awards for excellence in broadcasting.
7. The goal of the church’s Public Affairs Department has been no secret: it is to
build relationships.
8. Perhaps this erroneous view came about after the Book of Mormon was given the
subtitle “Another Testament of Jesus Christ.”
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or even plausible. Instead I am talking about accurately assessing our
goals, motives, and identity. Hence this open letter—my attempt to
aid you in acquiring an understanding of my faith. I am not striving to persuade you that our positions are ones that you should adopt
yourself, but rather to encourage you to rethink the issues that you
currently misunderstand—and misunderstand badly.
Why on earth would the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints want the public to see it as just another evangelical denomination? What would be its motivation? We see Evangelicals as good people with a flawed theology—one that is based on the philosophies of
men mingled with scripture. We believe we possess the fulness of the
gospel of Jesus Christ along with the true priesthood authority. And
we believe your religious tradition possesses neither. So why, Hank,
would we want to present ourselves as just another evangelical sect?
We don’t. Sandra Tanner is wrong. It is a shame you chose to lead with
her feckless statement.
In saying this, I hasten to add that I come to this task with several
assumptions. For example, I assume you are an honest man and that
when you get something wrong it is an error of the head, not of the
heart. I trust that when I provide evidence that has no clear counter
evidence to refute it, you will accept, at least tentatively, the new evidence as valid and modify your views—at least for the time being.
I also believe (or hope) that you would go on the air during future
broadcasts of your radio program and correct any misinformation
that may have been published in The Mormon Mirage. I trust you will
do this because I believe that you are a fundamentally decent fellow
who tries to live a life of discipleship to our Savior Jesus Christ as you
understand him. I will be listening to future broadcasts of your radio
show to see if these assumptions of mine are correct.
To close this initial discussion of Sandra Tanner’s erroneous statement, let me clarify for you what our actual position is, in terms of
how we would like to be seen. I will give it to you in three simple
words: Christian, but different.
Christian, but different. That should be clear enough. Yes, we see
ourselves as Christian. But we do not see ourselves as Christian in the
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same sense in which you typically use the word. We do not use the word
the way you do. To you, the term Christian means one who believes in
the fundamentals of what you like to call “historic biblical Christianity.”
We think your very definition is the mirage, but I do not intend to
debate that with you. Suffice it to say that when we say we are Christian,
we are merely saying that we are partisans of Christ. We place Christ
at the center of our lives. I have no qualms about referring to you as
a Christian. But in doing so, I do not assume that all of your beliefs
represent true doctrine (though some of them certainly do). So I do not
believe that it is “true doctrine” that bestows the title of Christian on
a person—if I did, I wouldn’t consider you a Christian. Instead, what
makes one a Christian is less about correct theology (important though
that is) and more about placing Christ at the center of one’s life and also
behaving like a Christian. Why? “By this shall all men know that ye are
my disciples, if ye have love one to another” (John 13:35).
In your introductory comments, you build on Sandra Tanner’s
opening statement. That strikes me as wholly partisan and unbalanced: your words lead me to believe that understanding the Church
of Jesus Christ is not your primary interest. You appear to be highlighting what you see as doctrinal differences and then closing the door. In
other words, you do not seem interested in a balanced understanding
of my faith. For instance, you couldn’t possibly be unaware on where
we happen to agree, yet you have no interest in even admitting that
some points of commonality exist. I wonder why that is. Only you can
answer that.
While you mention Fuller Seminary president Richard Mouw’s
apology to the Mormons for regular and ongoing evangelical misstatement of our beliefs, you seem to disagree with Mouw. While you
acknowledge that “some Evangelicals have treated Mormons disrespectfully” (p. 5), you are sweeping evangelical dirty laundry under
the rug. After thirty years of being involved in various forms of interaction with Evangelicals, I think I know something about the bellicose
tendencies of most of your colleagues in the countercult movement.9
9. I’ve met them near Temple Square in Salt Lake City during our church’s worldwide general conference. They were saying and doing blasphemous things to that which I
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What I know tells me that your statement, while technically true, is
misleading. Granted, some Evangelicals who haven’t yet been influenced by the countercult movement do not have the sort of distrust,
fear, loathing, or hatred of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints that most of your listeners do. But most of those Evangelicals
who have read the sort of literature put forth by the likes of Walter
Martin, James White, Sandra Tanner, and now yourself do treat what
you refer to as “Mormonism” and Latter-day Saints in general with
varying levels of contempt and disrespect. So you are out of line or out
of touch by downplaying evangelical mistreatment of Mormons—a
continuing mistreatment that began more than a century ago. What
has my attention is your downplaying the scope of this mistreatment
rather than the mistreatment itself. You would have much more credi
bility if you would simply admit, as Mouw did, that as a general rule
most Evangelicals involved with the countercult movement have been
abrasive, acrid, sarcastic, insulting, demeaning, rude, belligerent, vindictive, and misinformed. And that’s the short list.
Whatever one may think of the efforts of Robert Millet, he does
not strive to dupe Evangelicals into believing that Mormons are Evan
gelicals; rather, he is trying a fresh approach in communicating, an
alternative to the usual and unseemly vitriol that accompanies such
dialogues. To assume Millet is trying to trick Evangelicals into believing that Mormons are Evangelicals is simply to continue not to get it.
Remember: Christian, but different.
My final response is to the comments you make about the Book of
Mormon (pp. 6–8). My initial thoughts concern your choice of words.
You chose to retell the story of Moroni and Joseph Smith and the plates
from which the Book of Mormon was translated. I would urge you, in
the future, to try to tell the story as we would tell it, using the terminology we would use. What I have in mind here is the way you describe
the interpreting device known as the Urim and Thummim. You call
that holy instrument “a pair of magical eyeglasses” (p. 7). I suspect you
consider highly sacred. When you’ve got a group of people who behave in ways that cause
even zealous critics like James White to retreat in shame for fear of being associated with
such smut, you know you’ve got a serious problem on your hands.
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do this as a way of making light of a detail of a foundational story of
the Latter-day Saint faith. But it’s unnecessary and unseemly to do this.
May I suggest that in the future you take the high ground by avoiding
such cheap shots that are both undiplomatic and undignified.
You also refer to the religion founded by Joseph Smith as “Mormon
ism.” But you really ought to call this new religion by its official name,
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, if you wish to be more
accurate in your retelling of the past. The term Mormon was originally
applied to us by our enemies.
After presenting some background information, you dismiss the
Book of Mormon with a mere three paragraphs of badly reasoned
analysis. You make five points:
1. The Book of Mormon contains language that militates against
the biblical doctrine of the Trinity.
2. The Book of Mormon contains the silly notion of a man struggling to catch his breath after having his head cut off.
3. There is no archaeological support for a reformed Egyptian
language, for lands such as the land of Moron, or for Book of
Mormon peoples migrating from the ancient Near East to the
Americas.
4. The widely held Mormon belief that Native Americans are
descended from the Hebrew Lamanites has been undermined
by DNA science.
5. Whole sections of the Book of Mormon are derived directly
from the King James Version of the Bible, in spite of the fact
that the writings of Mormon and Moroni are said to predate
the King James Version by more than a thousand years.
Hank, do you honestly believe any of these five criticisms cannot
be answered, and answered decisively? Better yet, are you under the
impression that these criticisms have not been answered already? All
five of those issues, which I find deplorably weak, are easily answered.
I want to cut you some slack since you are not the “Book of Mormon
Answer Man,” but I would have assumed that someone of your stature
would offer more compelling criticisms.
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Here is why these five criticisms lack merit:
1. As to the Book of Mormon employing language about the God
head that is not Trinitarian, I would simply reply: Ignoratio elenchi!
Totally irrelevant! So what if the Book of Mormon’s teachings are not
what you consider orthodox Trinitarian? You are wrong to speak of
“the biblical doctrine of the Trinity.” There is no such doctrine taught
in the Bible. You are certainly free to preach whatever version of the
Trinity you find compelling as the supposedly correct way of conceiv
ing the oneness of the Father and the Son, but please do not pretend
this doctrine is biblical. Creedal notions of the Trinity may or may not
be true, but it is misleading to call it a biblical doctrine. Why do I say
that? Because many scholars make the case for it not being biblical.
Let me cite a number of them for you (and note that not one of these
scholars is a Latter-day Saint—in fact, all of them seem to believe in
some version of the Trinity):
The NT does not actually speak of triunity. We seek this in vain
in the triadic formulae of the NT. . . . Early Christianity itself
. . . does not yet have the problem of the Trinity in view.10
The New Testament itself is far from any doctrine of the
Trinity or of a Triune God who is three co-equal Persons of
One Nature.11
In the N.T. there is no direct suggestion of a doctrine of the
Trinity.12
The formal doctrine of the Trinity as it was defined by the
great church councils of the fourth and fifth centuries is not
to be found in the NT.13
10. Gerhard Kittel, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 1965), 3:108–9.
11. William J. Hill, The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation
(Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 1982), 27.
12. Ernest F. Scott, in An Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Vergilius Ferm (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1945), 344.
13. Harper’s Bible Dictionary (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985), 1099.
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I could have cited many more than these four statements that put your
statement in a very unfavorable light. The scholarly world claims that
the doctrine of the Trinity is not a biblical doctrine. So to denigrate
the Book of Mormon for not supporting a nonbiblical doctrine makes
no sense at all.
As an aside, I have to wonder just why you think that some understanding of the Trinity that was adopted in the fourth and subsequent
centuries ad is the correct doctrine. A look at the history of Trinitarian
formulas leaves one with evidence that the great apostasy as foretold
in scripture (Amos 8:11–12; Isaiah 24:5; 60:2–3; Acts 20:29; 2 Timothy
4:3–4; 2 Thessalonians 2:1–3) and as taught by modern prophets was
well under way.
To further show that the doctrine of the Trinity was formulated in
an environment of apostasy and darkness, I would recommend to you
a very enlightening book written by Ramsay MacMullen, Yale professor of history, entitled Voting About God in Early Church Councils.14
In it MacMullen examines what church councils were like and who
the typical bishop was that attended such councils, pointing out that
“some bishops were by their own admission ill-equipped to follow the
arguments they had to resolve.”15
Also, it is very interesting to know how these self-professed men
of God conducted themselves when things didn’t go quite their way.
According to MacMullen:
A particular proof of fervor lies also in the suffering they
are as ready to inflict as to suffer, where differences in belief
arise. This too, in its remarkable prevalence, is a novelty. In
councils, bishops are at their most ceremonious and reverent;
yet even in such a solemn setting they sometimes strike each
other or restrain by force, muzzle or shove each other, throw
about this or that object, and yell out the most savage cries for
this or that adversary to be killed in this or that cruel manner. Outside of the council chamber, they directly incite or
14. Ramsay MacMullen, Voting About God in Early Church Councils (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2006).
15. Ramsay MacMullen, Voting About God, 114.
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participate in physical acts against their adversaries, or witness such acts without protest; nor can they be heard often, or
ever, calling for an end to all the death and destruction which
darkened the streets around them.16
MacMullen concludes that shaping this Trinitarian doctrine
through the “creeds could be at least a contributing factor [to much
violence and loss of ecclesiastical authority], sometimes really the only
one, in street fights, stabbings in the church, brawls in public squares,
and general rough stuff”:
Besides, what of the tongues torn out of the mouths of bishops found to have uttered blasphemous opinions? and bishops
worked to death by a sentence to the mines? or scarred for life
by the beatings they received, sometimes a judicial flogging,
sometimes a blow from a sword that missed its mark—to be
seen on a fellow-bishop’s body, a sight to bring shivers.17
Does the formation of creedal Trinitarian doctrine sound to you like
it came through the work of the Holy Spirit, or is it more likely to have
come out of the then-fertile soil of apostasy? I think you know where
I stand on this question.
2. Your concern with a passage in Ether (15:30–31) is misguided
and based on a misreading of the text. But this is a common misunderstanding, though I would have thought that since context is
something you focus on so often on your radio show, you would have
examined the context of this passage. (Have you ever read the entire
fifteenth chapter of Ether?)
Here is the context: two warriors, Shiz and Coriantumr, are left
standing following a war of extermination. Shiz is said to have his
head cut off by Coriantumr.
And it came to pass that when Coriantumr had leaned upon
his sword, that he rested a little, he smote off the head of Shiz.
And it came to pass that after he had smitten off the head of
16. MacMullen, Voting About God, 116–17.
17. MacMullen, Voting About God, 59–60.
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Shiz, that Shiz raised up on his hands and fell; and after that
he had struggled for breath, he died. (Ether 15:30–31)
A simplistic reading suggests an absurdity. I understand that. However,
you should understand the text a bit differently.
But first an aside: Do you really think that if Joseph Smith were
astute enough to produce a volume as singular as the Book of Mormon
he’d be such a colossal dunce as to assume that a man who had just
gotten decapitated could still breathe?
Here is how the context of this passage might be understood:
Shiz and Coriantumr had been battling for a long time. They were
both exhausted. Coriantumr, in accordance with prophecy (Ether
13:20–21), got the upper hand, as an incapacitated Shiz was essentially
lying prone. While Coriantumr tried to steady himself to deliver the
deathblow with his sword, he evidently did not decapitate his foe.
Taking what was likely a wild swipe brought on by sheer exhaustion
as opposed to the pinpoint accuracy he would have employed had he
been well rested, Coriantumr may have missed his intended target of
Shiz’s neck. The blade of the sword struck perhaps about five to eight
inches above the intended target, cutting off a portion of Shiz’s head,
perhaps just above the ear. This was a deadly blow, but not a decapitation as we normally envision it. Thus Shiz, though dying, still had
much of his head intact while some of the upper portion was crushed
and/or severed. Read this way, it is entirely possible that Shiz could
have raised up on his hands and gasped for breath before giving up the
ghost.18 Therefore, the only real problem here is in the reading of this
passage, not the passage itself. Comments? Counterpoints? I’d love to
hear them.
18. Dr. Gary M. Hadfield offers this medical diagnosis: “Shiz’s death struggle illustrates the classic reflex posture that occurs in both humans and animals when the upper
brain stem (midbrain/mesencephalon) is disconnected from the brain. The extensor
muscles of the arms and legs contract, and this reflex action could cause Shiz to raise
up on his hands.” Gary M. Hadfield and John W. Welch, “The ‘Decapitation’ of Shiz,”
Insights (FARMS newsletter), November 1994, 2; BYU Studies 33 (1993): 324–25. See also
http://en.fairmormon.org/Book_of_Mormon_anachronisms/Shiz_struggles_to_breathe
(accessed 19 August 2008).
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3. You claim that there is no archaeological support for the Book
of Mormon, nor evidence for a language like reformed Egyptian. Have
you read Professor William Hamblin’s paper on this subject? I rather
doubt it. It will only take you a couple of minutes to get up to speed on
this issue. Hamblin concludes: “There are thus a number of historical
examples of Semitic or other languages being written in ‘reformed’
or modified Egyptian script; the Book of Mormon account is entirely
plausible on this point.”19
I wonder just how informed you are on the question of archaeological support for the Book of Mormon. Are you aware of the work
that has been done in the Old World, particularly on the question of
Book of Mormon place-names such as Nahom and Bountiful?20 If you
are not, one may fairly wonder how responsible it is to make such dogmatic and uninformed statements. Are you familiar with the work
of archaeologist John Clark?21 Apparently not, for his analysis brings
your dismissive disregard for the Book of Mormon with respect to
archaeological support into a very bad light. What about the work of
anthropologist John Sorenson?22 If you have not studied his work, I
would urge you to do so, for he makes a compelling case for the historical reality of the Book of Mormon.
As to your assertion that there is no evidence that Nephites,
Lamanites, or Jaredites migrated to the Americas from the Old World,
I wonder if this is a resort to a kind of legerdemain on your part. Is the
19. William J. Hamblin, “Reformed Egyptian,” Neal A. Maxwell Institute for Reli
gious Scholarship, http://maxwellinstitute.byu.edu/display.php?table=transcripts&id=36
(accessed 19 August 2008).
20. See S. Kent Brown, “New Light from Arabia on Lehi’s Trail,” in Echoes and Evi
dences of the Book of Mormon, ed. Donald W. Parry, Daniel C. Peterson, and John W.
Welch (Provo, UT: FARMS, 2002), 55–125.
21. John Clark, “Archaeology, Relics, and Book of Mormon Belief,” Journal of Book
of Mormon Studies 14/2 (2005): 38–49; available at http://farms.byu.edu/publications/
jbms/?vol=14&num=2&id=376 (accessed 19 August 2008).
22. John L. Sorenson, An Ancient American Setting for the Book of Mormon (Salt Lake
City: Deseret Book and FARMS, 1985); Images of Ancient America: Visualizing Book of
Mormon Life (Provo, UT: FARMS, 1998); and Mormon’s Map (Provo, UT: FARMS, 2000).
A massive two-volume work, Sorenson’s forthcoming magnum opus on the issue of
archaeology and the Book of Mormon will put to rest the notion that there is no archaeological support for the Book of Mormon’s truth claims.
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issue one of looking for evidence that points to exactly and only Nephites, Lamanites, and Jaredites that migrated to the Americas from the
Old World? Wouldn’t one start out by asking, more generally, if there
is evidence that various peoples migrated to the Americas from the
Old World? If you agree with that approach, then the evidence does
support the Book of Mormon, as a number of studies show.23
4. “In fact,” you assert, “in recent years the widely held Mormon
belief that Native Americans are descended from the Hebrew Laman
ites has been undermined by DNA science. Ironically, Mormon biologists, geneticists, and anthropologists acknowledge this powerful
DNA evidence that refutes the alleged historical accounts of the Book
of Mormon” (p. 8). You are simply not stating the truth here. Plenty of
Mormon scholars who are trained in the intricacies of DNA science
have said the opposite. Here are some samples:24
Michael F. Whiting: “As someone who has spent a decade
using DNA information to decipher the past, I recognize the
tentative nature of all my conclusions, regardless of whether
or not they have been based on DNA. There are some very
good scientific reasons for why the Book of Mormon is neither
easily corroborated nor refuted by DNA evidence, and current attempts to do so are based on dubious science.”25
John M. Butler: “A spiritual witness is the only way to know the
truthfulness of the Book of Mormon. Although DNA studies
have made links between Native Americans and Asians, these
23. See Steven C. Jett, “Before Columbus: The Question of Early Transoceanic Inter
influences,” BYU Studies 33/2 (1993): 245–71; and John L. Sorenson, “Ancient Voyages
Across the Ocean to America: From ‘Impossible’ to ‘Certain,’ ” Journal of Book of Mormon
Studies 14/1 (2005): 4–17.
24. For a compilation of recent scholarship on this issue, see The Book of Mormon and
DNA Research: Essays from “The FARMS Review” and the “Journal of Book of Mormon
Studies,” ed. Daniel C. Peterson (Provo, UT: Neal A. Maxwell Institute for Religious
Scholarship, 2008).
25. Michael F. Whiting, “DNA and the Book of Mormon: A Phylogenetic Perspective,”
Journal of Book of Mormon Studies 12/1 (2003): 24–35. Whiting earned his PhD at Cornell
University, is director of Brigham Young University’s DNA Sequencing Center, and is
currently an associate professor in BYU’s Department of Integrative Biology.
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studies in no way invalidate the Book of Mormon despite the
loud voices of detractors.”26
Ryan Parr: “There will always be those who must have every
detail before them prior to any acceptance of truth. This view
always generates a cascade of doubt that ends in an appeal
to the secular judge of science; however, in this particular
instance, the insistence that the presence of small groups from
the ancient Near East must absolutely be present in the current genetic record of Native Americans, as a means of testing the authenticity of the Book of Mormon, is an unrealistic
expectation.”27
David A. McClellan: “Although it may be possible to recover
the genetic signature of a small migrating family from 2,600
years ago, it is not probable. But either way, it would not allow
the story line of the Book of Mormon to be rejected because
the absence of a genetic signature means absolutely nothing.
. . . Thus, a statement that the Book of Mormon account is
absolutely impossible would be at the very least naïve, but most
probably quite foolish. It would reveal the overall absence of
scientific training, as well as an underlying agenda.”28
26. John M. Butler, “A Few Thoughts from a Believing DNA Scientist,” Journal of
Book of Mormon Studies 12/1 (2003): 36–37. Butler earned his doctoral degree in chemistry from the University of Virginia, is the author of eighty research articles and book
chapters on human DNA, and in 2002 was awarded the Presidential Early Career Award
for Scientists and Engineers from President George W. Bush for his work in pioneering
modern forensic DNA testing.
27. Ryan Parr, “Missing the Boat to Ancient America . . . Just Plain Missing the
Boat,” review of Losing a Lost Tribe: Native Americans, DNA, and the Mormon Church,
by Simon G. Southerton, FARMS Review 17/1( 2005): 83–106. Parr earned his PhD in
biological anthropology from the University of Utah and is currently vice president of
Research and Development at Genesis Genomics, a Canadian biotechnical company
exploring the use of mitochondrial DNA as a “biosensor” for the early detection of prostate and breast cancer. He has authored and coauthored mitochondrial DNA studies of
Native Americans, specializing in ancient DNA.
28. David A. McClellan, “Detecting Lehi’s Genetic Signature: Possible, Probable,
or Not?” FARMS Review 15/2 (2003): 35–90. McClellan earned his PhD at Louisiana
State University and is an assistant professor of integrative biology at Brigham Young
University.
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I hasten to point out that all the statements I have quoted here are
summary statements that come at the end of very detailed and scholarly essays.
Yet I think it telling that the statement you made about DNA,
which you probably know little about since you are not a scientist,
reveals something about the nature of your overall commentary on
my faith. It reveals that you often say things that are, frankly, irresponsible. I would hope that as you continue your ministry you would
grow more circumspect and less cavalier in your pronouncements on
Latter-day Saint matters. The simple fact is this: had you done the requisite study and analysis of the issues regarding DNA science and the
Book of Mormon, you would not have made the claims you did. I hope
you will recant them.
5. Your fifth criticism concerns the language of the Book of Mor
mon. You write: “A final crack in the credibility of the Book of Mormon
is that whole sections are derived directly from the King James Version
of the Bible—this despite the fact that the writings of Moroni and his
father, Mormon, are said to predate the King James Version by more
than a thousand years” (p. 8, emphasis in original).
Hank, I wish you could have been more clear. Since you didn’t
give a single example to support your claim, I am forced to try to read
your mind, something I prefer not to do.
Perhaps you are referring to the various Isaiah passages that
are found in the Book of Mormon (e.g., 1 Nephi 20–21; 2 Nephi
12–24). If so, your claim has no merit. All one has to do to reach that
conclusion is to consider the fact that the Book of Mormon story
includes a narrative of Lehi’s family obtaining an early version of
the Old Testament (as found on the brass plates of Laban discussed
in 1 Nephi 3 and 4). So if this is part of the Book of Mormon story,
which it is, why do you not see that there is no particular problem
with reproducing whole sections of the Isaiah portions of the King
James Version in the Book of Mormon? These passages didn’t originate with Mormon and Moroni.
Perhaps you are referring to the Sermon on the Mount passages
that are found in the Book of Mormon (see 3 Nephi 12–14). If so,
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again, your claim has no merit since the Book of Mormon includes
a narrative of the resurrected Savior Jesus Christ appearing to the
Nephite faithful and delivering essentially that same sermon found
in Matthew 5–7. So there is no particular problem with this kind of
duplication. These passages didn’t originate with Mormon or Moroni
either.29
Perhaps what concerns you is the very nature of King James idiom
within the pages of the Book of Mormon. If so, your argument might
be stated as follows: “The Book of Mormon is false because Mormon
and Moroni, who spoke no Elizabethan English, use Elizabethan
English throughout the Book of Mormon.” I hope I am not creating
a straw-man argument here, but you force me to make some assumptions about your point of view since your argument needs clarification. If this is essentially your point, it’s a terrible argument to put
forth because no thinking Mormon would claim that either Mormon
or Moroni employed English of any era, let alone Elizabethan English.
The English text of the Book of Mormon is the result of Joseph
Smith’s translation—a process of which we know very little. The King
James–like language we read in the English translation of the Book of
Mormon is just that—a translation. It in no way is meant to suggest
that any Nephite prophet used such language. Thus I do not see why
you make such a fuss about the fact that the Book of Mormon employs
an idiom in line with the King James Bible. That was considered the
scriptural language of Joseph Smith’s day; I would have been surprised
if the translation had come out differently.
Finally, you write, “Little wonder, then, that Mormons accept the
testimony of Moroni . . . based on a subjective feeling—a ‘burning
in the bosom’—rather than on history and evidence” (p. 8). Do you
really want your constituency to believe that divine truths can be
decided strictly on the basis of “history and evidence”? Do you truly
29. See John W. Welch, The Sermon at the Temple and the Sermon on the Mount (Salt
Lake City: Deseret Book and FARMS, 1990). See especially pages 161–63, where Welch
discusses the absence of the phrase without a cause in 3 Nephi 12:22a; compare Matthew
5:22a. This same phrase, while present in the KJV, is absent from many if not most of the
earliest Greek manuscripts. So much for the charge of blind plagiarism on the part of the
Prophet Joseph Smith.
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not understand that “evidence” is in the eyes of the beholder and what
constitutes one man’s “evidence” is another man’s “wishful thinking”?
And the same goes for history: do you not realize that what passes for
“history” in some circles would be called “myth” in others?
Let me pose a question to you: when two of the New Testament
disciples were walking on the road to Emmaus along with Jesus (who
was incognito at the time), what was the ultimate source of their testimony? Was it history and evidence as you use those terms? Here
is what the New Testament records: “And they said one to another,
Did not our heart burn within us, while he talked with us by the way,
and while he opened to us the scriptures?” (Luke 24:32). In other
words, the final deciding factor for these two early disciples was an
inner conviction, born of the Holy Ghost, that brought them truth.
The New Testament language (“Did not our heart burn within us”) is
not too different from the language of latter-day scripture as found in
Doctrine and Covenants 9:8: “I will cause that your bosom shall burn
within you; therefore, you shall feel that it is right.”
Likewise, it was the Holy Spirit, not man’s logic and reason, nor
evidence and history, that brought truth to the early apostles when
deciding on a question involving circumcision for gentile converts:
“For it seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us, to lay upon you no
greater burden than these necessary things” (Acts 15:28). And also, in
the case of Peter’s testimony concerning the divine sonship of Jesus,
the source of such testimony was not of man (as history and evidence
is) but from a divine source: “And Jesus answered and said unto him,
Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jona: for flesh and blood hath not revealed
it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven” (Matthew 16:17).
Hank, the Latter-day Saints do not ignore evidence, history, logic,
reason, or other forms of education and learning, even when it is secular in origin. However, while we keep a passport to Athens, we understand our citizenship lies with Jerusalem. I think I have some idea as
to why you tend to discount the notion of someone receiving special
revelation from the Holy Spirit. I suspect that since the Bible is the
only source you have (and thus the only source you believe you need),
you tend to assume that since you do not receive divine revelation
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from the Holy Ghost, then no one else possibly can. If indeed this is
how you feel, ironically it has far more in common with atheism than
it does with theism. Atheists typically think in similar terms: they
deny divine things because they are not part of their world.
Hank, I would invite you to take a second look at the teachings
and practices and scriptures of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints. I believe if you were to really examine what it is we teach
with a fresh curiosity and a true desire to understand, I think you
would do a much more credible job the next time you decide to publish something about the faith of the Saints. Unlike the nearly fact-free
tract you have published, I would hope that with more inquisitiveness
and less of an agenda, you would produce something that is not quite
so honeycombed with misstatements and instead produce something
fresh, distinctive, and instructive.
Warm regards,
L. Ara Norwood

Deification: Fulness and Remnant

Tom Rosson

Review of Daniel A. Keating. Deification and Grace. Naples, FL: Sapientia Press, 2007. ix +
142 pp., with bibliography, index, and scripture index. $25.95.

While often misunderstood in or eclipsed by various theological traditions of modern provenance, deification stands at
the very center of the Christian faith and constitutes the surpassing goal toward which the Christian life is directed.1

O

ne of the most controversial aspects of the restoration of the
gospel was the bold declaration by Joseph Smith and numerous later prophets that human beings may eventually become gods.
President John Taylor grounded this amazing truth in the incarnation
and atonement of our Savior Jesus Christ:
A man, as a man, could arrive at all the dignity that a man was
capable of obtaining or receiving; but it needed a God to raise
him to the dignity of a God. For this cause it is written, “Now
are we the sons of God; and it doth not yet appear what we shall
be: but we know that when he shall appear we shall be like him”
[1 John 3:2]. And how and why like Him? Because, through the
instrumentality of the atonement and the adoption, it is made
possible for us to become of the family of God, and joint heirs
1. Reinhard Hütter, quoted in Keating, Deification and Grace, back cover.
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with Jesus Christ; and that as He, the potential instrument,
through the oneness that existed between Him and His Father,
by reason of obedience to divine law, overcame death, hell and
the grave, and sat down upon His Father’s throne, so shall we
be able to sit down with Him, even upon His throne. Thus, as
it is taught in the Book of Mormon, it must needs be that there
be an infinite atonement [2 Nephi 9:7]; and hence of Him, and
by Him, and through Him are all things; and through Him do
we obtain every blessing, power, right, immunity, salvation and
exaltation. He is our God, our Redeemer, our Savior, to whom,
with the Father and the Holy Spirit, be eternal and everlasting
praises worlds without end.2
Daniel Keating, an associate professor of theology at Sacred Heart
Major Seminary in Michigan, offers a comprehensive presentation
of deification based on the Bible and the views of the early church
fathers. He discusses the most overt references to deification in the
Bible and does an excellent job of tying together Christ’s incarnation
with deification. This linkage, vital to the proper understanding of deification, is present throughout the Bible and in the words of the early
church fathers and numerous Latter-day Saint leaders. Keating argues
that historic Christianity simply must include the fundamental truth
expressed so cogently by Irenaeus, a late-second-century bishop: “Our
Lord Jesus Christ, who did, through His transcendent love, become
what we are, that He might bring us to be even what He is Himself.”3
Keating then sets out the clear implications of this teaching.
Evidences from the Bible and Early Church Fathers
After setting the stage for his topic, Keating begins making his
case for deification with a chapter entitled “The Graced Exchange:
2. John Taylor, The Mediation and Atonement of Jesus Christ (1882; repr., Heber
City, UT: Archive Publishers, 2000), 145–46.
3. Irenaeus, Against Heresies 5, preface, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. Alexander
Roberts and James Donaldson (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994), 1:526; quoted in
Keating, Deification and Grace, 12. Unless noted otherwise, the capitalization in patristic
quotations follows Ante-Nicene Fathers and Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers.
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Redeemed Humanity in Christ.” Some of the most clear and earliest
expressions of what Keating calls the “exchange formula” are from
Irenaeus—for example, “For it was for this end that the Word of God
was made man, and He who was the Son of God became the Son
of man, that man, having been taken into the Word, and receiving
the adoption, might become the son of God.”4 In the third century,
Clement of Alexandria wrote that “the Word of God became man,
that you may learn from man how man may become God.”5 Keating
offers numerous other examples of this exchange formula as found in
patristic writings.6
The exchange formula has its roots, however, in Paul’s second letter
to the Corinthians: “For you know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ,
that for your sake he became poor, though being rich, so that by his poverty you may become rich” (8:9).7 Keating goes on to explain that
the Fathers justifiably read this text in the light of Philippians
2:5–11. On this reading, “being rich” (2 Cor 8:9) is equivalent to
“being in the form of God” (Phil 2:6)—and the present tense of
the participle in both verses underscored for the Fathers that the
4. Irenaeus, Against Heresies 3.19.1, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, 1:448; quoted in Keating,
Deification and Grace, 11.
5. Irenaeus, Exhortation to the Heathen 1, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, 2:174; quoted in
Keating, Deification and Grace, 12.
6. Among the early Christian fathers cited by Keating are Athanasius of Alexandria,
Of the Incarnation of the Word, sec. 54, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip
Schaff, 2nd ser. (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994); Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 1.5, in
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 2nd ser., 7:203; Gregory of Nyssa, Against Apollinaris 11;
John Chrysostom, Homily 11.1, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff, 1st
ser. (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994), 14:38; Hilary of Poitiers, On the Trinity 10.7, in
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 2nd ser., 9:183–84; Ambrose of Milan, Of the Holy Spirit
1.9.107, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 2nd ser., 10:107; and Augustine of Hippo, On the
Gospel of St. John 12.8. Keating also draws on Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification
in the Greek Patristic Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), and on the
original French edition (1942) of Hans Urs von Balthasar, Presence and Thought: Essay on
the Religious Philosophy of Gregory of Nyssa, trans. Mark Sebanc (San Francisco: Ignatius
Press, 1995), in his discussion of the fundamental nature of the exchange formula in the
conception of deification.
7. This is Keating’s translation. It is worth noting that Mark the Ascetic and Gregory
of Nazianzus specifically use this verse and the idea of being rich vs. poor in connection
with human deification.
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Son of God remained God and retained his riches, even in the act
of emptying himself and becoming poor. Indeed, the exchange
at the heart of both these texts makes no sense if Christ, in his
condescension, loses the very thing he came to bring us. In the
same way, “he became poor” is equivalent to “emptied himself
. . . was born . . . and became obedient to death” (Phil 2:7–8). It
is shorthand for Christ’s Incarnation, passion, and death. But
the key difference between the two texts appears at this point.
In Philippians 2, the climax reached is the exaltation of the Son
himself in his resurrection and enthronement as Lord above
all creatures. In 2 Corinthians 8, the climactic result is our
enrichment. By means of the Son’s humbling of himself, we are
enriched with his own riches.8
Keating cites many biblical verses that point less directly to the
exchange formula. “But when the fullness of time had come, God sent
forth his Son, born from woman, born under the Law, to redeem those
under the Law, so that we might receive adoption as sons” (Galatians
4:4–5). Keating points out that one of Augustine’s exchange formula
statements, “The Son of God made Son of man, that He might make
the sons of men the sons of God,”9 is quite similar to that passage from
Galatians.
Keating also cites Romans 8:14–17, 29 and links these verses to
Galatians 4. He discusses the role of the Holy Spirit in “sonship/adoption.” Also highlighted is the significance of the familiar term Abba
(“Daddy”) used to refer to our Father in Heaven in both Romans 8:15
and Galatians 4:6. Keating stresses Romans 8:29:
8. Keating, Deification and Grace, 16–17. Two points here seem important. First,
the Book of Mormon, paralleling Keating, makes it clear that Christ’s “emptying” does
not result in lack of divinity. See John Taylor’s use of 2 Nephi 9:7 in the text above. Alma
34:12 also supports this view. Second, Latter-day Saints do not embrace the two-nature
Christology of Chalcedon, as Keating does. Instead, the incarnation was a “kenotic emptying” illustrated by the passage referenced here (Philippians 2:5–11); but as some Latterday Saints point out, this emptying was not such that Christ did not possess divinity
during the incarnation.
9. Augustine of Hippo, On the Gospel of St. John 21.1; quoted in Keating, Deification
and Grace, 14.
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The conclusion to this section (Rom 8:29–30) points to the
goal of our sonship in Christ: we are to be “conformed to the
image of his Son” [Romans 8:29]. God’s purpose in sending
the Son is that we be made like the Son. This notion is reinforced in 2 Corinthians 3:18, where Paul speaks about our
being transformed into his “image” from one degree of glory
to another. How, then, has Christ enriched us? By assuming
our humanity and redeeming us in and through that humanity, he has given us adoption as sons of God through the Holy
Spirit, for the purpose of transforming us to be made progressively into the image of the Son himself. (p. 18)
Unmentioned here, but significant, is that elsewhere Paul uses the same
word translated as “image” (eikon) to describe the Son: “lest the light
of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine
unto them” (2 Corinthians 4:4). If Christ, the image of his Father, is
embraced as divine and not as a weak copy of God, would men remade
into the “image of Christ” likewise not be weak copies?
First John 3:1–2 illustrates an important aspect of our progression
to deification. Keating tells us that Christians are in this life sons of
God but that upon resurrection we will be more. “We are to be sons
and daughters who are like the Son. But here, the fullness of transformation is reserved for the age to come. We are God’s children now, but
we will (somehow) become ‘like’ the Son in a much more profound
way when the Son appears in his glory” (p. 18).
The final biblical concept used by Keating to illustrate the ex
change formula is the idea of Christ as the Second Adam. The concept of image is again used to illustrate what we are and what we will
become. “The first man is of the earth, earthy: the second man is the
Lord from heaven. As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy:
and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. And as
we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image
of the heavenly” (1 Corinthians 15:47–49). Like John, Paul sees our
final transformation as occurring in the resurrection (vv. 51–52). This
biblical concept of our post-resurrection divinity being more than our
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mortal sonship supports the idea that our final, deified state is more
than we can see even as devoted, but mortal, followers of Christ.
This passage from Keating nicely summarizes the above points:
Though other biblical texts could be called upon for support,
the key texts on exchange and sonship (2 Cor 8:9; Gal 4:4–6;
Rom 8:14–17, 29; 1 Jn 3:1–2), in conjunction with Christ as
the New Adam and our transformation into his image (Rom
5:12–21; 1 Cor 15:44–49; 2 Cor 3:18; Eph 1:10), provide the primary biblical foundation and framework for the formula that
the Son of God became as we are so that we might become as
he is. (p. 20)
In the next section, “Redeemed Humanity in Christ,” we read
these words from Cyril of Alexandria:
It was not otherwise possible for man, being of a nature which
perishes, to escape death, unless he recovered that ancient
grace, and partook once more of God who holds all things
together in being and preserves them in life through the Son
in the Spirit. Therefore his only-begotten Word has become a
partaker of flesh and blood (Heb 2:14), that is, he has become
man, though being Life by nature, and begotten of the Life
that is by nature, that is, of God the Father, so that, having
united himself with the flesh which perishes according to the
law of its own nature . . . he might restore it to his own life
and render it through himself a partaker of God the Father.
. . . And he wears our nature, refashioning it to his own life.
And he himself is also in us, for we have all become partakers
of him, and have him in ourselves through the Spirit. For this
reason we have become “partakers of the divine nature” (2 Pet
1:4), and are reckoned as sons, and so too have in ourselves the
Father himself through the Son.10
10. Keating, Deification and Grace, 21. Keating bases his translation of Cyril of
Alexandria, Commentary on John 14:20, on P. E. Pusey, ed., Sancti patris nostri Cyrilli
archiepiscopi Alexandrini in e. Joannis evangelium (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1872),
2:485–86.
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The parallels between Cyril’s words here and John Taylor’s are striking. It is in and through Christ that we are deified to a form of oneness
with God the Father and his Son. Less explicit for Cyril and more
explicit for John Taylor is that when the exchange formula speaks of
Christ becoming man, it really refers to the totality of Christ’s mortal
ministry: incarnation, atonement, and resurrection.
In Keating’s chapter “Christ as Both Human and Divine,” the
Latter-day Saint reader should recognize that through the decisions
of the first four councils culminating in Chalcedon, the Roman
Catholics defined Jesus Christ as a possessor of two natures hypo
statically united into one person. For those who reject the distinction
between God nature and human nature in Jesus of Nazareth, this section of Keating’s book will be less directly significant. Still, Keating’s
conclusion on this point is powerful:
We are now in a position to return to the formula of exchange
with greater clarity about what this expression means. By
asserting that “the Son of God became the Son of Man, so that
the sons of men might become the sons of God,” the Fathers
were attempting to sum up the scriptural testimony concerning our redemption. Christ, by virtue of his divine-human constitution and by means of his saving actions, is the center and
locus of that redemption. He is the Second Adam who renews
our nature in himself, thus inaugurating a new humanity, and
breathes his Spirit into us, causing us to be adopted as sons and
daughters of the Father. By means of the indwelling of God,
we are set on a course in which we freely cooperate, to be conformed to the image of the Son (Rom 8:29). It is only in the life
of the age to come that this transformation will be completed,
and we shall see him as he is (1 Jn 3:2). This account of our
redemption embraces the full expanse of the biblical narrative,
from Adam to Christ, and the glory that awaits us in the new
creation. It incorporates the victory of Christ over the enemies
and ills that beset the human race: the power of indwelling sin,
the slavery of the devil, and the curse of death on our nature.
And it is both Christocentric and Trinitarian: The Father sends
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his Son in our fallen humanity, to redeem the human race and
to win for us adoptive sonship through the Spirit. (p. 28)
Keating makes a case for the God-man Christ lifting the faithful to
become man-gods like Christ. I will later examine a short excerpt
from the Council of Chalcedon that would seem to suggest that even
while embracing a dual-nature Christology, the witness of the Bible
and the early church fathers points us to some form of dual-natured,
deified man.
As Keating introduces three biblical passages with powerful deification language, he mentions the limits he will place upon man’s final
deified state as he envisions it within Catholic theology. Still, Keating
makes a strong case with these passages. To the student of deification
these are quite familiar:
I have said, Ye are gods; and all of you are children of the most
High. (Psalm 82:6)
Jesus answered them, Is it not written in your law, I said, Ye
are gods? If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God
came, and the scripture cannot be broken. (John 10:34–35)
Whereby are given unto us exceeding great and precious
promises: that by these ye might be partakers of the divine
nature, having escaped the corruption that is in the world
through lust. (2 Peter 1:4)
Keating observes that there is a “longstanding judgment that both the
language and the concept of deification were foreign intrusions into the
Christian faith from the world of Greek philosophy and the mystery
religions of the ancient world” (p. 16). He rejects this opinion, demonstrating that the Christian fathers began with the language of exchange
but moved to the biblical language of deification and other terms possibly chosen because they were not the common pagan terms.
Psalm 82:6 has an interesting place in the discussion of deification.
Critics of deification frequently claim that this passage has interesting
vocabulary but cannot be viewed as advocating deification. Keating
links this passage to John 10:34–35 and concludes that the fathers
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“believed themselves warranted to identify as ‘gods’ those who are ‘the
sons of God’ through Christ” (p. 31). Keating also quotes Carl Mosser
as arguing that “the patristic citation of Psalm 82:6 was not an ex post
facto attempt to provide warrant for alien terminology imported into
the Christian tradition by well-meaning Hellenizers.”11 He further
agrees with Mosser that “it was precisely the Christian adaptation of
this Psalm, very probably building on an earlier Jewish exegesis, that
ushered in the practice of identifying Christians as ‘gods’ ” (p. 33).
Keating then discusses 2 Peter 1:4 from a few different angles. He
notes that the Christian fathers sometimes drew upon this verse while
discussing deification but that this passage did not have a foundational
role in forming the language of deification in the early church.
To conclude this chapter, Keating points out that he has shown that
the “Graced Exchange” and deification language in general is “biblically grounded in key texts that point to our filial adoption in Christ
through the Spirit (2 Cor 8:9; Gal 4:4–6; Rom 8:14–17, 29; 1 John 3:1–2).”
He continues:
I have argued that the terminology of deification is rooted in,
and is confirmed by, key biblical texts that are interpreted in
the Fathers, and in the subsequent tradition, exactly in accord
with the account of our redemption summed up in the formula of exchange. The Fathers began to employ the vocabulary
of deification not because of a flirtation with Greek thought
and religion, but primarily in the interest of defending and
explaining the biblical record against what they perceived to
be distortions. It is noteworthy that—upon examination of the
key texts—the terminology of deification is typically found in
contexts where the Fathers are defending and explaining the
full divinity of the Son and the Spirit (and so, the doctrine of
the Trinity) and the Incarnation of the Son. (p. 38)
11. Carl Mosser, “The Earliest Patristic Interpretation of Psalm 82, Jewish Ante
cedents, and the Origins of Christian Deification,” Journal of Theological Studies, n.s., 56
(2005): 58; quoted in Keating, Deification and Grace, 33.

204 • The FARMS Review 20/1 (2008)

Keating’s next chapter, “Receiving the Divine Life,” explores the
link between three Roman Catholic sacraments (baptism, confirmation,
and the Eucharist) and deification. Latter-day Saints have similar cove
nantal ordinances typically called baptism, the gift of the Holy Ghost,
and the sacrament.12 He begins his discussion by answering a question,
“How do we receive divine life and become deified in Christ?”
The shorthand answer often given by the Fathers of the Church
is that we can be deified only through God’s direct agency,
and more specifically, through God himself dwelling actively
and effectively within us. The argument they employ—used
repeatedly to demonstrate the full divinity of the Son and the
Spirit—is that only God can properly sanctify and deify. No
creature can accomplish this. It is only through the effective
indwelling of the Son and the Spirit that human beings are
regenerated, sanctified, adopted as children of God, and deified. This is a most crucial point. If we fail to grasp it, we will
misunderstand the heart of what deification is.13
It is interesting to note that the deification of men through Christ
was used to defend the full divinity of Christ. Deification was often
12. Noel B. Reynolds, in his essay “The Decline of Covenant in Early Christian
Thought,” published in Noel B. Reynolds, ed., Early Christians in Disarray: Contemporary
LDS Perspectives on the Christian Apostasy (Provo, UT: FARMS and BYU Press, 2005),
295–324, directly points to the similarities between (1) early church sacraments as a
means for God’s pouring out of grace upon men and (2) the Latter-day Saint, Jewish, and
possibly the very early church practice of making two-way covenants. Although Latterday Saint covenants are not devoid of God’s graced gifts to men who imperfectly live
up to their part of the agreement, and although Catholic sacraments are not devoid of a
human component, the general distinction is worth noting.
13. Keating, Deification and Grace, 39–40. Keating’s point about deification through
uniting with God is quite clear in patristic writings. While Latter-day Saints typically
do not use the same communion wording that the early church fathers did, the ideas put
forth by President John Taylor (in the quotation linked to footnote 2 above) and exemplified in the scriptural passage “that they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I
in thee, that they also may be one in us” (John 17:21) do point to this. Latter-day Saints
are somewhat uncomfortable with the metaphysical unity of the Trinity, but the oneness
enjoyed by Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is the oneness in which we are called to participate. Later Keating will explain that the metaphysical unity of the Trinity is not in fact the
same as the oneness that deified humans enjoy with God.
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mentioned as an accepted truth from which to defend other aspects of
the gospel from challenges like Arianism, the heretical doctrine that
Christ is not of the same substance as the Father.
There are clearly differences in the way the Roman Catholic sacraments and Latter-day Saint ordinances are viewed, but Keating’s observations serve as a reminder of how important baptism, confirmation/
gift of the Holy Ghost, and the Lord’s Supper are to Christians. For the
early church, as well as for modern Catholics and Latter-day Saints,
these practices should be viewed as an indispensable part of the path
God offers for his children’s ultimate return to him and deification.
The chapter “Transformed into His Image” begins with an excellent summary:
The topic of human progress in deification is vast, encompassing far more terrain than a summary study of deification such
as this could possibly cover. Under the heading “progress in
deification” one could include topics such as holiness, freedom,
prayer, the theological virtues (faith, hope, and love), the fruit
of the Holy Spirit, and more broadly all that concerns our communion with God and our ethical responsibility as disciples of
Christ in the world. While acknowledging that all these subjects (and more) pertain to our growth in deification, I will
focus more narrowly on three foundational truths concerning
our progress in the divine life granted to us through Christ in
the Spirit. First, all progress in deification—in its various mani
festations—is grounded in divine grace and the prior indwelling of God. Second, the New Testament presents us with—and
beckons us to—transformation into full maturity in the image
of Christ, expressed especially by faith, hope, and love. Third,
our progress in deification has a baptismal and Eucharistic
shape. We are called to share progressively in the communion
of Christ’s suffering, death, and resurrection. These aspects of
our deification have been selected because they help us to see
the continuity in our path to deification from its beginnings to
maturity in this life. (p. 63)
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A few points in the above summary should be highlighted to a greater
extent. Keating’s discussion of two different readings of the scriptures
that were prevalent in the early church identifies a moral/tropological
reading (i.e., how we ought to live) and an allegorical/Christological
reading (i.e., who Christ is and what his work is) (p. 65). The point
should be made that the moral reading considered the imitation of,
and even the transformation into, what Christ is to be a major theme
of the New Testament. In addition, both readings reflect underlying
themes of the New Testament. Moreover, those who reject the doctrine of deification seem to emphasize the message that Christ is the
manifestation of his Father while neglecting the clear message that
we are to become through grace what Christ is as we strive to live in
imitation of him. To become like Christ, one must know him—that
is, know of his great love implicit in his redemptive mission. Thus “we
love him, because he first loved us” (1 John 4:19).
Keating next revisits the idea of humankind transforming into
the image of Christ (2 Corinthians 3:18; Romans 8:28–29). He then
discusses the similarities and possible differences in the terms image
and likeness. However, it appears that none of the early Christian
fathers utilized these terms to suggest that we are weakly remade into
what Christ is.
The Western theological tradition, following Augustine, has
typically understood “image” and “likeness” to be roughly
synonymous terms. The patristic witness to the other side of
this issue—that the terms “image” and “likeness” refer to distinguishable aspects of the divine work in us—begins with
Irenaeus, and is developed by authorities such as Clement of
Alexandria, Evagrius, Diadochus, and Maximus the Con
fessor. According to this view, “image” refers to what is given
in creation and not lost in the Fall, while “likeness” typically
describes what the human race lost in the Fall, and what we
progressively attain as we cooperate with the grace of God in
Christ. (pp. 72–73)
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Keating goes on to discuss growth toward Christ while emphasizing moral virtue, the place of prayer, and even suffering in the life of
the Christian. He also underscores our dependence on the work of
Christ.
It is because we have been born anew as sons and daughters of God and are partakers of the divine nature that we
can make progress in godly virtue. Here it will be helpful to
employ a distinction, found in Augustine and developed in
Leo the Great, between Christ as sacramentum (“mystery”)
and Christ as exemplum (“model”). As sacramentum, Christ
himself accomplishes the work of salvation, cleanses us from
sin, and joins us to the Father. As exemplum Christ provides
the model for how we are to live in him. Leo sums up this
double dependence on Christ by stating that “we cannot come
to Christ except by Christ,” showing that our imitation of him
is necessarily founded on our redemption in him. Because
Christ has assumed our nature and redeemed it in himself,
and given us a participation in him, we can now “put on” the
qualities of that new nature in imitation of Christ himself. In
this we are active, putting into practice by the grace of Christ
the new way of life in Christ. (p. 81)
In addition, Keating neatly summarizes what is meant by “progress in deification”:
It means that we are to become progressively like Christ,
transformed into the image of the one who is the very image
of God. The more we become conformed to the image of
Christ, the more we are like our Father in heaven (Mt 5:48).
We are to become holy as he is holy (1 Pet 1:15). It means that
we are to grow into mature sons and daughters of God, living
a life more and more characterized by the virtues of Christ
himself, especially faith, hope, and love. “Therefore be imitators of God, as beloved children. And walk in love, as Christ
loved us and gave himself up for us, a fragrant offering and
sacrifice to God” (Eph 5:1–2). Through our abiding in Christ
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and our increasing likeness to him, we are to be fruitful as the
Father intended us to be (Jn 15:8). (p. 87)
The concise and powerful exegesis Keating offers of the biblical and
early church teachings on deification was one of the two motivators for
this review. Keating clearly lays out a very powerful biblical case for the
deification of man. That we are to become as Christ is the message of the
New Testament. This message within the early church was even clearer
than the message that Christ was God, but this is also revealed in the
New Testament and embraced by the early church. Keating included a
great deal more from the early church fathers than is reproduced here,
but most of the scriptural references have been addressed. It is clear that
the doctrine of deification is central to the New Testament, and it is
those who deny it that have departed from the biblical witness.
Limits of Human Deification
Keating embraces a “limited deification,” insisting that human
“nature” cannot become the same as God’s “nature.” While aspects of
his view of deification are powerful, he is unwilling to fully embrace
the second half of the great exchange: “The Son became man that we
might become gods” (p. 12). Keating skillfully develops the case for
deification but refuses to go to the logical conclusion, as was the case
historically when developed theology replaced a biblical (and original)
understanding of humankind’s final destiny.
“We have now examined in some detail,” Keating writes at the
outset of chapter 5,
the meaning of deification according to the “formula of exchange” (admirabile commercium): how Christ has redeemed
and deified our nature in himself (chapter two); how we have
become “sons” and “gods” by receiving new life through the
effective indwelling of God (chapter three); and how we make
progress in the divine life through transformation into the
image of Christ (chapter four). It is now time to return to a
question that was posed at the start: Does the doctrine of deification, by means of its elevated and potentially exaggerated
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rhetoric, effectively compromise the fundamental distinction
between God and the created order, and so lead explicitly or
implicitly to a form of pantheism? To restate the question
against the backdrop of contemporary religious movements:
Doesn’t the notion of deification play into the hands of those
religious movements that claim, “you yourself are God,” and
so refuse to recognize any sovereign and transcendent God
deserving of our worship and obedience? The answer given by
the Christian tradition is a resounding “No.” (p. 91)
Keating then claims that these concerns are not new and that this has
been addressed from the beginning. He then turns to Irenaeus (d. ca.
ad 202), Athanasius (d. ca. ad 373), and others.
The term gods, when used by those who discuss deification today,
creates concerns for both those who deny deification and those who
take the biblical witness seriously. The Bible itself does not shun the
word gods. There clearly are examples of this plurality within the
Old and New Testaments,14 but there are also “God is one” statements throughout the Bible and the other Latter-day Saint scriptures. Keating suggests that concern for the oneness of God is reason
to be leery of the human deification. Among the church fathers, this
same concern was most apparent when they addressed the question
of the divinity (or lack of divinity) present within Jesus of Nazareth.
The “solution” to this plurality of deities in the early church was
eventually the doctrine of the Trinity as set forth in the ecumenical
creeds, where the word homoousian is employed to explain that God
the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit were “one God.”
Those discussing deification concerned themselves with the plurality of gods primarily in connection with the divinity of Christ and
not in connection with human deification.
14. There are numerous publications on a “divine council” and other concepts within
the Bible that point to a plurality of gods. The FARMS Review 19/1 had three essays on
this: “You’ve Seen One Elohim, You’ve Seen Them All? A Critique of Mormonism’s Use
of Psalm 82,” by Michael S. Heiser (an Evangelical scholar); “ ‘Ye Really Are Gods’: A
Response to Michael Heiser concerning the LDS Use of Psalm 82 and the Gospel of John,”
by David E. Bokovoy; and “Israel’s Divine Council, Mormonism, and Evangelicalism:
Clarifying the Issues and Directions for Future Study,” by Michael S. Heiser.
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The claim that the early church fathers were concerned with preserving the distinction between God and the created order is more complex than the plurality of gods issue. Irenaeus and those who discussed
deification after him all embraced creation ex nihilo.15 Still, this did not
preclude their use of powerful statements concerning the final state of
deified men. Keating argues that, in Irenaeus’s view, the final state of
deified men is limited. He claims that Athanasius, Augustine, and other
church fathers of the fourth century and later sought to preserve this
distinction between God and the created order by denying that deified
humans change nature. Keating’s case on this point is strong.
Keating believes the distinction between God and creature to be
unbridgeable:
We begin once again with Irenaeus, who attests to our becoming gods by the grace of adoption: “But of what gods [does he
speak]? [Of those] to whom he says, ‘I have said, you are gods,
and all sons of the Most High’ (Ps 82:6). To those, no doubt,
who have received the grace of the adoption, ‘by which we
cry, Abba Father’ ” (Rom 8:15). Two centuries later Athanasius
echoes Irenaeus, but adds the distinction between the Word,
who is God in essence, and human beings who are “gods” by
participation: “Wherefore [the Word] is very God, existing
one in essence with the very Father; while other beings, to
whom he said, ‘I said you are gods’ (Ps 82:6), had this grace
from the Father, only by participation of the Word, through
the Spirit.”16
There are other places where Athanasius makes his intent clear in
denying that men are changed in their nature, but Irenaeus offers
some interesting challenges for one who holds this view.
15. Justin Martyr (d. ad 165) did not embrace creation ex nihilo, but he died before
Irenaeus did. It should be noted that Latter-day Saints who embrace the concept that
“eternal intelligence” is present within all humans have a different starting point than
those who wrote during the second half of the second century or later.
16. Keating, Deification and Grace, 92. The Irenaeus quotation is from Against
Heresies 3.6.1, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, 1:419. The Athanasius quotation is from Four
Discourses Against the Arians 1.9, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 2nd ser., 4:311.
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His wisdom [is shown] in His having made created things
parts of one harmonious and consistent whole; and those
things which, through His super-eminent kindness, receive
growth and a long period of existence, do reflect the glory
of the uncreated One, of that God who bestows what is good
ungrudgingly. For from the very fact of these things having
been created, [it follows] that they are not uncreated; but by
their continuing in being throughout a long course of ages,
they shall receive a faculty of the Uncreated, through the
gratuitous bestowal of eternal existence upon them by God.
. . . [M]an, a created and organized being, is rendered after
the image and likeness of the uncreated God. . . . [W]e have
not been made gods from the beginning, but at first merely
men, then at length gods. . . . He shall overcome the substance
of created nature. For it was necessary, at first, that nature
should be exhibited; then, after that, that what was mortal
should be conquered and swallowed up by immortality, and
the corruptible by incorruptibility, and that man should be
made after the image and likeness of God, having received the
knowledge of good and evil.17
This passage shows a number of things. First, as Keating points out,
there is a progression in deification. The Christian has received the
adoption today, but over time it is possible to “receive the faculty of
the Uncreated” and to “overcome the substance of the created nature”
and to receive “eternal existence.” As mentioned above, it is clear that
Irenaeus believed in creation ex nihilo, but he did not place limits
upon the remaking of men into the image of God, though Athanasius
and later church fathers clearly did. Thus we have this statement by
Irenaeus:
How, then, shall he be a God, who has not as yet been made
a man? Or how can he be perfect who was but lately created?
How, again, can he be immortal, who in his mortal nature did
not obey his Maker? For it must be that thou, at the outset,
17. Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.38.3–4, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, 1:521–22.
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shouldest hold the rank of a man, and then afterwards partake of the glory of God. For thou dost not make God, but
God thee. If, then, thou art God’s workmanship, await the
hand of thy Maker which creates everything in due time; in
due time as far as thou art concerned, whose creation is being
carried out.18
Here Irenaeus makes his point clear: It is not that God is incapable or
unwilling to remake our nature, but rather that it is important that we
acknowledge that it is God who bestows this gift upon us. Irenaeus is
also saying that human deification is a process.
Keating returns to the exchange formula as he considers how God
became man so that men can become gods while not being gods by
nature and, additionally, if God did so without becoming man by
nature. In so doing he introduces two ways in which something can
“participate” in something else:
In the thought-world of the Fathers, “participation” and its
cognate words (participate, partake, share, etc.) had a more
definite meaning than they do for us today. They inherited
a common philosophical understanding of these terms—
derived from Plato, Aristotle, and the Neo-Platonists—and
they re-fashioned them to describe a specifically Christian
understanding of God, creation, and redemption in Christ.
The concept of participation was used philosophically in two
main senses. First, it described how different particulars all
share some common element. For example, all individual
human beings share a common humanity, and so “partake”
of a common nature. In this case each human being shares in
this nature equally. Second (and crucially for our purposes),
the concept of participation was used to describe the unequal
relationship between what is essential and what is derivative.
If a king is understood to have authority in himself, then his
first minister would participate in that authority. More significantly, if God is the source of all being, then we as creatures
18. Irenaeus, Against Heresies 4.39.3–4, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, 1:522–23.
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participate in his being. We do not share or participate in the
divine being as God himself possesses it. Rather, we share in
his being in that he gives us our created being by bringing
us into existence. He has it essentially; we have it derivatively
and by participation. He is being; we participate in being.
Participation is a way of speaking about how “in him we live
and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28). (p. 97)
From the above understanding of the word participate, it seems that
Keating could suggest that Christ participates in the human nature
derivatively and that deified humans thus participate in the divine
nature derivatively as well. This would be a consistent way to read the
exchange formula even though Irenaeus and the Bible seem to indicate a stronger form of participation/partaking. This, however, is not
Keating’s point.
Instead, Keating seems to further undermine his ultimate point
about participation when he shows that Athanasius (who, as noted
earlier, embraced the idea of limited deification) claimed that the Son
is the Father’s not by participation, but rather by being of the essence
of the Father:
[The Son is] not a creature or work, but an offspring proper to
the Father’s essence. Wherefore He is very God, existing one
in essence with the very Father; while other beings, to whom
He said, “I said ye are gods” [Ps 82:6], had this grace from the
Father, only by participation of the Word, through the Spirit.
. . . For He is Himself the Father’s Power and Wisdom, and by
partaking of Him things originate are sanctified in the Spirit;
but the Son Himself is not Son by participation, but is the
Father’s own Offspring.19
Here Athanasius goes out of his way to identify the Son as fully
divine. This is the position developed and embraced by the later
19. Athanasius, Against the Arians 1.3.9; 3.23.1, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers,
2nd ser., 4:311, 394; quoted in Keating, Deification and Grace, 98.
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church fathers. Keating, however, insists on reading the exchange formula differently.
Keating offers a remarkable proposal. The exchange formula evidenced in the Bible and in patristic writings before the fourth century
should be read with two different meanings for the concept of partaking/participating—namely, when Christ participated in our nature
(i.e., became man), that transformation was complete and full; but
when we participate in his nature, that process is derivative and does
not involve a change in our created nature.
It is noteworthy that both parts of the “formula of exchange”—
the Son became like us, so that we might become like the
Son—are expressed in the New Testament in terms of participation. In Hebrews 2:14 the Incarnation itself is depicted in the
language of participation: “Since therefore, the children share
(koinōnein) in flesh and blood, he himself likewise partook
(metechein) of the same [nature].” Here we have an example
of the first sense of participation, namely, sharing in a common nature. In order to redeem us and “to bring many sons
to glory” (Heb 2:10), the Son of God came to share fully in
our nature, that is, he became a human being. But the goal of
the Son sharing in our nature is also stated in participationist
language. We are told in 2 Peter 1:4 that God’s divine power
at work in us is brought to completion by our becoming “partakers (koinōnoi) of the divine nature.” Here we have in bold
and demonstrative language the promise that the Father has
sent the Son to deliver us from sin and to cause us to become
sharers in the divine nature itself. But in 2 Peter 1:4 we have
an example of the second sense of participation, the unequal
and derivative sharing by the creature in the infinite Creator.
In this case, we as partakers never become, strictly speaking,
what we partake of. We partake of the divine life, but do not
become God by nature. And so we can rephrase the formula of
exchange (“the Son of God became the Son of Man, so that the
sons of men might become sons of God”) in terms of the two
senses of participation found respectively in Hebrews 2 and
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2 Peter 1. The Son of God partook of our nature and became
fully what we are (human beings), so that we might partake
of the divine nature and become by grace and participation
what he is by nature. To put this in the creedal terminology
of the Council of Chalcedon (a.d. 451): The eternal Word of
God, consubstantial with the Father, became fully a human
being, consubstantial with us in our nature, so that we might
become partakers of his divinity. But we never become consubstantial (one in being) with the Father as he is; rather, we
are inserted by grace into the divine communion of Persons.
This is what it means to become “gods by grace.” (p. 101)
For those who embrace the idea of limited deification and wish to reconcile it with the witness of the Bible and the early church fathers,
Keating’s approach may provide a way out. Nevertheless, there is no
evidence to suggest that the biblical authors (and almost no evidence
for Irenaeus) would have been so blatantly inconsistent in the course
of two halves of one sentence.
Other options available to Roman Catholics do not involve an
equivocation in the meaning of participate/partake. For instance,
one view would be that as the church began to understand more fully
who Christ was, it recognized that men could not have their nature
remade into the nature of Christ, so the developed understanding
of deification became the limited deification advocated by Keating.
Alternatively, while one does not see Roman Catholics advocating that
humans receive what Irenaeus termed the “faculty of the Uncreated,”20
there is nothing irreformable that limits the final state of deified men.
According to Chalcedon, the single-person Christ became consubstantial with humans and remained consubstantial with his father. To
fully embrace the biblical and early church language, it would seem
that a deified human could become consubstantial with God while
remaining consubstantial with all men (it would always be true that
men become gods because of divine grace).
20. See the quotation linked to note 17 above.
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For Latter-day Saints who believe that the authority of the early
Christian church to define doctrine was lost in the apostasy, the introduction of limited deification language into Catholic thought during
the fourth century could be viewed as pointing to a loss of the fulness of the gospel. As creation ex nihilo was embraced by the early
church and more sophisticated philosophical language became part of
theology, the nature of Christ (eternal creator or creature) became an
issue. God was “wholly other,” and Christ became homoousian with
the Father. Humans became limited in their future divinity.
Conclusion
For many years the doctrine of deification was discussed only in
scholarly contexts. Now, as the writings of the church fathers are enjoying widespread availability, the questions concerning this doctrine
are being explored further. There may be solutions to the participation
puzzle that are more elegant than Keating’s, and there is surely more
insight and perspective to be gleaned from the writings of the church
fathers. In any event, the Latter-day Saint position that humans can
ultimately become fully divine through the work of Christ and their
growth in him is solidly grounded in the Bible and in the beliefs of the
very early Christian church.21
Keating’s final chapter retraces his discussion of deification and
emphasizes the beauty and awe-inspiring nature of this doctrine.
Deification in any of its manifestations is a powerful concept and
should pull the Christian closer to God. Because Keating brings out
the message of deification contained in the New Testament and in the
21. After discussing the two forms of participation, Keating does address the solution
that many attribute to the theologian Gregory Palamas (1296–1359), though early hints
exist in the writings of the Cappadocian fathers and Irenaeus: God’s energies are fully
shared with men, but his essence is unsharable and unknowable. The Eastern Church
preserved the idea of deification (or theosis) very openly. The Western Church (certainly
in Aquinas’s thought but in other sources too) has suggested that the beatific vision
(a way of describing what those in heaven experience of God) includes God’s energies and
essence. Add to this God’s simplicity in Western thought, and it would seem to demand
that the Eastern solution is difficult to embrace within a Western tradition. Still this may
be another option for the faithful Roman Catholic.
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writings of the early church fathers, his book, even on this ground
alone, is a valuable resource. The Roman Catholic will find a faithful
presentation of what it means in that religious tradition for humans
to become gods. The Latter-day Saint will find some interesting arguments but will have a different picture of deification in the Bible and
the early Christian church. The fulness of life that God wishes to
bestow upon his children serves to magnify his goodness and glory.
The gospel restoration ushered in by the Prophet Joseph Smith points
all people to the wonderful culmination of personal growth toward
God, and recognizing this should propel all of us to greater life and
fuller love of our Father in Heaven.

The Myth of the Modern;
The Anti-myth of the Postmodern
James E. Faulconer

T

oday the word postmodernism is used mostly as a label for those
with whom right-thinking people disagree. Those who consistently label themselves postmodernist are usually affecting a pose that
may also require a black turtleneck and perhaps even a beret, a pose
that is seldom differentiable from what has for more than fifty years
had another name, relativism. I do not usually call myself a post
modernist, and I am not a relativist in the conventional sense (though
I am also not an absolutist in the conventional sense). So why am I
defending postmodernism? Because I believe that misunderstanding
and, therefore, ignoring postmodernism has allowed much modernism to continue on, unaffected, though it ought to have taken stock
when it came under a postmodern attack. Let me briefly revisit the

This essay was first delivered at the annual meetings of the Mormon History Association,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 2007.
As I use the word in this discussion, myth is an expression of a particular way of
organizing and understanding the world. Myth is not a pejorative term, and it does not
imply that the expression in question is false. In this sense, all reflection is mythic: it
expresses a particular way of organizing and understanding things. Thus the rise of
modernism in the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries marks a radical shift in
the prevailing myth for European society. René Descartes’s Discourse on the Method for
Rightly Conducting the Reason is symptomatic of that shift, recognizing that the myth of
traditional Christianity no longer gives order to life and postulating an alternative order,
an order that we take up as the myth of modernity.
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issue that I think has gotten lost, an issue that has largely been ignored,
even as postmodernism has quietly slipped into at least some historical thinking and writing. I want to ask what postmodernism means
for thinking about history.
However, as a nonhistorian among historians, I will play it safe. I
will say little about history or doing history. Instead, I will explain two
issues in modernism that are, I believe, directly related to its implications for history, show some alternatives for our usual assumptions,
describe how postmodernism works with regard to modernism, and
leave thinking about concrete implications to those who actually do
history. I hope to show that postmodern thinking is neither the wild
danger that many take it to be when they look at some of its advocates nor the reactionary intellectual movement that some suspect
when they see it done by conservative religious apologists like many
among us. To make my argument, I will paint a portrait of modernity with broad brushstrokes. My painting will focus primarily on
modernity’s understanding of the subject, in other words of the ego,
and on its understanding of temporality. Then I will paint an equally
broad portrait of some contemporary alternative assumptions to
show the origin of some of postmodernism’s questions of modernity.
I will argue that, historically, modernism takes the individual ego to
be the basic unit of understanding and that it implicitly takes the ego
to be an entity that exists prior to society, culture, and history so that
those things impinge upon the “I” as exterior forces. In addition,
modernism takes the knowledge of our temporal existence, history,
to be like every other kind of knowledge in that it is ultimately based
on atemporal, causal, universal laws. Then I will describe a recent
contrasting view, though still a view within modernism. That contrasting view understands the individual as coming into being with
and through society, culture, and history, and it seeks to understand
temporality in temporal rather than atemporal terms. Finally, my
claim about postmodernism will be that it uses the assumptions of
the latter, with a variety of techniques, to question the standard view
of modernism, but it does not take a position itself on the particular
question at hand.
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Modernity
Strictly speaking, there is no definition of modernity. Rather than
a definite set of characteristics, modernity is a constellation of positions and beliefs, “a rational demand for unity, certainty, universality,
and ultimacy” together with
the belief that words, ideas, and things are distinct entities; the
belief that the world [or nature, which is the Good] represents
a fixed object of analysis separate from forms of human discourse and cognitive representation; the belief that culture is
subsequent to nature [and imposed on it, and so is something
that ought to be stripped away epistemically] and [the belief]
that society is subsequent to the individual [and therefore also
an artifice imposed on him or her].1
Further, as we see in the title of René Descartes’s book Discourse on
Method, for moderns reason is exercised in method, of which geometry
is the first example. The result is our contemporary insistence on methodology (and the concomitant exactitude of mathematics). Moderns
believe that the use of method results in scientific progress. The story
still told by modernism is that by the continuous use of reason, we
have improved on the intellectual beginning given us by Greek and
Latin intellectuals, a beginning that was interrupted by the Christian
Middle Ages but restored with the Renaissance, and a beginning that
we continue to improve on with human perfection as its ideal and perhaps even reachable goal. For modern thinkers, method is possible—it
works—because reason rather than tradition is the sense common to
all human beings. Reason is the sensus communis.
Finally, method is deemed necessary by modern thinkers, particularly those of the Enlightenment, because they hold what Hans-Georg
Gadamer calls a “prejudice against prejudice itself.”2 Prejudices, in
the literal sense of prejudgments, are imposed from the outside on an
1. Steven Daniel, “Paramodern Strategies of Philosophical Historiography,” Epoché:
A Journal for the History of Philosophy 1/1 (1993): 42–43.
2. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed., translation revised by Joel
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 2004), 273.
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already-existing individual who observes an already-existing Nature.
So prejudices are necessarily distortions of what is original, of what is
real, of what stands before and apart from human mind and culture.
Prejudices prevent already fully formed, reasoning egos from making their own judgments about the already-determinate and supposedly external world. According to modernism, this means that good
thinking avoids all prejudice. The ordinary person’s reason is corrupt
because it is exercised in a historical and cultural environment that
has imposed false judgments on him or her in the form of tradition,
custom, and opinion. Religion is particularly corrupting of reason,
for it makes revelation (which not every person has) and tradition (a
nonuniversal, pre-given understanding from which a merely particular understanding comes to be) more fundamental than the natural
light of reason, which modernism takes to be definitive of every fully
human person. Enlightened persons use reason (which is prior to all
prejudgment because it is natural to all human beings) to rid themselves of these prejudices.3 Thus in modernism the already-universal,
internal light of reason replaces the light of reason as understood in
premodern Judaism and Christianity. For the latter, the light of reason
was universal only eschatologically and could be received and exercised only communally.
Likely there are other points of modernism worth mentioning.
Nevertheless, these points are enough, I think, for us to see the constellation of ideas that I am talking about. And I repeat: one could subscribe to some of the points of this constellation of modernism without
subscribing to them all and remain within the modern constellation.
Consider one of these points more closely, the redefinition of the
individual ego, in technical terms, the subject. Prior to about the midseventeenth century, the subject was “that which supports the properties I see.”4 In other words, it was the thing that has the properties we
3. Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” in Kant Selections, ed. Lewis White
Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1998), 462–67.
4. For more on this see, James E. Faulconer and Richard N. Williams, “Reconsidering
Psychology,” in Reconsidering Psychology: Perspectives from Continental Philosophy, ed.
James E. Faulconer and Richard N. Williams (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1990), 9–60.
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observe when we encounter something. It was that which is “underneath” the properties I perceive. In contrast, the object was “the
thing as it appears to me, the properties I perceive.” Strictly speaking, neither of these terms referred to what we mean today by “subject.” Both are different ways of talking about what we now refer to as
the object. Neither means “the perceiving or thinking ego.” However,
after Descartes, as everyone knows (at least implicitly), by “object” we
mean that which has the properties we observe (the thing-in-itself)
with its properties. And the “subject” is that which does the observing. Philosophically, the subject (formerly something that could not be
known directly) has become self-certainty, self-consciousness (known
directly, by introspection).5 We seldom think about this change, this
reversal, in the meaning of our terms. Indeed, most people do not
know that it occurred. In spite of that, this shift of meaning was a
revolution in Western thought and history, and its effects have been
enormous as well as numerous.
Perhaps the most important consequence of the new understanding of the subject is that the rational subject (and recall that all subjects
were assumed to be rational by nature) became the standard for truth.
That is why, for modern thinkers, authority (a standard of truth outside the individual) is to be avoided if at all possible. As strange as it
may at first glance seem, this placement of truth in the subject, modern subjectivism—though not “subjectivism” as we use that term today:
subjectivity—is what makes science as we know it possible. Objectivism
is a result of modern subjectivism! In spite of the way we usually speak
of truth within modernism, as Christina Gschwandtner says, “truth
and knowledge become dependent no longer on the reality which is
being examined, but rather on the subject which inspects them and the
method it employs.”6 Modern subjectivism, the original form of subjectivism, holds that the individual is the standard of truth but that reason
5. In Descartes’s work, such as the Meditations on First Philosophy, the subject
becomes, fundamentally, the pure experience of self and only secondarily (with the proof
of God) the experience of anything outside the self. That understanding of self haunts all
modernism, even that which does not rely on Descartes.
6. Christina M. Gschwandtner, Reading Jean-Luc Marion: Exceeding Metaphysics
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 187.
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is not only natural to all human beings but the same in them all. Thus if
one individual comes to a rational conclusion, any other individual will,
by the proper use of the reason they share (in other words, by method),
be able to see the truth of that conclusion: objectivism.
The positive result of this redefinition of the subject is a new kind
of systematic knowledge and the technologies spawned by that knowledge. It is science as we know it. Without the science and technology
that the modern understanding of the individual and reason makes
possible, no scholarly work, not even the most militant and faddish
postmodern, could happen in anything like its present form. More
importantly, without modern science and its technology, life would
be much more as Hobbes describes it, “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short.”7 In spite of that, however, this new standard for truth not
only made science possible, it opened the way for what comes to mind
when we hear the word subjectivism, namely, a particularly impoverished understanding of the Sophistic formula “Man is the measure
of all things.” All that was required for the new meaning of the term
was for people to begin to question whether reason is common to all
human beings or the same in those who have it. Without that modern
supposition, all real knowledge is relative to the individual ego. If we
remove the supposition that reason is the same in all, then rational
subjects can disagree and, since rational subjects are the standard of
truth, it follows that there are as many truths as there are disagreeing rational subjects (relativism in its ordinary sense). Both scientific
objectivism and modern relativism are a consequence of modernism’s
redefinition of the subject.
But modernism did not reject everything it inherited from
Christian philosophy. In particular, it did not reject the ancient idea
that what is most real is atemporal, outside of time. Since Plato and
Aristotle, thinkers have taken the temporal world to be a manifestation of an atemporal, unified whole, and they have taken genuine
knowledge to be knowledge of that atemporal whole. To quote Plato,
for them the cosmos is “the moving image of eternity,”8 and what we
7. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, xiii.
8. Plato, Timaeus 37d6.
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want to know is eternity rather than its moving image. Indeed, modern science (which does not necessarily include contemporary science) not only accepted that belief, it strengthened it: science uncovers
the atemporal laws that structure our temporal existence; it uncovers
what is truly real and which stands, as it were, “behind” the world of
experience. Modern science differed with Christian philosophy by no
longer granting revelation a role in uncovering the real, but it accepted
the idea that true knowledge, which is after all what the word science
means, is knowledge of the eternal rather than the temporal. To use
Spinoza’s phrase, for modernism to do science is to know the world sub
specie aeternitatis, as universally and eternally true without reference
to merely temporal reality. Modernism rejects authority and tradition
as prejudice, and it replaces them with the methodical quantification
and systemization of atemporal properties and laws.
As I have mentioned, we ought all to be grateful for the blessings
that modernism has given us. I have no desire to live in a world with
neither representative republican democracy nor disk drives, both
impossible without modernism. Nevertheless, it has not been an unalloyed blessing, for at the heart of modernism is a hidden but real negation of the world. Consider the Cartesian ego, who cannot know anything but himself directly.9 Consider the Kantian subject, who cannot
know himself or the world at all, who can know only appearances
of those things—phenomena—but never things themselves. Nihilism
lurks here: if we cannot know the world itself, then why assume that
there is any such world?
Beginning in the nineteenth century, first with the Romantics
and then with those such as Kierkegaard, Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche,
thinkers began to question modernism’s claims and to recognize that
those claims and the nihilism implicate in them are part and parcel
of a good deal of the alienation of modern Western society, a society
founded on the idea that we do not have direct access to reality, only
9. I use the masculine pronoun on purpose since, though modernism insists that
the subject is not gendered, it takes little analysis to see that it is, in fact, masculine.
Modernism, like most of the rest of Western thought, unquestioningly takes the masculine to be representative of all humanity.
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to concepts and ideas, only to universals or generalities and never to
specifics. In modernism, I am a person only to the degree that I am
someone in general: I have brown hair and brown eyes; I am short and
decidedly not thin. To know me is to know a list of qualities, qualities
that are shared by many others. It is probably impossible to make a list
of qualities that describes me and me alone.10 No list of qualities seems
capable of capturing what is unique about me. And yet, that is what
can be known of me. As the twentieth century showed us only too
well, perfect method and perfect reason brought together in modern
technology—alienated human beings reduced to general qualities—is
the perfect recipe for world war and mass death. Two world wars, the
Holocaust in Europe, the Killing Fields of Cambodia, the tense standoff between the Western world and Iran, . . . we could continue with a
long list of the other fruits of modernism and its implicit nihilism.
The philosophical response to this has been to question whether
the subject is a “natural,” precultural being onto which we impose
culture, history, and meaning. Instead of being what modernism at
first takes the self to be, perhaps it is, for example, a being’s response
to those around it and to its enmeshment in culture and history. We
can understand the self as an ongoing interpretation of itself living
in the world, with things, and among others. The self can as easily—
or more easily—be understood as something that comes to be in history and culture than it can be understood as something that ideally
stands outside them as an observer and judge. The twentieth-century
French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, for example, argues forcefully that
the self must be understood to have a temporal dimension qua self.11
It comes to be and changes over time. Ricoeur argues that the permanence the subject has—and it must have some kind of permanence
10. It may appear possible to make a complete list by pointing to the right conjunction of plausible properties: James Faulconer is the person married to Janice Faulconer,
living in west Provo, with four children and eleven grandchildren, . . . However, such
a list requires the use of proper names, at least “Janice Faulconer” and “Provo.” That
complicates the matter considerably, as any number of contemporary philosophers have
argued. See, particularly, Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1980).
11. Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992).
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over time if it has identity—is not the permanence of an entity, but
that of character or what we might also call “style,” a way of being in
the world rather than a set of properties that one has.12 Thus, though
modernism has taken self-understanding to be immediate, for thinkers like Ricoeur all self-understanding is necessarily interpretation. It
is mediated rather than immediate. Contrary to Descartes and contrary to the assumptions of modernism, I know neither myself nor
the world as an immediate, uninterpreted object of understanding,
for neither the subject nor the world is an entity that persists permanent and unchanged through time. Who we are, and who we are in
relation to the past, is always a matter for interpretation. There is no
final story, though of course it does not follow that there are no true
stories. That is because the surprising result of the postmodern claim
that I do not know myself immediately is that I do nevertheless know
myself. In contrast, the early modern assumption that I have direct
access to myself leads to the seemingly self-contradictory result that I
cannot know myself at all. Why? Because the direct access to myself
presumed by early modernism turns out really to be only direct access
to my properties.13
Additionally, if the self is not, as modernism first assumed, the
rational and singular entity with direct access to self and world, then
that self is not the standard for truth that modernism has presumed.
The foundation for modernism’s prejudice against authority crumbles,
and we must once again ask about authority (including, of course, the
authority of modernism!): which ones shall we trust and why?14 Some
12. The difference between a way of being and a list is that the former is an activity,
an engagement in the world, while the latter is not.
13. Since first writing this, I have discovered that Jean-Luc Marion makes an argument for my claim in The Erotic Phenomenon, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2007), 13–15.
14. It is important to recall that Plato describes the epistemological attitude that
characterizes our relation to the world as pivsti, trust rather than certainty (Republic
511e). That understanding of human understanding was part of the Western tradition up
until approximately the Renaissance, when certainty, formerly reserved for mathematical objects, became the desiderata for all knowledge. (See also Aristotle’s remark that it is
unwise to require more exactness of any area of inquiry than is appropriate, Nicomachean
Ethics 1094b24–25.)
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authorities that we have come to accept may lose their hold over us,
new ones may arise, and others that we have rejected, including tradition and revelation, may once again emerge as possible.
However, if the prejudice against prejudice has fallen, then we
must ask also about the even older prejudice against temporality. Why
assume that all legitimate and worthwhile knowledge is ultimately
knowledge of what is atemporal? In the early and mid-twentieth century, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger argued that since
Parmenides Western metaphysics has been based on the notion that
the ultimate reality is a thing of some kind, an entity: some atemporal
entity that exists apart from the world metaphysically accounts for
the world that we experience. For many, that entity has been God;
for secular modernism, it was Reason or Law or the Dialectic. There
were disagreements about the nature of ultimate reality, but there
was almost universal agreement that it is ultimately atemporal and
an entity (if only a rational or conceptual entity).15 Though it may be
possible to give a more contemporary interpretation to the familiar
phrase from Eliza R. Snow’s hymn “O, My Father”—“Truth is reason,
truth eternal”—it expresses the traditional and modern understanding of truth as an atemporal thing. On that modern view, the closer we
can come to giving an atemporal account of things, including events
now and in the past, the closer we come to speaking the truth.
Some respond by arguing that history is the expression of a hidden, causal logic. However, as the works of thinkers such as Hegel,
Feuerbach, Marx, Compte, Spencer, and Spengler show us, construing the passage of time that way results eventually in a deterministic
history. The complexity and interestingness of history becomes only
a constant repetition of “more of the same.” In spite of the apparent
differences of various events, no moment of history genuinely and
importantly differs from any another. Indeed, on this view, ultimately
history is not itself something real. It is only the manifestation of some
15. Most often its characteristics are those of the traditional God: in addition to
atemporality, nonspatiality, and characteristics such as absolute unity and absolute transcendence of the world. For example, notice that Descartes adopts much of the medieval
language describing God to describe the ego in Meditations.
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overarching principle. That is the real. Worse, the thinking of people
like these has often given grounds for the justification of tyranny by
those who claim to have seen through the veil of history to its undergirding structure. If we can see through the veil of history and time—
supposedly mere appearances—and discern the structure, the real,
that makes them what they are, then we can see the future. We can see
the direction of history, and we can justifiably take power over those
who would impede that direction. By virtue of our insight into the
reality behind mere history, we have the right to spill “a little blood”
for the greater good.16
Of course, few today understand history in this way, at least not
explicitly. Any who do not see the folly of history understood that
way need to read more history. Nevertheless, arguably, thinkers like
Feuerbach, Marx, and Spengler were taking the modern understanding of history to its logical conclusion. Whether the ultimate metaphysical reality is God or Reason or Economics, if it is static—in other
words, if it is eternal in a classical sense—then it has neither future
nor past. To know it is to know everything. To the degree that one has
knowledge, one escapes the bonds of time and enters into the eternal.
And, like the traditional god on which modern knowledge is modeled,
one who knows the eternal is surely qualified to rule among those who
have not yet seen the eternal except in its misleading appearance as an
account of the past.
The alternative is to deny that the atemporal is fundamental, to
look for knowledge in the temporal, as Heidegger has argued we can
and must. Surely history is about the passage of time rather than about
its permanence. Surely if any science—any knowledge—denies the
eternality of what-is, it must be the science of history, but that denial
requires a shift in our metaphysics.
We find the beginning of that shift, one comparable to the shift
from Newtonian to Einsteinian mechanics, in Heidegger’s work, which
16. As Joseph Bottum notes, many thinkers have come to this conclusion. See “Death
and Politics,” First Things: The Journal of Religion, Culture, and Public Life, http://www
.firstthings.com/article.php3?id_article=5917 (accessed 24 September 2008), though I must
note that Bottum’s criticisms of Jacques Derrida and others show that he does not understand postmodernism.
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is central to understanding the difference postmodernism makes to
history. It is important, however, to point out that the shift from time
as atemporal to time as temporal is not yet postmodernism. It is a shift
within modernism, a new modern step. Nevertheless, the shift is crucial:
to deny that history is essentially atemporal is to argue that its basic
structure is the event, a happening of temporality, rather than the thingin-itself, which is, at least ideally, atemporal. That shift makes postmodernism possible.
To better understand this shift, consider the problem of repeating
past events, and do so by considering Søren Kierkegaard’s little book
Repetition. Ostensibly a fictionalized account of Kierkegaard’s failed
love life (written under the pseudonym Constantin Constantius),
Repetition is really about Kierkegaard’s desire to be a Christian. In
specific terms, the problem is that in order to consummate his love for
his abandoned beloved, the young man must repeat the moment of his
first love. By analogy, in order to be a Christian, Constatin must repeat
what the first apostles did when Jesus called to them, “Come, follow
me.” But he cannot repeat that first moment, neither the erotic nor the
Christian moment of first love. He cannot do so because the second
moment includes the first, but the first does not include the second.
He has already loved; the apostles have already responded; and that
“already” is part of this moment but not part of the first. The apostles
did not follow Christ with the kind of knowledge that the nineteenthcentury would-be believer Constatin has, so he cannot do what they
did. He seems doomed never to be truly a Christian.
In general terms, the problem looks like this: If each moment is
unique, rather than the product of an atemporal law, then it is impossible for us ever to repeat any previous moment. Even if two moments
could be identical in every other respect, the fact that the second
occurred after the first would make it different from the first. And, of
course, no two moments are identical in every other respect. But the
seeming impossibility of repeating a past event results from a misunderstanding. It is the misunderstanding of taking the previous event
to be reducible to its properties: Supposedly event A at time Ta has
properties 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on. In order to repeat event A at time Tb, I
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have to experience an event with those same properties and no more.
(If event B has additional properties, then it is like event A in some
respects, but it is not the same.) So if I think of the two events in terms
of their properties, then I can never repeat a previous event. Indeed,
I cannot even think about a previous event as the event that it was
because I will always be thinking about it afterward, at a time when it
has new properties, such as the fact that it caused other, later events,
including my thought of it. Like the paradoxes of Zeno, Kierkegaard’s
book seems to demonstrate the impossibility of something that we
know is possible, namely, the repetition of a previous moment or at
least our meaningful reference to it.17
As outrageous as it may seem, in principle I cannot create a new
account of any event without falling prey to the problem I have just
described: if what I say about the past is always inadequate because
it tries to repeat that past, then it seems impossible to say anything
adequate. That is the consequence that modernism yields. We cannot solve the problem by finding some new feature of events that we
can add to our list. However, we do see and experience things and
events. We remember them. We refer to them. We live with them. The
problem is not that we do not do these things. The problem is that the
more we try to explain our repetitions, the more they slip through
our explanatory fingers. We cannot avoid trying to explain events, but
every modern explanation of an event unavoidably turns it into an
entity, an object of inquiry, rather than a temporal event. That reintro
duces the problem that talk about events was meant to avoid. Thus our
accounts necessarily put us at least one remove from that to which
they ostensibly refer, and once we are removed we have a difficult time
giving another account that allows us to get back. However, getting
back is usually not as difficult as thinking makes it seem. All we need
to do is to stop talking and point—which is where postmodernism
comes in.18
17. I take Kierkegaard to be offering a reduction ad absurdum, a reductio designed to
help us see something that we will not see otherwise. In contemporary parlance, he offers
us a deconstruction.
18. As John D. Caputo explains, though philosophical accounts of linguistic reference always run aground, we do successfully refer to things: “Proper names refer in
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Postmodernism
To understand postmodernism, first notice that, unlike most philo
sophical movements, postmodernism cannot be defined descriptively.
Modernism is a set or constellation of doctrines or beliefs; postmodernism is a set of strategies for questioning modernism.19 To be postmodern is to take up a position of questioning within rather than simply
against modernism, and it is to take up that questioning with a constellation of strategies rather than in a content or with a method. The
practices of postmodernism can, however, be described in one word,
destabilization. The aim of postmodern thinking is the destabilization
of modern thinking rather than the creation of new conclusions. This
means that there is no such thing as postmodernism per se. Under the
overworked label postmodernism we find a group of divergent thinkers who, relying on the alternatives of thought we see in thinkers like
Heidegger and those he has influenced, share related ways of questioning modernism, especially the questioning of modernism’s unifying
tendencies and its assumption of universality, though they often differ
over how to do so and what that questioning means.
Because our accounts take up events as objects, they cannot avoid
tending toward ideas of permanence and eternality, unity, certainty,
progress, and univocal meaning, whether they rely on the atemporal assumptions of early modernism or the temporal assumptions of
late modernism. Even if we adopt an understanding of the world that
actu exercitu, in the exercised act, in actual use, in the concrete happening or the factual event. . . . It is a wonder, a little difficult to account for, but it happens. . . . [It is]
something that philosophy is forced to swallow while being unable to digest.” Against
Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference to Deconstruction
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 76–77.
19. The use of the prefix post- to describe something that happens within rather than
after modernism probably strikes many as odd. Granted. However, Jean-François Lyotard,
who seems to have been the first to use the term in philosophy, makes that point in
Postmodernism Explained, trans. Don Barry (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1993). Note also that by defining itself by its relation to modernism and by having no (or
little) positive content itself, postmodernism cannot hope to “get beyond” modernism in
any real sense. I believe that most noteworthy postmodern thinkers recognize this. Indeed,
given the technological blessings of modernism and such things as democracy and human
liberation that are consequent on it, few even wish to get beyond modernism.
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comes from the assumptions of thinkers like Heidegger and Ricoeur,
we will think of our ideas and conclusions in terms of permanence,
certainty, univocity, and so on. In other words, at any meta-level our
words no longer point at either things or events. They are about our
words and theories rather than about the world to which our words
refer. That is the benefit of reason: it allows us to reflect on our words
and theories critically. However, that benefit is not pure, for when we
move to a meta-level, we cease to be able to point directly to ourselves
and the world. We can only talk about them at a distance. As Maurice
Merleau-Ponty says, “We can only think the world because we have
already experienced it,”20 so our reflection on our thinking of the
world is twice removed from our experience. By itself reason cannot
avoid alienation from the world. Indeed, at least in modernism, alienation is thought’s ineluctable though unacknowledged goal.21
Postmodernism is about interrupting our chains of accounts so
that pointing can succeed. What may seem like wacky or idiosyncratic interruptions by the postmodernist are intended to interrupt
the modernist assumptions and methods we use to understand the
world so that we can return to the world that makes our assumptions
and methods possible. Postmodern strategies of reading and responding are intended to interrupt our explanations and to help us, as it
were, to point. They are supposed to make us stop talking about things
and talking about our talk in order to look directly at those things.22
These interruptions cannot stand on their own. They are not intended
to. They are not methods, neither for obtaining truth nor for showing
that there is no truth. Instead they have a relation to modernism similar to the relation of negative theology to theology.
20. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical
Consequences” and “Eye and Mind,” in Phenomenology, Language and Sociology: Selected
Essays of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ed. J. O’Neill (London: Heinemann Educational, 1974),
201, emphasis added.
21. That is its goal because it is also its origin, namely, the subject before and apart from
any relation to anything but itself, as in Descartes but, I would argue, as also in Hobbes.
22. In this, they are the inheritors of Edmund Husserl’s maxim “To the things themselves,” the maxim of phenomenology—one more reason that postmodernism cannot be
understood as coming after modernism.
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There are two moments in negative theology. One is to discover and
to say as accurately as possible the right names and descriptions of the
Divine (comparable to modernism). Though it seems to be a paradox,
the second moment is to show that these names are inadequate (roughly
comparable to postmodernism). For example, one must say, “God is
just”; it is blasphemy to say otherwise. Nevertheless, once that is established as true, it is also true that the sentence is inadequate. Those who
know God know that “God is just” is not enough. In fact, from the point
of view of a claim to have said the complete and final truth, the claim
“God is just” is not only inadequate, it is untrue. We know what justice
is only by using our own justice as a reference point. However, God’s
justice surpasses ours, so much so that justice is an inadequate name to
use for it. So we must also say, “God is not just”—but we must take care
how we read what looks like a simple denial of God’s justice.
The negative theologian recognizes the absolute necessity of
speaking about God. Theology is necessary. He or she worries, however, that our theology may give us the impression that, having established God’s justice, we are now done with thinking it. Rather than
continuing to wrestle with God’s justice and our relation to it, we
may become “comfortable” in our knowledge. When we do so, we are
no longer engaged with the actual problem of justice. Instead, it has
been replaced by our thought about justice. We have come to believe,
implicitly, that our knowledge has encompassed the infinite. So the
negative theologian reminds us of God’s infinity by showing us the
failure of our affirmative theology. The point is not that there is no
God or that God is, in a straightforward sense, not just. The point
is that we must continue to speak of God, to praise him, to think of
him, to wonder at his justice by questioning our own. Thus negative
theology makes it possible for positive, praising theology to continue.
Because it does, the second moment of theology, negative theology, is
not a moment of pure denial. Rather, in spite of first appearances, it is
as much a moment of praise as is affirmative theology. For the negative theologian, true theology comes neither in affirmative theology
by itself nor in negative theology alone, but in the “third way” that
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overcomes their opposition, namely, the continued praise and insight
that is opened by the opposition between the two ways.23
As I understand postmodernism, its interruptions of modernism—in
the forms of deconstruction, Nietzschean genealogy, reinterpretation,24
rhetorical play, and so on—are meant to open a third way of understanding. They are meant to allow us to continue to refer to and deal
with the world even while retaining a continually chastened modernism. Postmodernism is an interruption of the alienated destiny that
modern beliefs entail. It tries to make possible a third way toward that
which modernism intends but cannot keep in sight by itself. When not
merely an affectation, postmodernism stands as anti-myth to modernism’s myth, with the hope that the world—other persons, our relations
to them (as in justice), and things—will appear, glistening in the space
between them.
A Postscript on Postmodernism and Relativism
I hope that readers can now see that one of the ironies of much
trendy postmodernism is its taking of subjectivist positions (using the
contemporary sense of subjectivist), such as that the meaning of a text
or event is whatever a person takes it to be. That is ironic because one of
the central tenets of modernism is the importance of the subject, and a
major feature of postmodernism is that it questions the importance of
the subject. One cannot argue both that meaning is merely subjective
and that the subject is not central to the creation of meaning.
The outrageous forms of postmodernism turn out to be more
modern, though self-contradictory, than those who hold it think. Post
moderns who accept strong relativism appear to accept this argument:
Knowledge is as modernism says or there is no knowledge.
Modernism is wrong about knowledge.
So, there is no knowledge.
23. See Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn
Horner and Vincent Berraud (New York: Fordham, 2002), 128–42, for an excellent
account of negative theology.
24. I use reinterpretation for hermeneutics here to avoid confusing the hermeneutics
of Gianni Vattimo (reinterpretation) with the hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer.
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However, the first premise of this argument is an explicitly modern
premise. Thus those who accept the argument agree with modernism that the only alternative to the modern account of knowledge is
the ultimate illegitimacy of all knowledge claims, but one need not
believe that to question modernism. One can believe that modernism is wrong about knowledge but that knowledge is, nevertheless,
possible. Those who accept the strong relativist argument are radical
only in their posture, not in their position; radical relativism is an
unsophisticated, privative variation on modernism.25
Some postmodern thinkers, such as Gilles Deleuze and Félix
Guattari,26 may argue for a strong form of relativism, but this is a
minority position and not implicit in every postmodern position.

25. Jürgen Habermas makes a similar point in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity:
Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987).
26. In, for example, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
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Steven A. Cramer. Chosen: The Path to Divine Acceptance. Springville, UT: Cedar Fort, 2007. 207 pp., with index, appendixes, and
bibliography. $14.99.
Steven Cramer (the pseudonym for Gerald Curtis) has written
many books on repentance and overcoming temptation. This book
uses the medium of a novel to show the practical application of the
counsel contained in his other books.
Elder Curtis has been in the mission field for six months and has
been working hard. But he has a big problem—he is feeling guilty for
lying to his leaders about his worthiness. He had a pornography habit
that he stopped six months before his mission interviews so that he
could say he was worthy. Now he realizes that he made a mistake.
The elder has a series of interviews with his mission president,
President Love, over a couple of days. He is given materials to read
in between these interviews, which he then discusses with President
Love. He learns what true repentance is and what it entails, and he
and the president discuss such topics as godly sorrow, the atonement,
forsaking sins, making restitution, confession, and even the pitfalls of
perfectionism. He learns that we decide whether we are “chosen,” as
the word is used in Doctrine and Covenants 121 (which is also how
the word is used in the title of the book).
The discussion between the elder and his mission president makes
it easier to understand the principles being taught. One limitation
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of the fictional scenario, however, is that it is quite difficult to show
meaningful changes in the elder’s life in just two days. This is obviously not how quickly true repentance happens in reality. But, as the
author points out in the introduction, this story condenses time in
order to expand doctrinal content. The author also steps out of the
story in the appendixes, reminding readers that those addicted to pornography are usually not able to stop on their own and that recovery
resources are readily available.
This book thoroughly covers the doctrine of repentance, even
treating aspects that are generally not discussed elsewhere. The dialogue between the characters helps explain some of the more difficult
concepts. Repentance is not an easy road, and this book can serve as
a helpful guide.
Trevor Holyoak
D. G. Hart. Deconstructing Evangelicalism: Conservative Protes
tantism in the Age of Billy Graham. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005. 224 pp., with index. $18.99.
Orthodox Presbyterian seminarian and distinguished historian
D. G. Hart has no use for the label evangelical. Why? The word has
come to identify such a broad range of conservative Christian ideologies that it has lost its power to identify much of anything. There is no
evangelical creed or confession, nor is there any ecclesiastical structure. Because the label identifies a vast diversity of opinions about a
number of issues, Hart makes an argument for its irrelevance.
Hart describes how a very old label was given new life and meaning soon after World War II by Billy Graham (and his wealthy associates who founded Christianity Today). Those folks began at first to
talk about a “new evangelical” movement. They did this in an effort to
overcome and combat what was considered the deadening influence
of the older fundamentalism. But the word evangelical in America,
Hart contends, does not identify a polity or church or ecclesiastical
structure. Instead, it identifies a vague faith tradition or umbrella
under which a host of parachurch agencies, nondenominational
megachurches, Pentecostals and charismatics, and differing opinions
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on crucial issues compete with each other. In Hart’s view it is pointless
to lump these and similar movements and agencies under one name,
since to do so obscures more than it reveals about contemporary Protestantism in America. For this and many other reasons, Hart calls for
the label evangelical to be abandoned. “Despite the vast amounts of
energy and resources expended on the topic, and notwithstanding the
ever growing volume of literature on the movement, evangelicalism is
little more than a construction” (pp. 16–17).
In the first part of his book, Hart traces the history of evangelicalism in the twentieth century (pp. 33–106). He is deeply troubled by pollsters who use the label evangelical and give it a vague, minimal meaning
to identify conservative, nonliberal Protestant American religiosity.
They end up including under that label such a wide variety of religious
opinions and commitment that one cannot trust their results. Part 2 of
Deconstructing Evangelicalism—entitled “The Unmaking of Evangelicalism” (pp. 107–74)—is an attempt to argue that what the label identifies is really a flush of competing ideologies that are without a fixed
content or creed. Hart strives to understand how one might fruitfully
categorize a movement that, having no confessions or denominations to
hold it together, looks to celebrity parachurch figures like Billy Graham,
James Dobson, and Tim LaHaye for leadership.
Hart asserts that evangelicalism cannot exist as a visible part of
Christ’s church in historically upholding what he considers the three
marks of the church—that is, right preaching of the word of God,
correct administration of the sacraments, and discipline in order to
uphold the first two. Hart insists that evangelical parachurch organizations have different goals than those he considers essential to Christ’s
church (pp. 123–24). Parachurch organizations are, for Hart, more
business undertakings than they are bonafide churches. If consumers
do not buy the product (radio or TV sermon) or whatever the parachurch is selling, they can simply look for a different provider. Hart
insists that “churches, unlike parachurch entities, have creeds that let
people contemplating membership know the content of the denomination’s faith. Churches also have structures of governance that provide a mechanism of accountability that is very different from that of
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the market model, which determines which parachurch celebrities are
the most popular and therefore authoritative” (p. 124). Hart argues
that “to be an evangelical is to be in a perpetual frenzy of trying to get
more—more money, more contributors, more access, more zeal, and
of course more believers” (p. 124). And, of course, “parachurch organizations have the goal of adding to mailing lists to increase the chances
of raising more revenue through direct mail appeals” (p. 124). These
comments are a very modest selection of Hart’s criticisms of contemporary American conservative Protestantism from the perspective of
a distinguished intellectual historian with an acerbic style.
Hart strives to talk professional historians out of their current
enthrallment with whatever currently mingles and wars under the
label evangelical. His conclusion is that much of what takes place under
the label evangelicalism is an effort to attract consumers, not genuine
disciples of Christ. It “lacks an institutional center, intellectual coherence, and devotional direction” (p. 176). He holds that post–World
War II evangelicalism is the product of an individualistic “culture of
celebrity, which is perhaps the flip side of denying the authority of
traditions” (p. 120). The result has been to “combine two cups of inerrancy, one cup of conversion, and a pinch of doctrinal affirmations;
form into a patchwork of parachurch agencies, religious celebrities,
and churches; season with peppy music professionally performed; and
bake every generation” (p. 183).
Irving Hexham. The Christian Travelers Guide to Great Britain.
Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 2001. 245 pp. $16.99.
According to Irving Hexham, a distinguished professor of religious studies at the University of Calgary, one can find “travel guides
with titles like Pagan Europe, Occult France, Magical Britain, and
The Traveler’s Guide to Germany” (p. 7), but not all that much on the
Christian contribution to Europe, even or especially in standard travel
books, which “tend to underplay Christian contributions to Western
civilization through neglect or a negative tone” (p. 7). In an effort to
correct this situation, Hexham has generated a series of guidebooks
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that includes, in addition to the one he wrote on Great Britain, books
on Germany, France, and Italy.
The reasons Hexham gives for his efforts should resonate with
Latter-day Saints because they, too, have come to recognize that
the Bible is steeped in history and the remembrance of history. Both the Old and New Testaments constantly reminded
their readers about particular historical events (Deuteronomy
4:9–25) both by retelling the story and through commemorations which enact the central acts of salvation (Exodus 13:3–
16; 1 Corinthians 11:25–26). Further, an appeal is frequently
made to visible memorials that remind people of God’s wonderful deeds (Acts 2:29–36). We also find both Jews and early
Christians visiting historical sites as acts of devotion (Luke
2:21–41; Acts 21:17–27). (p. 8)
Hexham insists that Christians are “not a tribal religion rooted in
local communities bound by kinship bonds” (p. 9) but should instead
be a community grounded on faith. “The great truth of the New Testament is that Christians are children of God by adoption” (p. 9). And
this explains why the scriptures “point to examples of faith which we
are encouraged to follow and remember (Joshua 4; Luke 11:29–32;
Acts 7; Hebrews 12). Remembering acts of courage and obedience to
God strengthens our own faith. This fact was long recognized by the
leaders of the church. Throughout history, Christians have told and
retold stories of courage and faith” (p. 9).
But now much of this has been neglected or forgotten. In its
place we have what Hexham calls “secular gossip.” By this he means
what appears in the mass media—on television and the radio and in
magazines. We are inundated with bizarre stories of the (mis)deeds
of “celebrities.” So we “are full of ‘lives.’ But they are the lives of pop
singers, film stars, television personalities, and secular politicians”
(p. 9), and not the lives of the heroic figures of Christian faith, as was
once the case. This fact deeply troubles Hexham. Why?
Christianity is rooted in history. The New Testament begins
with a genealogical table that most modern readers find almost
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incomprehensible (Matthew 1:1–17). The purpose of this genealogy is to locate the birth of Jesus in space and time according to the standards of Jewish history. The appeal to ‘the first
eye-witnesses,’ in the prologue to the gospel of Luke, is also
intended to engage the skepticism of Greco-Roman readers by
providing specific historical data against which ancient readers
could weigh the writer’s claims (Luke 3:1–2). The Gospels contain many references to historical data and specific geographical locations. So important is historical truth that its denial
becomes the mark of heresy. (p. 8)
According to Hexham, “the importance of history and the way
in which we remember past events is recognized by many influential
opponents of Christianity” (p. 8). He then points out that the most
determined enemies of Christianity (he mentions Karl Marx and
Adolf Hitler) made the control of history, or of its interpretation, the
key to controlling the future (p. 8). In this manner they built in one
way or another, Hexham believes, on Enlightenment skepticism about
divine things. This has led, he believes, to the denial “of the validity of Christians history” (p. 8). But following the biblical model with
its emphasis on remembrance, Hexham believes that “visiting places
and seeing where great events took place help people remember and
understand the present as well as the past” (p. 8). Hexham has fashioned these travel guides with this end in mind: the great deeds of the
Christian past are worthy of remembering and can still enhance the
faith of those who now travel the world. But can close encounters with
the places where terrible deeds were done in the name of Jesus Christ,
since this is often part of the larger story, also enhance or refine faith?
For a Latter-day Saint, the answer has to be yes.
The Christian Travelers Guide to Great Britain is not, of course,
an exhaustive account. But it provides in the first part a very useful
brief account of British history and in the second part an explanation of English literature, art, music, and architecture, followed by a
description of fifty-eight sites like London, York, and Cambridge. This
volume, and the others in this series, can be recommended for Latter-
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day Saints with an urge to actually learn something about what they
are seeing while on holiday.
Peter Charles Hoffer. Past Imperfect: Facts, Fictions, Fraud—Ameri
can History from Bancroft and Parkman to Ambrose, Bellesiles,
Ellis, and Goodwin. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. xiv + 287 pp.,
with index. $26.00.
Past Imperfect is a remarkable book. It contains both an extensive
commentary on recent instances of fabrication, plagiarism, and falsification by professional historians and a useful survey of the history of
attempts by American historians to write about the past. Peter Hoffer,
a distinguished University of Georgia historian with considerable
experience in dealing with ethical issues among historians, sets out
some of the reasons that it is not possible for historians to be neutral
and objective and also why they are tempted to cheat. To set the stage
for his examination of several recent instances of blatant misbehavior
by several well-known historians, Hoffer describes the rise of professional standards that historians are presumed to follow, including the
American Historical Association’s guidelines for professional conduct, as well as the efforts to enforce these standards.
Hoffer describes some of the temptations to fabricate that historians face in their search for tenure, fame, and wealth. His examination of the misdeeds of some famous contemporary historians—
Stephen Ambrose, Doris Kearns Goodwin, Michael Bellesiles, and
Joseph Ellis—is judicious and fair, if not exhaustive. Ambrose was
widely known for being what Hoffer describes as a “superb storyteller”
(p. 176), evident in his acclaimed 1992 book Band of Brothers, a tale of
a company of paratroopers in the 181st Airborn Division from D-day
until the end of World War II. Ambrose found his career in shambles
at the end of his life because of claims “that he improperly borrowed
from others’ works, putting his name on what was not his—what
Ambrose said added up to “about 10 pages out of a total work of some
15,000 pages in print” (p. 177). Hoffer is generous in his assessment of
the scholarly sins of Ambrose.
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The case of Joseph Ellis should be of special interest to Latterday Saints. Walter V. Robinson, an investigative reporter at the Boston Globe, discovered that Ellis had fabricated an entire career as an
antiwar protestor and active participant in the Vietnam War in his
wildly popular lectures to undergraduate students at Amherst College
and Mount Holyoke. Ellis, a gifted writer, had achieved notoriety for
books such as the Founding Brothers (2000), in which he sought to
turn the large figures in the founding of America into human beings.
He was controversial because at first he “denied Thomas Jefferson’s
relations with his slave Sally Hemings, then reversed himself on the
issue” (p. 213). What Hoffer does not reveal is that it was also Ellis
who, in an attempt to persuade voters that President Bill Clinton was
just doing what others of large reputation had done previously, proclaimed there was DNA proof that Thomas Jefferson had fathered one
of Hemings’s children. This was not exactly what the DNA studies had
shown, since the father could have been the brother of Thomas Jefferson or one of his brother’s sons. Ellis clearly used his large reputation
to distort the relevant DNA findings.
Hoffer demonstrates that even history done by properly credentialed, professional historians often does not and cannot reflect real
events or persons. It is often not a matter of truth but of personal
ambition or avarice, sometimes coupled with ideological passion and
factional expediency. Even, or especially, when one encounters the
essays of some obviously gifted, well-trained, professional historians,
one may end up with blatant fraud and not just a difference of opinion about some complex, controversial issue. This is the conclusion of
Hoffer’s judicious study of forgery, fabrication, and plagiarism in the
history profession.
Hoffer shows that there is no single agreed-upon body of knowledge or interpretation that students of the past are expected to command. The work of historians provides a shifting array of opinions
about the past. Despite this fact, Hoffer is right in arguing that there
should be no dispute with respect to plagiarism, falsification of
research, or misrepresentation of sources. Even more disconcerting
is the discovery that books are published and then lauded that lack
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careful historical scholarship and, in some cases, involve fraud. Hoffer
attempts to explain why the scholarly sins of the prominent figures he
examines are important even if the errors were, as was the case with
Ellis, in lectures to students rather than in books. Such wrongdoing is
deplorable. Latter-day Saints are constantly faced with it on the margins and outside the circle of faith, and sometimes from within.
To see the sour fruit of such misconduct, one only has to glance
at Charles L. Wood’s The Mormon Conspiracy: A Review of Present
Day and Historical Conspiracies to Mormonize America and the World
(2001), Grant H. Palmer’s An Insider’s View of Mormon Origins (2002),
Richard Abanes’s One Nation Under Gods: A History of the Mormon
Church (2002), Matthew A. Paulson’s Breaking the Mormon Code: A
Critique of Mormon Scholarship Regarding Classical Christian Theology and the Book of Mormon (2006), or several recent books on the
Mountain Meadows Massacre by agitated critics of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints. The Saints are increasingly confronted by
such shameful potboilers; they must also learn not to test their faith
against the shifting sands of historical fads and fashions.
Dean L. May and Reid L. Neilson, eds., with Richard Lyman Bushman, Jan Shipps, and Thomas G. Alexander. The Mormon History
Association’s Tanner Lectures: The First Twenty Years. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006. xi + 406 pp., with notes on contributors and index. $70.00 hardcover, $30.00 paperback.
The late O. C. Tanner, a Salt Lake City entrepreneur who had
become wealthy in the jewelry business, funded various foundations,
lectureships, and projects. The funds he provided for the Mormon
History Association’s annual Tanner Lecture support lectures by
scholars outside the Latter-day Saint community. These scholars, who
may or may not have previously been familiar with or even interested
in Mormon things, must be willing to fashion a lecture drawing on
their own skills and insights on some topic of interest to Latter-day
Saint historians. The first of these lectures was delivered by Gordon
Wood, a well-known American historian. Dean May and Reid Neilson’s collection features twenty-one Tanner Lectures. Although all of
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these lectures have previously been published, it is convenient to have
them assembled in one volume.
The lectures are organized under topical headings within three
broad categories. Richard Bushman introduces six lectures under the
rubric “Beginnings,” Thomas Alexander introduces eight lectures
related to the theme “Establishing Zion,” and Jan Shipps introduces
seven lectures on the topic “Mormonism Considered from Different
Perspectives.” As is often the case with such anthologies, the lectures
as a whole are uneven. Some, however, are outstanding and have consequently drawn considerable attention. The intriguing lecture by
Martin Marty, read at the 1983 MHA meetings in Omaha and titled
“Two Integrities: An Address to the Crisis in Mormon Historiography,” has now been published in various versions four times. Because
this material has been published before, the general introductions
stood to enhance the anthology’s value for readers. Unfortunately, the
introductions are uneven and bland, enough so that little would have
been lost if the lectures had been reprinted in chronological order
without editorial commentary.
Shawn McCraney. I Was a Born-Again Mormon: Moving Toward
Christian Authenticity. New York: Alathea Press, 2003 (reprinted
in April 2007). xvii + 359 pp., with bibliography. $9.99.
The fact that this book is self-published might explain why it is
larded with typographical mistakes and garbled sentences. McCraney
rambles and opines about how he sees Mormon things. His apostasy
seems to be the result of his desolate youth and hence probably of his
failure to ground his faith properly, which led to intense turmoil and
confusion. His way out of the problem he created for himself has been
to adopt a narrow version of a fundamentalist faith. He wants Latterday Saints to follow his rebellion against the Church of Jesus Christ,
while also urging those who do this to continue trying to appear to
be regular faithful members of the community of Saints. He is hoping thereby to evangelize Latter-day Saints for the Calvary Baptist
denomination, but without using the full range of resources generated
by the countercult movement. The literature that led to his apostasy is
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clearly not included in his bibliography (pp. 355–58), while even that
literature upon which he now draws support is not mentioned, except
in footnotes.
Even a casual reader is likely to notice glitches and garbling in
McCraney’s book. For example, the first seventeen printed pages are
not paginated. The text includes references to items published after the
original publication date. Either what McCraney calls a second printing
is actually a somewhat revised edition or the publication date is simply
wrong. It seems odd that McCraney actually includes in his bibliography such items as Bertrand Russell’s Why I am Not a Christian, as well
as four books by Jean-Paul Sartre. All of these set out a functional atheism. One wonders if McCraney thinks that this literature would assist
one in becoming a born-again Christian. Or has he included such items
in his bibliography to signal his reading habits? Be that as it may, he was
apparently impressed by Mormon America, though he refers to Richard
and Joan “Osling” rather than Ostling. This is typical of the content of
this self-published screed. It is also noteworthy that Craig Hazen and
Grant Palmer endorsed McCraney’s book.
D. Jeffrey Meldrum and Trent D. Stephens. Who Are the Children
of Lehi? DNA and the Book of Mormon. Draper, UT: Greg Kofford
Books, 2007. 144 pp., with index. $29.95.
The beginning lines of “The Blind Men and the Elephant” have
long been used as a caveat to be careful of conclusions that do not take
into account the whole picture.
It was six men of Industan
To learning much inclined,
Who went to see the Elephant
(Though all of them were blind),
That each by observation
Might satisfy his mind.1
1. John Godfrey Saxe (1816–1887), “The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Hindoo
Fable,” Masterpieces of Religious Verse, ed. James Dalton Morrison (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1948), 428.
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And speaking of elephants, a statement attributed to the German
mathematician Carl Friedrich Gauss again warns us of the fallibility
of conclusions based on selected data: “Give me four parameters, and I
will draw an elephant for you; with five I will have him raise and lower
his trunk and his tail.”2
These caveats are of special relevance when it comes to the many
claims and counterclaims about the ability of DNA data to prove or
disprove the historicity and truth of the Book of Mormon. Fifty years
ago, when I was a beginning DNA researcher, personnel in my lab and
in most other laboratories working in the same field were convinced
that although we had a pretty good idea of the structure of DNA, it
would never be sequenced or used as a means to measure heredity in
the simplest of organisms, let alone in humans. Now even the youngest
child has heard about DNA and its great power in resolving the identity
of individuals and their relationship to others. This power comes with
a very substantial caveat as reflected in the quotations above. There is
a great need to carefully examine our assumptions when attempting
to draw conclusions based exclusively on the use of this methodology
in areas where it is not the only methodology available.
Meldrum and Stephens have done an excellent job of providing in
this small volume the tools necessary to evaluate the many problems
associated with using DNA data to solve the Book of Mormon historicity issue.
Both authors are believing members of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints and make it clear in the introductory chapters
that they have a spiritual witness of the historicity and truth of the
Book of Mormon as revealed to and translated by Joseph Smith. After
explaining in relatively simple terms the science involved in tracing
the genetic ancestry of individuals and populations, they point out
the strengths and weaknesses of DNA science and go on to discuss the
problems associated with using it to trace the origins of pre-Columbian
American populations. They carefully explain the correct use of the
principle of parsimony (Occam’s razor) and point out the weakness of
2. Octave Levenspiel, “Catalytic Kinetics and Elephant Curves,” http://levenspiel
.com/octave/elephant.htm (accessed 29 September 2008).
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science as a tool to prove a negative. They conclude with the following
statement:
We cannot conclude this book without a final comment about
the evidence that continues to accumulate relevant to the historicity of this unique book of scripture. There is growing evidence for trans-oceanic contacts between the Old World and
the New World that challenges the paradigm of an isolated
Western Hemisphere singularly colonized by a founder population from Siberia. (p. 127)
For those who want a good source of information about DNA
and its implications for identifying the origins of pre-Columbian
American populations, I recommend this book as a good starting
place. However, for those who do not have a good foundation in biology and its terminology, I recommend acquiring a good dictionary of
biological terms in order to understand some of the more technical
discussions.
Lawrence Poulsen
Robert L. Millet and Gregory C. V. Johnson. Bridging the Divide:
The Continuing Conversation between a Mormon and an Evan
gelical. Foreword by Craig L. Blomberg and Stephen E. Robinson.
Rhinebeck, NY: Monkfish Book Publishing, 2007. xxxi + 185 pp.,
with appendixes. $14.95.
Bridging the Divide is said to be a continuation of a debate generated by the publication of Stephen Robinson’s “blockbuster” (p. ix)
apologetic work entitled Are Mormons Christians? (1991). Greg Vettel
Johnson, then a student at Denver Theological Seminary, brought this
book to the attention of the faculty there and then helped facilitate
Robinson and Craig Blomberg’s How Wide the Divide? (1997), which
was dedicated to Greg Vettel (now Johnson). However, whatever else
might be said about Bridging the Divide, it is not the next stage in the
sophisticated debate one finds in How Wide the Divide? or in numerous other publications, including the FARMS Review. It is not serious
scholarship. Instead, it is Robert Millet’s way of taking advantage of
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Pastor Greg Johnson’s radical shift away from a Walter Martin mode of
confrontational, adversarial sectarian anti-Mormonism (pp. 154–55).
Greg Johnson was a Latter-day Saint until he was fourteen, when
he, with his mother, swallowed Walter Martin’s version of antiMormonism. Johnson eventually discovered that Martin’s countercult
version of sectarian anti-Mormonism is both reprehensible and unproductive. Bridging the Divide contains the fruit of the radical shift that
Pastor Johnson underwent in the 1990s. He has been grasping for a
viable way of offering to the Saints his version of what he calls “orthodox, historical biblical Christianity” (p. 151). He insists that evangelicals should “change our methods, change our strategy” (p. 150), but
his efforts to provide impetus to this new approach have met with
much opposition—even (or especially) within conservative Protestant
circles in Utah. It is not at all clear what he wants to offer the Church
of Jesus Christ. He grants that evangelicals manifest great diversity
but that “when it comes to the fundamental teachings of Christianity,
there is encouraging unity on our biblical interpretation” (p. 110). He
makes the adjective biblical do all the heavy lifting. He expresses a
hope that God is at work in some way to bring about a transformation
of Latter-day Saint faith so that its adherents might fit comfortably
under the current version of the evangelical umbrella.
Bridging the Divide seems to be a much-refined, polished, edited
“transcript” of one of the more than fifty conversations that have taken
place between Millet and Johnson “in the last seven or eight years”
(p. xii). These conversations, described as being impromptu interfaith
dialogues and not debates or confrontations, are always spiced with
audience participation. Part 1 of Bridging the Divide (pp. 1–32) consists
of background information on Robert Millet, a popular Latter-day Saint
speaker and author, and the Reverend Greg Johnson, a conservative
Protestant pastor who currently operates a parachurch agency in Utah
called “Standing Together.” Part 2 (pp. 33–60) consists of questions and
answers by Millet and Johnson and is followed by Part 3, “Questions
from the Audience” (pp. 61–124). Part 4 (pp. 125–29) is a joint “conclusion” that articulates some truisms about the need to “straighten out
much of the misperception that underlies misunderstanding” (p. 128)
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and also the need to, “down the road, open doors, dissolve barriers, and
make strait the way of the Lord” (p. 129). Bridging the Divide thus consists of sundry items representing in an idealized, polished form what
has come to be known as the “Bob and Greg Show.”
Latter-day Saints would, of course, very much like to see a lessening of hostilities generated and fostered by the anti-Mormon element
of the evangelical countercult movement. Can the Bob and Greg Show
make that happen? Not likely. Greg Johnson is hopeful but not exactly
enthusiastic since he asks his evangelical readers, “If God moved
among the LDS Church [Johnson seems to have in mind the Brethren]
to adjust, discover, clarify, give new perspective or emphasis to some
areas of [Latter-day Saint] doctrine, would the Evangelical community just dismiss and mock Mormonism and Mormon people with the
accusation of superficiality and dishonesty?” (p. 163). It appears that
the evangelical community needs to believe that Latter-day Saints do
not mean what they say and do not say what they mean. To the degree
that evangelicals actually believe this is true, it seems that any honest
effort to tone down evangelical hostilities faces obstacles within the
diverse and often warring factions that constitute the evangelical “faith
tradition.” One need not look far to see the kind of hatred generated
by signs that moderate, civil evangelicals are turning away from the
stereotypical countercult version of anti-Mormonism to advance the
problem a kinder, gentler effort at evangelizing either the Church of
Jesus Christ or individual Latter-day Saints. Reverend Johnson is not
at all sure where these conversations are heading. Instead, he merely
hopes that God in some inscrutable way will make something come
from his initiative.
One serious flaw in this book is the failure of both Millet and Johnson to show an awareness that others beyond their tiny group of associates have been and are continuing to have useful, civil conversations
with evangelicals and other Protestants, and also with Roman Catholics and Muslims. Many of these conversations are private, and others
take the form of essays, which both Millet and Johnson and their close
associates have chosen to ignore. Perhaps both Millet and Johnson only

252 • The FARMS Review 20/1 (2008)

recently came to discover the necessity and pleasures of discussing their
faith with those with differing understandings.
Donald W. Musser and David L. Paulsen, eds. Mormonism in Dialogue with Contemporary Christian Theologies, with a foreword by
Martin E. Marty, a preface by Donald W. Musser, and an introduction by both Musser and Paulsen. Macon, GA: Mercer University
Press, 2007. xiv + 562 pp., with index and scripture index. $25.00.
Even though this volume in some ways is more sophisticated
than previous exchanges between Latter-day Saints and evangelicals,
those fascinated by debates with evangelicals might be disappointed
with Mormonism in Dialogue with Contemporary Christian Theologies. The title of this collection of essays is misleading; its editors
employed the word contemporary, but they could not have meant
present, now, or current. Why? Mormonism in Dialogue begins with
essays by non-evangelicals about Karl Barth (1886–1968), Reinhold
Niebuhr (1892–1971), and Paul Tillich (1886–1965), with spirited
responses by Latter-day Saints. Many essays discuss theologies
or theologians of essentially historical interest. With perhaps two
exceptions, this volume consists of Latter-day Saint responses to
essays by essentially Protestant liberal scholars about either versions
of liberal theology or theologians whose influence is now primarily
restricted to a narrow academic audience.
Except for perhaps Karl Barth, who still has a few followers among
conservative Protestants or evangelicals, the opinions of these authors
now tend to be historical curiosities and not live options for those in
pulpits or pews on Sunday. In addition, from a Latter-day Saint perspective, there is no pressing reason for the Saints to be exposed to
the opinions of Barth, Niebuhr, and Tillich or to the more recent and
rather exotic theologies presented and debated in this volume.
In his insightful foreword, Martin Marty, a distinguished American church historian and occasional student of Mormon things,
admits that “no doubt most readers in religion would not have selected
a work that conjoins and juxtaposes Christian . . . theology and Mormon or Latter-day Saint thought” (p. vi). This would seem to be a
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way of saying that this volume has a limited utility or audience. He
therefore asks twice about this volume, “Why bother?” (p. vi). In his
response to this question, Marty offers some useful insights into the
differences between the Latter-day Saint insistence that their faith “is
rooted in narrative” and typical Christian theologies that “combine
the language of the Hebrew Scriptures with mainly Greek philosophical concepts as filtered through academic experiences in Western
Europe, most notably Germany” (p. vii). Marty seems to recognize
that the faith of the Saints is grounded in and consists of stories, both
from the past and also their own now. “It may be,” according to Marty,
“that this book will remind more Christians that their theology is also
born of story and stories” (p. vii).
With one exception—Clark Pinnock—the contributors to this volume set out Protestant liberal theologies or try to explain, for example,
in brief essays what Niebuhr, Tillich, and Barth thought. They are, as
Marty recognizes, not informed about or perhaps not even interested
in what Latter-day Saints believe, while “LDS scholars are far more at
home with . . . Christian thought than vice versa” (p. ix). The reason,
he explains, is that the Saints “earn their doctorates at Harvard or
other graduate schools permeated with the concepts of Christian theology, even if and though they often return home to Brigham Young
& Company” (p. ix). But the non–Latter-day Saint authors setting out
the opinions of theologians like Niebuhr, Tillich, and Barth “with few
exceptions . . . give little evidence that they boned up on LDS thought”
(p. ix). Marty sees this as a serious flaw since the “book format necessarily keeps the Latter-day Saint scholars in a kind of responsivedefensive mode” (p. ix).
However, Mormonism in Dialogue provides a platform for some
Latter-day Saint scholars to demonstrate their command of what is
mostly contemporary Protestant liberal theology. In virtually every
instance this is defensive. However, there are exceptions confined to the
end of the volume (pp. 385–553), where especially James E. Faulconer
(pp. 468–478) and James L. Siebach (pp. 462–467) respond to the sophisticated effort of David Tracy, an astute Roman Catholic theologian, who
attempted to model for the Saints a possible way of linking philosophy
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and theology (pp. 449–62). However, Siebach points out that for Latterday Saints “talk about God rests in the domain of prophecy and decidedly not in the domain of natural or systematic theology” (p. 462). He
concludes that what the Saints believe about divine things “lies more
in the mantic than the sophic mode; it is more Hebrew than Greek”
(p. 462). Without mentioning his name, Siebach mirrors the opinions of
Hugh Nibley and others on this issue. In the most impressive portions
of this volume, these insights are spelled out.
The final essays in this volume are among the most impressive;
they consist of an exchange between Clark Pinnock (pp. 489–514,
542–45) and David Paulsen (pp. 515–42, 545–53) on what is now often
called “open theology.” Pinnock is both a leading evangelical author
and also willing to give Latter-day Saint beliefs serious attention. For
this and other related reasons, he is currently being besieged by those
in thrall to Augustinian/Calvinist understandings of God.
Is there an audience among evangelicals or Protestant liberals
for the responses of Latter-day Saint scholars to theologians whose
influence has now largely faded? Or are liberation, black, feminist,
womanist, or process theologies of significant concern outside of narrow circles in the academic world to generate genuine concern among
either Latter-day Saints or conservative Protestants? Or are evangeli
cals (or other conservative Protestants) interested in the responses of
Latter-day Saints to these theologians or theologies? One wonders
who the intended audience is for this collection of essays.
Douglas A. Sweeney. The American Evangelical Story: A History of
the Movement. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005. 208 pp.,
with index and annotated suggestions for further reading appended
to each chapter. $17.99.
The American Evangelical Story can be highly recommended as a
reliable source for information and also for a deeper understanding
of an important segment of religious history. Douglas Sweeney sorts
out much of the confusion behind the various factions and ideologies
that have been known as “evangelical.” In addition, he demonstrates
that the label evangelical identifies an older and more diverse family of
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religious ideologies than is commonly recognized, since the label as it
is currently being used came on the scene after World War II.
Sweeney thus differs from those who tend to focus attention on
the movement that in the 1940s was initially known as the “new evangelicalism” but soon began to call itself simply “evangelical.” In his
final chapter, Sweeney traces the uneasy relationship of fundamentalism and evangelicalism. These are the two competing factions of
conservative Protestants that Latter-day Saints are most likely to have
encountered.
Sweeney demonstrates that the roots of evangelical religiosity go
back much further. Hence he concludes that “evangelicalism is not
fundamentalism and/or neoevangelicalism” (p. 156). Instead,
the evangelical movement dates from the early eighteenth
century—preceding the rise of fundamentalism by almost two
hundred years. All of today’s evangelicals have been touched
by fundamentalism, but not to the same extent. . . . Many
abandoned mainline Protestantism long before the period of
its fundamentalist conflict. Many others proved more interested in issues of Christian piety than in the doctrinal matters
dear to fundamentalist thinkers. (p. 156)
Sweeney also insists that the common definitions of evangelical are
not adequate since there is no agreement on any one of them other than
the word comes from the Greek in the New Testament (pp. 17–18). It is
thus an open question whether evangelical means anything more than
conservative rather than liberal Protestantism, but this is sufficient to
warrant a closer look at why the evangelical movement, as diverse as
it is, came to play its current role. Some writers, Sweeney notes, even
argue that the label should be abandoned (pp. 21–22). Sweeney insists
that the label identifies a very wide variety of Protestant factions that
have family relationships and no common identity. Following some
important recent scholarship, he traces the roots of these forms of religiosity to England and then to the Continent. He also demonstrates that
all of these “self-professing evangelicals have actually commandeered
this label, ignoring its use by groups that predate their movement by
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centuries” (p. 19). He has in mind, among others, Lutherans who have
called their denomination evangelical but who have nothing to do with
the movement that collared the name evangelical in the 1940s and that
now represents itself as historic, biblical, orthodox Christianity.
Through the activities of the sectarian countercult movement,
American Latter-day Saints may have encountered some form of
fundamentalism, with which the evangelical movement is often confused. Fundamentalism was an effort to fight Protestant liberalism,
which had essentially captured the levers of influence and power in
the mainline denominations. Sweeney quotes H. Richard Niebuhr
(1894–1962), who, though clearly not a fundamentalist, wrote in 1937
that the liberals had given us “a God without wrath [who] brought
men without sin into a kingdom without judgment through the ministrations of a Christ without a cross” (p. 161). Protestant liberalism
manifested a fervent moral optimism that was at times associated
with what was called the social gospel. In that guise it offered “soup,
soap, and salvation” in the hope that “moral effort could help to usher
in the millennium” (p. 163).
Fundamentalism was the main conservative response to liberalism (p. 156). In an attempt to regroup after it lost the battle within and
hence control of the mainline Protestant institutions, those who would
eventually call themselves fundamentalists met in Portland, Oregon,
in 1892 and endorsed biblical inerrancy (p. 159). The resulting tug-ofwar for control of Protestantism is known as the fundamentalist controversy (p. 164). Eventually the word fundamentalist came to identify
the fight against Protestant liberalism and also bigotry and religious
zealotry. When fundamentalists lost the battle for the Presbyterian
Church, J. Gresham Machem began issuing The Fundamentals, and
this publication cemented the label on that movement.
Sweeney thus ends his book where some other studies merely
begin—that is, with what was initially known during and immediately after WWII as the “new (or neo-) evangelicals” (p. 170). The fact
is that many who think of themselves as evangelicals imagine that this
movement began immediately after WWII. There is some truth in this
opinion. Billy Graham and his wealthy friends who created the maga-
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zine Christianity Today (pp. 175, 176) were searching for respectability
in the face of the embarrassment caused by belligerent fundamentalists. Others—for instance, those who founded the National Association of Evangelicals—also sought to rescue conservative Protestantism from fundamentalist “country bumpkins” (p. 170).
This new evangelical movement, compared with the earlier fundamentalists, showed “less concern to master the Christian martial arts”
(p. 171). Instead, it sought to “infiltrate the culture with a winsome
gospel witness” (p. 175). This movement soon went beyond the initial
neo-evangelicalism. With Christianity Today came an effort made to
provide an umbrella under which a host of widely different and even
competing and conflicting groups, ideologies, and parachurch movements could strive to lend credence and respectability to conservative
Protestantism, which had evaporated with the rise of the belligerent
fundamentalism. The story of what Sweeney calls “Fundamentalism
and Neoevangelicalism” (p. 155) involves the two connected but competing ideologies that Latter-day Saints typically confront, especially
when they encounter the unseemly countercult movement that operates on the margins of contemporary conservative Protestantism.
All of this is merely the last chapter of the remarkable story
Sweeney tells. In the earlier portions of his book, which take the movement back to less than three hundred years ago, there is no effort to
see evangelicalism as the “Lord’s New Israel,” since it has proven itself
“just as wayward as ancient Israel tended to be” (p. 11). Evangelicals,
Sweeney argues, have never proved morally blameless, and he has not
written this history to “puff evangelical pride” (p. 12). Instead, among
other things, he demonstrates the “great wealth of evangelical diversity” (p. 19). Calvinists and Arminians, for example, both assemble
under the evangelical umbrella, where they often slug it out. Sweeney
argues that “when viewed from the perspective of our multiplicity, we
evangelicals hold hardly anything in common. We are a people more
remarkable for our differences than our union” (p. 20). It is a religious
movement held together more by “family resemblance” than anything
else (p. 21). Sweeney goes on to demonstrate that in this movement
“white men are in the minority, few evangelicals are intellectuals, and
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evangelical beliefs seldom conform to a standard Calvinistic worldview” (p. 22). The movement, whose adherents are “certainly not the
only authentic Christians in the world,” is clearly not without its “nasty
witch hunts and power plays” (p. 24).
Sweeney begins his story by tracing the evangelical movement
in America to the Great Awakening (p. 36), which was a transatlantic affair involving continental Pietism (pp. 33–36) and John Wesley
and especially the Moravians. Both Wesley and the Moravians turned
up in Georgia in 1736. They were even on the same boat (pp. 37–38).
Sweeney describes the role of George Whitefield (pp. 40–44) and Jonathan Edwards. What follows is a rich, complex, and fascinating series
of remarkable stories. Sweeney then traces the larger story chronologically. He deals with an array of personalities, institutions, and missionary endeavors, as well as the slave problem, the subsequent religiosity of blacks, and the holiness of Pentecostal movements. Much of
this story might annoy or embarrass strict “Five-Point Calvinists” or
emissaries of the countercult movement who wish to engage in what
Sweeney calls “worship wars.”
The American Evangelical Story is highly recommended to those
Latter-day Saints who wish to understand the shape and contours—the
stormy shore and hence shifting sands—of conservative Protestantism
in America. There are many valuable nuggets in Sweeney’s fine book.
John W. Welch and Larry E. Morris, eds. Oliver Cowdery: Scribe,
Elder, Witness. Provo, UT: The Neal A. Maxwell Institute for Religious Scholarship, Brigham Young University, 2006. xii + 436 pp.,
with bibliography and index. $19.95.
Oliver Cowdery can plausibly be considered the cofounder of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Commonly called the
church’s “second elder” and, at one time, its “assistant president,” he
wrote most of the Book of Mormon out by hand from dictation as
Joseph Smith’s principal scribe, recopied the entire manuscript for the
printer, and, as one of the Three Witnesses, beheld the angel Moroni,
saw the plates, and heard the voice of God testify that the translation
was correct.
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With Joseph Smith, he was ordained to the Aaronic Priesthood by
John the Baptist and to the Melchizedek Priesthood by Peter, James, and
John. He was at Joseph Smith’s side in the Kirtland Temple on 3 April
1836, when Moses, Elias, Elijah, and the Savior himself appeared there
to accept the newly dedicated building and to confer priesthood keys.
Yet Oliver Cowdery was excommunicated from the church in
April 1838 and lived as a non-Mormon for the next decade. In 1848 he
was rebaptized, and two years later he died.
For obvious reasons, Latter-day Saint historians have found
Cowdery extraordinarily interesting, and they have written numerous articles about his life and career. Now several of the very best of
these have been gathered in Oliver Cowdery: Scribe, Elder, Witness—a
book well worth the attention of anyone interested in the truth-claims
of Mormonism and in its early history.
The cover of the book itself is important, as it features a recently
discovered daguerreotype image of Oliver Cowdery that is discussed
in an essay by Patrick Bishop. Other treasures include a brief biography of Cowdery by the premier expert on the Witnesses, Richard
Lloyd Anderson (who also contributed essays entitled “The Impact of
the First Preaching in Ohio” and “Reuben Miller, Recorder of Oliver
Cowdery’s Reaffirmations,” the latter dealing with the reliability of
the scribe who recorded Cowdery’s testimony upon his return to the
church); John W. Welch’s valuable essay “The Coming Forth of the
Book of Mormon”; Steven Harper’s “Oliver Cowdery and the Kirtland
Temple Experience”; and Royal Skousen’s “Translating and Printing
the Book of Mormon.” Altogether there are seventeen articles in the
volume written by thirteen authors.
“Oliver Cowdery and the Restoration of the Priesthood,” compiled
by Brian Q. Cannon and the BYU Studies staff, gathers and analyzes
several statements from Cowdery on that important subject. Matthew Roper’s “Oliver Cowdery and the Mythical ‘Manuscript Found’ ”
scrutinizes the hoary “Spalding Theory” of Book of Mormon authorship and finds it wanting (yet again).
Scott H. Faulring’s “The Return of Oliver Cowdery,” which won
the T. Edgar Lyon Award of Excellence from the Mormon History
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Association when it was first published in 2000, provides fascinating
and even moving background to that 1848 event, which demonstrated
Oliver Cowdery’s continuing testimony of Mormonism at a time when
the Saints were headed westward and when casting one’s lot with them
was anything but an easy road to prosperity or social status.
Larry Morris’s article entitled “Oliver Cowdery’s Vermont Years and
the Origins of Mormonism” dismantles persistent attempts to link Joseph
Smith Sr. with Oliver Cowdery’s father in a divining-rod incident that,
so the theory goes, helps to explain (away) the founding of the church
twenty-five years later. It also demolishes equally persistent efforts to tie
Oliver Cowdery to Rev. Ethan Smith and, thereby, to portray the Book of
Mormon as plagiarized from Rev. Smith’s View of the Hebrews.
As if that weren’t contribution enough, Morris’s “‘The Private
Character of the Man Who Bore that Testimony’: Oliver Cowdery and
His Critics” defends Cowdery’s reputation, intelligence, and honesty
against writers who, in their ardent desire to negate his testimony,
have attempted to besmirch his name. Morris, who is emerging as
a treasure in his own right, demonstrates that the critics rely upon
weak evidence, questionable sources, and circular reasoning in order
to make their fatally flawed case.
The founding events of the restoration took place in the literal, material world. They were not metaphorical. They were not merely symbolic.
Accordingly, they are of immense significance to all of humanity. Oliver
Cowdery’s unwavering eyewitness testimony of them, through persecution, suffering, illness, disappointment, anger, and even excommunication, is powerful evidence of their reality. This book provides powerful
scholarly evidence that his testimony can be trusted.
Daniel C. Peterson
N. T. Wright. Paul: In Fresh Perspective. Minneapolis: Fortress
Press, 2005. xii + 195 pp., with bibliography and indexes of selected
topics, modern authors, and text references. $25.00.
Although N. T. (Tony) Wright is the current Anglican Bishop of
Durham, he is also a prolific author of learned essays and books on the
New Testament. This is one of several of Wright’s books that gently but
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firmly challenge the common opinion among Protestant evangelicals
that an essentially Augustinian and Reformation-based understanding of justification, commonly attributed to the Apostle Paul, is the
key to Christian faith.
Wright is not alone in what is known as the “new perspective” on
Paul. The common Protestant understanding is intensified by fundamentalists and evangelicals who insist on radically contrasting even
obedience to moral law with what they call “faith alone.” But Wright
and others have shifted the understanding of law, which Paul often
refers to as “works,” a word he uses to identify ceremonial matters such
as circumcision and Sabbath observances required under the Torah.
Wright insists that for the followers of Jesus the Mosaic law was fulfilled in him and hence the old ceremonial law was no longer required;
faith became the sign of the new testament (covenant). Wright, quite
unlike Protestants generally, thus emphasizes the importance of the
new covenant in Paul’s scheme of things. This requires repentance
and faith in Jesus. In this new covenant, circumcision was no longer
a required work. Faith is manifested by obedience to the commandments of God, and obedience leads eventually to sanctification (or
what was also called deification).
Wright reaches his startlingly nonevangelical understanding by
entering into what he calls “the Three Worlds of Paul” (p. 3): Second
Temple Judaism (marked by a central concern for a covenant relationship with God); the dominating “Greek, or Hellenistic,” world; and
the Roman world. Paul was, Wright argues, at home in each of these.
Wright argues that Paul advanced a profoundly covenantal theology.
The language he quoted was all part of a series of connected “implicit
stories” (p. 11). Those who heard Paul’s language “believed themselves
to be actors within a real-life narrative” (p. 11) in much the same way
that those drawn to restoration stories of gospel fulness see themselves
as God’s covenant people. Those who heard Paul were reminded of
their being part of a “single, larger story which stretched from the crea
tion of the world and the call of Abraham right forwards to their own
day, and (they hoped) into the future” (p. 11). Put another way, “God
did not abandon his people when he packed them off to Babylon”
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(p. 12), but he found ways to keep his promises to his people with a
new covenant. This is clearly not the Paul of the Protestant notion of
justification by faith alone, but a much different way of reading his
letters.
But evangelicals might ask if Wright’s new perspective on Paul,
since it differs radically from their own, is objective, detached, neutral.
Wright’s answer is that “neutrality is impossible” (p. 15). Recently, he
points out, “a little pin,” as he calls it, has managed “to bore through
the castle walls of imperial objectivism” (p. 15). He insists that “the
only way forward from this point is by means of a robust critical realism . . . far removed both from the revived positivism on offer in some
quarters and the enthusiastic subjectivism advanced elsewhere, and
dependent for its effectiveness on the power, once more, of the stories
it tells” (p. 15). He insists that “it should come as a relief not to have to
aim at an impossible objectivity” (p. 17). Sounding much like Latterday Saints who have addressed these same issues, Wright argues that
“modernity’s all-important Self—proud, self-reliant, knowable, and
self-affirming—has been deconstructed into a mass of floating signifiers” (p. 173). The new being demanded by Paul’s stories of the Messiah and the covenant one makes with him in baptism is not the self of
self-realization, self-interest, or a host of other attributes attached to
the word that has taken the place of the soul in recent ideologies.
Wright shows that “the basic Christian mode of knowing is love,”
and hence it is not to be found by reducing everything to a power
play and a world where everything is reduced to “currency and commodity” (p. 173), or what we could call values. Unlike most evangelicals, Wright accepts “the postmodern critique of modernity” (p. 172),
but he does not think that critique has the last word. It has, however,
shown that “modernity stands accused of arrogance, with its technology, its philosophy, its economics and its empires—and, in a measure
at least, its theology and exegesis” (p. 172), but “postmodernity does
not give us a new home, a place to stay” (p. 172).
It seems that, on the one side, Latter-day Saints struggling with a
resurgence of belligerent, dogmatic atheism grounded in modernity,
and on the other side, conservative Protestants who are also often
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heavily influenced by strands of this same (until recently) dominant
objectivist ideology have found in Tony Wright a new compatriot—
one not entirely unlike the late C. S. Lewis.
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